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This thesis explores a new way to conceptualise political community in the contemporary 
European context.  Its point of departure is the normative debate concerning the type of 
collective bond feasible and desirable as an underpinning for the European Union, a debate 
centred on the older political-philosophical question of what must be common to a set of 
people such that they may be ruled through the same institutions.  The thesis argues that 
many of the existing approaches, which conceive a bond in terms of shared interests, cultural 
attributes, values, or practices of trust and solidarity, are liable either to underplay or to 
overplay how much the citizens of a polity must have in common, tending either to empty 
public life of the pursuit of shared ends or conversely to downgrade the importance of 
adversarialism.  Both may be seen as depoliticising moves.  Instead, drawing on agonistic 
theories of democracy and certain strands of politica  sociology, a more explicitly political 
conception of the collective bond is explored, based on the appraisal of substantive problems.  
Political community, it is suggested, should be sought in the common-sense assumptions and 
taken-for-granted reference-points people invoke when discussing matters of political 
relevance.  The concept of a ‘political bond’, whereby members of the collective are tied by a 
sense of shared predicament before common problems, is proposed as a normative ideal.  
This raises questions for empirical study to do with what problems people hold to exist, 
whom these are assumed to affect, and what possibilities of collective action are recognised 
for their address.  These issues are explored in depth using group discussions with taxi-
drivers in Britain, Germany and the Czech Republic.  Under scrutiny is the extent to which 
commonplace ways of speaking about the political serve to strengthen a European political 
bond, and in what respects they run counter to it and would need challenging if a European 
polity were to have everyday resonance.  The analysis indicates that while substantive 
problems of common concern are readily and richly articulated, and many of them placed in 
a transnational context, there is notable scepticism about the possibility of their remedy, and 
unevenness in the degree to which opponents are positioned as legitimate.  The thesis argues 
that only by tackling these wider patterns, which link to the health of contemporary 
democracy more generally, is it likely to prove possible to build a desirable political 
community at the European level. 
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The years around the turn of the millennium witnessed great interest amongst scholars of the 
European Union in the democratic basis of this new political arrangement.  Questions such as 
‘Does Europe need a Constitution?’ and ‘Is there, o can there be, a European society?’ were 
being asked, and proposals put forward on ‘How to democratise the European Union and 
why bother’.  In some ways this was remarkable, since for most of the period of post-War 
integration, issues of democracy had been rather marginal.  Integration was widely conceived 
to be an elite-driven process in which broader societal concerns played a limited role, and the 
degree to which institutions were insulated from direct popular pressure seemed justifiable 
due to the control enjoyed by the representatives of national government.  Yet from the early 
1990s onwards, it seemed, neither the descriptive-explanatory nor the normative argument 
could so readily be accepted.  ‘Non-elites’ were clarly liable to have a strong influence on 
the course of the integration process, as the referenda results on the Maastricht Treaty in 
France and Denmark seemed to demonstrate, while the terms of this treaty, widening the 
scope of integration and introducing majoritarian voting mechanisms, suggested the 
emergence of something considerably more than just an intergovernmental forum for solving 
problems of a technical kind.  Hence the scholarship on the EU developed a new concern for 
questions of democracy: the responsiveness of institutions on the one hand, and the 
significance of culture, ideas and notions of peoplhood as preconditions for the acceptance 
of these institutions on the other.  A debate emerged concerning the existence or possibility 
of a European ‘demos’, with this latter often understood in terms of socio-cultural 
regularities. 
 At the same time as scholars of the EU were discovering democracy, scholars of 
democracy were going through a period of revaluation themselves.  In Anglo-Saxon political 
science and theory, it had become common to conceptualise the legitimacy of political 
association according to two, perhaps competing, princi les: the ‘principle of democracy’ (or 
popular sovereignty) and the ‘principle of constitutionalism’ (or the rule of law).  While such 
a distinction is traceable in much of modern political thought, where the need to balance the 
expression of popular will with safeguards against a tyranny of the majority has been a 
familiar theme, what was perhaps new was the tendency to emphasise the latter at the 
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expense of the former.  The rule of law, it seemed, was being treated as more fundamental to 
democracy than the principle of democracy itself.  A redefinition seemed to be taking place, 
such that certain changes in the world of practice could be more easily accommodated and 
legitimised.  Processes of juridification, of the wakening of political power, and the decline 
of democratic deliberation in the representative institutions of the nation-state and amongst 
the broader public, were coming to be seen not as deviations from democracy but as patterns 
which could be accepted and even celebrated.1  The study and theorising of democracy was 
evolving rather rapidly. 
 Today, both of these trends continue.  In EU studies, the 2005 referenda defeats for 
the proposed EU constitution or ‘constitutional trea y’ in France and the Netherlands have 
slowed somewhat the flow of scholarship on ‘constitutional moments’ and the active 
founding of a polity, but questions to do with the viability of the EU and with its democratic 
credentials have if anything become more salient.  I  political science and thought, a small 
literature has begun to emerge on the dangers of depoliticisation, and global events such as 
the turmoil in Iraq have weakened the credibility of a predominantly constitutionalist 
understanding of democracy, but the subordination of questions to do with ‘the people’ and 
the democratic principle has continued.  Indeed, some f this has fed back into the debate 
concerning the democratic status of the EU: these rd finitions of democracy have been used 
to argue that the EU already satisfies the criteria of democratic legitimacy, regardless of 
issues to do with the demos and the principle of democratic control.2 
 It may be possible to set these two bodies of concerns, to do with the EU and with 
the nature of democracy, side by side with one another without concluding that the EU must 
subordinate the principle of democracy to the rule of law.  One way to read the debate in EU 
studies about the possibility of a European demos is to see it as expressing a renewed concern 
about the conditions under which the idea of popular sovereignty can be meaningfully 
realised.  Yet to focus on socio-cultural regularities and treat these as the prerequisites of a 
viable democratic polity, as much of this literature does, is to claim strong limits to the 
options available for a collective political arrangement.  While it may well be that individuals 
must hold something ‘in common’ if they are to regulate their lives through the same 
institutions, it may be necessary to conceptualise this in ways which are less prone to 
                                                
1 On some of these trends, see James Tully, 'The Unfreedom of the Moderns in Comparison to Their Ideals of 
Constitutional Democracy', The Modern Law Review, 65/2 (2002).  Also Peter Mair, 'Ruling the Void? The 
Hollowing of Western Democracy', New Left Review, 42/Nov/Dec (2006).  
2 Amongst the bigger names, see e.g. Andrew Moravcsik, 'In Defence of the "Democratic Deficit": Reassessing 
Legitimacy in the European Union', Journal of Common Market Studies, 40/4 (2002). 
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determinism and to the devaluing of political adversarialism.  The challenge would be to 
develop a less restrictive understanding of the possibility of creative political action and the 
exercise of popular sovereignty, without falling into the kind of voluntarism which blinds one 
to the existence of very real obstacles to democratic action in the European context and 
which prevents one acknowledging the weakness with hich it is currently pursued.   
 Conversely, regarding the significance of EU democracy for democracy more 
generally, it may be that the EU experience encourages us to rethink the nature of political 
community, not so as to reduce it to a bare constitutionalism but so as to find ways of 
uncoupling it from the nationality principle which has been its underpinning in the context of 
the nation-state.  If one understands the period of ‘organised modernity’ as being 
characterised by a fairly high degree of congruence between ‘social practices’, ‘social 
identities’ and the boundaries of the polity, and if one understands by contrast the 
contemporary world as one in which such closure can no longer be taken for granted (and on 
this there seems to be some consensus), then it may be that new concepts are needed that can 
better render conditions of plurality, complexity and dissonance.3  Indeed, it may be that 
there are normative reasons to welcome these changed conditions.  But even if there were 
not, the political constellation of contemporary Europe, characterised by a high degree of 
plurality, would seem to be a good place in which to explore the kinds of concept with which 
one might try to substitute older, problematic notions such as ‘identity’.   
  If this reasoning is secure, two things seem to foll w.  It seems that one may want 
ways of continuing the discussion about democracy and the nature of the common in the EU 
context with a particular sensitivity to the idea that the principle of democratic control is 
being subordinated to the principle of constitutionalism.  Likewise, it seems one may want 
ways of continuing the discussion about the nature of democracy more generally in ways that 
alert one to the possibility of a multiplication in points of reference and sources of 
identification, and of a diminishing coherence between these.  These are the points of 
departure for the following project, which seeks to elaborate the concept of a ‘political bond’ 
so as to address both concerns.  A political bond is presented both as a normative ideal for 
that which might be put in common by the citizens of a European polity, and as a critical-
descriptive tool by which to make some observations concerning the condition of democracy 
in contemporary Europe.   
                                                
3 Peter Wagner, 'Crises of Modernity: Political Sociology in Historical Contexts', in Stephen Turner (ed.), Social 
Theory and Sociology: The Classics and Beyond (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996). 
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 Our focus is in some ways prosaic: on the shared political problems which people 
describe themselves as facing, and the discursive resou ces which they routinely invoke for 
talking about them.  It is suggested that the sense of shared predicament before common 
problems may be a promising way to conceptualise the collective bond necessary to a 
political community.  Our study tries to open out how such problems are routinely perceived 
amongst contemporary populations, the patterns of alliance and opposition which they 
inspire, and the assumptions one finds to do with whether and how they might be susceptible 
to organised address.  By taking this problem-oriented approach, the intention is to tie 
ourselves closely to some of the basic issues to do with political association and the exercise 
of democratic voice.  It is an approach which differs from much of what one finds in the field 
of EU studies, where a common technique for studying the foundations of the EU polity 
amongst ‘the people’ is to ask a sample of people what they think of it.  This is an expression 
of what one might call the ‘EU-centrism’ of EU studies: those who wish to study the EU 
have a natural tendency to put it centre-stage in their research design, leading to the 
collection of data which, while undeniably tied closely to the research topic, may rather 
inflate the EU’s significance for respondents.  The approach taken here, as will become clear, 
consists not in polling ‘opinions’ about the institu onal architecture of contemporary Europe, 
nor in discerning the strength of ‘loyalties’ to one set of institutions or one cultural world 
over another, but in examining the reference-points which are invoked spontaneously when 
people talk about the problems which they see themselve , and people like themselves, as 
facing.  The contours of political community should be sought, it is suggested, not at the 
level of conscious beliefs, attitudes and opinions but in the taken-for-granted, common-sense 
understandings which people express when talking about substantive issues.  This approach 
allows one both to avoid an embedded EU-centrism and to comment more generally on 
questions to do with the health of democracy. 
 While this thesis begins in the mode of theoretical re soning, it soons take a strongly 
empirical turn by looking at the material generated in ten group discussions held with taxi-
drivers in Britain, Germany and the Czech Republic.  Even work which is theoretically-
oriented must, it is argued, pay close attention to the particularity of the context to which it is 
applied.  If it is to have any critical purchase thn it must form an understanding of the ‘way 
things are’ as well as the way they might be.  Theoretical ideas, unless one wishes to shelter 
them from all criticism except that to do with their internal logic, must be explored and 
developed outdoors.  In this sense there is a political-sociological move in this work.  But our 
purpose, it will be understood, is not that of the natural scientist: the empirical work is guided 
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by the goals of concept-formation and critical diagnosis rather than the ideal of detached 
observation.  Of course, even a strongly interpretative study would undermine its purpose if it 
were not rigorous in its methods and methodology.  While we do not wish to be judged 
according to the research standards of natural science, obviously a claim is made to careful 
attention in research design, and precision in the assembly, presentation and analysis of 
findings.  But the guiding concerns are those of the applied theorist, not those of the collector 
of facts. 
 A project such as this has a clearly cross-disciplinary character.  It draws on 
normative political theory, social theory, political sociology and (more ambivalently) 
political psychology, as well as on the relevant debat s in EU studies and political science.  It 
also involves the use of a relatively new qualitative research method – the ‘focus group’, or 
group discussion.  While this breadth of resources should be a positive feature, 
multidisciplinarity should not be the cause of easy celebration, for there are genuine tensions 
involved.  Perhaps the most notable and most general is that between normative political 
theory and sociology.  Simplifying a little, one may say that the role of the sociologist has 
traditionally been to look for the rules which govern the behaviour of a collective and its 
elements, seeking uniformity and order so as to explain and to predict.  A political 
philosopher, on the other hand, concerned with the possibility of human freedom and the 
renewal of political life, has often been sceptical of such rules, or has wanted to insist that 
any such rules are limited in scope and leave aspect  of life undetermined.  Perhaps these two 
perspectives are not in pure contradiction, but it is evident that a project which seeks to 
combine them must tread carefully.  In this work, we shall be drawn towards political theory 
which is especially sensitive to the importance of historical context, and which does not 
pursue abstract and universal truths.  At the same ti e, inspiration is taken not from classical 
sociology of the Durkheimian kind, but from more recent approaches which combine 
attention to patterns with an emphasis on interpretation, choices, and the possibility of 
change.  
 There are six chapters to the work that follows.  Chapter 1 sets out the basic problem, 
which concerns how best to conceptualise the collective bond that may be necessary for a 
viable democratic polity.  This is explored first as it has been discussed in political theory 
generally, and then specifically in the debate about a European demos.  Arguing that many of 
the existing approaches are adverse in their implications for contestatory politics and the 
possibility of collective self-rule, and therefore of a depoliticising tendency, this chapter lays 
out the contours of an alternative conceptualisation referred to as a ‘political bond’.  This is 
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presented as an ideal to be developed further in empirical study, and a sensitising concept 
with which to orient the empirical analysis.  Chapter 2 looks at the epistemological and 
methodological basis on which such a bond may be studied.  It assesses some of the 
empirical approaches which have been taken to the study of mass politics, and discusses the 
kinds of social theory appropriate to the concerns of this work, gravitating towards those 
which place an emphasis on routinised discursive practice.  It then presents the strategy and 
specifics of the exploratory study that follows (on which further details and reflections are 
provided in the Methodological Appendix).  From this point onwards, the narrative voice is 
enriched by the voices of taxi-drivers.  Chapters 3, 4 and 5 each explore in theoretical-
empirical mode one of the three key ideas associated with a ‘political bond’: the existence 
and nature of shared political problems constituting a political common, the collective 
positioning one finds with regard to the problems of the common, and the plausibility of a 
political project designed to address these.  Chapter 3 identifies three bodies of salient 
problems: Economics, Society and the Law, and Relations between Peoples, and these act as 
the units of analysis in Chapters 4 and 5.  Participants are given considerable scope to 
foreground whichever political problems they wish to, and the task is then to map out and 
evaluate the discursive patterns of political signif cance which accompany these.  Chapter 6 
then connects these observations directly to the question of a European polity.  It looks at the 
extent to which existing discursive practices are consistent with a political bond in Europe, 
and then – more critically – in what respects they would need to change and how such 















What must be common to a set of people such that they may be ruled through the same 
institutions?  While there may be no ‘eternal’ or ‘inescapable’ problems in (political) 
philosophy, there are questions of enduring relevance which seem to reappear in one form or 
another.  Historical situations are unique and the purposes of interpreters are specific: there is 
no progressive accumulation of answers to identical questions.  But it may be possible to 
speak of recurrent questions, at least ‘if sufficiently abstractly framed’,1 and to suppose that 
they recur under certain conditions.  The question raised here, which has been central to 
recent debates about the European Union, has not been a permanently central one in the 
history of political thought.  Few authors have made it the main focus of their attention.  But 
their more general concern for issues of democracy and order has quite often led them to 
indicate a position on it.  Wherever the foundations, the functioning or the composition of a 
political community have been matters of interest or d ubt, a position on this question seems 
discernible.2  In this sense, with some caution, one may suggest that the current debate about 
the EU has been revisiting an older question. 
 What it is that must be common to a set of people is likely to be considered 
important under two conditions in particular.  The first is if the authority to which they are 
subject relies on a principle of legitimacy grounded in a concept of ‘the people’.  Where this 
is the case, the theoretical question ‘who are the people?’ naturally arises as a basic 
constitutional matter.  The second is if that set of people, as individuals, have the power to 
                                                
1 Cf. Quentin Skinner, 'Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas', in James Tully (ed.), Meaning and 
Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics (Cambridge: Polity, 1988), p.66. 
2 A note on terminology: both ‘political community’ and ‘polity’ are terms which can be used in multiple ways, 
from which derives some of their usefulness.  Generally, the latter will be used as an umbrella term to refer to 
an organised arrangement of political power, avoiding related terms such as ‘state’ or ‘political system’ because 
these are laden with historical and disciplinary associations one may wish to avoid.  The former term, ‘political 
community’, will be used when intending to emphasise the human and hermeneutic dimensions of the polity, 
whilst recognising that the term ‘polity’ is by no means disconnected from these.   
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make themselves heard by the institutions which rule them, and to engage or challenge their 
coercive authority.  Where this is the case, it becomes of some practical importance what 
kind of institutions ‘make sense’ to them, and with w om they are willing to engage in 
government.  One sees immediately that the word ‘people’ can be used in at least two ways: 
to refer to an abstraction, the sovereign ‘people in reserve’ as it has been called, and to refer 
more empirically to a collective agent or series of agents, ‘the people in action’.  One can 
trace the dual sense of the term back to ancient Rome, where the notion of the ‘populus’ was 
used on the one hand to refer to the citizenry and sovereign body of the Roman Empire, and 
on the other hand to the common masses engaged in popular government, to the ‘plebs’ who 
made their political voice heard in the context of he Roman Republic.3   
 In the Middle Ages by contrast, with the principal exception of certain city-states on 
the Italian peninsula, this double aspect of ‘the people’ was less prominent.  Dynastic rule 
was the norm, and while kings – if pushed – might claim to have been authorised by ‘the 
people’ (as an abstraction) to rule over them, the set of people who happened to be alive at 
any given moment generally had minimal control over th  institutions which governed them.  
They constituted rather a resource to be used for ec nomic and military purposes, that over 
which the king was rightfully ruler.  The authority of the power-centre was little challenged, 
and could be strengthened in moments of crisis by reference to the principle of divine 
legitimacy.  If the king was king, he was probably rightfully so, success being the evidence 
of divine support.  While this argument came under some strain during the sixteenth century, 
when the religious division between Protestantism and Catholicism meant that rebels against 
the king’s authority could invoke divine support for themselves, and could claim to be acting 
for the spiritual good of ‘the people’, the model of dynastic rule survived for some time 
longer.  In these circumstances, the question of what must be common to a set of people such 
that they may be ruled together generally did not arise. 
 It came to the fore, one may argue, with the English Civil War and the French and 
American Revolutions.  With the problematisation and then the renunciation of monarchical 
rule, the concept of the people as sovereign was recoupled with the idea of popular rule and 
the practical ability of the masses to affect the course of government.  The French 
Declaration of the Rights of Man asserted that ‘theprinciple of all sovereignty resides in the 
Nation.  No body or individual may exercise any power other than that expressly emanating 
                                                
3 Margaret Canovan, The People (Cambridge: Polity, 2005). 
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from the Nation.’4  The US Constitution declared itself in the name of ‘We the People of the 
United States’.  These were assertions of the princi le of self-government, and they reopened 
the question of the identity of ‘the people’ (the slf) who/which were/was constituting the 
polity and then ruling and being ruled together.  As Claude Lefort has put it, before the 
revolutions ‘power was embodied in the prince, and it therefore gave society a body.  
Because of this, a latent but effective knowledge of what one meant to the other existed 
throughout the social.’  With the arrival of democra y, ‘the locus of power becomes an empty 
place.’5  The commonality of the people, what it is that defines them and holds them together 
as a political community, is now something no longer obvious, something which needs 
answering and to which all answers are contestable.  ‘The meaning of the transformation can 
be summarised as follows: democratic society is instituted as a society without a body, as a 
society which undermines the representation of an organic totality.  […] [N]either the state, 
the people nor the nation represent substantial entities.  Their representation is itself, in its 
dependence upon a political discourse and upon a sociological and historical elaboration, 
always bound up with ideological debate.’6 
 Some of the classic texts of political theory constitute a central part of this 
ideological debate, of the attempt to come to terms with the uncertainty that follows the 
assertion of rule by ‘the people’ and their engagement in the processes of self-government.  
In the pages which follow we shall be considering some of the responses they contain to what 
will henceforth be called the ‘question of the common’.  A reason for which this question 
became important theoretically in this period was that the principle of self-government had 
been established under conditions which, unlike the classical context, did not permit the 
direct participation of all citizens in the mechanisms of decision-making – even when full 
citizenship was restricted to a limited number of males.  Organs of representation were 
required, and this meant conceptualising who it was that the representatives represented.  
Majority voting was necessary, and this required a sense of who constituted the universe of 
voters.  More generally, self-government without direct participation required giving a sense 
of normative purpose to the polity, justification for obedience to state authority, to the 
suppression of immediate interests, and to the acts of redistribution which the state might 
engage in.  These issues acquired further urgency as a result of the socio-economic 
developments associated with the Industrial Revolution: as capitalism advanced, wealth 
                                                
4 Article III. 
5 Claude Lefort, 'The Question of Democracy', Democracy and Political Theory (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1988), p.17. 
6 Ibid. p.18. 
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inequalities increased, as did functional specialisation.  More diversity and fragmentation 
heightened the concern with common bonds, the investigation of which would become the 
task of the emerging social sciences.7  There were also a considerable number of practical 
issues to do with political association which arose nce the unifying figure of the monarch 
was removed.  In the case of territorial disputes, principles would be needed by which to 
decide whether a certain group of people belonged to one polity or to another.  As will be 
seen, a third conception of ‘the people’ would soon arise, that of the people as a 
transgenerational unity or ‘nation’.  Individual entitlements to political and welfare rights 
would also need to be granted or withheld.  As people started to cross borders more freely, 
these boundary problems increased in urgency. 
 It is useful at this point to distinguish between two different ways in which the 
question of the common can be formulated.  One is to pose it as a membership or boundary 
question, a question of who is to be included in the political community and who may be 
properly excluded.  Both the territorial extension of the polity and the granting of citizenship 
rights to temporary and long-term residents are matters which are here to the fore.  A second 
way to treat it is as a question of the cohesiveness of a unit which one takes as given.  In this 
perspective, the precise extension of polity boundaries is always an unsettled matter, but it is 
assumed that – wherever it happens that they are located – they are in need of the support of 
some kind of integrative force so as to ensure the s ability of the polity and the endorsement 
of its citizens.  A collective bond is required in order to conjure the unity of ‘the p ople’ such 
that they are suited to rule through the same institutions, and such that those institutions are 
democratically viable.   
 Despite the salience of all such issues from the later eighteenth century onwards, few 
theorists have made the boundary question their systematic problem.8  Many of the major 
debates in twentieth-century political philosophy took existing political communities as 
given, preferring to focus on the questions of justice which emerge within these units.  There 
is a normative reason why this may be so: to accept that there may be legitimate reasons to 
                                                
7 Peter Wagner, A History and Theory of the Social Sciences: Not All That is Solid Melts into Air (London: 
Sage, 2001). 
8 With some observations on the literature see: Margaret Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory 
(Cheltenham: Edwin Elgar, 1996); Robert Dahl, After the Revolution? Authority in a Good Society (Revised 
edition edn.; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990); Brian C. J. Singer, 'Cultural Versus Contractual 
Nations: Rethinking Their Opposition', History and Theory, 35/3 (1996); Friedrich V. Kratochwil, 'The Politics 
of Place and Origin: An Enquiry into the Changing Boundaries of Representation, Citizenship and Legitimacy', 
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 1/1 (2001); Bernard Yack, 'Popular Sovereignty andNationalism', 
Political Theory, 29/4 (2001); Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso, 2000a); Rogers M. 
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University Press, 2003). 
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draw boundaries of membership to a political community is always close to adopting a 
position of ethical particularism.  Universalistic perspectives in all periods, from 
contemporary liberal cosmopolitanism back to Marxism, the humanism of Erasmus or the 
Christianity of St. Augustine, have all been inclined to see the drawing of political 
boundaries as morally arbitrary, and have therefore had little reason to place emphasis on the 
kinds of principle one might invoke to do so.  There is also a theoretical reason why the 
problem of boundaries and inclusion has been avoided: it is rather resistant to logical 
reasoning.  Clearly it cannot be resolved by a straightforward appeal to democratic decision-
making, to an aggregation of individual votes, since as Robert Goodin puts it, ‘that is like 
saying the winning lottery ticket will be pulled out of the hat by the winner of that selfsame 
lottery.’9  Nor do appeals to the principle of ‘all affected interests’, or ‘all probably affected 
interests’, suggest a solution, since then there are problems of who can authoritatively judge 
such questions.  Appeals to cultural markers or geographical features simply beg the question 
of which should properly be invoked.   
 The difficulty with formulating the question of the common as a boundary question 
is that it may imply that membership is something to be settled definitively rather than a 
matter of ongoing interpretation.  It may suggest that ‘the people’ can be captured in a single 
representation, and that this representation can correspond neatly with the material world.  
On the contrary, as Lefort’s notion that power in a democracy is an ‘empty place’ makes 
clear, ‘the people’ will always be the site of contested representations.10  If rules, as 
Wittgenstein reminds, do not contain the rules for their own application, then there is an 
inescapably practical basis to all moves to create, extend and withhold the rights of 
citizenship.11  The move from representations to practices of inclusion and exclusion is one 
which depends on practical decisions and ongoing reappraisal, which is no doubt why the 
few political philosophers who have tackled this formulation of the question have generally 
concluded that it is a matter more for historians than theorists and philosophers.12  Thus while 
                                                
9 Robert E. Goodin, 'Enfranchising All Affected Interests, and Its Alternatives', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
15/1 (2007), p.43. 
10 This point is developed further by Ernesto Laclau in his discussion of the concept of ‘the people’ as it i  
employed in the politics of populism: cf. Laclau, On Populist Reason (London: Verso, 2005). 
11 Cf. David Bloor, 'Wittgenstein and the Priority of Practice', in Theodore R. Schatzki, Karin Knorr Cetina, and 
Eike von Savigny (eds.), The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory (London: Routledge, 2001); Barry Barnes, 
'Practice as Collective Action', in Theodore R. Schatzki, Karin Knorr Cetina, and Eike von Savigny (eds.), The 
Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory (London: Routledge, 2001). 
12 Robert Dahl declares that ‘having puzzled over the problem for years, with astonishingly little help from the 
legacy of great writings about democracy, I have become persuaded that there is no theoretical solution to the 
puzzle, but only pragmatic ones.’  (Dahl, After the Revolution?, p.45.)  Frederick Whelan agrees that 
‘boundaries comprise a problem … that is insoluble within the framework of democratic theory, and it may be 
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both formulations of the question of the common raise issues of political importance, clearly 
any answer to the second question (concerning the coll ctive bond) need not depend for its 
validity on the clarity of answer it provides to the first (concerning membership).  The 
membership question is never fully resolved, and for this reason one may find value in 
conceptualisations of the collective bond which remain open on the question of boundaries. 
 How best to characterise the collective bond that may be necessary for a viable 
democratic polity is the question that will be pursued in this chapter and beyond.  It is by no 
means simply a descriptive problem.  That multiple representations of ‘the people’ are 
possible means that this collective bond can be conceptualised in different ways, and the best 
way to do so can be a matter for extensive debate.  Importantly, different conceptualisations, 
as well as varying in the degree to which they are theoretically coherent and empirically 
plausible, vary in their normative implications.  They are laden with consequences for how 
one understands the purpose of the polity and the nature of citizenship, and how one 
understands the challenges which a particular polity or polities in general may face.  
Different conceptualisations of the common may suggest different positions on why citizens 
should obey the law when they would rather not, andccept decision-making when it runs 
counter to their perceptions of self-interest.  They may shape what citizens understand by the 
common good, or whether they doubt the existence of such a thing, and the extent to which 
they seek participation in the political process.  Towards whom solidarity should be shown 
will depend substantially on how one makes sense of the collective.  Also, while no 
conceptualisation of the common can provide a settled answer to the question of boundaries, 
nonetheless some can serve to naturalise certain bou daries while problematising others.  
Why it is logical for ‘us’ to share a certain political arrangement depends crucially on how 
that ‘we’ is elaborated.   
 Before looking at how these matters have been discussed in relation to a European 
polity, we shall look first at some of the resources in political and social theory upon which 
this debate has drawn.  The bonds identified refer to a range of features: interests, material 
social structures, cultural attributes (whether or n t given an ethical status), values and 
principles (both universal and particularist), reciprocal trust and solidarity, and substantive 
problems.  Each should be seen as involving claims which are normative, theoretical and 
empirical, the awkwardness of such distinctions notwithstanding.  In assessing them we shall 
                                                                                                                                            
that democracy is practicable only when a historically given solution to this issue (justifiable or not, by some 
theory other than democratic theory) is acceptable.’  (Frederick G. Whelan, 'Democratic Theory and the 
Boundary Problem', in J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman (eds.), Nomos XXV: Liberal Democracy (New 
York: New York University Press, 1983), p.16.) 
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be interested in each of these aspects, since a model’s desirability may vary in line with its 
coherence and plausibility, but ultimately some prominence will be given to the kinds of 
political vision that each implies, in particular its mplications for active debate over matters 
of public concern and for the possibility of contestatory politics.  The account is mainly 
schematic rather than historical, and certainly not chronological.  The aim is to derive a series 
of logical positions which can act as points of orientation when looking at current debate on 
contemporary Europe, and to anticipate some of the lines of critique to which positions in 
this debate may be subject.  While the charge that we engage here in the ‘mythology of 
doctrines’ may have some substance,13 this is perhaps mitigated by the purpose of the 
exercise: not to provide a history of ideas, but to br aden our understanding of the 
possibilities open to the European debate.  The goal is not naively to ‘learn’ from past 
authors, but to enrich the stock of resources with hich we may ‘do our own thinking for 
ourselves’.14  Questions to do with how such bonds might be or have been explored in an 
empirically-informed way are postponed until the following chapter. 
 
 
Collective Bonds in Political Thought 
 
That common interests might serve as the collective bond is a staple idea of political 
philosophy.  Though not directly a contribution to democratic thought, Thomas Hobbes’ 
social contract theory can be seen as proposing a collective bond based on security interests.  
Equally vulnerable to the dangers of the state of nature, and each having an interest in exiting 
a condition of anxiety and threats to survival, individuals (male heads of household, that is) 
come together to construct Leviathan.  It is the concern for security that binds them, and it is 
the same which guarantees the stability of the polity, since only by submitting to the 
authority of the sovereign can citizens expect their s curity interests to be maintained.  With 
their polity subsisting in a wider state of nature, it is through their self-interested loyalty that 
citizens derive protection from outside assault.15  The collective bond is a security bond.   
 In John Locke’s version of the social contract, inerests are expanded beyond those 
of immediate security to include the need to protect private property and to develop the basic 
                                                
13 Cf. Skinner, 'Meaning and Understanding'. 
14 Ibid. p.66. 
15 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Richard Tuck edn.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
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infrastructure required for commerce.16  The political significance of commercial interests 
becomes a theme of considerable prominence particularly in writings from the Scottish 
Enlightenment.  Here one sees what can be called a commercial bond.  While the private 
interests of individuals may clash, they are bound together by the marketplace, which allows 
them to pursue their private interests in organised an  peaceful competition, to engage in 
transactions which are mutually desired, and to derive the benefits of overall economic 
growth.  Whereas ‘the passions’ make the life in common unpredictable and prone to conflict 
and violence, ‘the interests’ serve to domesticate individuals and to encourage them towards 
mutual cooperation.17  These ideas, traceable to the political thought of Bacon, Spinoza, 
Hume and Montesquieu,18 find their most complete theoretical elaboration in the political 
economy of Adam Smith.  ‘Commerce and manufactures gradually introduced order and 
good government,’ writes Smith, ‘and with them, the liberty and security of individuals, 
among the inhabitants of the country, who had before lived almost in a continual state of war 
with their neighbours and of servile dependency upon their superiors.’19  It was this type of 
society, consisting of aggregates of self-interested individuals bound together by the interests 
of commercial exchange, which would later be referrd to by Tönnies as Gesellschaft,20 and 
via the work of Hayek it continues to inform modern libertarian theories of democracy and 
economistic approaches to political science such as rational choice theory. 
 While their thin notions of the common good (security and economic growth) and 
their celebration of the private sphere might have been a progressive move in the 
Enlightenment period,21 today these interests-based perspectives may seem to accord too 
minor a role to political discussion and action on matters of shared concern.  A commercial 
perspective seeks to marginalise from the public domain those bonds of attachment which are 
not conceived in terms of economic interest, and hol s a suspicion of activity which cannot 
                                                
16 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government (Oxford: Blackwell, 1966). 
17 Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism Before its Triumph 
(Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996). 
18 E.g. Hume’s treatises ‘Of Commerce’, ‘Of Money’, and ‘Of Trade’, in David Hume, Political Essays 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).; Charles-Louis De Secondat Montesquieu, baron de, Th  
Spirit of the Laws, trans. Anne M. Cohler, Basia C. Miller, and Harold S. Stone (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989). 
19 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (London: Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, 1990), Book 3 Chap. 4, p.385. 
20 Ferdinand Tönnies, Community and Civil Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p.57. 
21 Though it was by no means unopposed.  See for instance Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in 
France (New York: P.F. Collier & Son, 1910), para. 165: ‘a political community ‘ought not to be considered as 
nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, calico or tobacco, or some ther 
such low concern, to be taken up for a little temporary interest, and to be dissolved by the fancy of the parties.  
It is to be looked on with reverence, because it is not a partnership in things subservient only to the gross animal 
existence of a temporary and perishable nature.’  
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be understood in terms of the pursuit of individual advantage.  While it may, in its 
democratic strands, acknowledge ‘the people’ as the ultimate source of authority in the 
political community, there is little room in this perspective for ‘the people’ as active agents 
engaged in collective decision-making and self-rule.  Also, the goods which a commercial 
bond invokes (growth, increase, innovation) are substantively ill-defined, and therefore act 
badly as points of normative orientation.22  More empirically, one may wonder whether a 
bond based on interests, whether security or commercial, is sufficient to constitute a political 
community.  As Smith himself was no doubt aware, a commercial bond, and the legal 
agreements it entails, may require practices of cooperation based on ‘common sympathies’ as 
well as the pursuit of self-interest if it is to bemaintained.  Otherwise, as Charles Taylor puts 
it, such a bond may produce little more than ‘fair-weather friends’ who cooperate with one 
another so long as they profit, but who are tempted to revert to open brutality when their 
interests cease to be satisfied.23  Even where the complete breakdown in civil relations is not 
in prospect, ‘consumer loyalty’ is a weak principle for political community, since consumer 
loyalties are easily transferred.24  Furthermore, ontologically, these perspectives generally 
rely heavily on some problematic units, in particular that of ‘the individual’ and of ‘interest’.  
The first of these will be considered further in Chapter 2; the second, as has often been noted, 
conceals considerable ambiguity.  Interests can be perceived in multiple ways, and it is their 
social construction which is crucial.  Interests in themselves explain everything and 
nothing.25 
 Classical sociology, in posing and seeking to understand the problem of social order, 
provides another body of ideas on what may hold ‘the people’ together.  Here one might 
speak of a structural bond.  Material social structures are the foundations of the common in 
this perspective, though these are conceptualised in a variety of ways.  For Marx they 
consisted of class structures and forces of production.26  For the early Durkheim, before he 
deepened his concern with the symbolic, they were to be understood as structures of social 
density and the ‘organic solidarity’ or mutual depend nce generated by social 
                                                
22 Cf. Peter Wagner and Nathalie Karagiannis, 'Towards  Theory of Synagonism', The Journal of Political 
Philosophy, 13/3 (2005), p.241. 
23 Charles Taylor, 'Cross Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate', in N. L. Rosenblum (ed.), Liberalism 
and the Moral Life (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), p.175.  The same argument is made by 
Durkheim (Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society (New York: Free Press, 1964), p.204): ‘There is 
nothing less constant than interest.  Today, it unites me to you; tomorrow, it will make me your enemy.  Such a 
cause can only give rise to transient relations and passing associations.’ 
24 See Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory, p.86. 
25 Stephen Holmes, 'The Secret History of Self-Interest', in Jane Mansbridge (ed.), Beyond Self-Interest 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1990). 
26 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1954). 
 10 
differentiation.27  For Simmel, it was social ‘forms’, such as cooperation, subordination and 
centralisation, that were the basic phenomenon.28  These approaches deserve mention here 
because they constitute one of the main materialist counter-positions to accounts based on 
the interests of individuals.  Just like individual interests, social structures are taken as 
objectively given, and the role of interpretation is downplayed.  The systematic concern of 
these sociological approaches was not the viability of the polity however.  Indeed, with 
strong elements of social determinism, they may be thought of as antithetical to any 
conception of politics which emphasises agential action and the possibility of directed 
change: as with interest-based perspectives, ‘the people’ as engaged in self-rule are quite 
marginalised, and with them the significance of political will.  Furthermore, many such 
sociological approaches have been r liant upon political structures for the definition of their 
basic unit – society – and are therefore quite unable to problematise the viability of political 
institutions.29  For the exploration of an emergent polity such as the EU, such classical 
sociological perspectives have for this reason been limited in their value. 
 An historically important attempt to specify the common has involved the evocation 
of ethical ties.  In this perspective, the referent of ‘the people’ is conceived as something 
more than just the ultimate source of political authority and the aggregate of living 
individuals engaged in joint action.  Rather, ‘the people’ is understood to be an organic unity 
which stretches across time, and towards which historically-existing individuals may owe 
duties.  Loosely one may say that such approaches conjure an ethical-cultural bond.  The 
unity may be conceived in religious terms, and examples of its political expression might be 
the late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Zionist movement, contemporary Islamic 
movements, and anti-Catholic movements in early-modern England.  It can be conceived in 
racial terms, as with the fascist ideology of the National Socialists.  It can also be conceived 
using the category of nationhood – though as will be seen below, not all nationalisms are of 
this type.  In all such approaches, shared attributes are given an ethical status which 
transcends the set of individuals who happen to exhibit them at any given moment.  
Essentialist or Romantic nationalism, as one may term it, creates its myth of the enduring 
collective through a mix of references to markers such as territory, language, symbolic 
                                                
27 Durkheim, The Division of Labour.  
28 Georg Simmel, On Individuality and Social Forms: Selected Writings (Donald N. Levine edn.; Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1971). 
29 For a detailed treatment of ‘methodological nationalism’, see Daniel Chernilo, 'Social Theory's 
Methodological Nationalism: Myth and Reality', European Journal of Social Theory, 9/1 (2006). 
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practices, blood ties, historical events and feelings of belonging.30  In particular, it contains a 
demand for political power, for the establishment of p litical institutions which can serve and 
advance the nation.  Herder’s celebration of the German language and its poetry as the 
repository of the Volksgeist and as the natural underpinning for a political community was 
one of the milder expressions of Romantic nationalism.31  Mazzini called for widespread 
upheaval, albeit ultimately for the good of mankind as a whole, as Italians helped other 
nations to realise their destiny.32  Fichte, in his Addresses to the German Nation, written after 
Prussia’s defeat by Napoleon at Jena in 1806, was more narrowly assertive, recalling the 
resistance of ‘our earliest common forefathers’ to the Roman Empire as a spur to present-day 
action: ‘It is they whom we must thank – we, the immediate heirs of their soil, their language, 
and their way of thinking – for being Germans still, for being still borne along on the stream 
of original and independent life.  It is they whom we must thank for everything that we have 
been as a nation since those days, and to them we shall be indebted for everything that we 
shall be in the future, unless things come to an end with us now and the last drop of blood 
inherited from them has dried up in our veins.’  The project was clear: ‘Wherever a separate 
language is found, there a separate nation exists, which has the right to take independent 
charge of its own affairs and to govern itself.’33   
 Conceiving the common in these terms faces objections which to many 
contemporary eyes will seem obvious.  There is the empirical problem that the map of 
peoples is scarcely so easily drawn, even in Europe alone.  One decade’s clearly identifiable 
nations are the next decade’s artificial and untenable conglomerations (in a more recent 
period, the Czechs and Slovaks of Czechoslovakia for example).  There is no finite number 
of nations: they evolve and splinter, as do religions.  There is then the normative concern 
that, whilst collectivism of this kind need not in principle be aggressive to the outside world, 
it is clearly exclusive, and probably exclusionary of all who do not conform to the high level 
of commonality which it requires.  In many cases compliance is no matter of decision: it is 
                                                
30 For one summary see Bhikhu Parekh, 'Politics of Nationhood', in Keebet von Benda-Beckman and Maykel 
Verkuyten (eds.), Nationalism, Ethnicity and Cultural Identity in Europe (Utrecht: ERCOMER, 1995). 
31 Michael N. Forster (ed.), Johann Gottfried von Herder: Philosophical Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002). 
32 ‘Beyond the Alps, beyond the sea, are other peoples now fighting or preparing to fight the holy fight of 
independence, of nationality, of liberty; other peol s striving by different routes to reach the same goal […]  
Unite with them; they will unite with you.’ Nagendranath Gangulee (ed.), Giuseppe Mazzini: Selected Writings 
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1974), p.112. 
33 Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Addresses to the German Nation, trans. R. F. Jones and G. H. Turnbull (Chicago: 
Greenwood Press, 1922), pp.145ff.  For overviews of the literature on nationalism see Canovan, Nationhood 
and Political Theory; Anthony Smith, Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of 
Nations and Nationalism (London: Routledge, 1998). 
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precisely attributes which cannot easily be adopted or rejected which are to the fore in these 
approaches.  Even were it possible to adopt them (as perhaps is the case with language), this 
approach makes a strong assumption of there being a single common good.  For anyone who 
believes that reasonable people may disagree on the good, and that politics in a democracy is 
about coming to terms with this fact, this perspectiv  is likely to appear unduly 
homogenising, promoting a conception of political community which is strongly conformist. 
 A more common and ostensibly more feasible approach resists the essentialisation of 
particularist, inherited attributes by pointing instead to whatever combination of attributes 
and values a set of people happen to have, and believe or can be induced to believe they 
have, in common.34  One could speak here of an instrumentalist-cultural bond, in contrast to 
the ethical version.  This approach presents itself as pragmatic and reflexive: whilst not 
uncritical, it does not make strong normative assumptions about the proper nature of the 
common ties.  ‘The people’ are understood as a set of living individuals; ‘the people’ as an 
organic totality, if it is invoked at all, is treated as a useful fiction.  The community is no 
more than ‘imagined’.35  Since no outward markers or particular values are giv n a priori 
moral significance, in general this approach marks  turn towards people’s goals, beliefs and 
feelings, a turn from the material to the ideational world.  It is taken for granted that people 
have particularistic ties, but their nature will vary.36  J.S. Mill provides a famous and 
comprehensive statement of this perspective in his discussion ‘Of Nationality’.  While Mill 
makes some functional arguments about the importance of a shared language for the 
circulation of opinions necessary for representative government, his argument tries to remain 
open on precisely what cultural and ideational features must be held in common.  It is from a 
contingent combination of various perceived commonalities that t e ‘common sympathies’ 
which allow the establishment and maintenance of comm n political institutions derive.37  In 
                                                
34 This approach can be described in various ways: ‘liberal nationalism’ and ‘patriotism’ are terms one finds in 
the literature.  For arguments against treating them s parately, see Margaret Canovan, 'Patriotism Is Not 
Enough', British Journal of Political Science, 30/3 (2000), esp. p.417. 
35 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin andSpread of Nationalism (London: 
Verso, 1991). 
36 For particularism taken as a ‘brute fact’, see. e.g David Miller, 'In Defence of Nationality', in David Miller 
(ed.), Citizenship and National Identity (Malden: Polity, 2000a), p.25: ‘There can be no question of trying to 
give rationally compelling reasons for people to have national attachments and allegiances.  What we can do is 
to start from the premise that people generally do exhibit such attachments and allegiances, and then try to build 
a political philosophy which incorporates them.’  
37 ‘A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a N tionality, if they are united among themselves by 
common sympathies, which do not exist between them and any others – which make them cooperate with eac
other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the same government, and desire that it should 
be government by themselves or a portion of themselve , exclusively.  This feeling of nationality may have 
been generated by various causes.  Sometimes it is the effect of identity of race and descent.  Community of 
language, and community of religion, greatly contribute to it.  Geographical limits are one of its causes.  But the 
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more recent accounts, ‘common sympathies’ tend to be reworded as ‘trust’, ‘solidarity’ or 
‘social capital’.  In this formulation, nationality can be presented as a crucial underpinning 
for progressive agendas which call on individuals to accept costs for the benefit of others 
(e.g. wealth redistribution).38  Indeed, it may be necessary to cultivate such feelings using 
various forms of indoctrination, education in particular.  Such approaches recall the emphasis 
placed by Socrates on the ‘Phoenician tale’, the myth of common origins as described in 
Plato’s Republic, or similar instrumental arguments for creeds, myths, religions and 
education found in the work of Machiavelli, Rousseau nd Montesquieu.39  Other 
contemporary approaches recall Tocqueville’s emphasis on the importance of face-to-face 
interaction in associations for the achievement of common sympathies.40 
 While it is a wide range of approaches which come under the heading of an 
instrumentalist-cultural bond, they are certain problematic features which are shared by them 
all.  Attributing importance to cultural markers or particularist values, even if one does not 
prescribe their content, means being ready to defen the process by which they emerge.  As 
Margaret Canovan points out, herself sympathetic to this approach, it implies being ready to 
defend what is usually a bloody process.  Cultural attributes or particularist values tend to be 
celebrated most if at some time in the past they have been fought for.41  Civil and interethnic 
war, interstate war and the struggle for liberation te d to be the conditions for their 
emergence (and for the defeat of competing visions), rather than a steady process of 
crystallisation under a stable legal order.  Not only this, but also once established they can be 
normatively problematic.  These approaches may not prize any one conception of cultural or 
                                                                                                                                            
strongest of all is identity of political antecedents; the possession of a national history, and consequent 
community of recollections; collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same 
incidents in the past.  None of these circumstances however are either indispensable, or necessarily sufficient by 
themselves.’  J. S. Mill, Chap. 16 of John Stuart Mill, 'Considerations on Representative Government', Three 
Essays (Oxford: Oxford  University Press, 1975), ‘Of Nationality’, p.380. 
38 See e.g. David Miller, 'The Nation-State: A Modest Defence', in Chris Brown (ed.), Political Restructuring in 
Europe: Ethical Perspectives (London: Routledge, 1994); David Goodhart, 'Too Diverse?: Is Britain Becoming 
Too Diverse to Sustain the Mutual Obligations Behind a Good Society and the Welfare State?' Prospect, 95 
(2004); Brian Barry, Democracy, Power and Justice: Essays in Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1989); Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory.   
39 Plato, The Republic, trans. R.E. Allen (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), Book III;  Niccolò 
Machiavelli, The Discourses (Bernard Crick edn.; London: Penguin, 1970); Jean-J cques Rousseau, The Social 
Contract, trans. Maurice Cranston (London: Penguin, 1963); The Government of Poland, trans. Willmoore 
Kendall (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972); Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws. 
40 ‘Feelings and opinions are recruited,’ writes Tocqueville, ‘the heart is enlarged, and the human mind is 
developed only by the reciprocal influence of men upon one another.  I have shown that these influences ar  
almost null in democratic countries; they must therefore be artificially created, and this can only be 
accomplished by associations.’  Alexis de Tocquevill , 'Of the Use Which the Americans Make of Public 
Associations in Civil Life', in Olivier Zunz and Alan S. Kahan (eds.), The Tocqueville Reader: A Life in Letters 
and Politics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), p.183.  
41 Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory, chap. 9. 
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values commonality, but they do prize a fairly high degree of homogeneity, of ‘shared 
values, shared tastes or sensibilities’ which extend across the majority of individuals.42  It is 
difficult to see how this can avoid having repressive and totalising political implications.  It is 
but a short step to the proposition, found in the essentialist perspectives on collectivity, that 
all those who supposedly share the same culture, identity or values also share a single, 
substantive common good, and that all those who do not easily align with this culture / 
identity / values, or who choose to dissociate themselves from it, must be in collision with 
this common good.43  Political disagreement becomes suspect, and may be delegitimised as 
unpatriotic.  Non-cultural forms of collective identification (e.g. based on categories of class) 
may be suppressed, with outcomes which are decidedly un-progressive.  Cultural differences 
with those outside the community, and the significance of these, may be exaggerated in the 
attempt to cultivate a distinctive ‘identity’ for the citizens of the polity, leading to a 
potentially dangerous hardening of physical boundaries and, as an unintended consequence, 
of moral boundaries too.  There is also, in the emphasis on tradition, a conservative tendency: 
to emphasise the need for (perceived) cultural regularities is to place a strong constraint on 
the possibility of innovative political action and ew political beginnings, and may be to give 
a false sense of permanence and naturalness to boundaries which are subject to ongoing 
negotiation.   
 One response to these challenges is to downplay the importance of cultural markers 
and speak of trust and solidarity in more abstract terms.  We shall return to the notion of a 
social bond in the next section, since it is in the contemporary European context that it has 
been given one of its fullest articulations.  Another response, common amongst liberal 
nationalists, is to argue that national identification is not exclusive of other forms of 
identification, or that ‘national identity’ can exist ‘at more than one level’: as David Miller 
puts it, ‘one can be both Catalan and Spanish … perha s emphasising different aspects of the 
double identity in different contexts or for different purposes.’44  It is an intuitively plausible 
idea, but then raises awkward ontological questions about what is to be understood by terms 
such as ‘identity’, ‘shared culture’ and ‘shared values, shared tastes or sensibilities’.  Miller’s 
move is to avoid social determinism by speaking of ‘purposes’ and context, with the 
implication that ‘identities’ are invoked reflexively according to the challenges of the 
                                                
42 Miller, 'The Nation-State: A Modest Defence', pp.140-1. 
43 For a critique of this kind, see Parekh, 'Politics of Nationhood'. 
44 David Miller, Citizenship and National Identity (Cambridge: Polity, 2000b), p.130.  For a discussion of the 
difficulties of the word ‘identity’, see Peter Wagner, 'Identity and Selfhood as a Problématique', in Heidrun 
Friese (ed.), Identities: Time, Difference and Boundaries (Oxford: Berghahn, 2002), pp.32-55, and Rogers 
Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, 'Beyond 'Identity'', Theory and Society, 29/1 (2000). 
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situation at hand.  The result however is a perspective which is highly flexible, agential, 
individual and instrumental, and one wonders then exactly what is meant by ‘identity’ 
(normally understood as coherence and sameness) and in what sense ‘shared values, shared 
tastes or sensibilities’ are shared.  Are they shared always, or only when agents choose to 
share them?  If the emphasis is on choice, must it be these things that they choose to share?  
There are also epistemological difficulties with these approaches: the wish to avoid the 
reification of cultural markers, since these evolve and since not all are attributed importance 
at a given moment, results in considerable emphasis being placed on beliefs and norms.  As 
things existing ‘inside the brain’, these are inaccessible to observation, and their nature and 
existence is a matter of speculation.  One may end up in a position of pure agnosticism about 
what features are held in common.  Faced with such uncertainty, the danger is always that 
one lapses back into essentialism by focusing on particular markers and claiming that they 
are the crucial ones, with the likely political consequences we have indicated.45   
 A natural counter-position to these culturalist pers ctives is to maintain that what a 
set of people must have in common so as to share political institutions is not outward markers 
given a spurious importance but a convergence on princi les to which they may commit 
themselves by choice.  One can speak here of a bond of values and principles.  In the most 
radical perspective, these are conceived as universal.  The French Declaration on the Rights 
of Man and the US Constitution can be understood as attempts to define principles of 
universal appeal which will be sufficient to bind together French and American citizens in an 
attitude of ‘constitutional patriotism’ towards their political institutions.  In this perspective, 
what ‘the people’ have in common is post-political, the outcome of reasoned agreement, and 
pre-political allegiances are expected to be strongly subordinated or disowned.  Human rights 
and the rule of law might be candidate universal principles.  Amongst political theorists, the 
early Habermas would be a prominent example of this type of thin, universalist perspective 
on commonality.46  At first glance the position is normatively appealing, since other than 
those who give an ethical status to particularist pre-political allegiances presumably few 
could object to universal principles.  If one accepts the possibility that values and principles 
                                                
45 Of course, it is possible to mitigate this problem by shifting away from an emphasis on mental phenomena 
and conceiving commonality of culture and values in terms of discursive resources.  More on this will be said in 
Chapter 2.  Disciplines such as cultural sociology and nationalism studies have much to offer here.  Some recent 
approaches in political theory do gesture in this direction: see Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory, 
chapter 7, where she introduces nationhood as a mediating phenomenon, and Rogers Smith, who emphasises the 
discursive when he refers to ‘stories of peoplehood’ (Smith, Stories of Peoplehood). 
46 For a reading of the evolution of Habermas’ thought on this, see Patchen Markell, 'Making Affect Safe for 
Democracy?: On "Constitutional Patriotism"', Political Theory, 28/1 (2000). 
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could be formulated sufficiently abstractly such that reasonable objection would be 
unthinkable, yet not so abstractly as to deprive them of meaning and affective appeal, then 
the political implications might seem attractive.  However, firstly taking the argument on its 
own terms, there is the clear danger that an appetite amongst citizens for the universal could 
result in a cosmopolitan distaste for all political institutions (except perhaps the global) r ther 
than a strong commitment to one particular set.  The activities of non-state actors – human 
rights NGOs, for instance – might come to seem a better focus of loyalty than the polity.  
Certainly there is no reason why a set of people might be expected to see their own political 
institutions as the ones which best embody the universal: when judged on these criteria, the 
conduct of a neighbouring polity might seem more alluring.  Insofar as universal values and 
principles were successful in inspiring allegiance, disengagement from the political life of the 
particular polity might be the predictable consequence.  This would be depoliticisation in the 
form of political withdrawal.  The history of post-revolutionary France and the US (and other 
polities with universalist doctrines such as the Soviet Union) suggests that further notions of 
commonality are generally required as a supplement in order to foster allegiance,47 and 
Habermas’s own thought has evolved in a somewhat more particularist direction, such that 
the principles which bind together the community are understood to be not expressions of the 
universal but ‘nationally specific interpretations’ thereof.48  (Since this latter perspective has 
been developed furthest in connection to the EU debate itself, it will be looked at in detail in 
the next section.) 
 Secondly, as a more fundamental critique, there are reasons to doubt whether such 
universality is possible, and reasons to suppose that the pursuit of it may be adverse to 
contestatory politics.  Despite acting as the inspiration for many well-intentioned conquerors, 
claims to the universal have a habit of coming across as ‘yours’, as resistance to Napoleon or 
as the experience of decolonialisation might suggest.  Rather than there being a single scale 
of ‘the good’ against which all will make their asse ments of value, arguably there are 
multiple conceptions of the good, and these may be incommensurable.49  Given that a 
                                                
47 For arguments that these ‘supplements’ are of a cultural kind, see Canovan, The People, and on France in 
particular see Singer, 'Cultural Versus Contractual Nations'. 
48 Jürgen Habermas, 'Citizenship and National Identity', Praxis International, 12/1 (1992), p.507.  Habermas 
also emphasises the maintenance of national identities in 'The Postnational Constellation and the Future of 
Democracy', in Jürgen Habermas (ed.), The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays (Cambridge: Polity, 
2001a), p.99. 
49 Cf. Richard Bellamy, Liberalism and Pluralism: Towards a Politics of Compromise (London: Routledge, 
1999), and ‘Still in Deficit: Rights, Regulation and Democracy in the EU’, European Law Journal, 12/6 (2006); 
in a more sociological vein, see Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot, On Justification: Economies of Worth 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
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consensus on the universal tends not to arise naturally, any attempt to consecrate a certain set 
of values and principles as universal is likely to involve a concerted effort to cast competing 
perspectives, though widely held, as illegitimate.  The language of universality is the 
language of universal reason, which is intolerant of disagreement and always liable to treat 
that which opposes it as mad or bad.  To advocate the pursuit of universality under conditions 
where ‘the universal’ is contentious requires narrowing the parameters of political debate 
such that one conception of the good is treated as unsusceptible to reasonable denunciation 
by competing conceptions of the good.  This conception of the common, minimal on its own 
terms but liable to herald something rather thicker, s ems quite problematic for a democratic 
polity. 
 The final perspective on the common which is considered here likewise avoids 
grounding the viability of political institutions on pre-political homogeneity.  That ‘the 
people’ can be usefully thought of as existing as a social or cultural totality separate from the 
political process is denied.  At the same time, that ey may be held together by nothing more 
than objective interests, economic or security-related, is also doubted.  Rather, it is the 
appraisal and debate of common problems, with a view to collective action to address them, 
which binds together citizens in this perspective.  One can think of this as a republican 
bond.50  As one author puts it, ‘citizens are neighbors bound together neither by blood nor by 
contract but by their common concerns and common participation in the search for common 
solutions to common conflicts.’51  Just as the approach looked at above considers perceived 
rather than ‘really existing’ cultural and values-based commonality, this approach may 
address perceived commonality of problems and the perceived importance of acting 
collectively to address them, without attempting to justify these perceptions with an appeal to 
material reality.52  The process of identifying problems and disputing how they should be 
dealt with is given considerable importance.  Particularly in the neo-Roman strand of 
                                                
50 ‘Republicanism’ is a broad term of course: our focus here is less on the classical Greek tradition (as renewed 
later by Marsilius and then Rousseau) than on the neo-Roman tradition, as revived in the Italian Renaiss nce 
city-states.  Cf. Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Vol. 1: The Renaissance 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978); David Held, Models of Democracy (Cambridge: Polity, 1996).  
51 Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1984), p.219.  This approach has an affinity with the principle of ‘all affected interests’ which 
is sometimes proposed as the basis for political membership: Dahl, After the Revolution?; Goodin, 
'Enfranchising All Affected Interests'.  Whilst this principle can be formulated in different ways, it main 
contention is that a set of people should be enfranchised whenever there is a decision to be made whose 
consequences would (alternatively, might) affect them.  While related, this principle refers primarily to 
membership rather than to the collective bond, and puts less emphasis on how interests are constructed as part 
of a political process. 
52 For this reason, like the others, it can provide no u equivocal answer to questions of political membrship.  
Just as someone who claims to feel ‘culturally Austrian’ may be hard to gainsay, likewise someone who claims 
to be affected by a certain set of political problems.  How one responds to such claims is a question of practice. 
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republicanism, the potential for persistent political disagreement and power-political struggle 
tends to be foregrounded – indeed, it is precisely because there may be no universally 
acceptable values or principles (other than the most ba ic ones of democracy itself, liberty 
and equality) that people may be inspired to participate in the political process so as to secure 
their objectives and visions.53  There is little call for homogeneity in this perspective.  As 
Chantal Mouffe has put it, the ‘modern form of political community is held together not by a 
substantive idea of the common good but by a common bond, a public concern.  It is 
therefore a community without a definite shape or a definite identity and in continuous re-
enactment.’54    
 The republican tradition was originally developed in an age of small political 
communities where ‘the people’ could assemble in person.  First-hand participation and 
deliberation on collective action was seen to reinforce the sense of common endeavour 
amongst citizens and (particularly in the tradition nspired by ancient Greece) to enrich the 
individual’s moral capacity.  A question which remains open is the degree to which 
participation can still be valorised under the conditions posed earlier, where even though the 
idea of self-rule is entrenched, not everyone can be engaged personally in decision-making 
and where some degree of representation is required.55  The extent to which participation can 
be encouraged without resort to coercion also remains n ongoing debate within republican 
writing.56  Another important concern must be with the nature of the problems which are held 
in common.  While a sense of shared problems may bind people together strongly within a 
political community, there is no guarantee that others – inside or outside the community – 
will be treated with the level of respect which might be normatively desirable.57  Chauvinism 
of all forms remains a danger.  Finally, there are th  same ontological and epistemological 
questions which were raised above to do with how the perception of commonality should be 
conceptualised.  To all of these issues we shall return later in the course of this work. 
 
                                                
53 Privileging rationality, consensus and morality is the Kantian tradition, with Habermasian ‘deliberative 
democracy’ an important contemporary variant as will be seen later.  More inclined to emphasise the benefits of 
conflict are Machiavelli, The Discourses; Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society (Fania Oz-
Salzberger edn.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Harrington and Milton (see the interpretation 
of Quentin Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism: An Inaugural Lecture Deliv red Before the University of 
Cambridge on 12th November 1997 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998)), and more cautiously 
Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). 
54 Chantal Mouffe, The Return of the Political (London: Verso, 1993), p.67. 
55 This is the question raised by Benjamin Constant, 'The Liberty of Ancients Compared with That of Moderns', 
Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
56 See e.g. Barber, Strong Democracy. 
57 Discussing this, see Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory, p.95. 
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The European Demos Debate 
 
The approaches we have outlined tend to explore the question of the common more as a 
conceptual problem than a historically rooted one.  In many cases they form one dimension 
of a more general theoretical exploration of political and social order, where what is at stake 
is the viability of ‘the polity’ in the abstract rather than the viability of a particular polity.  
One body of work in which the question of the common has been matched to the study of a 
polity in its specificity is that which addresses the European Union.  In this field, the so-
called ‘demos debate’ has been a central feature of r cent years.   
 This is a debate which was slow to emerge.  As an offshoot of political science, EU 
studies traditionally restricted itself to a fairly narrow range of institutional questions, chiefly 
to do with how best to explain the process of regional integration.  Next to the majesty of the 
neofunctionalist-intergovernmentalist debate, question  to do with ‘the people’ seemed rather 
slight.  ‘It is as impracticable as it is unnecessary,’ explained Ernst Haas, ‘to have recourse to 
general public opinion.’58  Those of a more euphemistic disposition tended to speak of a 
‘permissive consensus’ amongst member-state populations in favour of European 
integration.59  Discussion of demos-related issues can be associated with two subsequent and 
related ‘turns’ in the EU-studies literature.  The first may be called the ‘polity turn’.60  It 
marks a move towards treating the existence of the EU as an enduring phenomenon (a ‘brute 
fact’ rather than a temporary arrangement or an incipient process) and, moreover, as 
something worthy of study in its own right rather than as a derivation of national-
governmental policies.  The focus shifts from explaining the process of integration to 
exploring the nature of its outcome, and treating that outcome as a self-standing entity rather 
than just a highly developed form of intergovernmental organisation.  For those who accept 
this polity turn, the amount and the scope of legislation which is produced in Brussels, the 
extent to which this is beyond the immediate control of any single member-state government 
because of the powers of the European Commission and P rliament, and the use of majority 
                                                
58 Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950-57 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1958), p.16. 
59 Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European 
Community (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970). 
60 Cf. Volker Balli, 'A Normative Self-Understanding of the European Union "In Practise"', Standing Group on 
the European Union Third Pan-European Conference on EU Politics (Istanbul, Turkey, 2006); Peter Wagner 
and Heidrun Friese, 'Survey Article: The Nascent Political Philosophy of the European Polity', Journal of 
Political Philosophy, 10/3 (2002).  The ‘governance turn’ may be treated s an alternative expression for the 
same – cf. Beate Kohler-Koch and Berthold Rittberger, 'Review Article: The 'Governance Turn' in EU Studies', 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 44/1 (2006). 
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voting in the Council of Ministers, all point towards the need to see the EU as a polity of 
some sort.  Precisely what sort is of course highly contested (the question of how best to 
characterise the institutional regime will be returned to in Chapter 6), but few consider that 
the debate is irrelevant.61  The very ambiguity of the term ‘polity’, unburdened by the 
historical and disciplinary associations of terms such as the ‘state’ or the ‘political system’, 
and therefore accepting of a certain agnosticism as regards institutional design, makes it a 
suitable basis for consensus.  This acceptance of the EU as a brute fact is coupled with the 
growing tendency in the fields of International Relations and European Studies to 
problematise the nation-state as the natural ‘container’ of the political process.  Processes 
associated with ‘globalisation’, in particular the entrenchment of neoliberal economics and 
increases in transborder migration, have seemed to cast doubt on conventional (i.e. 
Westphalian) understandings of state sovereignty.62   
 A ‘polity turn’ implies a ‘normative turn’.  Firstly, to acknowledge the emergence of 
the EU as a self-standing polity, and to entertain doubts about the future of nation-state 
sovereignty, is a strongly normative move, whether one chooses to advertise this or not.63  
Rather than simply a classificatory matter, it says much about the kinds of political vision to 
which one wants to lend credence.  Secondly, and as a more explicit normative move, many 
scholars have addressed the implications for the health of contemporary European democracy 
of what they take to be the new empirical reality of a self-standing European polity.64  A 
range of questions emerge in this literature.  If democracy requires a demos, to what extent 
does one exist on a scale coextensive with the Union?  What kind of collective bond should a 
demos be understood to imply?  What are the preconditi s for such a bond?  Can one speak 
of a ‘democratic deficit’?  More concretely, can the EU serve as the basis for a normative 
project designed to preserve certain achievements of he European nation-state which are 
deemed to be facing erosion under the conditions of globalisation?  The continuous prospect 
                                                
61 For a useful overview of this debate, see Paul Magnette, What Is the European Union?: Nature and Prospects 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); also Neil Walker, 'The Idea of a European Constitution and the 
Finalité of Integration', Francisco Lucas Pires Working Papers Series on European Constitutionalism (2002). 
62 For one perspective on this, see Jürgen Habermas, 'The Postnational Constellation and the Future of 
Democracy', in Jürgen Habermas (ed.), The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays (Cambridge: Polity, 
2001b), esp. p.88. 
63 Cf. Neil Walker, 'Late Sovereignty in the European Union', in Neil Walker (ed.), Sovereignty in Transition 
(Oxford: Hart, 2003). 
64 Richard Bellamy and Dario Castiglione, 'The Normative Challenge of a European Polity: Cosmopolitan and
Communitarian Models Compared, Criticised and Combined', in Andreas Follesdal and Peter Koslowski (eds.), 
Democracy and the European Union (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1998); also, on the need for a more 
‘intentionalist’ paradigm for European integration, see Claus Offe, 'The Democratic Welfare State: A European 
Regime under the Strain of European Integration', Political Science Series, Institute for Advanced Studies, 
Vienna, 68 (2000).   
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of enlarging the Union to include further states on its periphery, and thereby to increase the 
diversity within the Union, adds to the force of such questions.  Authors concerned with 
normative questions have no doubt been drawn to the study of the EU exactly because it may 
seem to represent an opportunity to redefine what the nature of the collective bond should be.  
It represents a ‘fresh start’ as it were, and for the very fact that a multinational polity cannot 
rest purely on a national bond, it suggests the possibility to envisage a ‘post-national’ 
politics, a new kind of political closure which is not founded on an exclusive, hegemonic 
identity.  Naturally, normative concerns and empirical claims are frequently intertwined, such 
that a prescription for further European integration, r a return to the nation-state, is 
presented as the logical conclusion to be drawn from a particular diagnosis of the present.65 
 The debate about the common in the European context draws in many of the 
arguments from social and political theory which were considered in the preceding section.  
One widely held position sees ‘Europeans’ as linked by their shared interests.  In the 1940s 
and 1950s, the populations of European nation-states were generally seen as overtly hostile to 
one another, and it was assumed that any moves towards integration would have to quieten 
their passions by appealing to their interests.  In the early post-War years these interests were 
understood by many as security interests, implying a security bond based on the need to 
establish peace between European states.66  More commonly, and perhaps the default 
perspective on European integration once the early federalist visions had faded, an economic 
perspective was advanced.  With arguments similar to those made during the Scottish 
Enlightenment, it was suggested that integration and polity formation could be advanced by 
enabling the pursuit of interests through commercial exchange.  The deepening of market 
interaction, and functional integration led by the establishment of cross-national functional 
institutions, was viewed as establishing a commercial bond between elites; this in turn would 
create wider economic benefits for the member-state populations as a whole, and they would 
then come to associate their prosperity with the European Community and thus grant it a 
degree of allegiance.  The earliest act of integration was explicitly characterised by Jean 
Monnet in these terms: ‘in itself this [the founding of the ECSC] was a technical step, but its 
                                                
65 For an analysis of the interlinkage of normative and empirical arguments in Habermas’ work, see Pablo de 
Greiff, 'Habermas on Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism', Ratio Juris, 15/4 (2002), p.428. 
66 See e.g. Winston Churchill, ‘The tragedy of Europe’, Speech to the Academic Youth, Zurich, 19 Septembr 
1946, in Winston Churchill, Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches, 1897-1963 (Robert Rhodes James 
edn.; New York: Chelsea House, 1974).  Security interests could also be understood in terms of the coll ctive 
ability to influence global politics, an argument tha  has recently been explored by Glyn Morgan in the language 
of ‘justification’ – Glyn Morgan, The Idea of a European Superstate: Public Justificaion and European 
Integration (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). 
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new procedures, under common institutions, created  silent revolution in men’s minds.  It 
proved decisive in persuading businessmen, civil servants, politicians and trade unionists that 
… the economic and political advantages of unity over division were immense.’67  The 
ascendancy of the neofunctionalists, though they were little interested in normative questions 
and focused predominantly on elite actors, ensured that this was the mainstream perspective 
throughout the 1960s.68 
 The popularity of an interests-based approach has since somewhat declined however, 
no doubt partly because the Community itself has evolv d (since the Maastricht treaty at the 
latest, its policy fields extend well beyond the economic), and probably also for many of the 
reasons described earlier.  In descriptive-empirical terms, one may wonder whether a bond 
based on interests, security or commercial, is sufficient to constitute a political community.  
To conceive a European polity in terms of a commercial bond is to suggest that political 
community is ultimately reducible to one set of conerns (the economic) and that popular 
economic interests favour the integration process so unambiguously that they can be relied 
upon alone to generate the necessary allegiance to common institutions.  But interests, as has 
been said, tend not to be so unambiguous: they can be appraised in multiple ways, and are 
always susceptible to redescription.  Moreover, in th s market-oriented perspective the only 
shared interests are long-term; in the short-term, interests relate to individuals or aggregates 
of individuals, and pull in different directions therefore.  Even taking seriously the economic 
arguments for European integration, it is clear that not everyone can be a market ‘winner’ all 
of the time: benefits are distributed across time and space.  Particularly in periods of slow 
economic growth, many actors may come to perceive themselves to be ‘losers’, and other 
economic actors as competitors rather than partners i  transaction.  Non-elites in particular 
may decide that the short-term costs of integration tend to weigh most heavily on them (as 
indeed may be the case), and  there is no reason to suppose that an appeal to their ‘long-term 
economic interests’ will be sufficient to retain their sense of the collective.  If the empirical 
argument is inconclusive, for this reason one can take a critical approach to the normative 
implications of accepting such a position.  As suggested in the previous section, a 
commercial perspective on the common offers few opportunities for collective political 
action on the part of citizens.  The role of governme t is likely to be restricted to establishing 
                                                
67 Jean Monnet, 'A Ferment of Change', Journal of Common Market Studies, 1/3 (1963), p.205. 
68 Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950-57; Haas, Beyond the Nation-
State: Functionalism and International Organization (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964); Leon 
Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1963).  On the influence of the neofunctionalists, ee Jonathan P. J. White, 'Theory Guiding Practice: Th  
Neofunctionalists and the Hallstein EEC Commission', Journal of European Integration History, 9/1 (2003). 
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the regulatory framework within which market-based r lations unfold, with little opportunity 
for exercising democratic control over these.  Decision-making consists of a series of 
bargains between the representatives of interest groups, and since interests are taken as given 
there is no role for a process of political debate and contestation through which to evaluate 
them and through which to seek an interpretation of the common good.  To treat interests as 
constitutive of the demos is a depoliticising move, and is likely to exacerbate wider trends in 
contemporary democracy towards the marginalisation of the principle of democratic control 
or its narrow interpretation simply as the aggregation of votes on election day. 
 Considering a commercial bond too thin a basis for a European demos therefore, and 
seeking a perspective which enables the pursuit of more than just the most basic common 
goals, other authors have been tempted to apply some of the arguments to do with cultural 
and values-based commonality.  The approach which tr es o identify markers of ethical 
significance, as in the Romantic nationalist writings of the nineteenth-century, is rare in the 
academic literature.  Although discussion of the significance of Christianity for the EU was a 
feature of the public debate surrounding the drafting of the Constitutional Treaty, and has 
since been revived as a possibility by the German Chancellor,69 a religious bond of this kind 
seems both empirically and normatively implausible.  Likewise the ‘common European 
civilisation’ based on a ‘common heritage’ which was referred to in the 1973 Declaration on 
European Identity finds little comparable expression in contemporary academic writing.70  
Larry Siedentop does come close to declaring latent commonality amongst Europeans when 
he writes of the ‘moral inheritance’ which they share nd which they need to ‘become more 
conscious of’.71  In his narrative, Christianity (Protestantism in particular) was crucial in 
entrenching the modern idea of equality and the tradition of political liberalism; a mixture of 
residual anticlericalism and a mistaken pursuit of the multicultural society prevents 
‘Europeans’ recognising that this is what they have in common.  ‘Europeans have only to 
pick up the pieces of their past in order to become aware of important moral continuities.’72  
Despite this language of authenticity, there is nonetheless an instrumentalist bent to his 
argument.  This ‘story’ of the past which ‘we can tell ourselves’ has a purpose: ‘unless a 
coherent identity presides over the process of European integration, that process will, sooner 
or later, lead to disorder,’ and the ‘future influenc  of Europe in the world’ will depend on its 
                                                
69 See www.guardian.co.uk/eu/story/0,,1860140,00.html, accessed November 2006. 
70 For more on the Declaration, see Gerard Delanty, 'Models of European Identity: Reconciling Universalim 
and Particularism', Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 3/3 (2002). 
71 Larry Siedentop, Democracy in Europe (London: Allen Lane, 2000), Chap. 10 (‘Europe, Christianity and 
Islam’), p.214. 
72 Ibid. p.189. 
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clarity.73  With this pragmatic twist, it is recognisably a twenty-first century version of the 
nineteenth-century argument.  The position falls foul f the same arguments we raised 
against the original, however: it posits a level of h mogeneity which can be seen either as 
wholly unrealistic for today’s Europe or, if one were to take it seriously, highly repressive of 
those who do not conform easily to it. 
 A looser and unequivocally instrumentalist conception of a cultural bond is more 
frequently to be found in the European demos debate.  Anthony Smith defines ‘collective 
cultural identity’ in terms which avoid valorising a particular narrative: ‘This would refer not 
to some fixed pattern or uniformity of elements over time, but rather to a sense of shared 
continuity on the part of successive generations of a given unit of population, and to shared 
memories of earlier periods, events and personages in the history of the unit … [and] the 
collective belief in a common destiny of that unit and its culture.’74  The emphasis is strongly 
on perceptions – note the (not entirely clear) concepts of shared memories and collective 
beliefs.  Like Miller in the previous section, Smith seeks to avoid the normative charge that 
he is positing an unduly strong degree of homogeneity by emphasising the possibility of 
multiple identifications and the importance of situation.  ‘In the ancient world,’ he writes, ‘it 
was possible to be Athenian, Ionian and Greek all at the same time; in the medieval world, to 
be Bernese, Swiss and Protestant; in the modern Thid World to be Ibo, Nigerian and African 
simultaneously.  Similarly, one could feel simultaneously Catalan, Spanish and European; 
even – dare one say it? – Scottish-or-English, British and European.’75  A large body of 
empirical literature attempts to operationalise these distinctions and to measure the ‘sense of 
belonging’ or ‘identity’ which EU citizens display.76  There is much talk of ‘nested’ and 
‘cross-cutting’ identities, and even a ‘marble cake’ model has been put forward.77  However, 
as suggested above, and as will be discussed further in the next chapter, the appeal to 
individual perceptions – unless one wishes to remain at a very high level of abstraction – 
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brings significant methodological problems with it.  Furthermore, how abstract feelings of 
belonging connect to the question of political community is not immediately clear, and the 
more the cultural identification is pluralised and relativised, and seen to be fluid and 
evolving, the less it can be seen as determining the viability of political institutions.   
 Unsurprisingly, the temptation is always to fill out the details of the narrative, 
leading to a position which is rather less ecumenical.  When asking specifically what is 
common to all Europeans, Smith has a list of attribu es including traditions of Roman law, 
political democracy, parliamentary institutions, Judeo-Christian ethics, Renaissance 
humanism, rationalism, empiricism, romanticism and classicism, which in his view together 
constitute a ‘family of cultures’ in at least some of which ‘all Europe’s communities’ have 
participated.78  For him, what needs to be established is how far an awareness of these shared 
traditions has penetrated ‘each of Europe’s national identities’.79  The link between culture 
and political community is made explicit: 
 
… until the great majority of Europeans, the great m ss of the middle and lower classes, are ready to 
imbibe these European messages in a similar manner and to feel inspired by them to common action 
and community, the edifice of ‘Europe’ at the political level will remain shaky.  This is all too clear 
today in respect of foreign policy and defence, where we are witnessing the need for European 
governments to respond to their national public opinion and the failure of Europeans to agree on a 
common policy.  Once again, the usual divisions of public opinion between European states have been 
exposed, and with them the tortuous and divided actions of Europe’s governments … The ‘European 
failure’ only underlines the distance between the European ideal and its rootedness in the popular 
consciousness of Europe’s national populations – and he ce the distance between European unification 
at the political and cultural levels and the realities of divergent national identities, perceptions ad 
interests within Europe. 
 
By equating divisions of opinion with a lack of European identity and as therefore 
antithetical to political community, the culturalist reasoning thus arrives at a rather 
unfortunate political philosophy.  Political adversarialism, rather than the mark of the healthy 
democracy, becomes that which should fade away oncecultural disharmony is removed.  
While one may perhaps sympathise with Smith’s frustration at an inadequate ‘European’ 
response to the 1990s Balkan crisis, it is clear tht positing the necessity of cultural unity 
feeds all too easily into a strong conception of the common good which emphasises the 
necessity of political agreement.  The conception of citizenship is a quite passive one, 
whereby good citizens display the regularity of opinion to which their cultural regularities 
should dispose them.  A collective bond of this kind is a strongly depoliticising one. 
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79 Ibid. p.71. 
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 Faced with these unwelcome implications, there is the option of course to downplay 
the cultural dimension and to speak of reciprocal identification less closely tied to cultural 
markers; that is, to propose a social bond rather than a cultural one.  In this perspective, a 
polity must be underpinned by trust and solidarity amongst its citizens, trust understood as 
the belief that other citizens (strangers) will undertake their civic duties, solidarity as the 
willingness to comply in situations where others and not oneself are the beneficiaries.  Such 
beliefs, it is supposed, enable the effective operation of many of the most basic functions of a 
polity, including taxation, social security and the assembly of military force.  Neither of these 
social dispositions is simply the faithful observance of cultural commonality, but nor can 
they be generated from above: as Claus Offe puts it, ‘ he “horizontal” phenomena of trust and 
solidarity (linking citizens to each other) are preconditions for the “vertical” phenomenon of 
the establishment and continued existence of state authority ...’80  The polity can do no more 
than develop what already exists.  Offe views a European polity with some scepticism on the 
grounds that such trust and solidarity is absent amongst Europeans.81  Indeed, it may be that 
an ‘idea of liberation’ is required to generate thesense of unity between people under which 
trust and solidarity can flourish, ‘be it liberation from the rule of oppressive or exploitative 
foreign … powers or liberation from princely particularism, arbitrariness, unjust oppression, 
and belligerent passions.’  Since there is no obvious sense in which Europe holds ‘the 
promise of liberation’, Offe concludes that for the foreseeable future there will be no 
European social bond to underpin a European polity.82   
 This diagnosis is ostensibly plausible, and avoids conceptualising the collectivity in 
terms which are inherently exclusionary.  It largely avoids social determinism, since – not 
least because Offe is vague on the origins of trust and solidarity – he does not rule out the 
possibility that they might later emerge at a European level.  Also, his approach initiates a 
welcome shift away from the focus on ‘objective realities’ (interests or cultural markers) and 
individual perceptions towards what one might call social practices, the methodological 
implications of which move will be considered further in the next chapter.  Nonetheless, the 
account relies on a considerable amount of assertion.  Offe’s challenge is to identify the ‘dog 
that doesn’t bark’: that is, the continued non-occurrence of trust and solidarity between 
Europeans.  It is a notoriously difficult type of challenge, especially if one wishes to attribute 
a decisive importance to the non-occurrence, since one has little sense of what the non-
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occurrence might look like if it did occur, and little reason to be sure that, of all the non-
occurrences which do not occur, this is the decisive one.  One could in principle use the 
method of contrast: that is, one could give some indication of the nature and significance of 
the non-occurrence by highlighting the nature and the significance of its occurrence 
elsewhere.  However, Offe is not in a position to do this, since his argument is that the 
process of European integration also weakens levels of trust and solidarity which European 
populations demonstrate amongst themselves (as opposed to across one another).  Thus he 
can give little indication, other than a footnote or two concerning patterns of charitable 
donation,83 of how suitable levels of trust and solidarity would look if they were present.  
One does indeed wonder how one would measure the presence or absence of trust and 
solidarity other than with reference to that which it is supposed to determine, the viability of 
the polity and its institutions.  Offe’s argument, which is generally maintained at a high level 
of historico-sociological abstraction, does not clarify this.    
 These weak points in the descriptive-analytical potential of the argument mean that 
one needs good normative reasons for adopting it.  One wonders, however, whether this 
approach does not rather overplay the importance of the social bond for political community, 
again at the expense of adversarialism.  Offe speaks of ‘social trust, or the presumption of 
generally benign or at least non-hostile intentions  the part of partners in interaction’ as 
being ‘arguably indispensable as a factor of social integration in modern democratic market 
societies.’84  It seems evident that the kind of trust he has in mi d is that which is universal 
across the political community, extended to all citizens, and without distinction according to 
issue-area.  It is not clear however why this should be a necessary feature of a political 
community.  Is it not possible for citizens to see c rtain other groups of citizens as opponents, 
persons whose intentions may well be hostile towards them, without this spelling the end of 
political community?  Is this not precisely how, speaking in stereotypes, the poor may see the 
rich, or the country folk may see the urbanites?  And is it not exactly this mis-trust which 
may inspire them to form political movements so as to eek to capture the political agenda?  
These are open questions admittedly, but they do seem to point towards an alternative 
reading.  What are surely more important in the European context than blanket trust (or 
solidarity) across populations are two related but different conditions: a) that identification 
does not always, on all issues, divide up along national lines; and b) that those who are not 
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trusted (or however one terms it) are nonetheless tolerated as members of the political 
community.  Neither of these presupposes the existence of a comprehensive social bond 
extending evenly across all citizens in all areas. 
 As will have been anticipated in light of the earlier section, a European demos can 
also be conceptualised without reference to a socio-cultural substrate.  One such approach 
imagines a bond of shared values and principles.  That supposedly universal shared 
principles such as human rights or the rule of law might constitute the common is a 
perspective which has been aired in the European debate, though predictably with limited 
success.  The constitutional patriotism of the earli r Habermas provides little basis for a 
collective bond which is specifically European, and most constitutional patriots refer to a 
more particularist set of values, as below.85  As Pierre Manent has observed, ‘Europeans 
cannot consider that only Europe is entitled to the universal because, if they did so, at that 
very instant the universal would cease to be universal!’86  Some of those authors who do 
make reference to principles intended to be universal probably do so for the very reason that 
they oppose the idea of a European polity, preferring to see it instead as an expanding 
association of loosely interdependent states under conditions of globalisation.  Thus Anthony 
Giddens, for whom ‘the EU is not a state at all, and will never become one’, argues that ‘the 
identity of the Union … should be developed around civic values, not around attempts to find 
a common heritage’, and that ‘what matters about the European Union today is not primarily 
that it is European, but that it forms a bridgehead towards global governance.’87  It is 
certainly a consistent move to reject the universal a  a basis for the particular, but it comes at 
the price of claiming that the particular is actually the embodiment of the universal, i.e. that 
the EU is the vanguard of mankind’s future.  Historically, such moves tend to arouse 
suspicion from those outside the vanguard. 
 More frequent therefore has been the move to invoke values or principles understood 
to be European rather than universal.  This is the approach one associates with the later 
Habermas.  It is not ‘relativist’ – it retains a criti al disposition in prioritising certain values 
over others as expressive of the common – but it sees the universal as mediated by 
particularity.  That which is shared comes to be elaborated and redefined in the course of 
constituting the polity, and acts as the normative consensus within which political conflict is 
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contained.  ‘In a future Federal Republic of European States,’ writes Habermas, ‘the same 
legal principles would … have to be interpreted from the perspectives of different national 
traditions and histories.  One’s own tradition must in each case be appropriated from a 
vantage point relativised by the perspectives of other raditions, and appropriated in such a 
manner that it can be brought into a transnational, Western European constitutional culture.  
A particularist anchoring of this kind would not do away with one iota of the universalist 
meaning of popular sovereignty and human rights.’88  Moral self-reflection on the 
experiences of European history plays a special role in this perspective, as a shared set of 
post-nationalist values emerges through an engagement with the past and an 
acknowledgement of the destructive tendencies of the Westphalian nation-state system.89  
Lest this process of reflection seem excessively abstr ct, often there is the suggestion that the 
shared values or shared ‘political culture’ be given tangible form with the creation of a 
European constitution.  Both the legal text itself, and the experience of drafting and debating 
that text, serve to amplify the values held in common, ideally exerting a ‘catalytic effect’ on 
the consolidation of the polity.90  The emphasis on a creative process is clear: rather than the 
polity being dependent upon pre-political bonds, it is affirmed that ‘peoples come into being 
… only with their state constitutions.’91  Habermas fills out the perspective by drawing on his 
earlier work on the public sphere,92 and his later work on deliberative democracy.93 
 Importantly, those proposing a collective bond of this kind as the basis for a 
European demos generally do not see it as a substitute for identification at the national level.  
Habermas observes that ‘it is neither possible nor desirable to level out the national identities 
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of member nations, nor melt them down into a “Nation of Europe”.’94  Likewise, J.H.H. 
Weiler, though diverging from Habermas in expressing scepticism towards an EU 
constitution, envisages a separation of roles, European citizens having ‘contemporaneous 
membership in an organic national-cultural demos and in a supranational civic, value-driven 
demos.’95  Rather than a European demos, this view imagines a  assembly of demoi.  ‘The 
national is Eros: Reaching back to the pre-modern, appealing to the heart with a grasp on our 
emotions, and evocative of the romantic vision of creative social organization as well as 
responding to our existential yearning for a meaning located in time and space.  The nation, 
through its myths, provides a past and a future.  And it is always a history and a destiny in a 
place, in a territory, a narrative that is fluid and fixed at the same time.  The dangers are self-
evident.  The Supranational is Civilization: Confidently modernist, appealing to the rational 
within us and to Enlightenment neo-classical humanism, taming that Eros.’96  Rather than 
negated, national modes of identification are simply not privileged: hence the sense of 
Cronin’s observation that this version of constitutional patriotism is best characterised as 
‘post-nationalist’ rather than ‘post-national’.97  
 By focusing on discourse and the discursive renegotiati n of the common, this 
approach avoids mistaking ‘the people’ for a coherent body extending through time.  It is 
clear on the point that ‘the people’ should be understood as a floating signifier whose 
meaning is cast differently at different times, thereby opening the space for a political 
process of revaluation.98  That it cannot specify who is to be party to this process of 
renegotiation is a failing shared with all the approaches we have discussed, contrary to the 
claims of certain culturalists, since no representations of ‘the people’ can count as final, and 
so the referent is always contested and evolving.  This emphasis on ongoing reappraisal 
notwithstanding, in certain important ways it seems unconducive to contestatory politics and 
active citizenship.99  Firstly, insofar as a thin collective bond of civi  alues at the European 
level is coupled with the reinvention of a cultural bond at the national level, many of the 
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criticisms we directed at the latter are transferabl : one does not circumvent them by insisting 
that the cultural bond be domestic to the nation-state.  Secondly, while it is through a process 
of open debate that particularist European values ar  held to emerge, the parameters within 
which these should lie seem quite narrowly defined in advance: deliberation in the unfolding 
public sphere is marked by its rationality and should lead ultimately to a rational consensus.  
The model is therefore vulnerable to one of the criticisms made of Habermasian deliberative 
democracy more generally: that it is depoliticising because it has an elitist bias, since it limits 
the involvement of citizens who are only weakly able to frame their interventions according 
to prevailing conceptions of what characterises ration l debate.100  A disjuncture may then 
emerge such that certain values achieve consensus at the elite level – aversion to the death 
penalty, for instance – without these reflecting the achievement of a broader consensus across 
the citizen body, leaving large numbers of citizens (perhaps the majority) only with the 
options either to adapt or withdraw their consent.101  Even were one to accept the conceptual 
possibility of a genuine post-political consensus that extended to all Europeans without it 
being a ‘top-down imposition’, one would be strained to imagine the public sphere 
adequately free of power-political influences and the functional problems of language 
diversity such that this ideal consensus could takeshape in an inclusive public debate.102   
 Moreover, while it is questionable whether shared values sufficiently uncontroversial 
to be accepted by all would generate much of an affective response, those that might do so 
could well be politically unattractive.  Appealing to emotions of shame and anger, one 
proposal for a more affective constitutional patriotism,103 would involve couching large 
numbers of contemporary political issues in the language of morality.  This holds 
considerable problems: if political actors conclude that moralistic arguments appealing to 
values embodied in a constitution are ‘trumps’, it encourages them to frame political debates 
as moral clashes between right and wrong.  This may le d to the adoption of an 
unquestioning disposition and a conviction of moral superiority, which in turn may lead to a 
hardening of intolerance and the demonisation of opponents.  Such features have been noted 
in the Europe-wide reaction in 2000 to the involvement of Jörg Haider’s FPÖ party in 
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Austria’s coalition government.104  The withdrawal of normal courtesies at the diplomatic 
level, and a series of demonstrations by ordinary citizens around Europe intended to ‘shame’ 
those who had voted for Haider, engendered an unattractive mix of expressions of moral 
superiority on the one side and defensiveness and indignation on the other, both with 
nationalist undertones.  By converting Haider’s success from a political into a moral issue, 
the boundaries of legitimate public debate became narrowed, and those in sympathy with his 
views were placed outside the normal political process.  Much as one may sympathise with 
the moral judgement behind it, such a move arguably weakens the political process by 
increasing the danger of anti-democratic responses. 
 Lastly there is the question of the constitution itself.  Many advocates of 
constitutional patriotism in the EU context are advocates of an EU constitution: giving 
emphasis to legal structures is one way to avoid ungrounded speculation about the values 
which a set of people (as individuals) may hold in common.  With a constitution, not only is 
there a specific text which the demos has in common; there is also the experience of drafting 
and debating that text, the experience of the constitutional moment.105  While this is 
undoubtedly true in the case of successful constitutional polities, it may be that they also 
enjoy certain supporting conditions.  The ‘idea of liberation’ referred to above may be one.  
Large numbers of popular movements embodying the demand for a constitution might be 
another.  Widespread and stable prior agreement about the kind of polity which is to be 
founded (its regime) might be a further requirement (a d this, in the EU case, presumably as 
a derivation of convergent experiences at the natiol level).  These conditions allow for a 
constructive drafting process and for a text short enough to have popular resonance.106  
Where they are absent however, the drafting and approval process may be a divisive affair, 
merely serving to highlight how little ‘the people’ hold in common.  Constitutions alone do 
not generate patriotism. 
 
                                                
104 On the dangers of the use of ‘shaming’ in response to the rise of Haider in Austria, see both Jan-Werner 
Müller, 'A 'Thick' Constitutional Patriotism for the EU?  On Morality, Memory and Militancy', Law and 
Democracy in Europe's Post-National Constellation: Concluding Conference of the CIDEL-Project (EUI 
Florence, 2005), and Chantal Mouffe, On the Political (London: Verso, 2005). 
105 On this see Habermas, 'Why Europe Needs a Constitution', and Neil Walker, 'Europe’s Constitutional 
Momentum and the Search for Polity Legitimacy', International Journal of Constitutional Law, 4/2 (2005). 
106 The assumption here is that agreement is likely to produce a shorter text.  One could of course imagine that 
disagreement might produce a short and highly ambiguous text, the avoidance of specificity being the only way 
to secure ultimate agreement, but such a text would be much less likely to succeed as a common point of 
(affective) identification. 
 33 
 In presenting this overview of the European demos debate, the intention has been to 
suggest that none of the approaches currently available is of such descriptive plausibility it 
has to be accepted at face value, and that for this eason the political implications of each are 
an appropriate element in their assessment.  The commonality required for a European demos 
does not seem to be fully captured when conceptualised n terms of a security bond, a 
commercial bond, a cultural bond, a social bond, or a values/constitutional bond.  Moreover, 
each seems to carry a depoliticising tendency of some kind, whether this involves proposing 
a high degree of regularity across the citizen body and downgrading the importance of 
political adversarialism, or emptying public life of the pursuit of all but the most general 
shared ends.  None of these perspectives seems to provide a satisfactory perspective from 
which to conceive political community on a scale coxtensive with the European Union. 
 One coherent response would be to dismiss therefor b th the possibility of a 
European demos and with it the viability of the EU.  The difficulty of conceptualising the 
collective bond would be read as the consequence of features specific to the EU case, such as 
cleavage structures across the member-state populati ns and the historical conditions in 
which the EU has emerged.  In this perspective, the debate has ground to a halt due to real-
world reasons: there is something particular about E rope which makes the question of 
peoplehood essentially problematic, and it should therefore be put to one side so as to 
concentrate better on democracy at the nation-state lev l.  Such a response would be 
premature and perhaps a little complacent.  It would s ggest that there are no further lines to 
the debate that can be pursued, something one may hope to dispute.  It would also suggest 
that the task of conceptualising the collective bond at the state level does not face similar 
difficulties.  Yet as ongoing debates in many EU memb r-states and North America about 
‘national identity’, citizenship, social inclusion and the limits of tolerance imply, the nature 
of the demos resists easy conceptualisation at the stat level too.107  Abolishing the EU would 
not resolve this, since wider processes of globalisation and ongoing social differentiation are 
involved.  The question of the common is one which liberal democracy as a whole 
increasingly grapples with in today’s world; its difficulty is not peculiar to the EU, and so its 
difficulty cannot lightly be seen in itself as evidence of the non-viability of the EU.108   
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 A second coherent response would be to dismiss not the EU as such but the 
possibility of democracy at a European level.  Such a move is quite common in the EU-
studies literature.  It tends not to take the form f a Schumpeterian dismissal of the very idea 
of rule by ‘the people’.109  Rather, those contesting the ‘polity turn’ argue that the EU is best 
seen as an international regime in which member-state governments retain the crucial 
powers.  The trappings of democracy, and collective bonds in particular, are not necessary at 
a European level therefore, since popular sovereignty is secured at the nation-state level; any 
remaining problems of democracy are institutional and can be addressed through member-
state initiatives (e.g. making the Council of Ministers more transparent, or increasing the role 
of national MPs in the scrutiny of European legislat on).110  A related argument holds that, 
while the EU institutions do (and should) exert real powers in certain policy-areas, these are 
not areas in which majoritarian democracy is needed.  Andrew Moravcsik speaks of a 
division of labour between the EU and its member-state  which ‘gives the impression that the 
EU is undemocratic, whereas it is in fact simply specialising in those aspects of modern 
democratic governance that tend to involve less direct political participation.’111  This is in 
line with Fritz Scharpf’s distinction between ‘input-oriented legitimation’, based on popular 
voice, and ‘output-oriented legitimation’, based on quantifiable success in the achievement of 
goals.112  The activities of the EU institutions are restricted to policies which are regulatory 
rather than redistributive (or technocratic rather than political), and for this reason he 
suggests they require legitimation only of the second kind, for which ‘demos’-related issues 
are unimportant.  Giandomenico Majone likewise emphasises that the EU’s competences are 
(and should remain) limited to regulatory policies (‘efficiency issues’, as he calls them), and 
argues that for these the crucial principles are expertise and the neutrality of regulators, 
principles which non-majoritarian institutions are b st placed to observe.  Accountability is 
thus indirect, and again the question of a demos that can exert democratic control is 
avoided.113 
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 The difficulty for these authors is to identify what constitutes an ‘efficiency issue’, 
i.e. an issue for which political contestation is unnecessary.  To do so properly, one would 
have to be able to define the nature of the issue without appealing to a historically rooted set 
of ideological assumptions.  That the contemporary liberal-economic orthodoxy holds for 
example that monetary policy is best removed from the control of political representatives 
does not suffice to establish that this is so; the contrary perspective, that the timing and depth 
of adjustments to currency exchange rates has consequences involving unequally distributed 
costs and benefits, and that the issue is therefore on  for political negotiation and 
compromise, is an equally plausible perspective.  This being so, the majoritarian model of 
democracy is hard fully to abandon.  While the delegation of power to bureaucracies may be 
necessary for the day-to-day functioning of a democracy, in any perspective which takes 
seriously the sovereign authority of ‘the people’ it needs to be possible for this delegation of 
power to be periodically challenged.  That one could conceive European-level policy-making 
as purely technocratic is illusory.  Questions of democracy do not go away at the European 
level, and so neither does the question of the demos. 
 A third coherent response to the difficulties of cn eptualising the common would be 
to argue that these difficulties highlight the impossibility of imagining the demos in anything 
less than universal terms.  In this view, the acceptance of political boundaries can only be a 
temporary concession: any theoretical attempt to conceptualise the common should be more 
ambitious and should take a global polity as its point f departure.  As the cosmopolitan 
theorist Robert Goodin puts it, there are ‘good grounds for thinking that (at least in principle) 
we should give virtually everyone a vote on virtually everything virtually everywhere in the 
world.’114  This response, though not complacent, is again premature.  The normative reasons 
to be sceptical of global governance cannot be explored here, though their existence can be 
acknowledged.115  The practical difficulties are rather obvious: creating a world government 
would require all known power-centres voluntarily to relinquish their power under conditions 
where – quite in contrast to a Hobbesian state of nature – they are by no means all equally 
vulnerable to threat.  This is, as Goodin acknowledges, quite possibly a ‘wildly impractical’ 
vision, and ‘even the most dewy-eyed cosmopolitans r rely envisage a centralized, unitary 
government issuing world-wide diktats from some Capital of the World.  The proposal is 
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almost always for a “world government, federal in form.”’116  Once one reverts to a federal 
model, taking territorial states as given and exploring the possible relations between them, 
the question of the common quickly returns at a sub-glo al level, for even in a global 
federation the viability of the federal units is animportant concern.  One suspects that the 
argument for a global demos may be treated as another device with which to highlight 
cosmopolitan obligations between states rather than as a proposal for global government, and 
is therefore a counter-argument to exploring further  European case only in appearance. 
 We shall therefore adopt what is a fourth coherent sponse, which is to conclude 
that the demos question needs to be explored from a different angle.  A new kind of 
collective bond needs to be conceptualised, one that can serve as a normative ideal whilst 
retaining a basic level of empirical plausibility.  The next section lays out some ideas for a 
formulation we shall refer to as a ‘political bond’.  It will be sketched as an outline, to be 
developed further over the course of the subsequent chapters. 
 
 
A Political Bond 
 
Drawing on what has been said so far, one challenge must be to conceive of a bond which is 
sufficiently ‘thick’ to make sense of the political community without being unacceptably 
exclusionary and without implying a position of social determinism.  Though demanding, 
this seems an important orientating principle with w ich to begin.  An alternative conception 
of the collective bond arguably needs to be more substantial than a commercial bond, which 
tends towards the atomisation of individuals and which allows space only for a minimal 
conception of the common and the common good.  Such a position rather strongly downplays 
any notion of ‘the people’ as engaged in collective self-rule, and seeks to empty public life of 
the pursuit of all but the most general shared ends.  At the same time, however, one does not 
want to lay the basis for a thicker conception of the common simply by invoking 
homogeneity of culture and values.  The myth of ‘the people’ as an enduring, 
transgenerational entity needs to be abandoned: contra those espousing the essentialist 
version of a cultural bond, it should be considered no more than a myth, and contra those 
espousing the instrumentalist version of such a bond, it should be considered an unhelpful 
myth.  It posits a degree of uniformity which is unrealistic and which, being unrealistic, 
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would be repressive to seek to achieve.  Its conception of the common good is too strong.  It 
also – in some variants – implies strong constraints on the possibility of new political 
beginnings, since the viability of political institutions is socio-culturally determined.  Such 
approaches, one might say, put excessive emphasis on what individuals are assumed to have 
in common, at the expense of what, more voluntaristically, they may be said to hold in 
common, where the latter refers to a practice rathe than an attribute.  If this suggests a move 
away from the socio-cultural to the political, again care is needed to avoid conceptualising 
the common in terms which are overly thin, as may be the case when one imagines a 
constitutional bond based on allegiance to fundamental principles.   
 A related challenge is to strike a balance between emphasising relations of conflict 
and relations of consensus and agreement.  A commercial bond is perhaps too comfortable 
with the presence of conflict, since its image of self-interested individuals in competitive 
pursuit of divergent private interests raises the lik lihood of political community itself being 
the object of ongoing cost-benefit calculations.  The integrity of the demos is likely to persist 
despite, rather than as a result of, such a bond.  However, many of the other approaches we 
have considered put rather too much store by consensu  and agreement, often seeking an 
overarching ‘identity’ to which all must subscribe, whether this is understood pre-politically, 
in terms of culture, values, trust and solidarity, or post-politically, in terms of rationality.  
Any conception of politics which allows for reasonable but fundamental disagreement about 
the life in common requires a collective bond which lies somewhere between these two, 
which allows for some notion of common endeavour whilst at the same time admitting the 
possibility of a plurality of political goods and some degree of conflict in their pursuit.  Some 
sense of common purpose with others in the citizen body is indispensible, but one need not 
assume that this should extend to all citizens at all times.  In conceptualising an alternative 
collective bond one may take inspiration in this regard from those who conceive an agonistic 
model of democracy.  Mouffe presents her understanding of agonistic politics in contrast to 
rationalist perspectives on the one hand and ‘antago ism’, i.e. unrestrained intolerance, on 
the other.  She maintains the idea of the common good, but treats it as a ‘vanishing point’ 
which can never be reached.117  As she puts it: ‘In politics the public interest i  always a 
matter of debate and a final agreement can never be reached; to imagine such a situation is to 
dream of a society without politics.  One should not h pe for the elimination of disagreement 
but for its containment within forms that respect the existence of liberal democratic 
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institutions.’118  From this perspective, the embrace of adversarialism may also engender the 
kind of affective response liable to be absent when t  collective bond is conceived in terms 
of allegiance to abstract principles.  Mouffe’s oppsition to all kinds of consensus and 
rationalism tends to be rather strongly stated, and it may be that the possibility of consensus, 
based on some idea of ‘reasonableness’ rather than ratio ality, is something which one needs 
to hold on to, both for normative and empirical reasons.119  Without it, there may be little 
defence against a tyranny of the majority, little scope for a progressive politics, and the 
constant danger that passions become mobilised for illiberal ends.  But a conceptualisation of 
the collective bond should treat consensus as a possible achievement rather than as a 
presupposition.  Benjamin Barber seems to have it right with his rather poetic formulation: 
‘the garden where there is no discord makes politics unnecessary; just as the jungle where 
there is no reasonableness makes politics impossible.’120   
 A further challenge for formulating a more political conception of the common is to 
maintain a close link to the substantive issues which political decision-making addresses.  
One wants political problems themselves, rather than cultural markers, values or suchlike, to 
be the reference-points for collective positioning, enabling ordinary citizens to ‘make sense 
of’ the political community in terms which are closely related to their everyday concerns, and 
taking advantage of the possibilities a European polity seems to hold for tackling common 
problems on a continental scale.  This means giving greater emphasis to how the nature of 
the collective may vary across issue-areas.  Instead of performing what we called earlier a 
reductive move, whereby just economic issues or just c ltural issues are held to be the 
fundamental points of orientation for political community, one wants to hold open the 
possibility that different issue-areas inspire kinds of identification.  One wants to 
problematise the notion that one must speak either of a ‘European demos’ or of a ‘national 
demos’ (or of both, or neither), and to raise the possibility, cautiously, that the collective 
bond may be rather less uniform than this, that it need not involve a comprehensive symbolic 
closure and a settled allocation of institutional competences either at the one level or the 
other.  There is an empirical sense to this move – such uniformity may be unrealistic, both in 
terms of institutional structures and symbolic boundary-marking – and a normative sense – 
such uniformity may sacrifice the attainment of certain substantive goods and certain 
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possibilities for political inclusion to a rather dy concern with structural coherence.  Such a 
move is not without potential difficulties, as will be discussed in Chapter 6.  There is 
however an existing body of literature which explores the institutional consequences of such 
a move in the European context.121   
 Most conceptualisations of the collective bond in the European debate avoid 
altogether the discussion of specific political issue  and maintain their discussion at a more 
abstract level.122  Most likely this is because the demos question seem  to refer to the form of 
political life rather than to its substance, and seems to require a perspective emptied of 
particularities, since ‘the nature of an issue’ cannot itself determine the political process by 
which it should be dealt.  To be sure, who does and does not share in a particular set of 
substantive problems does not translate easily into a principle by which to include and 
exclude people from the political community, since th se are highly subjective matters, but 
that should not disqualify it from consideration: unless one expects from one’s 
conceptualisation of the common an answer to the boundary question, something which 
should not be made the mark of a useful perspective, an appeal to issues in their particularity 
does not seem out of place.  Indeed, precisely this ambiguity on matters of membership may 
speak in its favour, since it discourages the formation of hard boundaries towards the world 
outside the polity.  This is indeed the approach which we associated earlier with a republican 
bond, whereby commonality is conceived in terms of c mmon problems and common 
conflicts.  Elements of this more issue-based approach have been taken up in the EU debate 
by several scholars.  Kalypso Nicolaidis has gesturd in this direction by arguing that ‘the 
glue that binds the EU together is not a shared identity; it is, rather, shared projects and 
objectives’, and by speaking of the Union as a ‘community of projects’.123  Charles Sabel and 
his collaborators have developed a distinctive, pragm tist approach to the EU – ‘directly-
deliberative polyarchy’ – which is marked by its rejection of the need for common identity, 
shared orientations or fundamental values, and its emphasis rather on the recognition of 
common problems whose resolution, because of the complexity and uncertainty of the 
modern world, requires mutual engagement, practical cooperation and the reciprocal 
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exchange of ideas.124  Though the question of the common tends to be secondary in these 
accounts to matters of institutional design, the move towards substantive issues seems a 
useful one, allowing a close link to be maintained between the theoretical question of the 
demos and the everyday concerns of ordinary people.  Furthermore, it allows us to draw on a 
body of literature (explored further in Chapter 2) that looks at how political issues may 
become the target of mass mobilisation for collective action.  The demos debate can therefore 
be enriched not just with theoretical work on agonistic democracy but also with empirically-
minded approaches to citizenship and mass involvement in adversarial politics.125 
 With these considerations in mind, one can sketch, in the form of a normative ideal, 
an alternative conceptualisation of the collective bond, one that will be taken forward for 
further exploration in the following chapters.  This perspective is centred on the idea that 
human ties may emerge out of the sense of ‘shared predicament’, i.e. the sense of being faced 
with the same problems.  What constitutes ‘us’ in this perspective is not some attribute that 
‘we’ share or believe ourselves to share, but the sense that we find ourselves in situations 
which are alike.  From this may emerge the sense that ‘our’ fates are entwined and that our 
problems need addressing collectively.  ‘We’ may come to see ourselves locked into 
situations together, and therefore grant allegiance to those political institutions which seem to 
promise an amelioration of those situations.  These ideas can be set out more exactly by 
dividing this alternative conceptualisation of the collective bond into three parts as follows: 
 
1. The Political Common.   
This first element points to the significance of sub tantive political issues.  A political 
common may be defined as the assumed existence by members of the collective of mportant 
common problems in need of address.  At its core would be the myriad substantive problems 
which provoke a sense of injustice and the perceived need for remedy amongst sections of 
the citizen body.  Such problems would be ‘common’ in the sense that they would be treated 
by those who articulate them as shared, as liable to affect ‘people like us’ rather than just 
‘me’, where the ‘we’ may differ according to the problem in question.  This is not to suggest 
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they would be appraised by all in consistently the same way, that there is uniformity in how 
they are constructed: one could expect some variation across space and time.  They would 
not be common in the sense of there being a consensu  that every such problem affects 
everyone alike in the political community: on the contrary, a we-they dynamic would be 
involved, such that it is assumed that there are opponents to ‘people like us’ living within the 
political community whose position on these problems is quite different, or who may indeed 
be generative of them.  What is critical, rather than that they would attract ‘common frames’ 
shared by all in the community, is that when articulated they would be ‘framed as common’ 
and recognised by others as familiar points of reference.126   
 By speaking of ‘assumed existence’ the intention is to avoid taking a position on the 
ontological status of such problems, and instead to foreground their appraisal and 
interpretation.  By suggesting that these problems would be considered ‘important’ and ‘in 
need of address’ it is implied that they would be th subject of a certain amount of affective 
involvement.  They would be reference-points considere  to be significant.  It might be that 
those who articulated and appraised them would not necessarily themselves use the word 
‘political’ to refer to such problems, but they would have to treat them as both shared and 
significant.  By referring to ‘members of the collective’, one implies an unspecified number 
of individuals affiliated to the polity.  The origins of their membership is a question which 
can be bracketed for the reasons given above.  Their number would be unspecified, since not 
all problems would need to be of importance to all persons in all places: there is scope for 
variety here, though one would want ‘most of the peopl ’ to make ‘at least some 
assumptions’ of this kind.   
  One can suppose that a rich political common composed of many diverse kinds of 
problem would be conducive to preserving the integri y of the community.  In so far as 
common problems are perceived, it is perhaps likely that some would be seen as ‘going 
together’ because they have similar origins or similar effects, as opposed to others which 
relate to quite different aspects of life, with the consequence that a political common would 
be composed of a plurality of problem domains, each with a different thematic focus.  This 
could be normatively attractive.  If opponents are constructed in relation to problems, and 
there is a plurality of problem domains, then there will be a plurality of we-they formulations 
rather than a single axis of confrontation.  Different kinds of problem will provoke different 
ways of formulating opponents, and any one formulation will relate only to a subset of the 
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problems of the common, thus constraining the likelihood that the community fragments into 
a series of discrete adversarial groups who choose t  separate from each other.  The 
feasibility of pointing to a particular section of the citizen body and saying ‘we have nothing 
in common with them’ would be reduced by the multiplic ty of resources for collective 
positioning.  Thus rather than binding all citizens to one another in an image of unity, the 
problems of the political common would pit some against others in a web of allegiances and 
conflicts.  
 
2. The Political Subjects, their Counterparts and Opponents 
In order to foster a collective bond appropriate to a polity such as the EU, the acts of 
collective positioning thus inspired would need to fulfil two conditions.  Firstly, as the basis 
for a transnational demos, one would want those ‘people like us’ who are affected by the 
problems in question – call them the political subjects – to be conceived not just as limited to 
‘people in our country’.  Treating the problems as purely domestic to individual member-
states would provide little basis for a collective bond wider than this, and while it might be 
valid for a subset of problems to be treated in this way, this could not be the case for all.  
Instead one would want to see the assumption that there are counterparts to ‘us’ in other EU 
countries, i.e. people who face similar problems.  It would not be necessary that problems are 
described as affecting specifically ‘Europeans’, since this would imply a strong level of 
consensus across the board.  But there would need to be some sense of transnational ‘shared 
predicament’, of there being at least some groups in other EU countries who constitute 
‘people like us’.  By the same token, other EU countries one would want to see treated not 
just as unitary actors but as environments worthy of comparison because they feature others 
who face similar problems.  One would want to see ref rence not so much to undifferentiated 
wholes (‘the French’ or ‘the Spanish’) but to the comparable experiences of those living 
within these countries (in France, in Spain). 
 This positioning of the subjects and their counterparts would have to be coupled with 
tolerance towards those who are assumed to be opponents, i.e. those who threaten their well-
being.  While, if one holds that conflict is constitu ive of the political, a ‘we-they’ dynamic of 
some kind is always present, still it would have to be agonistic rather than antagonistic: 
opponents would have to be treated, in the language of Mouffe, as adversaries who are to be 
convinced or defeated, rather than enemies to be destroy d or banished from the 
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community.127  They would need to be seen as legitimate sharers of ‘our space’, even if much 
disliked.  While the subjects/counterparts and their opponents would have little in common 
other than their conflicts and their membership in the community – in contrast to maximalist 
approaches to the common there is no overarching ‘ident ty’ that links them, nor a diffuse 
sense of solidarity or a common set of values beyond the basic democratic values of liberty 
and equality – their adversarialism would have to sp short of the break-up of the 
community.  The struggle against opponents would have to be treated as ongoing.  Ultimately 
this would not be something for which one could give grounds – opponents would be 
tolerated not because they bear a particular attribu e which links them to ‘us’, but simply 
because, to speak with Wittgenstein, ‘this is what we do’.128  Nurturing this attitude of 
tolerance would be a role for civic education.  Again, that acts of collective positioning 
would be made according to problems, and that there might be multiple sets of problems at 
stake, would perhaps make the task of fostering this tolerance easier, since a plurality of 
domains would mean that those who may be seen as opponents with regard to one set of 
problems may be seen as ‘people like us’ in connection to another. 
 
3. The Political Project 
A political bond would be completed by the assumption that seeking to address these 
problems through common political institutions constitutes a worthwhile endeavour.  They 
would have to be treated as problems which can and should be tackled, rather than as just 
‘facts of life’, and tackled in organised collective terms rather than just on an d hoc personal 
basis.  If they were seen in such a way that there was no sense of their possible remedy, the 
problems associated with the political common would be as likely to inspire a retreat into the 
private realm as a concern for collective action.  Likewise, if these problems were assumed to 
be resolvable on a personal basis, whether by individual intervention or individual 
adaptation, there would be no reason to make political claims which attempted to influence 
decision-making.  (This would be a model based on ‘c sumer satisfaction’ again.)  Only if 
they were seen as requiring collective address would these problems have an integrative 
force.  The level of popular participation in decision-making would not necessarily have to 
be high (this is a separate issue to which Chapter 6 will return), but it would need to be 
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readily assumed that political approaches are worthhile.  The sense of shared predicament 
would have to be linked in other words to a sense of the worth of a political project. 
 To constitute a collective bond supportive of a European polity there would need, 
moreover, to be the assumption that the nation-state c nnot alone provide the means to 
address all these problems sufficiently, coupled with a sense that at least some of these 
problems can and should be addressed at a higher-than-national level, with the EU as one 
plausible option.  Some Europe-wide approaches would have to ‘make sense’ in principle, 
even if the Brussels institutions in their current form, and the policy-making they have given 
rise to, were assumed to be deficient in some way.129  The opportunity to tackle some of the 
problems of the political common is what would lend to the European polity the necessary 
commonsense plausibility.   
 
With each of these three elements present one could speak of a collective bond, and given 
that it is addressed to the framing of public concer s one might refer to it as a political bond.  
On membership questions it would be as ambiguous as all formulations of the collective 
bond: it would not provide a clear criterion for inclusion or exclusion, since who shares in the 
same problems is something about which plenty of debate may be had.  There is no myth 
here of ‘the people’ as a coherent and unambiguous c llective extended through time.  The 
conceptualisation fits well, on the other hand, with the two other senses of ‘the people’ which 
have been highlighted, that of the final source of authority, and the more empirical sense of a 
set of individuals engaged in influencing the course of decision-making.  A political bond 
provides an alternative perspective on the nature of the common – the appraisal of common 
problems.  It conceives members of the collective as tied to one another by the mutual 
concern that a sense of shared predicament may generat .  Such citizens, rather than being 
atomised, have a web of links extending out towards others.  To the extent that others share 
in ‘our’ problems, ‘we’ take interest in their experiences because through the practice of 
comparison there may be something to be learned, and because in some cases it may be 
desirable to seek joint political action in remedy of those problems.  Yet there is no 
presumption of consensus across the full range of political problems: indeed, the absence of 
consensus and the consequent desire to control aspects of the political agenda are what – in 
the ideal rendition of such a bond – provide the impetus to come together.  This 
conceptualisation does not presume coherence across issue-areas: indeed, a certain 
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irregularity may usefully soften the symbolic boundaries which are constructed.  It need not 
imply a high degree of political participation, but does require a certain degree of faith in the 
worth of acting politically.   
 It has been one of the themes of this chapter that t e debate about how to 
conceptualise a European demos, rather than being mainly empirical, is of an ideological 
character, since whatever position one adopts implies consequences for the kind of 
democracy which is possible.  How one responds to these basic questions says much about 
which contemporary political trends in nation-state politics one approves of and wishes to see 
replicated at a transnational level.  This is why we have approached the question of the 
common in Europe with an eye to how it may connect with wider developments to do with 
the health of contestatory politics, the principle of democratic control and the role of citizens 
in public life.  The argument has been that many of the existing approaches to this question 
conceive either of a quite minimal degree of commonality amongst citizens or that they 
rather overplay the degree of regularity which is necessary, and that both of these moves may 
have depoliticising consequences.  By minimising the sense of common purpose amongst 
citizens one is liable to diminish the expectation and possibility of exercising democratic 
control over matters of common concern; conversely, by overstating the degree of common 
purpose one may narrow the sphere of reasonable disagreement and circumvent some of the 
very debates which it is the peculiar virtue of democracy to make possible.  What one wants 
from an explicitly political conceptualisation of the collective bond is a perspective which 
allows greater scope for political adversarialism and which points towards revitalising the 
principle of popular sovereignty and active citizenship.  A political bond as it has been 
outlined so far, centred on the three elements of the political common, collective positioning 
and the political project, seems to provide this, but it is just the bare sktch of an ideal: it can 
be treated as a starting-point for further explorati n. 
 Each of these three elements will be the subject of a later chapter, where they will be 
approached with an empirical eye.  Ideals, it need scarcely be said, are not susceptible to 
empirical (dis)confirmation, since they are intended to organise one’s understanding and 
suggest diagnoses rather than directly correspond to a real-world situation.  At the same time 
however, to treat them as purely theoretical constructs, and to evaluate them only on the 
grounds of internal consistency, is to deprive them of much of the critical and suggestive 
force they may have, and to overlook an important means by which they can be explored and 
developed.  This is all the more true given that the goal is not to theorise the political bond in 
some purely abstract or universal sense but to conceptualise it for a specific context.  
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Empirical research represents a useful way to pursue a line of thought, and ‘theory without 
some kind of exemplification is no theory at all,’130 just as empirical research should be 
concept-driven.  The strategy is therefore to set th se lightly sketched theoretical ideas in a 
dialectical relationship with a small-scale empirical study.  The concept of the political bond 
is applied to a body of empirical material, one theone hand to assess how smoothly the 
concept may be employed, and on the other to explore the material in a theoretically 
informed way.  But before embarking on this explorat y study, we take advantage of the 
opportunity which exploratory research provides to deal head-on with some of the 
epistemological and methodological questions which arise in the course of theoretical 
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By raising the prospect of a political bond as an alternative way to conceptualise the 
common, we are placing centre-stage the political concerns of ordinary people.  It is these 
that are taken as the best starting-point for exploring political community, and it is through 
these that a close link can be maintained to questions of popular sovereignty and the health of 
democracy more generally.  At least since the early twentieth century, social and political 
science has tried to engage with these everyday political concerns in a number of ways: with 
‘the people’ taken to be involved in at least some degree of self-rule, the political dispositions 
of the citizenry in modern democracy have naturally been a topic of some interest.  But how 
to study empirically these dispositions represents something of a puzzle, for the reason that 
‘the people’ can be conceptualised in such different ways.  To list just some, the object of 
study might be conceived as a certain aggregate of individuals, as a unitary collective, a 
communication system, an ensemble of practices, or perhaps as just another piece of raw 
matter upon which material forces exert themselves.  The politics of ‘the people’, as an 
empirical phenomenon, has therefore been subject to widely different approaches.  The task 
of this chapter is to look at some of these approaches to lay (i.e. non-professional) politics in 
detail, particularly those which are currently widespread in EU studies, with a view to 
assessing their applicability to the project of exploring a political bond.  Then, in the latter 
part of the chapter, the attention will be focused more closely on the study to be developed in 
the chapters that follow. 
 In exploring a political bond as we have defined it, it is clear that the symbolic world 
– that to do with meanings and interpretation – is to be taken seriously.  A collective bond 
based on the notion of objective interests has been r j cted as both normatively weak and 
empirically unsatisfactory.  One methodological approach to lay politics on which there is 
little need to dwell therefore is the political-economic one which conceives the subject matter 
as the aggregation of individual or collective interests.  Writers such as Josef Schumpeter and 
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Anthony Downs take as their starting assumption man’s instrumental rationality.1  Subjective 
appraisals diverging from means-ends rationality are st ongly downplayed so as to facilitate 
theoretical abstraction.  The weaknesses of such moves have been well documented and need 
not be repeated here.2  Whilst these models have spilt over into empirical work looking at the 
accuracy with which economic interests can be used to explain political behaviour (e.g. 
voting), these studies are generally unable to avoid br nging in the ideational dimension: 
‘attitudes’ usually make an appearance as an ‘intervening variable’ to explain how interests 
guide behaviour.3  Interests are essentially ambiguous things even in an established polity, 
and all the more so in conditions where the boundaries of political community are under 
challenge.  Simple utility maximisation cannot be th  basic ordering principle by which to 
explore a political bond. 
 If homo economicus cannot be the guide, nor too can homo sociologicus, the 
protagonist of much traditional sociological theory who plays out his role in a social totality 
held together by forces of production, the division of labour or behaviour-determining values 
and norms.4  A number of those who seek to explore empirically  culture- or values-based 
bond fall into this category: not those who seek to explore perceptions of commonality (these 
will be considered below) but those who attempt to trace the distribution of objectively 
observable attributes.  Such studies explore whether, for instance, individuals in post-
communist Europe tend to share the same ‘values’ as their western counterparts.5  This is 
sociology of the Talcott Parsons variety – as is often the case when self-consciously 
sociological approaches are adopted in International Relations or European studies.  
Ontological collectivism of this kind, despite the appearance of radical divergence from the 
individualism of economic approaches, shares the basic ssumption that the ideational is 
                                                
1 Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy; Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy 
(New York: Harper, 1957). 
2 For one discussion see Holmes, 'The Secret History of Self-Interest'; Jane Mansbridge, 'The Rise and Fall of 
Self-Interest in the Explanation of Political Life', in Jane Mansbridge (ed.), Beyond Self-Interest (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1990). 
3 See e.g. Seymour Lipset, Political Man (London: Heinemann, 1959); Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, 
Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality (New York: Harper and Row, 1972). 
4 Cf. Andreas Reckwitz, 'Towards a Theory of Social Practices: A Development in Culturalist Theorising', 
European Journal of Social Theory, 5/2 (2002). 
5 See for instance Dieter Fuchs and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, 'Eastward Enlargement of the European Union 
and the Identity of Europe', in Jan Zielonka (ed.), Europe Unbound: Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries 
of the European Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Jürgen Gerhards and Michael 
Holscher, Kulturelle Unterschiede in der Europäischen Union: Ein Vergleich zwischen Mitgliedsländern, 
Beitrittskandidaten und der Türkei (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2005); Peter Ester, Loek 
Halman, and Ruud De Moor (eds.), The Individualizing Society: Value Change in Europe and North America 
(Tilburg: Tilburg University Press, 1993).  Such works are in the tradition pioneered by Ronald Inglehart, e.g. 
Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics 
(Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977).  
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epiphenomenal, that order is achieved independently of people’s interpretation.  As Andreas 
Reckwitz writes, pointing to an alternative perspectiv , ‘the seemingly opposed classical 
figures of the homo economicus and the homo sociologicus hare a common “blind spot”: 
they both dismiss the implicit, tacit or unconscious layer of knowledge which enables a 
symbolic organisation of reality.  The basic distinc ons and schemes of this knowledge lay 
down which desires are regarded as desirable and which norms are considered to be 
legitimate; moreover, these cognitive-symbolic structures (of which language is a prominent 
example) reproduce a social order even in cases in wh ch a normative consensus does not 
exist.’6  Exploring the political bond as a normative ideal is exactly to explore the ideational 
background that conditions what may be considered dsirable and legitimate.  For this 
reason, this chapter concentrates on those approaches w ich put the ideational/symbolic at 
the centre of their accounts of social order and political behaviour.  For our purposes, it is 
useful to distinguish between three broad traditions, referred to here as mentalism, 
intersubjectivism, and text/practice-oriented approaches.  These will be addressed in turn. 
   
 
Mentalism: Approaches from Political and Social Psychology 
 
One way to make sense of the ideational or symbolic world is to conceive it in terms of the 
structure of individual minds, an approach which has been referred to in social theory as 
‘mentalist’.7  In political science, this approach is adopted wiely, often with aspirations to 
explanatory science, and usually in combination with empirical research which uses 
quantitative, statistical methods.  A Cartesian mind-body dualism is the basis of this 
perspective, whereby inward mental states (independent variable, sometimes dependent 
variable) are taken to cause or condition outward behaviour (dependent variable).  Identity 
studies is one field where this perspective is commnly found: ‘collective identity’ is then 
understood to be the sum of individual beliefs about what is shared with other individuals.  
One finds this approach taken by many in the European debate when exploring the possibility 
of cultural commonality at a European level: do citizens of the EU believe that they share 
cultural features with one another?  Do they have a ‘sense of belonging’ towards Europe 
and/or the EU; do they claim a ‘European identity’?8  As one author asks, ‘is the EU 
                                                
6 Reckwitz, 'Towards a Theory of Social Practices', p.246.   
7 Cf. Ibid.  
8 Surveying a large literature, see Kohli, 'The Battlegrounds of European Identity'. 
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represented as an entity in its citizens’ minds?’9  This approach also represents one means by 
which to operationalise a social bond, whereby one examines whether EU citizens believe 
they can trust one another.10  The reasoning behind all such approaches is ostensibly valid: if 
charting ‘objectively existing’ commonality risks slipping into essentialism and social 
determinism, the answer must be to measure the ‘subjective perception’ of commonality or 
the ‘psychological existence of a community’.11  As one scholar puts it, a ‘bottom-up’ 
perspective may be more fruitful than a ‘top-down’ o e.12   
 Given that many of these approaches draw on political psychology (and indirectly 
social psychology), it is worth looking at this field in a little detail.  Political psychology 
emerged as a discipline in the US in the early 1960s, assisted by advances in the fields of 
sampling theory and psychology.  As the self-description ‘psychological’ makes clear, the 
focus is firmly on the individual and that which is in the individual’s head: attitudes (general 
dispositions), beliefs (deeply held attitudes) and opinions (expressly formulated views on a 
particular subject).13  Key research questions for political psychology have included: how 
much do people know and care about politics?  How much coherence and stability is there to 
their beliefs and opinions?  To what extent are elite-level ideological structures (e.g. the left-
right divide) manifest in lay political opinion?  How are emotions engaged?  How can voting 
behaviour be explained?  One contributor to the European debate neatly sums up the 
political-psychological perspective by referring to ‘a golden hierarchical assumption of the 
study of political behaviour: the idea that for every individual, his beliefs influence his 
attitudes, which, in turn, influence his actual behaviour.’14 
Two works are often singled out for their subsequent impact on the discipline, and 
their titles give an indication of the research preoccupations of the time: Robert Lane titled 
his interviews-based study Political Ideology: Why the American Common Man Believes 
What He Does, and stated one of the aims of his project as ‘undertak[ing] to discover the 
                                                
9 Emanuele Castano, 'European Identity: A Social-Psychological Perspective', in Richard K. Herrmann, Thomas 
Risse, and Marilynn B. Brewer (eds.), Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU (Oxford: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), p.43. 
10 Oskar Niedermayer, 'Trust and Sense of Community', in Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Sinnott (eds.), 
Public Opinion and Internationalized Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.229 makes an 
empirical study of trust with reference to a Eurobar meter question about trust in people from other countries.   
11 Castano, 'European Identity: A Social-Psychological Perspective', p.43. 
12 Michael Bruter, Citizens of Europe?  The Emergence of a Mass European Identity (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005). 
13 Summarising this conventional usage of terms, see Dennis Kavanagh, Political Science and Political 
Behaviour (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983). 
14 Bruter, Citizens of Europe?, p.3. 
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latent political ideology of the American urban common man’.15  Philip E. Converse, a 
highly influential figure in the (largely dominant) quantitative tradition, wrote under the 
heading ‘The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics’, and defined a belief system as ‘a 
configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form 
of constraint or functional interdependence.’16  ‘Ideology’ and ‘belief system’ are the key 
words for both authors: the starting-point is that of he coherent and sophisticated ideal, from 
which empirically observed reality diverges.17  The kind of hypothesis one might test was 
whether those who favour ‘federal aid to education c uld be predicted to be more, rather than 
less, favourable to an internationalist posture in foreign affairs, for these two positions in the 
1950s were generally associated with “liberalism” in American politics.’18  The important 
conclusion of Converse’s study was that, other than for those he termed elites (the top 10% 
or so), beliefs about politics tended to be unstable and weakly integrated: ‘the net result, as 
one moves downward, is that constraint declines across the universe of idea-elements, and 
that the range of relevant belief systems becomes narrower and narrower.’  Knowledge of 
‘what goes with what’, and why, is information that has to be diffused from above; ‘very 
little information “trickles down” very far,’19  and there existed ‘a basic discontinuity 
between the “message-as-sent” and the “message-as-received”.’20  This sparked much 
discussion as to whether ‘attitudes’ or ‘non-attitudes’ are the norm amongst non-elites.  John 
Zaller caused some discomfort by suggesting that citizens might respond to opinion polls 
according to whatever happens to be at the top of their minds, based on factors such as the 
headlines of yesterday’s news or how the question was framed.21  His suggestion that they 
‘make it up as they go along’ was successfully provocative.22 
Thus the shadow hanging over these mentalist approaches to the ideational has been 
the lingering suspicion that, taking individual minds as the unit of analysis, there may in fact 
                                                
15 Robert E. Lane, Political Ideology: Why the American Common Man Believes What He Does (New York: 
Free Press, 1962), p.3. 
16 Philip E. Converse, 'The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics', in David E. Apter (ed.), Ideology and 
Discontent (New York: Free Press, 1964), p.207. 
17 N.B. Lane (Political Ideology) also talks more loosely about ‘latent ideological themes’ and ‘ideological 
patterns’ (pp.9-10), but the highly developed scheme he presents (on pp.14-5) makes clear the extent to which 
his starting point is the complex, intertwined system. 
18 Converse, 'The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics', p.230. 
19 Ibid. p.213. 
20 Philip E. Converse, 'Public Opinion and Voting Behavior', in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (eds.), 
Handbook of Political Science 4 (Reading MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), p.81. 
21 John R. Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
22 See for example Paul M. Sniderman, Philip E. Tetlock, and Laurel Elms, 'Public Opinion and Democratic 
Politics: The Problem of Nonattitudes and Social Construction of Political Judgement', in James H. Kuklinski 
(ed.), Citizens and Politics: Perspectives from Political Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), pp.254-88, where Zaller’s suggestion is called ‘an extraordinary assertion’ (p.256). 
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be nothing that is worth studying.  The target of enquiry may be too unstable to be measured.  
Nonetheless, other scholars in political psychology, reacting against the connotations of 
citizen incompetence and the negative implications f r democracy, abandoned the search for 
over-arching belief-systems and sought to move resea ch in the ostensibly more promising 
direction of domain-specific structures.  Key research questions here have included: how do 
individuals nonetheless get by on a limited amount of knowledge, and what mechanisms are 
available to them to allow them a basic degree of organisation in their political views on at 
least some issues?  Two strands of research can be distinguished here, following a cleavage 
which one might term ‘hard vs soft individualism’.  Both address the attitudes, beliefs and 
opinions of individuals, with these ‘located in the ad’ and separable from the interactive 
context, but explain them from different perspectives.  ‘Hard individualists’ tend to address 
these questions by focusing on factors inside the mind which may facilitate a degree of 
coherence and stability: ‘core values’,23 for example, political engagement,24 or education 
and individual cognitive abilities.25  ‘Soft individualists’ by contrast focus on the role of 
environmental factors outside the mind in structuring mental activity, such as the way 
political parties and the media bundle issues together into ideational packets,26 or how the 
media may encourage individuals to see their experiences as part of broader social patterns 
rather than as personal, isolated and idiosyncratic.27  Lying somewhere on the continuum 
between hard and soft individualism are a series of approaches which try to link the cognitive 
and the environmental, e.g. by studying heuristics,28 stereotypes,29 or schemas.30  Again, this 
                                                
23 E.g. Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics, 
Inglehart and Paul R. Abramson, 'Economic Security and Value Change', American Political Science Review, 
88/2 (1994); Stanley Feldman, 'Structure and Consistency in Public Opinion: The Role of Core Beliefs and 
Values', American Journal of Political Science, 32/2 (1988). 
24 Studies of engagement often pick up Converse’s concepts of ‘centrality’ and ‘issue publics’ (the aggre ate of 
those individuals for whom a given issue is of particular salience and on which their opinions are fairly stable).  
See Converse, 'The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics', p.245.  The concept has been developed by 
David J. Elkins, Manipulation and Consent: How Voters and Leaders Manage Complexity (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press, 1993). 
25 For a discussion of the importance of education as predictor of attitude stability, see Converse, 'Public 
Opinion and Voting Behavior', pp.103-4.  For an interesting typography covering ‘sequential thinkers’, ‘linear 
thinkers’ and ‘systematic thinkers’, see Shawn Rosenberg, 'The Structure of Political Thinking', American 
Journal of Political Science, 32/3 (1988).   
26 See e.g. Paul M. Sniderman and John Bullock, 'A Consistency Theory of Public Opinion and Public Choice: 
The Hypothesis of Menu Dependence', in Paul M. Sniderman and Willem E. Saris (eds.), Studies in Public 
Opinion (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003), drawing on Edward G. Carmines and Geoffrey C. 
Layman, 'Value Priorities, Partisanship and Electoral Choice: The Neglected Case of the United States', 
Political Behaviour, 19/4 (1997), pp.283-316. 
27 Diana Mutz, 'Contextualising Personal Experience: The Role of the Mass Media', The Journal of Politics, 
56/3 (1994).  
28 E.g. Paul M. Sniderman, Richard A. Brody, and Philip E. Tetlock, Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in 
Political Psychology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).  Heuristics commonly studied include 
racial heuristics, judgement of political parties based on attitudes towards their ‘brand names’ (Michael  Tomz 
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literature tends to downplay the possibility of integrated beliefs across the range of political 
issues (the kind of global constraint which Converse was looking for) and to focus on 
domain-specific ideational packages.31   
While these mentalist approaches do at least give prominence to the ideational, they 
are problematic in several ways.  The most important is the strong emphasis on the 
individual, even in those approaches which accord importance to environmental factors.  
Reasons may include the simplification this entails for empirical research (‘measurement’ is 
easier if one assumes that the appropriate units correspond to the layout of a telephone 
directory, and aggregation becomes more straightforward if each unit is taken to be of equal 
value), the ambition to causal explanation (which requires parcelling up the world so as to 
give ontological priority to some bits over others), and semantic and normative assumptions 
about what we do and should mean when we speak of democracy.  But it relies on a piece of 
strong conjecture: the assumption, that is, that inside the individual’s mind there are attitudes, 
beliefs, values, heuristics or schemas as things which he or she carries around and deploys in 
like manner from one situation to another, regardless of the context, so as to form an opinion.  
Converse defines constraint in its ‘static’ version as this: ‘the success we would have in 
predicting, given initial knowledge that an individual holds a specified attitude, that he holds 
                                                                                                                                            
and Paul M. Sniderman, 'Constraint in Mass Belief Systems: Political Brand Names as Signals', 2004 Annual 
Meeting of the American Political Science Association (2004)) and judgements based on attitudes towards 
individual politicians.  The concept of ‘heuristic’ is a loose one (a heuristic, one might say) and attracts criticism 
within the field for imprecision regarding how it can be identified and the conditions needed for it to be 
employed.  For some doubts see e.g. Robert Luskin, 'From Denial to Extenuation (and Finally Beyond): 
Political Sophistication and Citizen Performance', in James Kuklinski (ed.), Thinking About Political 
Psychology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), and for some self-doubts see Sniderman and 
Bullock, 'A Consistency Theory of Public Opinion', pp.599-600; also Paul M. Sniderman, 'Taking Sides: A 
Fixed Choice Theory of Political Reasoning', in Arthur Lupia, Mathew McCubbins, and Samuel Popkin (eds.), 
Elements of Political Reason: Understanding and Expanding the Limits of Rationality (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), pp.599-600. 
29 Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock, Reasoning and Choice; John Duckitt, The Social Psychology of Prejudice 
(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994); Peter W. Robinson (ed.), Social Groups and Identities: Developing the 
Legacy of Henri Tajfel (Bodmin: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1996); Russell Spears, Penelope J. Oakes, Naomi 
Ellemers, and Alexander S. Haslam (eds.), The Social Psychology of Stereotyping and Group Life (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1997); Penelope Oakes, Alexander Haslam, and John Turner, Stereotyping and Social Reality 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1994); Henri Tajfel, Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psychology 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
30 Susan T. Fiske and Shelley E. Taylor, Social Cognition (Reading MA: Addison-Wesley, 1984); Pamela 
Johnston Conover and Stanley Feldman, 'How People Organize the Political World: A Schematic Model', 
American Review of Political Science, 28/1 (1984), p.96.  For critiques and responses, James Kuklinski, Robert 
Luskin, and John Bolland, 'Where Is the Schema? Going Beyond the ‘S’ Word in Political Psychology', 
American Political Science Review, 85/4 (1991); Milton Lodge and Kathleen M. McGraw, 'Where Is the 
Schema?  Critiques', American Political Science Review, 85/4 (1991). 
31 Johnston Conover and Feldman, 'How People Organize the Political World', talk (p.101) of four basic 
‘domains of stimuli about which people have political beliefs’: foreign affairs, economic matters, racial affairs, 
and social concerns.   
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certain further ideas and attitudes.’32  Ideas and attitudes are described as though they come 
in a specifiable unit form, like the songs which make up a record collection, possessed or not 
possessed.  Following an analogy no more tortuous than he original, it is like assuming the 
existence of a music-player in the brain, and then asking whether it can confidently be 
predicted that an individual holds a Leonard Cohen so g on their mental player given that it 
seems they have a Bob Dylan song there.33   
One scholar of European identity, who takes identity in individualist terms as a 
question of ‘how EU citizens feel’, claims that it is ‘most obviously’ the case that there is ‘a 
causal link between European identity and support f integration.’34  The problems 
associated with hypothesising mental states have been noted by Wittgenstein and his 
interpreters, and in advance of significant developments in cognitive science (the point would 
still be contentious) there are good reasons for aviding speculation of this sort altogether.35  
What seems particularly difficult is to hypothesise a chain of mental states and then to 
attribute to some of these a causal status.  Not only is it a kind of guesswork most at odds 
with the scientific-explanatory intentions of this literature; it is also rather in contrast to the 
empirical spirit, since all that one can study are processes of interaction, not pre-interactional 
mental states.  Study itself is a form of interaction, and as such is always non-individual and 
contextually situated.   
Research methods serve to embed this problematic emphasis on the individual mind.  
Opinion polls and related quantitative approaches ar  quite unable (and not designed) to 
study contextual interaction, the formation of opinions in argumentation with others, or how 
argumentation weaves different issues together; quite the contrary, the point of using polls is 
usually to neutralise the importance of situational cues and thereby get at the supposed pre-
interactional attitude, belief (etc.) as directly as possible.  Albeit in the name of polling public 
opinion, respondents are questioned in private, are encouraged to make up their own mind 
without help from the interviewer or from acquaintances, and are guaranteed anonymity of 
response, all lest their answers be distorted in some way.  The goal is to minimise the 
intrusion of ‘context’ (sometimes referred to as ‘bias’ or ‘framing effects’).  When empirical 
findings do not invite unequivocal conclusions, it is often these situational factors which take 
                                                
32 Converse, 'The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics', p.207. 
33 The analogy can be comfortably extended to Converse’s ‘dynamic’ notion of constraint also.  It is, 
incidentally, unfortunate that the word ‘view’ has come to be used in a similar fashion to beliefs and ttitudes 
(one ‘holds’ a view, so it is said), despite the pers ctival understanding that it seems to promise. 
34 Bruter, Citizens of Europe?, p.6; p.3. 
35 See for example Theodore R. Schatzki, Social Practices: A Wittgensteinian Approach to Human Activity and 
the Social (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), chapter 2; and more below. 
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the blame, resulting in rather fruitless debates about whether ‘real attitudes’ are being missed 
because of the distorting effect of framing, and whether the attitudes which have been 
documented are not in fact merely ‘non-attitudes’ masquerading as attitudes.36  The polling 
method is the logical operationalisation of the theoretical assumption that individuals can be 
considered in isolation, and serves at the same time to entrench it.   
 A related problem concerns the propositions on which opinions are to be taken.  An 
aggregative approach based on adding up opinions, beliefs or attitudes relies on there being 
only one proper way to formulate these propositions a d only one proper way for these 
propositions to be interpreted.  If there were multiple ways then the logic of numbers would 
break down and the aggregations would be meaningless.  It assumes, in other words, a fixed 
vantage-point from which all political issues can be described and correctly appraised, an 
ideal language of politics in which neutral propositi ns can be expressed.  The vitality of this 
assumption is remarkable given the strength of the challenges which have been made to it in 
contemporary philosophy, challenges which are generally ignored in the field.37  Instead, 
large amounts of data of doubtful worth are scrutinised and made the basis of explanatory 
accounts.  The aggregative data assembled by Eurobarometer provide one example.  
Consider for example some of the findings of Standard Eurobarometer 65 released in the 
summer of 2006, which neatly illustrate the significance of question-wording.38  Question 
A11a asks: ‘Generally speaking, do you think that (our country)’s membership of the 
European Union is a good thing?’  Question A12a asks: ‘Taking everything into account, 
would you say that (our country) has on balance benefit d or not from being a member of the 
European Union?’  Now, for countries which joined the EU in 2004, i.e. little more than two 
years before the study, one would expect these two questions to produce very similar 
responses, with the interesting variation occurring for those countries which had been 
members of the Union for perhaps a decade or more.  Where accession was very recent, the 
distinction between past and current benefits should in principle be negligible.  Instead, with 
                                                
36 See above.  The metaphor of the ‘frame’ is an interesting one: it asks us to think of the objects towards which 
attitudes are formed as being analogous to pictures, and contextual factors as analogous to the picture-frame and 
the picture’s setting more generally (neighbouring pictures, the play of sunlight, the art gallery itself, and so on).  
In the view of art which the metaphor asks us to take up, there is a correct picture-frame, a correct s t of 
neighbouring pictures, a correct play of sunlight, a correct art gallery, etc., and all other variations can only be 
treated as distortions.  This conception of art is not widely held, and raises doubts about the analogous 
conception of politics. 
37 E.g. Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).  
Urging a reassessment of social-scientific methods in light of these challenges, see Friedrich V. Kratochwil and 
Jörg Friedrichs, 'On Acting and Knowing', Workshop on the (Re-)turn to Practice: Thinking Practices in 
International Relations and Security Studies (EUI Florence, 2007). 
38 Accessed October 2006 at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb65/eb65_en.htm.  
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the exception of Cyprus, all ten of the populations which joined in 2004 produce 
considerably more positive responses to the second question than the first (18% higher in the 
case of Latvia, 15% higher in the cases of Slovakia nd Estonia, 14% higher in the case of 
Slovenia, 13% higher in the case of Lithuania).  Unless one attributes this discrepancy to 
respondents making a judicious distinction between th  benefits of the previous months and 
the expected hazards of the coming ones – an endorsement of the Union combined with a 
desire to leave it – one is tempted to think that one could carry on concocting questions with 
slightly different wording, each of which would result in a rather different ‘aggregation of 
attitudes’.39  Contra Converse, there is no fixed ‘universe of idea-elemnts’, and therefore no 
single correct way to formulate survey questions.40  One is reminded of the old warning that 
quite discrepant results may be had from polling a sample of priests on whether it is ‘OK to 
smoke when praying’, and whether it is ‘OK to pray when smoking’. 
Not only is one confronted by empirical oddities.  More theoretically, all questions 
carry a large number of assumptions with them.  Onesees this with the questions which 
Eurobarometer has regularly posed concerning people’s attitudes to EU-related issues: 
‘Generally speaking, do you think that [your country’s] membership of the European 
Community is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?’  ‘In general, are you [very 
much / to some extent] for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe?’  ‘In the 
near future do you see yourself as [nationality] only, [nationality] and European, European 
and [nationality] or European only?’41  Here again one sees the difficulties of the ideal-
language perspective.  Each question is in no way ‘neutral’ since it contains a whole range of 
assumptions, e.g. that the European Community is important to people and that they should 
have an opinion on it (even if this be that it is ‘neither good nor bad’), or that ‘feeling 
European’ is something as natural as ‘feeling British’.  (One rather suspects that when 
Eurobarometer asks such questions it is being faithful o one of the ambitions of those that 
subsidise them – the European Commission – to problematise the notion that citizens’ 
                                                
39 Note also that responses to b th questions are as positive or more positive than in Eurobarometer polls of the 
preceding years, suggesting that the discrepancy should not be understood as a careful evaluation of the 
changing fortunes in the EU of the country in question. 
40 A personal favourite from the literature is the finding that 98% of Albanians favour democracy while 65% 
favour autocracy (cit. in Fuchs and Klingemann, 'Eastw rd Enlargement of the European Union', p.16). 
41 Using the first two questions, Matthew Gabel and Harvey D. Palmer, 'Understanding Variation in Public 
Support for European Integration', European Journal of Political Research, 27/1 (1995).  Using the first, 
Christopher Anderson, 'When in Doubt, Use Proxies: Attitudes toward Domestic Politics and Support for 
European Integration', Comparative Political Studies, 31/5 (1998); McLaren, 'Public Support for the European 
Union'.  Using the last, Sean Carey, 'Undivided Loyalties: Is National Identity an Obstacle to European 
Integration?', European Union Politics, 3/4 (2002). 
 57 
automatic identification should be with the nation-state.42)  Furthermore, the analyst has no 
way of knowing what criteria are being brought to bear on these questions by respondents, 
and may be tempted – often due to the ambition to explain – to supply his or her own: one 
major scholar in the field, Matthew Gabel, is inclied to equate European integration with 
economic interdependence;43 others have cast political institutions as the core feature,44 for 
others it is the relocation of sovereignty,45 each the kind of mono-causal account which is 
necessary for the formulation of explanatory hypotheses.  The ‘explanation of attitudes to the 
EU’ is thus deduced to be considerations of individual utility, institutional effectiveness or 
national identity and value preferences.46  Because of the plurality of ways in which these 
survey questions can be interpreted, each of these readings and many more are possible, and 
none of them can be judged the most authentic.  Theproblem is compounded in many cases 
by the use of ambiguous words like ‘identity’ to suggest a specious unity to a range of quite 
disparate ideas – despite the far-reaching critiques to which ‘identity’ has been subject, in 
particular by Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper.47  These failings make it particularly 
hard to accept the pretensions to scientific objectivity with which these and many studies of 
attitudes, beliefs and opinion are presented, with heavy use of vocabulary such as 
‘hypothesis’, ‘variable’, ‘statistical representativi y’ and ‘controlling for’: the implication is 
that there is an unambiguous truth to be accessed and that those who arrive at alternative 
interpretations are mistaken.  On this reading, plurality becomes an empirical curiosity, 
whereas it should be treated as theoretically grounded.48 
 There need be no automatic association between methodological and ontological 
individualism and quantitative methods, and while quantitative polling methods have a 
natural affinity with aggregative approaches (since both prioritise the numerical) this 
association could in principle be weakened.49  Most in the field of political psychology would 
                                                
42 On the intended performative effects of such polling, see Cris Shore, Building Europe: The Cultural Politics 
of European Integration (London: Routledge, 2000), esp. pp.51-2.   
43 See Matthew Gabel, 'Economic Integration and Mass Politics: Market Liberalisation and Public Attitudes in 
the European Union', American Journal of Political Science, 42/3 (1998a), p.937: ‘EU membership represents a 
specific international economic policy: the liberaliz tion of the movement of goods, capital, labor and services 
among the EU member-states.’ 
44 Anderson, 'When in Doubt, Use Proxies'. 
45 Carey, 'Undivided Loyalties'. 
46 These major approaches have been summarised by Gabel, 'Public Support for European Integration'. 
47 Brubaker and Cooper, 'Beyond 'Identity''. 
48 On the problems surrounding the study of ‘beliefs’ and ‘attitudes’ using polling methods, see e.g. Claire 
Waterton and Brian Wynne, 'Can Focus Groups Access Community Views?' in Jenny Kitzinger and Rosaline S. 
Barbour (eds.), Developing Focus Group Research: Politics, Theory and Practice (London: Sage, 1999).  
49 Note Lane’s use of interview methods.  Suggesting a shift to the collective whilst maintaining quantita ive 
methods, see e.g. Lynn M. Sanders, 'Democratic Politics and Survey Research', Philosophy of the Social 
Sciences, 29/2 (1999).  In European Studies, Bruter supplements his quantitative work with some focus-group 
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probably dispute, however, the necessity of such a move, and the association between 
individualism and quantitative methods has been institutionalised by key periodicals such as 
Public Opinion Quarterly and Political Psychology.  That survey questionnaires are 
problematic is well known however: they are agenda-setters in the sense that they presuppose 
which are the important questions to be asked, and so can justifiably be criticised as 
instruments of power.  They also remove from the researcher’s view much of the most 
interesting material – the process of engagement with a question, the hesitations, the 
indifference, the side-comments, discussion with others, and variation in discussion across 
contexts.  Aggregative approaches based on opinion polling can be insensitive to differences 
a) in the relative importance of different political issue areas, and b) in the relative 
importance of the opinions of different individuals or groups.50  Whilst innovations in 
method can to some extent alleviate the first of these blind-spots,51 the second is bound up in 
the logic of random sampling, the point of which is to be blind to such differences.  
Quantitative methods are also particularly problematic under conditions where the 
‘container’ of the political process is itself in question, as in the contemporary European case.  
The political community cannot confidently be equated with the nation-state or with the 
European polity, or with any other immediately recognisable formation, and therefore there is 
no clear answer to the question of whom to include in the aggregation tally.  Opting to 
aggregate the opinions of all citizens of the European Union, or not to do so, is a highly 
normative, ‘unscientific’ decision. 
 One of the standard defences given of opinion polling is that, for all its faults, it is no 
worse than the mechanisms which are used as part of the democratic process to ‘capture 
public opinion’: electoral voting and referenda.  These are also based on the principles of 
                                                                                                                                            
research (Bruter, Citizens of Europe?).  While he claims that this refines his ‘bottom-up’ approach to ‘political 
identity’ and ‘European identity’ (p.164), it is based on direct questions designed to elicit attitudes towards all 
things European and gives no indication of how readily European reference-points would be invoked in 
discussion without such prompting.  It retains the ‘ op-down’, Euro-centric predisposition in other words.  Of 
course, all research is interventionary in some way, but when examining something as conceptually problematic 
as European identity one needs to be especially careful in one’s methods. 
50 On the problems of the polling method, see Herbert Blumer, 'Public Opinion and Public Opinion Polling', 
American Sociological Review, 13/5 (1948); Pierre Bourdieu, 'Public Opinion Does Not Exist', in A. Mattelart 
and S. Siegelaub (eds.), Communication and Class Struggle (New York: International General, 1979), and 
Theodor W. Adorno, 'Opinion Research and Publicness (Meinungsforschung und Öffentlichkeit)', ranslated by 
Andrew J. Perrin and Lars Jarkko, Sociological Theory, 23/1 (2005).  Of course, good political psychologists 
are not unaware of these limitations.  Converse himself noted that that ‘attention to numbers [i.e. aggre ations 
of beliefs], more or less customary in democratic thought, is very nearly irrelevant in many political settings,’ 
and he argued only that ‘claims to numbers are of some modest continuing importance in democratic system  
for the legitimacy they confer upon demands.’ Converse, 'The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics', p.207. 
51 On this see Philip E. Converse, 'Changing Conceptions of Public Opinion in the Political Process', Public 
Opinion Quarterly, 51/2 (1987).  Pre-poll interviews can be used to improve the question set. 
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equality of individuals and the secrecy of ballot.  Following this argument, polls are therefore 
rather well equipped to study the political process,52 and those who criticise the one must 
inevitably criticise the other.  The research method is thereby given a kind of normative 
protection.  There is indeed some truth in the ideathat the two are linked: it is quite possible 
that, in liberal democracies, a certain conception of public opinion is reified so as to give 
meaning to the idea of popular sovereignty, and that polling is embraced as another means to 
lend solidity to this.  Hence what Blumer called ‘the narrow operationalist position that 
public opinion consists of what public opinion polls poll.’53  However, the critique need not 
be so radical.  It is sufficient to note that polls are very often bad predictors of political 
behaviour, and should therefore be accorded no special status as a research method.  To pick 
an obvious and important example, in March 2005 Euroba ometer released figures 
suggesting that 48% of the French population and 63% of the Dutch population were in 
favour of the EU Constitutional Treaty, with 17% and 11% against it respectively.  It 
moreover suggested that these high levels of support cor esponded to a high level of 
knowledge about the Treaty, with the populations of b th countries featuring in the top five 
of the EU-25 on this measure.54  The results of the referenda themselves a few months later 
were rather different of course: 55% of the French vote and 62% of the Dutch was against.  
Although it is quite possible that ‘public opinion’ changed rapidly in the intervening months, 
or that the referenda themselves failed to capture that opinion, both possibilities raise strong 
questions about exactly what it is which is captured at any one moment and aggregated. 
Mentalism, individualism and the quantitative survey method seem to offer quite 
limited possibilities for our purposes.  This is not t  say that these approaches contain 
nothing which is relevant to this study: the move which one sees within political psychology 
from global approaches (like that of Converse or Lane, looking at large-scale structures like 
‘belief-systems’ or ‘ideologies’) to domain-specifi approaches is in fact highly suggestive of 
the problems of conceiving lay politics as an integrated whole, and in this sense is rather 
valuable.55  The suggestion by certain authors in the schema-theory tradition that there may 
be four basic domains of stimuli about which people have political beliefs – economic 
matters, social concerns, foreign affairs and racial affairs (with a suggested interlinkage 
                                                
52 Blumer anticipates this point ('Public Opinion', pp.547-8). 
53 Ibid. p.543. 
54 See Eurobarometer Special 214, ‘The Future Constitutional Treaty’, March 2005, downloaded November 
2005 from http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_214_en.pdf. 
55 The increasing popularity of a domain-specific approach in cognitive psychology has been charted by 
DiMaggio in Paul  Dimaggio, 'Culture and Cognition', Annual Review of Sociology, 23 (1997). 
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between the last two) – is a useful sensitising idea.56  Likewise the concern with ‘framing 
effects’, which has been forced upon the discipline by the incoherence of data derived from 
polling, is of considerable interest.  But despite noteworthy developments of this kind, these 
approaches do not offer a model for our empirical exploration.  Individualist mentalism does 
not mark a sufficient improvement on perspectives ba ed on interests, norms and values.57 
 
 
Intersubjectivism: the Deliberative Democracy Approach 
 
In the earlier decades of the twentieth century, a number of other scholars had been studying 
lay politics from a rather less individualist perspective.  Many, particularly in the American 
pragmatist tradition, were interested in studying empirically the inheritance of Enlightenment 
political theory, and concepts such as ‘public reason’ and ‘public opinion’ provided points of 
departure for investigating how contemporary democracy measured up to Enlightenment 
ideals.  For writers such as Cooley, James, Peirce, Dewey, Mead, Le Bon, Park, Blumer, C. 
Wright Mills and Tönnies, public opinion was essentially an ‘organic social process’,58 and 
their writing was oriented to the study of the collective, whether in the form of ‘the public’ 
(the classical idea of a collective bound together by reasoned debate), ‘the crowd’ (a 
collective linked by sentiment) or ‘the mass’ (a collective linked by a common object of 
interest).  In a period when the idea of a systematic scientific method was coming to 
dominate the study of society and politics, the imagin tive and often explicitly normative 
approaches favoured by authors in this tradition, accompanied by the methodological 
difficulties associated with not treating public opinion as an aggregate of individual opinions, 
probably gave rise to suspicion.59  Perhaps also, in focusing on the collective, some f these 
authors – though not all – were guilty of replicating an individual-society dichotomy and 
giving an undue priority to the second of the two ples, with all the problems of 
mystification, social determinism and re-subordination of the ideational which this can lead 
to.   
                                                
56 Johnston Conover and Feldman, 'How People Organize the Political World: A Schematic Model'.  On domain 
specificity see also Shanto Iyengar, Is Anyone Responsible?  How Television Frames Political Issues (Chicago 
IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991). 
57 Cf. Barnes, 'Practice as Collective Action', pp.17-8. 
58 Slavko Splichal, Public Opinion: Developments and Controversies in the Twentieth Century (Lanham, MD.: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), p.78. 
59 This is not to say that all writers in the mentalist-individualist tradition were dismissive: Convers’s notion of 
the ‘issue public’, which viewed the size of the public increasing or decreasing according to the issue around 
which it coalesced, can be thought of as a response t  these sociological perspectives. 
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However, with its emphasis on interaction and communication, this tradition was a 
forerunner for more recent approaches which look at lay politics not in terms of aggregating 
the attributes of unitary individuals but in terms of discursive interaction.  The study of 
discourse and discursive practice has been attractive for several reasons.  Firstly, it holds out 
the possibility of dissolving the dichotomy of individual and society.60  Discourse plainly 
cannot be understood purely in terms of individual action or collective structures: the 
sentence is not ‘owned’ by the speaker, since it requi s borrowed vocabulary and grammar 
to be meaningful, but vocabulary and grammar would neither exist nor evolve but for the 
incessant creativity of the speaker.61  The speaker is both master and slave.62  In addition to 
this useful starting-point, a focus on discourse invites particular emphasis on the context in 
which opinions are formed and on the process by which they are developed, both of which 
are neglected in the mentalist approach.  It also invites sensitivity to a wider field of political 
behaviour than simply the ticking of boxes on questionnaires and voting slips.  Attention to 
discourse has taken divergent forms, with ontological assumptions and normative 
commitments which do not always coincide.  What these approaches share however is that 
each may be said to have evolved in reaction both t mentalist approaches and to the 
‘objectivist’ approaches of political economy and traditional sociology.  In this section we 
consider the deliberative model, which in the context of European Studies takes as its 
principal theoretical point of departure the work of Jürgen Habermas.63 
The deliberative model has been treated as both a normative ideal of democracy and 
as an explanatory model for the institutional processes of existing polities, amongst them the 
                                                
60 That the dualism is problematic has been long observed, yet from many social-theoretical perspectives t is 
hard to shake off.  On this see for instance John Dewey (Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart & Winston, 1927), p.191): ‘Because an individual can be dissociated from this, that and the other 
grouping, since he need not be married, or be a church-member or a voter, or belong to a club or scientif c 
association, there grows up in the mind an image of a residual individual who is not a member of any 
association at all.  From this premise, and from this only, there develops the unreal question of how individuals 
come to be united in societies and groups: the individual and the social are now opposed to each other, and there 
is the problem of “reconciling” them.’   
61 On moving beyond the dichotomy of individual and social totality, see Schatzki, Social Practices, chapter 1. 
62 Roland Barthes, 'Inaugural Lecture, Collège De France', in Susan Sontag (ed.), Barthes: Selected Writings 
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1982). 
63 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984); Habermas, The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere; Habermas, Between Facts and Norms; Habermas, The 
Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory (Ciaran Cronin and Pablo de Greif edn.; Cambridge MA:
MIT Press, 1998). Habermas, 'The Postnational Constellation'.  More generally, see also John Rawls, Political 
Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); John S. Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and 
Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Amy Gutmann, Why 
Deliberative Democracy? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).  For a review article, Simone 
Chambers, 'Deliberative Democratic Theory', Annual Review of Political Science, 6 (2003). 
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European Union.64  In terms of the different kinds of collective bond that were considered in 
the previous chapter, it can clearly be linked to a constitutional bond.  In its ontology it is 
informed by Habermas’ intersubjectivism: agents are conceived as expressing their 
individuality in the context of social relationships of communication.65  They engage as 
partners in ‘communicative action’, understood as follows: 
 
‘[action] oriented to achieving, sustaining and reviewing consensus – and indeed a consensus that rests 
on the intersubjective recognition of criticisable validity claims.  The rationality inherent in this 
practice is seen in the fact that a communicatively achieved agreement must be based in the end on 
reasons.  And the rationality of those who participate in this communicative practice is determined by 
whether, if necessary, they could, under suitable circumstances, provide reasons for their 
expressions.’66   
 
Rationality, understood in terms of a social process of argumentation, is central to this 
perspective: the emphasis is on an inclusive process of open and reasoned argumentation, 
leading to enlightened opinion-formation and the adoption of policies universally 
recognisable as favourable.  Deliberation rather than voting is the key practice.  In a 
definition which has been taken up in the EU literatu e, one author casts the deliberative 
model as the ‘rule of reasons’: ‘a political practice of argumentation and reason-giving 
among free and equal citizens, a practice in which individual and collective perspectives and 
positions are subject to change through deliberation and in which only those norms, rules or 
decisions which result from some form of reason-based agreement among the citizens are 
accepted as legitimate.’67  In the field of empirical research, key questions have been: how 
far can existing decision-making processes be considered deliberative, and how can 
institutions be designed so as to allow deliberation t  flourish?  In what ways does a 
‘deliberative’ public, more engaged and better informed than the usual, produce a better 
quality of opinion?68  In the European context, a question given considerabl  prominence is 
whether it is possible to speak of an emerging European ‘public sphere’. 
                                                
64 Explicitly connecting the normative and the explanatory, see Erik O. Eriksen, 'Reflexive Integration in 
Europe', in Erik O. Eriksen (ed.), Making the European Polity: Reflexive Integration in the EU (London: 
Routledge, 2005a), esp. pp.9-10 and pp.16-7. 
65 Cf. Maeve Cooke, 'The Weakness of Strong Intersubjectivism: Habermas's Conception of Justice', European 
Journal of Political Theory, 2/3 (2003). 
66 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, p.17. 
67 Rainer Forst, 'The Rule of Reasons: Three Models of Deliberative Democracy', Ratio Juris, 14/4 (2001).  His 
definition is invoked in Rainer Schmalz-Bruns, 'On the Political Theory of the Euro-Polity', in Erik O. Eriksen 
(ed.), Making the European Polity: Reflexive Integration in the EU (London: Routledge, 2005), and in Eriksen, 
'Reflexive Integration in Europe'. 
68 For a review of the empirical work see Michael X. Delli Carpini, Fay Lomax Cook, and Lawrence R. Jacobs, 
'Public Deliberation, Discursive Participation, and Citizen Engagement: A Review of the Empirical Literature', 
Annual Review of Political Science, 7 (2004).   Note in particular Fishkin’s ‘deliberative polls’, intended to 
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First elaborated by Habermas in historical terms, as the sphere of debate which 
emerged among the middle-classes of late-seventeenth- and early-eighteenth-century 
England in contradistinction to state authority,69 the term ‘public sphere’ has been adopted in 
the European debate with more than one meaning.  Some give it a spatial definition, for 
instance ‘that space in which citizens come together to discuss and debate issues of common 
or public concern’.70  Others take it in a more linguistic sense, as a ‘ocial construction’ 
which ‘does not pre-exist outside social and political discourses’,71 or as ‘the debate held in 
public by several actors who are in one way or another in contact with each other, for 
instance, through the pages of a newspaper.’72  It has also been suggested that, in English, the 
conventional word ‘public’ can do much the same work, and that the concept ‘public sphere’ 
is at least in part an artefact of the English-language translation of Habermas’ key text.73  
What unites these perspectives is the concern to den te the unfolding process of rational 
consensus-formation so central to deliberative democracy: given that this process is 
indispensable to the vision, a term which can signify its material expression is indispensable 
too, and ‘public sphere’ plays this role.  Those who envisage a deliberative EU therefore 
claim the necessity of a European public sphere, and see its achievement as necessary to 
fostering political community at the European level and redressing the deficiencies of EU 
democracy.74  Under modern conditions, direct deliberation involving all citizens appears 
impossible: therefore, where public-sphere literature takes an empirical turn, it is very often 
to study the media (traditional and new), understood as a ‘proxy’ for a public sphere75 or ‘a 
container, or carrier of a mediated public sphere.’76  It has been studied in very different 
ways, from content analyses of national media which trace the frequency with which 
                                                                                                                                            
provide a glimpse of the possibilities for lay delib ration.  See e.g. Robert Luskin, James Fishkin, and Roger 
Jowell, 'Considered Opinions: Deliberative Polling  Britain', British Journal of Political Science, 32/3 (2002). 
69 Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. 
70 John Crowley and Liana Giorgi, 'Introduction: The Political Sociology of the European Public Sphere', in 
Liana Giorgi, Ingmar von Homeyer, and Wayne Parsons (ed .), Democracy in the European Union: Towards 
the Emergence of a Public Sphere (London: Routledge, 2006).  Likewise, Erik O. Eriksen speaks of the public 
sphere as ‘the social room that is created when individuals discuss common concerns in front of an audience.’ 
Erik O. Eriksen, 'An Emerging European Public Sphere', European Journal of Social Theory, 8/3 (2005b), 
p.341. 
71 Thomas Risse, 'An Emerging European Public Sphere?  Theoretical Clarifications and Empirical Indicators', 
Annual Meeting of the European Union Studies Associati n (EUSA) (Nashville TN, 2003b), p.2. 
72 Marianne van de Steeg, 'Rethinking the Conditions f r a Public Sphere in the European Union', European 
Journal of Social Theory Special issue (November) (2002), p.503. 
73 Slavko Splichal, 'In Search of a Strong European Public Sphere: Some Critical Observations on 
Conceptualizations of Publicness and the (European) Public Sphere', Media, Culture and Society, 28/5 (2006). 
74 As Splichal notes though (ibid. p.7), there is no consensus on whether a European public sphere is nece sary 
to solving the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’ or whether it is this deficit itself which must be addressed o as to 
create the circumstances conducive to a public sphere. 
75 Risse, 'An Emerging European Public Sphere?' 
76 Van de Steeg, 'Rethinking the Conditions for a Public Sphere', p.503. 
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European themes are discussed, to discussions of the possibilities for a pan-European 
media.77  No consensus has emerged on whether a European public sphere does or can exist. 
To some extent, the public-sphere debate has moved beyond the original concerns of 
deliberative democracy, with certain recent contributions celebrating the possibilities for 
meaningful disagreement and ideological contestation that would be opened up in a well-
functioning European public sphere.78  Deliberative democracy itself has become a pluralised 
set of approaches, some of which emphasise the non-necessity of consensus and the 
embeddedness of the reasoning process.79  While these are welcome developments from the 
perspective of a political bond, which we have defin d in agonistic terms, it is important to 
address an assessment to the core of the approach, whi  remains the Habermasian tradition.  
In this, deliberative democracy is predicated on the idea that discursive interaction which is 
free and fair will produce a rational consensus – perhaps even that a rational consensus can 
be defined as that which emerges when conditions for free and f ir discursive interaction are 
achieved.80  Where these conditions fail, it is assumed to be for empirical rather than 
theoretical reasons.  The intersubjectivist perspectiv  therefore relies, like those in the 
mentalist-aggregative tradition, on the idea of a single language of politics, the medium 
through which free public reason can be exercised and r tional consensus can be achieved.  A 
quotation from Habermas serves to confirm as much: ‘The concept of communicative action 
presupposes the use of language as a medium for a kind of reaching understanding, in the 
course of which participants, through relating to a world, reciprocally raise validity claims 
that can be accepted or contested.’81  However, treating language as a medium and equating 
rationality with the giving of reasons is to severely downplay the significance of routinised 
language practice and the taking-of-things-for-granted.  As James Tully has emphasised, 
drawing on the insights of the later Wittgenstein, it is quite un-reasonable to see reason-
                                                
77 For reflections on the relative merits of these approaches, see Jürgen Gerhards, 'Europäisierung von 
Ökonomie und Politik und die Trägheit der Entstehung einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit', Kölner Zeitschrift für 
Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 52/Sonderheft 40 (2000); Cathleen Kantner, Kein modernes Babel: 
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building’ in John E. Fossum and Hans-Jörg Trenz, 'The EU’s Fledgling Society: From Deafening Silence to 
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approaches, see Andrew Knops, 'Debate: Agonism as Deliberation – on Mouffe’s Theory of Democracy', The 
Journal of Political Philosophy, 15/1 (2007). 
80 For the different positions taken by Habermas on these definitional questions, see Cooke, 'The Weakness of 
Strong Intersubjectivism'. 
81 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, p.99. 
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guided behaviour as that which submits (or grants the possibility of submitting) all arguments 
to a validity-test.  There is always a point at which the justifications are exhausted, when 
bedrock is reached and ‘my spade is turned.  Then I am inclined to say: This is simply what I 
do.’82  If assumptions are therefore unavoidable, the notio  that the discourse can be divested 
of all particularity so as to enable a rational universal consensus, answerable to a universal 
morality, is implausible.  Indeed, it is precisely the impossibility of shaking off all features of 
particularity which establishes the ‘rough ground’, as Wittgenstein calls it, upon which 
discursive practices like communication and deliberation can be achieved.83 
From this perspective, an intersubjectivist approach which takes discourse as a matter 
of reasoned communicative action seems rather narrow, and some of the concerns of the EU 
deliberative-democracy literature appear somewhat overdrawn.  If one weakens the 
attachment to a certain understanding of rational consensus as the outcome of deliberation, 
one need not follow the preoccupation of certain scholars that political issues be framed in 
the same common fashion across the member-states of he EU.84  If one loosens the concern 
for the overarching unity of debate, the attention given to media discourse may likewise 
come to seem excessive.  Certainly, in giving overwh lming emphasis to reasoned debate 
amongst the (political- and media-) elites of the public sphere as the foundation of political 
community, such a perspective is likely to underestimate the significance of the taken-for-
granted knowledge which exists amongst EU citizens more widely.  Arguably, instead of 
dismissing the tacit as the unreasonable, one needs to look more closely at precisely the 
assumptions about political problems which are to be found in everyday language.  This 
means shifting away from an intersubjectivist ontology and the metaphor of language as 
medium towards a perspective from which one studies th  possibilities for subjecthood and 
political action which are held out in discursive practice.  This is the sense of Mouffe’s call 
not simply to ‘replace the dominant “means/ends ration lity” [of aggregative perspectives] 
by another form of rationality, a “deliberative” and “communicative” one’: 
                                                
82 James Tully, 'Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy: Understanding Practices of Critical Reflection', Political 
Theory, 17/2 (1989), p.181, citing Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1976), §217. 
83 A similar conclusion is reached in Chantal Mouffe, D liberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism (Vienna: 
Institut für Höhere Studien, 2000b), p.13. 
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Public Sphere?', p.6), ‘communicating about the same issues at the same time is a definitional requirement for a 
public sphere which is not really controversial in the literature.’ 
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the failure of current democratic theory to tackle th question of citizenship is the consequence of their
operating with a conception of the subject which sees the individuals as prior to society, as bearers of 
natural rights, and either as utility maximising agents or as rational subjects.  In all cases they ar 
abstracted from social and power relations, language, culture and the whole set of practices that make 
the individuality possible.  What is precluded in these rationalistic approaches is the very question of 
what are the conditions of existence of the democratic subject.85   
 
While the deliberative-democracy approach marks an important move towards taking 
ideational questions seriously while avoiding the individualism and the guesswork associated 
with mentalist approaches, a more complete shift towards discourse and practice is one which 
foregrounds these ‘conditions of individuality’ as the central object of study.  Thus, while 
sharing many of the normative orientations of Habermasian deliberative democracy (not least 
the emphasis on politics as the basis of community) and being in sympathy with the some of 
its methodological interests (in particular, the workings of language), we turn attention to a 




Text- and practice-oriented approaches 
 
Here one is embracing a range of approaches.  Most can loosely be associated with the so-
called interpretative or linguistic turn in the social and political sciences, though the word 
‘turn’ is misleading if taken to imply chronological sequence (these approaches exist in 
parallel with those we have already looked at, and draw on philosophical traditions which are 
hardly recent) and if taken to imply a strong programmatic unity.  Most share a commitment 
to the notion, popularised by contemporary philosophers such as Richard Rorty, that reality is 
best treated not as something external to language which can be ‘captured’ with it, but as 
something that impinges on us through language.  These approaches therefore mark ‘a turn 
from socio-historical “realities” to their linguistc representation. […] [L]anguage is no 
longer understood as an instrument in social practice but rather as the site or “ground” for 
such practice.’86  What can profitably be studied is not the correspondence between the 
phenomenal world and our descriptions of it, but rather the relationship which we establish 
with this world in our act of describing it.   
                                                
85 Mouffe, Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism, p.10. 
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 Such a perspective weakens the faith in rationality as a point of (potentially) 
universal orientation because it implies that disagreement may be rooted in divergence of 
language use, and that any particular language use which claims to embody rational discourse 
may be susceptible to persistent scepticism.87  Such a perspective also challenges scientific 
aspirations towards explanatory accounts of human behaviour.  As James Tully puts it, 
following Wittgenstein, ‘do not look for an “explantion” but simply investigate how the 
“ language game is played” (Wittgenstein 1997: 654, 656).  … [C]oncentrate on the ways 
language-users use words and the activities in which the uses of words are woven 
(Wittgenstein 1997: 10, 1974: 204).  What is needed is neither a theory of the game in 
question (which is another game with signs) nor an explanation of an underlying structure 
that determines the play, but a perspicuous representation of the physiognomy of the game 
itself: what the players do and how they do it […].’88  Interest is refocused on the routine and 
the performative use of language, the latter as influe tially set out in John Austin’s theory of 
speech acts.  Rather than treating the utterance as a pure rendition of something which is in 
people’s heads, attention is directed to the place of the utterance in the discursive situation, 
on what people are doing when they express opinion, when they say one thing rather than 
another.89  More generally, one sees in these approaches a shift towards the affirmation of 
plurality and contingency, and a shift away from the prioritising of coherence, order, 
structure and system characteristic of much of traditional sociology or sister-disciplines such 
as semiotics.  The idea that the social world is governed by macro principles or rules that 
determine individual behaviour is rejected.  In this, the influence is evident – to varying 
degrees – of the French post-structuralists, Foucault, Derrida, Lacan and Deleuze.  One can 
speak of a new emphasis on the cr ativity of human action.90  The problems never shaken off 
by the structuralists – how to think about agency and change, how to think about 
contradiction – are given pride of place.  Typical research questions become: how do the 
linguistic resources at people’s disposal shape the way they talk about politics?  What 
patterns of meaning-making and argumentation are available to them?  What kind of variety 
is there, and what can be said of it?  What can one be told not just by the explicitly expressed 
(the opinion) but also by that which is taken for granted, the common sense?  How do 
different ‘ways of talking’ relate to different kinds of political action?  Interpretation and 
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‘Globalisation, the politics of identity and social hope’, in Richard Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope (London: 
Penguin, 1999). 
88 James Tully, 'The Agonic Freedom of Citizens', Economy and Society, 28/2 (1999), p.163. 
89 John L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962). 
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exploration rather than explanation are to the fore.  Research methods reflect the shift away 
from the acontextual: the study of texts (naturally-occurring or in interviews) is common, as 
are anthropological methods such as participant observation.   
 Though broadly in sympathy with these textualist approaches, another set of authors 
have argued that it is the ‘practice’ rather than the ‘ ext’ which should be taken as the basic 
social phenomenon.91  These approaches share the concern to avoid seeing th  world in terms 
either of individuals or holistic social entities: as with textual approaches, theirs is, as 
Theodore Schatzki terms it, a ‘site ontology’.92  They differ however in emphasising the 
importance of non-propositional knowledge (‘know-how’, as opposed to ‘know-that’) for 
understanding human behaviour, in foregrounding the‘embodied’ character of this 
knowledge, and in making more frequent reference to the material world.  Thus in defining a 
‘practice’, Reckwitz speaks of ‘a routinised way in which bodies are moved, objects are 
handled, subjects are treated, things are described and the world is understood.’93  The 
discursive is in this way treated as one of several kinds of routinised behaviour, and not all of 
these have a well-defined discourse that accompanies th m.94  ‘Competence’ is a key 
concept, since it allows one to avoid seeing behaviour as the following of predefined rules 
which exist external to practices themselves.  Another definition, by Barry Barnes, brings this 
out clearly: ‘Let practices be socially recognised forms of activity, done on the basis of what 
members learn from others, and capable of being done well or badly, correctly or 
incorrectly.’95  A practice is identifiable not because it is the enactment of a rule, but because 
it is a ‘way of carrying on’ which can be judged by others to whom it is recognisable as being 
more or less competent.   
 These textualist and practice-oriented theoretical moves, which share much in 
common compared to the mentalism of political psychology and the rationalism of the 
Habermasian deliberative democratic approach, can be associated with several empirical 
approaches to the study of lay politics.  One of these (though perhaps the most loosely 
related) is ‘frame analysis’.  Broadly falling within the fields of political sociology and 
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Routledge, 2001), discussing the question of vocabulary of appraisal for such practices as house-painting and 
flirting. 
95 Barry Barnes, 'Practice as Collective Action', ibid. p.19. 
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communications, it traces its ancestry to US symbolic interactionism as developed by G. H. 
Mead and Herbert Blumer, takes its unit of analysis (the ‘frame’) from Erving Goffman, and 
has been further developed from the 1980s onwards by authors such as David Snow, Robert 
Benford and Sydney Tarrow in their studies of social movements, and William Gamson in 
his landmark study of everyday political discussion, Talking Politics.  There is no consensus 
on the definition of a frame (some scholars giving it a considerably more linguistic twist than 
others96) but one way to think of them is as inherited ‘ideational materials’97 or tropes which 
both enable and constrain actors in their political discursive practice.  Robert Entman has 
suggested that ‘to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more 
salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, 
causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item 
prescribed.’  He suggests that frames define problems, diagnose causes, make moral 
judgements, and suggest remedies.98  Key questions for these authors have included: what 
role do frames and framing play in determining the success of social movements in capturing 
lay support for political causes?  What is the role f media – how do they make use of 
popular tropes,99 and what are the consequences of certain ways of news reporting (‘episodic’ 
versus ‘thematic’) for how lay people attribute political responsibility?100  How do cultural 
tropes affect people’s receptivity to institutional change, including the process of European 
integration?101  
One way to avoid slipping into a structure-agency di hotomy is to conceive of frames 
as ideational resources, and to adopt the toolkit metaphor which has been proposed by Ann 
Swidler for cultural analysis more generally.  Swidler argues against the assumption that the 
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influence of culture on behaviour is to be seen in terms of values supplying the ultimate ends 
towards which action is oriented.  ‘People do not build lines of action from scratch, choosing 
actions one at a time as efficient means to given ends.  Instead, they construct chains of 
action beginning with at least some pre-fabricated links.  […]  A culture is not a unified 
system that pushes action in a consistent direction.  Rather, it is more like a “tool kit” or 
repertoire from which actors select differing pieces for constructing lines of action.’  Here 
one sees a move towards a stronger emphasis on actor agency than is customary in sociology, 
and her move away from the assumption of coherence is signalled in the call for cultural 
research to focus ‘not on cultures as unified wholes, but on chunks of culture, each with its 
own history.’102  At the same time, pure voluntarism is avoided by noting that resources are 
taken up only to the extent that they are culturally vailable.  The study of ‘symbolic 
boundaries’ is one way in which research in cultura sociology has explored these questions 
empirically.103  Modes of justification have been another important field of enquiry, 
especially under the influence of social theorists Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot.  In 
their account, humans find themselves in situations where they must relate to one another 
according (inter alia) to ‘regimes’ of love, of violence, of familiarity and of justification.  In 
outlining the grammar of the regime of justification, they claim to have identified by 
empirical means six ‘orders of worth’ or grandeur (‘Inspired’, ‘Domestic’, ‘Civic’, 
‘Opinion’, ‘Market’ and ‘Industrial’) by the logic of which justificatory arguments can be 
made.  Here again one sees the shift away from the assumption of coherence and of ideal 
language: these orders of worth are ‘formally incompatible with one another, since each of 
them is recognised in the situation in which its validity is established as universal’; conflict 
resolution depends on participants to the conflict reaching ‘tacit agreement’ about which 
orders of worth are relevant to their dispute.104  Some orders of worth may be more prevalent 
in certain social environments than others, a possibility which has been explored empirically 
by Lamont and Thévenot and their fellow contributors in Rethinking Comparative Cultural 
Sociology: Repertoires of Evaluation in France and the United States.  Likewise, 
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reconciliation between orders of worth may be more achievable in some contexts than 
others.105   
Often as important for scholars associated with these approaches is how collective 
ideational materials (maintaining the broadest formulation) can inhibit as well as foster 
political participation.  The normative commitment to active citizenship and ‘civil society’, 
characteristic of much of empirical political sociology, comes through strongly in these 
works.  In Avoiding Politics, Nina Eliasoph looks at how, in certain social situations, norms 
of etiquette can render inappropriate discussion of politics and the adoption of perspectives 
which go beyond personal interest.  As she puts it, emphasising the significance of discursive 
practice, ‘the problem with psychological approaches is that what matters for democracy is 
not only what individuals privately hold inside their brains.  […] The “democratic norms” 
that really matter are unspoken norms for conversation, manners, civility, tact, that make 
citizens comfortable engaging in freewheeling political conversation in everyday life 
contexts.’106  Invoking Goffman’s distinction between ‘frontstage’ and ‘backstage’, she 
explores how people in private contexts can feel fully able to articulate collective interests 
whilst in public contexts they may feel constrained to adopt the more parochial language of a 
particular ‘identity’.  By studying how norms may vary across contexts and how they rely on 
individual choices for their maintenance, she avoids resurrecting the passive figure of homo 
sociologicus.  In Habits of the Heart, Robert Bellah, Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, 
Ann Swidler and Steven M. Tipton deploy interview methods to explore the contemporary 
condition of American mores – things such as ‘consciousness, culture, and the aily practices 
of life’ 107 – and chart the processes of increasing individualsm and fragmentation plus the 
ways in which these are resisted.  In some of these political sociological approaches, the 
recognition of the lack of a shared, coherent languge of politics seems to coexist with a 
yearning for exactly such a language;108 to this extent they maintain a linkage with the 
deliberative-democracy tradition. 
In Britain and parts of continental Europe, similar questions to those explored in 
political and cultural sociology are studied under the explicitly textualist rubric of ‘discourse 
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analysis’, though between these literatures there has been little in the way of cross-
fertilisation.  Discourse analysis is a wide field (a bit like Hampstead Heath).  It traces its 
lineage from language philosophy through French post-structuralism, Harold Garfinkel’s 
ethnomethodology, Conversation Analysis as developed by Harvey Sacks and Emanuel 
Schegloff, the neo-Marxism of Antonio Gramsci, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, and a 
range of other influences depending on the particular subfield.  By no means all works in this 
tradition have been empirical, but those which have be n tend to look at the ‘interpretative 
repertoires’ which speakers in discourse situations invoke as they engage in discursive 
practices such as the construction of (collective) identity, acts of legitimisation and 
delegitimisation, and the building and mobilising of c alitions.109  This approach has been 
usefully applied in the context of European Studies to explore the ‘narratives about Europe’ 
which may structure how the EU is discussed by politica  actors.110 
Finally, in an approach emerging from social psychology, Rom Harré has developed 
‘positioning theory’, a perspective with considerable possibilities of empirical application to 
the study of lay politics.111  Reacting against frame analysis (and, less directly, identity 
studies) for being insensitive to the dynamic and performative aspects of conversational 
interaction, he works with the concepts of ‘subject position’ and ‘positioning’.  Subject 
positions are locations in discourse to which individuals attach themselves using pronoun 
grammar, thereby embracing the conceptual repertoir which comes with that position.  
Positioning refers to the discursive practice whereby individuals assign subject positions to 
themselves and to others.  It is a relational activity (others are positioned as one positions 
oneself), and it can extend beyond the intentions and the awareness of the actors involved 
(indeed, actors are constituted by positioning).  As a psychologist, Harré’s focus is generally 
on interpersonal positioning in the small-group setting, but the concepts have been applied 
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also to the intergroup level, whereby groups of individuals position themselves as a ‘we’ at 
the same time as constructing a ‘them’.112 
 
Whilst many of these approaches have developed in parallel rather than in 
conjunction with one another, there is a certain overlap in their strengths and weaknesses.  
Their attraction lies in their resistance to many of the thematic criticisms we have developed 
in this chapter so far: they seek the symbolic in the observable world rather than the 
cognitive; they avoid reducing language to the medium of conscious communication, 
focusing instead on its unintended aspects and its political effects; and they provide 
opportunities for sidestepping structure-agency problems and the slide into determinism or 
voluntarism.  Our empirical exploration of the ‘political bond’ will focus on discursive 
practices (i.e. patterns of talk) as the site for study, and will draw inspiration from these 
approaches to do so.  Political community is thereby xplored in the common-sense 
assumptions and taken-for-granted reference-points which people invoke when discussing 
matters of political relevance.  A focus on discursive interaction enables the advantages of a 
practice-oriented approach to be combined with sensitivity to the ideational content of 
politics.  It matches with a number of talk-centred perspectives on citizenship in which 
discussion is treated as a form of political practice.113  For the reason that we shall be 
drawing on a number of the approaches above, it is as well to be mindful of some of the 
questions they leave unresolved, before sketching out m re fully our own perspective.  
One straightforward problem is that they have all suffered from substantial 
imprecision regarding their key concepts: ‘frames’, ‘cultural tools or resources’, ‘discourses’, 
‘interpretative repertoires’, ‘practices’ and ‘ordes of worth’ have been used to mean rather 
different things by authors working within the same tradition, with little convergence on 
common definitions.  It has been noted, for instance, that the word ‘discourse’ has been taken 
to mean ‘a textual unit that is larger than a sentence’, a ‘wider set of social practices’ and, 
most expansively, as ‘coterminous with the social’.114  Such variation can be found merely 
amongst those who style themselves discourse analysts; if one looks further afield, to US 
sociology for example, further connotations are added to the word.  Likewise, the concept of 
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frame as used by frame analysts has a wide semantic r ge, and arguably ‘framing is not a 
clearly explicated and generally applicable concept, but only a metaphor that cannot be 
directly translated into research questions.’115  A glance at The Practice Turn in 
Contemporary Theory is enough to observe the word ‘practice’ being used in more than one 
way.  Meanwhile, even within a single article, Boltanski and Thévenot’s fundamental 
concept ‘order of worth’ is occasionally substituted for terms such as ‘world’ or ‘convention 
of equivalence’, according to a rationale which is not always obvious.   
For those sympathetic to such approaches, ambiguity of this kind need not be a major 
concern – indeed it is fully understandable as partof the vibrant and disruptive character of 
language and its evolution.  More problematic – rega dless of how one defines the units of 
analysis – is how one explores them empirically.  How does one identify a discursive 
resource, or a practice?  One needs to be sufficiently alien to the subject matter in question to 
be ‘struck’ by its distinctive features (the danger b ing that one takes these for granted just 
like the actors themselves) and yet one needs also to be sufficiently embedded in it as to be 
able to interpret and make sense of what is found.116  As well as striking this balance for the 
purpose of identification, one faces the challenge of how best to think of the specimens that 
one draws out: as embedded in a larger grammatical structure (a parole embedded in a 
langue, in Saussure’s terminology), or as simply one of several utterances bearing a 
resemblance to one another but not structured by a larger whole?  If the former, then how 
does one study grammatical structures when all that one can access is particular utterances, 
how does one derive the nature of the category from the item?  If the latter, then what is it 
that allows a connection between utterances to be made, how does one generalise one’s 
findings?  Many discourse analysts and practice theorists describe themselves as post-
structuralist and reject the idea of grammars, thoug  often they seem unable to dispense with 
these entirely.  Jonathan Potter and Margaret Wetherell, for example, claim that ‘in discourse 
analysis the extracts [selected from interviews] are not characterisations or illustrations of the 
data, they are examples of the data itself.  Or, in ethnomethodological terms, they are the 
topics itself, not a resource from which the topic is rebuilt […]’, but this sits rather badly 
with their definition of an interpretative repertoie as ‘basically a lexicon or register of terms 
and metaphors drawn upon to characterise and evaluate actions and events.’  It is unclear 
how one can speak of that which is ‘drawn upon’ without making assumptions about the 
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place of the utterance in a broader scheme, without, in other words, linking that which is ‘in 
the text’ to something which is ‘beyond the text’.117  Harré and Davies are particularly 
insistent: ‘language exists only as concrete occasions of language in use.  La langue is an 
intellectualising myth – only la parole is psychologically and socially real.’118  For them, 
Erving Goffman’s frame analysis was flawed because it was ‘transcendental’: frames were 
understood as ‘transcendent to action … as pre-existing devices (or tools) employed by 
people to create conversations’, whereas ‘the whole of the “apparatus” must be immanent, 
reproduced moment by moment in conversational action and carried through time, not as 
abstract schemata, but as current understandings of past and present conversations.’119  
Whilst theirs is a coherent perspective, it seems to make difficult something which can often 
be of great interest in the analysis of any given empirical situation: that is, consideration not 
just of what was said but of what was not said and might have been said.  When Boltanski 
and Thévenot adopt the term ‘grammars of worth’, it is precisely this possibility which they 
enable, albeit at the risk of reifying structure once more.   
Similar problems of inference arise in a different guise when one inquires into how 
best to describe the set of people who invoke these r p rtoires (frames, resources etc.).  In 
this there is a strong danger of ‘groupism’, that is, of inferring arbitrarily that the boundaries 
of the circle of repertoire-users correspond to the boundaries of a recognisable group.  The 
problem is more fundamental than methodological natio lism, since redescribing the 
account with reference to other units (cities, for example, or professions) is of little help.120  
Potter and Wetherell seem to slip into groupism when lauding a work of discourse analysis 
which takes a particular set of biochemists as representative of all biochemists, and these as 
representative of scientists generally.121  Clearly one wants to avoid linking the use of 
particular discursive repertoires with a pre-defined collectivity, both because a neat overlap 
of this kind is empirically implausible and because for normative reasons one wants to avoid 
arriving at a determinist perspective which does not all w for the possibility that individuals 
may renounce some of the patterns with which they ar  confronted.  To some extent one can 
circumvent the difficulty by careful phrasing of one’s research goals and conclusions.  A 
good example is the work of Lamont and Thévenot, studying ‘schemas of evaluation 
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mobilised at the discursive or interactional level,’ who state their concern as with 
‘documenting how these schemas are unevenly present across national cultural repertoires,’ 
on the assumption that ‘different national communities are not equally likely to draw on the 
same cultural tools to construct and assess the world that surrounds them.’  Their leading 
argument is nicely worded to emphasise the territorial spread and ‘availability’ of such 
repertoires rather than their adhesion to particular social groups: ‘we suggest that cultural 
repertoires prevailing in the United States make market references more readily available to 
Americans and enable them to resort to such referenc s i  a wide range of situations, whereas 
the French repertoires make principles of civic solidarity more salient and enable a larger 
number of French people to resort to them across situations … However, this does not mean 
that market criteria of evaluation are absent from the French repertoires, but only that they 
are used in a small number of situations by a smaller number of people’.122  Even this 
formulation, however, supposes that the most noteworthy variation is cross-national, rather 
than for instance cross-regional or cross-class (or cr ss-whatever), and so the difficulty is 
only partially resolved.  It is likely that language itself is the culprit, since whatever noun one 
uses to describe the participants in an empirical study (other than ‘the participants’) will 
imply some act of inference to a larger population: ‘taxi-drivers’, ‘British working men’, 
‘Czechs’, ‘taxi-drivers in Lübeck’ … each category description presupposes a generalisation.  
A combination of cautiously phrased and consistently problematised generalisations, plus the 
avoidance of questions of statistical significance, probably represents the most sensible and 
the least dogmatic means by which to continue empirical research in the face of this 
challenge.123   
A final problem which persists in these approaches relates to the question of agency – 
particularly important for those interested in tracing causal connections.  One of Swidler’s 
arguments for shifting to an understanding of culture as ‘toolkit’ was that this was a move 
away from the social determinism associated with seeing culture as determinative of values.  
Humans could now be understood as active ‘problem-solvers’ rather than as passive bearers 
of structure, but without sliding to the polar extreme of the radically autonomous individual 
since they work within the constraints of their inherited cultural resources.  Similar 
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considerations are undoubtedly behind several of the approaches we have considered: those 
using frame analysis to study social movements have often emphasised – perhaps out of 
sympathy for their agenda – the freedom which such movements have to select the frames 
most likely to mobilise supporters.124  Discourse analysts vary on this question, depending on 
whether they locate power in the discourse or in maipulators of the discourse, but Boltanski 
and Thévenot are explicitly sensitive to the selection and deployment of orders of worth by 
actors who are interested in justice, and Harré and Davies speak of ‘at least a possibility of 
notional choice … [being] inevitably involved because there are many and contradictory 
discursive practices that each person could engage in.’125  Arguably, however, none of these 
approaches is able to give a satisfactory account of how this process of strategic choice 
works.  In particular, there is a danger that, in presenting actors as able to select different 
frames or discursive resources according to their particular goals, one reverts on the one hand 
to means-ends rationality and a disembedding of the actor, and on the other hand one 
resurrects the idea of a meta-language in which competing options are constituted, evaluated 
and selected.  These difficulties can be avoided if one abandons the attempt at causal 
explanation, and it would seem that there are good reasons for doing so, but it is a move 
which many are naturally reluctant to make. 
 
Having taken some time to explore the neighbouring terrain, we can now lay out some 
principles for the empirical study which follows.  Discursive practices are the focus, here 
understood to consist in coordinated speech-acts.  They are transpersonal phenomena which 
involve mutual adjustment amongst persons.  Discursive practices are not ‘shared’ across 
individuals in the sense that they are the result of common knowledge or common norms, 
whether explicit or tacit: there is not, following the important critique made by Stephen 
Turner, a ‘tacit rulebook’ which all are assumed to have learnt.  But nor can these practices 
simply be reduced to idiosyncratic habits of speaking which individual persons have picked 
up in one way or another over the course of their lives and which they then deploy as just the 
enactment of a disposition.126  As Barnes correctly points out, there is an irreducibly social or 
coordinative dimension to practices, in that ‘habit is not enacted well or badly, but practice 
                                                
124 Snow and Benford, 'Ideology, Frame Resonance, and P rticipant Mobilization''; William Gamson, 'Political 
Discourse and Collective Action', in Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow (eds.), 
International Social Movement Research, 1 (London: JAI Press, 1988); Gamson, Talking Politics; Gamson, 
'Constructing Social Protest', in Hank Johnston and Bert Klandermans (eds.), Social Movements and Culture 
(London: UCL Press, 1995). 
125 Davies and Harré, 'Positioning: The Discursive Production of Selves', p.45. 
126 Turner, The Social Theory of Practices. 
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is.’127  For our purposes, this means the object of study can be taken as the conversation in 
which participants successfully interact with one another without visible signs of 
bewilderment.  It is their ability to ‘get by’ in discussion which is considered suggestive, and 
that which they share is that which they collectively create in discussion. 
Contra mentalist approaches, and the quantitative methods with which they have been 
associated, beliefs are rejected as the appropriate uni  of analysis.  It is held that there is no 
definitive description to be given of the mental phenomena which give rise to the articulation 
of opinions, since these are underdetermined by the opinions themselves.  Putting mental 
phenomena to one side, and abandoning thereby the attempt at causal explanation, one can 
nonetheless investigate phenomena which appear at the level of the text, namely the patterns 
of assumption which can be identified in discursive int raction.  Assumptions in other words 
are understood not as psychological phenomena (on which this work will remain largely 
agnostic) but as transpersonal things manifest in what is said or pointedly not said in a given 
discursive situation, the things which are taken for granted in any given speech act.  These 
are deep features of the text: even where there is disagreement in opinions, one may look for 
agreement in assumptions, since in order to carry on a discussion people must take a large 
amount for granted so as to restrict the sphere of agreement or disagreement to a manageable 
size.  For the purposes of exploring a political bond, the assumptions that will be of interest 
are those to do with what kinds of political problem are important, how problems are linked 
to one another, how they can be explained, and the extent to which it is plausible to attempt 
to address them in some organised, collective fashion.   
In studying assumptions as textual features, the res arch is addressed to observable 
kinds of behaviour rather than hypothesised mental states.  Studying discursive practice is 
therefore methodologically attractive, and also allws one to sidestep complex questions to 
do with intentionality.  Of course, this is not to make a positivist or behaviouralist claim in its 
favour.  Identifying assumptions requires interpretation: they are never self-evident, and it is 
always possible to add more to those which one has identified.  Analysis of this kind is 
therefore no more a ‘neutral’ exercise than any other form of empirical research – but it is 
better grounded than that which relies on hypothesising about invisible states of 
                                                
127 Barnes, 'Practice as Collective Action', p.26. 
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consciousness.128  To reiterate, the problem of agency, and the associated problems of 
explanation or the identification of causal mechanisms, will be considered mainly in passing. 
Assumptions, it is suggested, are not made ‘at random’.  At any given discursive 
moment, some are appropriate and some are inappropriate; more generally some tend to go 
together and others not, and some tend to appear accompanied by certain concepts and ideas 
in clusters.  Certain assumptions – e.g. that all heads of state will die tomorrow – are likely to 
provoke surprise and censure in the text, if they ar  made at all.  It is possible therefore to 
speak of at least a basic level of order, and thus t e necessity that participants to the 
discursive practice exercise some competence in the way they speak.  It is the existence of 
order and the necessity of competence which allows the researcher the possibility of drawing 
generalisable conclusions, since these features point to the existence of patterns which extend 
beyond the collection of individuals who happen to be present.  It is also this which allows 
the researcher to simplify what would otherwise be unmanageably complex.   
Aside from on the making of assumptions, the focus will also be on discursive 
practices of positioning, something of crucial relevance to the political bond as we have 
described it.  Rather than speaking of ‘identity’, individual or collective, as something which 
is brought to bear on a discussion by its participants, we look at how the text exhibits subject 
positions within a discourse which are taken up, ascribed or resisted by the speakers.  
Chapter 4 will look closely at the subject positions which recur in the text, how ‘we’s’ and 
‘they’s’ are constructed and what kind of relationship is posited between the two – something 
which serves to illuminate the question of ‘shared predicament’.  We shall be looking at who 
is implied by the ‘we’ who share in certain problems, and how those ‘others’ who oppose 
them are positioned; also at how certain subject positions carry implications of agency and 
others of passivity.  Just as certain assumptions te d o go together, so too do certain subject 
positions.  Thus it becomes possible to pick up the idea of ‘domains’ of patterned discourse, 
and to attempt to ‘make sense’ or ‘find order’ in what appear to be contradictions.  Here one 
can refer to Mouffe’s idea of the individual: ‘It is necessary to theorise the individual, not as 
a monad, an ‘unencumbered’ self that exists prior to and independently of society, but rather 
as a site constituted by an ensemble of “subject positions”, inscribed in a multiplicity of 
social relations, the member of many communities and participant in a plurality of collective 
                                                
128 For remarks in a similar vein, see ibid. and Ann Swidler, 'What Anchors Cultural Practices', in Theodore R. 
Schatzki, Karin Knorr Cetina, and Eike von Savigny (eds.), The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory 
(London: Routledge, 2001a). 
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forms of identification.’129  Individuals are ‘always multiple and contradictory subjects … 
constructed by a variety of discourses, and precariously and temporarily sutured at the 
intersection of those subject positions.’130 
In setting out these premises, to be clarified and developed in subsequent chapters, we 
borrow liberally from the textualist and practice-oriented approaches outlined above.  The 
focus on routinised discursive behaviour (in the form of assumptions and positioning), and 
the concern with know-how and competence, are both clearly in tune with some of the key 
concerns of practice-oriented approaches.  Departing from a purely textualist understanding, 
a collective bond is conceived not simply as a ‘discourse of the common’ or a ‘story of 
peoplehood’131: this would be to put too much emphasis on consciou  and full articulation, 
coherence and narrativisation, and would prompt questions as to where the authoritative 
versions of such stories are to be found.  Rather, a bond is explored in routinised discursive 
practices in which competence can be judged, the tak n-for-granted aspects of knowledge 
which precede conscious deliberation and reflection.  Conversely, unlike practice-oriented 
approaches, for the purposes of this project there is little need to emphasise the ‘embodied’ 
character of such routines: they are embodied in so far as they involve patterned usage of the 
tongue, but this is not their most interesting feature.  In this sense the approach is more 
textualist, and the adoption of terminology from Harré and Mouffe (whose work also invokes 
‘subject positions’ as a concept) is an expression of this.  Occasionally there will be reason to 
adopt the vocabulary of ‘practice’, ‘discourse’, ‘repertoire’, ‘resource’ and ‘common sense’, 
notwithstanding the degree of ambiguity that each of these suggestive terms contains.  The 
notion that they can be usefully defined in the abstr ct as a precursor to the analytical process 
is rejected: their meaning should be sought in their usage. 
Ultimately the assembly of terms and premises is pragmatic, and it is in the spirit of 
the approaches described above that one designs one’  res arch not according to abstract 
principles of good method but according to the specificities of the research problem at 
hand.132  As Reckwitz highlights, practice theory is not ‘true’ in the sense of being the only 
perspective which corresponds to the ‘facts’, nor should it necessarily be seen as a ‘theory’ in 
the sense of a unitary body of principles which must be adopted or rejected wholesale.  
Rather it is a ‘vocabulary’, a ‘heuristic device, a sensitising “framework” for empirical 
                                                
129 Mouffe, The Return of the Political, p.97. 
130 Ibid. p.20. 
131 Using the latter term, see Smith, Stories of Peoplehood. 
132 In the terms of Michael Billig, scholarship must take precedence over methodology: cf. Billig, 'Methodol gy 
and Scholarship in Understanding Ideological Explanatio ', in Charles Antaki (ed.), Analysing Everyday 
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research […, one which] opens up a certain way of seeing and analysing social 
phenomena.’133  Consequently, one should not approach empirical study styling oneself as a 
‘frame analyst’ as opposed to a ‘discourse analyst’, a ‘cultural sociologist’ or a ‘political 
sociologist’, as though these terms each implied a cle r and distinct kind of activity.  Instead 
one should treat these fields as providing useful indications of how relevant research might 
be undertaken.  In the words of Alexander Pope, ‘fools admire, but men of sense approve.’134   
 
 
Outline of an Empirical Study 
 
The research with which we shall explore the notion of a ‘political bond’ involves 
assembling groups of lay people – i.e. those with no professional interest in politics – and 
getting them talking about problems in public life.  Our focus is on everyday talk, unlike the 
close attention to media discourse which one tends to find in the public-sphere debate, or the 
articulations of well-organised social movements that one finds in the literature on 
contentious politics.  While the media undoubtedly have a key role in supplying the 
repertoires with which everyday talk unfolds, media messages are very often supplemented 
by other resources drawn from daily life, with outcomes which are unpredictable.  Moreover, 
that which is given prominence in the media is by no means automatically given prominence 
in everyday talk: reading, listening and watching is selective, and topics and messages can be 
ignored as well as borrowed.  There is a disjuncture between what journalists choose to write 
about and what lay people are able to talk about.135  Similarly, scholars who focus on claims-
making by organised societal actors are at risk of overlooking the broader and less 
conspicuous social configuration from which these emerge.  A political bond needs to be 
sought in the wider citizenry and not just in its most structured and most vocal elements.136 
 The extent to which ordinary people ‘talk politics’ in their everyday lives is of course 
a matter of some debate, even taking a quite broad understanding of what constitutes political 
talk.  Some studies based on participant observation, mainly in the US, have emphasised the 
tendency of non-elites actively to avoid such discus ion, considering taboo the expression of 
strong and opposing views, and unwilling, as individuals, to put themselves in a position 
                                                
133 Reckwitz, 'Towards a Theory of Social Practices', p.257. 
134 Alexander Pope, An Essay on Criticism (London: Collins, 1973), Part II, l.190. 
135 For some thoughts on the relation between media and everyday discourse, see Gamson, Talking Politics. 
136 This point is well made in Fossum and Trenz, 'The EU’s Fledgling Society', in their discussion of works such 
as Doug Imig and Sidney Tarrow, 'Political Contentio  n a Europeanising Polity', West European Politics, 23 
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where they might have to justify opinions.137  Other studies, by contrast, have suggested that 
it is by no means uncommon, at least amongst those of fairly close acquaintance.138  Context 
is no doubt important: familiar surroundings and familiar faces are likely to be conducive to 
such talk.139  As will become clear, the discussions which form the basis of this study were 
not isolated events: they contained a number of cross- eferences to conversations which had 
taken place naturally between some of the participants on prior occasions, and were thus 
enmeshed in a broader history of discussion.  Our focus is principally qualitative, however, 
on the kinds of discursive practice which can be observed rather t an on the frequency with 
which they arise in different contexts.  Participant observation would not have been suitable 
to the goal of exploring common patterns of discursive practice in multiple locations and a 
number of linguistic environments.140  We look at how a certain set of people talk when 
given the opportunity to do so, and treat the provisi n of opportunities as a separate – though 
important – issue.141 
The discussions that were conducted were loosely structured: while certain topics 
were placed on the agenda by the researcher using thema ic index-cards, participants were 
generally given freedom to choose what to talk about and when.  (For full details on methods, 
see the following chapter and the Methodological Appendix).  The goal was to minimise the 
significance of the researcher’s a priori assumptions about what was ‘relevant’ and 
‘important’ to the discussion whilst at the same time maintaining a minimum level of 
comparability between the interviews.  Too many studies of lay perspectives on European 
politics start with the assumption that the EU is inherently important to people and go on to 
                                                
137 See in particular Eliasoph, Avoiding Politics. 
138 Katherine Cramer Walsh reports that explicitly political conversations took place on more than half of the 
100-plus mornings that she observed the discussion of a group of pension-age male friends hanging out in their 
local coffee-shop.  Cramer Walsh, Talking About Politics.   
139 Cf. Pamela Conover, Donald D. Searing, and Ivor Crewe, 'The Deliberative Potential of Discussion'.   
140 One rationale for participant observation is that it provides access to naturally-arising situations rather than 
those arranged by the researcher.  The dichotomy of natural and artificial is, however, a problematic one, as 
others have noted (Gamson, Talking Politics, pp.18-9), and relies on a model of the scientific method which is 
not shared here.  A strong rationale for participant observation, on the other hand, is that it allows ne to chart 
variation in behaviour across different contexts.  Comparison, rather than some notion of the ‘natural’, is then 
the guiding principle, and many interesting findings may be gathered.  However, if one wishes to draw ta
from a considerable number of settings, participant observation is generally unviable because of the lev l of 
familiarity which one needs to cultivate with those one is studying.  This process is likely to be all the longer if 
one is (e.g. for language reasons) identifiably a ‘foreigner’ in at least some of those settings. 
141 Much the same approach, though it is rarely acknowledged, tends to be taken by those who put cultural 
symbols (flags etc.) at the forefront of their exploration of the common.  There seems little reason to assume 
that these have a more prominent place in daily life than the substantive problématiques which will be explored 
here, and for this reason no special justification for studying the latter seems to be required. 
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ask interviewees what they think about it.142  By contrast, the attempt here was to see what 
reference-points were invoked spontaneously in discus ion.143  This meant allowing 
participants considerable freedom to set the discussion agenda, and probing directly on 
matters related to the EU only towards the end of the discussions.144  The use of group 
discussions rather than one-to-one interviews has a number of advantages: the power-
advantage of the interviewer over the interviewee is somewhat reduced, and the interviewer 
is in less of a position to dominate the discussion either by direct intervention or silent 
authority.  Indeed, after the first twenty minutes or so, the researcher can adopt a fairly low 
profile (though of course, his presence is surely always felt, as perhaps is the presence-to-
come of an academic audience).  Furthermore, group discussions allow one to look at such 
interactional features as responses, reactions, conensus and jokes, and to get a better feel for 
the ‘common sense’.  The role of the individual’s whimsy in setting the course of discussion 
is also reduced in the group environment, since intrviewees are accountable to each other 
for what they choose to talk about; that which is collectively deemed inconsequential is likely 
to be drowned out in discussion.145   
 Taxi-drivers were chosen as the interview subjects.  Groups of four of them, 
sometimes three, were enlisted at taxi-ranks using a financial incentive, and accompanied to 
pubs or cafés for approximately two hours of discusion.  Participants were usually familiar 
with one another – in many cases, already talking to each other when approached – and were 
familiar with the surroundings in which they were interviewed.  As subjects for empirical 
research, taxi-drivers have been used before.  Diego Gambetta and Heather Hamill 
                                                
142 See e.g. OPTEM, 'The European Citizens and the Future of Europe: A Qualitative Study in the 25 Member 
States', (Eurobarometer, 2006).  While this large-scale qualitative study contains some interesting fidings, it 
seems likely to have overstated the extent to which citizens look to the EU as a response to their concerns (pp.8-
9) simply by virtue of the structure of its Discussion Guide (Appendix III).  Already from the second question 
(p.73), respondents are invited to focus their attentions on the EU by being told that ‘one of the factors likely to 
play a role in the future is the European Union andhow it will develop.’  Thus the everyday concerns which 
they articulate in response to the first question are automatically given a connection to matters European, and 
this can hardly but encourage the ‘europeanisation’ of subsequent responses.   
143 A valuable study in this regard is Ulrike Hanna Meinhof, 'Europe Viewed from Below: Agents, Victims, and 
the Threat of the Other', in Richard K. Herrmann, Thomas Risse, and Marilynn B. Brewer (eds.), Transnational 
Identities: Becoming European in the EU (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004).  Meinhof use interviews 
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Germany and Germany/Poland invoke in their everyday-life narratives.  This is a well-structured study, and her 
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144 This technique of delaying direct probes on the topic f research interest until the end of the interview, so as 
to explore the extent to which it is invoked naturally, is sometimes referred to as ‘funnelling’: cf. David L. 
Morgan, Focus Groups as Qualitative Research (Qualitative Research Methods Series 16; London: Sage, 
1997), p.41. 
145 On the group-interview method, see ibid., Michael Bloor et al., Focus Groups in Social Research (London: 
Sage, 2001), and Jenny Kitzinger and Rosaline S. Barbour, 'The Challenge and Promise of Focus Groups', in 
Jenny Kitzinger and Rosaline S. Barbour (eds.), Developing Focus Group Research: Politics, Theory and
Practice (London: Sage, 1999). 
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interviewed taxi-drivers in Belfast and New York to explore the cues that are used to make 
quick decisions about which strangers are likely to be trustworthy.146  In their sociological 
study, taxi-drivers were interesting because their daily vulnerability to being cheated, 
intimidated or attacked meant that they were likely to be particularly skilled players of the 
‘trust game’; they were interesting, in other words, because they were in a position of 
heightened sensitivity to rather ordinary problems.  Likewise, in this study of lay politics, 
taxi-drivers were chosen on the supposition that their conversation may exhibit in 
concentrated form the kinds of assumption which are frequently made by lay people.  On the 
one hand their profession puts them in a position of heightened sensitivity to a wide range of 
political developments.  They are amongst the firstto be affected by changes in prices or 
spending behaviour, by the arrival of immigrant labour, by increases in criminal behaviour or 
by new policing tactics.  On the other hand they are also exposed to a wide range of opinion 
stimuli (in particular newspapers and the radio, and the experiences of others as narrated to 
them on the job), militating against the possibility that theirs is a speech community isolated 
from the rest of society.  Also, the s lf-understanding147 of many taxi-drivers is arguably as 
people of common sense and practical wisdom.  Unlike, for example, students, academics or 
perhaps artists, they show little tendency to emphasise their personal originality by 
formulating opinions which consciously diverge from those they hear around them; rather, it 
seems, they take some pride in saying pretty much what ‘everyone’ is saying.  Of course, one 
should be wary about whether they do this accurately, whether they in any sense represent 
the ‘voice of the people’ as some of them claim to, and there is no doubt that some of the 
concerns they voice are idiosyncratic, such as annoyance at the parking violations of civilian 
drivers who park on their ranks.  But it is generally their stated intention to speak as other 
people speak, and so their talk makes an interesting site for the analysis of discursive 
resources which are available more widely.  Furthermore, they have no reason to be 
unusually favourable or hostile to the EU, something which might have had a bearing on the 
kind of issues which are to be explored.   
                                                
146 Diego Gambetta, Streetwise: How Taxi Drivers Establish Their Customers' Trustworthiness (New York: 
Russell Sage, 2005).  Studying the experiences of South Asians in the North of England, see Virinder S. Kalra, 
From Textile Mills to Taxi Ranks: Experiences of Migration, Labour and Social Change (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
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used in the field of neurology to study brain activity during the process of memory recall: their significance here 
lies in their need to activate large amounts of stored memory to navigate their way around the city.  See Eleanor 
A. Maguire, Katherine Woollett, and Hugo J. Spiers, 'London Taxi Drivers and Bus Drivers: A Structural MRI 
and Neuropsychological Analysis', Hippocampus 16/12 (2006). 
147 For thoughts on the use of this term, see Brubaker nd Cooper, 'Beyond 'Identity''. 
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 While we are interested in them mainly for the patterns to be found in their 
conversation, taxi-drivers also may have some significa ce as actors in themselves.  They 
can be treated as belonging, across the countries and cities studied, to a class position which, 
from most ideological perspectives, is politically important.  The large majority of taxi-
drivers are without higher education (a few individuals in our sample had attended university 
for a couple of semesters, but left before completion).148  While average earnings are 
inherently difficult to calculate for taxi-drivers, anecdotal evidence suggests that for each of 
the countries studied, the majority of taxi-drivers may be considered to earn below the 
average income and to occupy that socio-economic spa e which extends, on a conventional 
stratification scale, from the working class to thelower-middle class or petit bourgeoisie.149  
There are of course many theories of class and political mobilisation,150 and given that this 
study does not treat the ideational as socio-economically determined, these questions are not 
explored here in detail;151 nonetheless, it can perhaps plausibly be said that it is such people 
whom political movements have to mobilise so as to be politically meaningful, and that by 
studying the discursive practices of such people one can study the resources which are there 
to be mobilised and the common-sense assumptions which may inhibit their mobilisation.  It 
                                                
148 An interesting study in itself would be the stereotypes to be found in different countries concerning who it is 
one is likely to find behind the wheel of a taxi.  A considerable number of German social scientists gave 
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working week or at the weekends.  Drivers who work weekend nights may earn considerably more than those 
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inspector, and therefore tend to be reluctant to declar  truthfully their earnings.  Data on average earnings, as for 
instance compiled by the British Office for National Statistics (see 2006 report), should therefore be treated 
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taxi-drivers themselves use to compare earnings with one another – see e.g. www.taxi-driver.co.uk or 
www.taxiforen.de/forum.  These indicate earnings after running costs (fuel, lic nsing, maintenance, possible car 
rental etc.), and before tax, of around €25,000 in Br tain, €20,000 in Germany (though lower in the east), and 
€6000 in the Czech Republic, each of which falls short of Gross National Income per capita as cited in the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) database 2006.  Drivers working night hours in capital 
cities (who do not feature in this study) may nonetheless earn considerably higher figures.  Perhaps less 
important (in terms purely of earnings) is the distinction between drivers who are self-employed (and own their 
taxi) and those who are employed by a firm, of which there was a mixture in each of the cities interviewed in 
(though in Britain there was a larger proportion of self-employed drivers than in Germany and the Czech 
Republic, and some variation between cities).  There is no clear economic hierarchy between the two, since 
while those who are self-employed keep a larger share of their profits and may work for longer hours, those 
who work for a firm tend to have a more reliable turnover of jobs and may not have to purchase their tax .  
150 Klaus Eder, 'Does Social Class Matter in the Study of Social Movements? A Theory of Middle Class 
Radicalism', in Louis Maheu (ed.), Social Movements and Social Classes (London: Sage, 1995). 
151 For a similar thought on the (non)-importance of ‘exogenous identities’, see Ruth Wodak, 'National and 
Transnational Identities: European and Other Identiti s Constructed in Interviews with EU Officials', in Richard 
K. Herrmann, Thomas Risse, and Marilynn B. Brewer (eds.), Transnational Identities: Becoming European in 
the EU (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), pp.99-100. 
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is sometimes suggested, both in the EU context and in democracies more generally, that 
those in the upper-middle and upper classes of society tend to be more supportive of the 
polity and the institutions under which they live than those lower down the socio-economic 
scale.152  To the extent that this is so, it is the working classes and the lower-middle classes 
that one needs to study if one is to assess the viability of the polity.  Finally, there are some 
practical reasons for choosing taxi-drivers.  They are accessible, since with the right 
incentive their time can be secured, and since they can generally be found clustered in one or 
two places.  They generally display camaraderie with each other and are rarely intimidated 
into silence.  They are also people who are used to selling their time, suggesting a two-hour 
interview does not represent a major interruption or distortion of their schedule.  One can 
speculate that in this sense the interview is not as unnatural a phenomenon as it might be for 
certain other social groups operating to different daily routines. 
 A total of ten interviews were conducted: three in Britain (Reading, Swansea and 
Norwich), four in Germany (Lübeck, Kassel, Erfurt and Würzburg) and three in the Czech 
Republic (Liberec, Plzeň and Ostrava).  Looking at cities in more than one country alerts one 
to features of the discourse which might be invisible f one looked at just a single country and 
language, and allows one to look for common patterns.  While the total number of 
interviewees is small in statistical terms (thirty-seven, all of them male) it is well suited to the 
close textual reading necessary for this kind of prject.  The countries were selected with 
(presumed) diversity in mind: Germany being a large, established member state of the EU, 
having land borders with several other countries; Britain being another large state but with a 
shorter and more troubled membership of the EU behind it, and an island status; the Czech 
Republic being a much smaller country, one which has recently undergone significant 
political change since the fall of communism and which at the time of interview had just 
recently acceded to the EU.  The cities (approximately 100,000 to 300,000 inhabitants in 
size153) were generally chosen with geographical spread in m d, although Erfurt was 
selected more specifically so as to include a former East German city: this meant having, as 
well as variation by country, something of an east-west axis, intended to act as a brake on 
thinking instinctively in national terms.  Capital nd second cities were avoided on the 
assumption that taxi-drivers there were more likely to be recent arrivals from outside the 
                                                
152 See e.g. Rosemary Crompton, Class and Stratification: An Introduction to Current Debates (Cambridge: 
Polity, 1998). 
153 Ostrava, at around 300,000 inhabitants, was the larg st.  Reading, Lübeck and Erfurt have populations n the 
range 200-250,000; Swansea, Norwich, Kassel and Plzeň have c. 150-200,000 inhabitants; Würzburg and 
Liberec, depending how one measures them, are sized 100,000 to 150,000. 
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country or to be part-time workers (e.g. students).  One does not really know of course how 
much and what kind of impact such factors might have had, but they were generally felt to be 
more of a bad than a good thing.  Whilst a small handful of participants in the study were 
internal migrants or first-generation immigrants, all had been living in the city of interview 
for at least a decade. 
 Full details of the recruitment process and the factors which may have affected it can 
be found in the Appendix, but a brief introduction f the participants and the cities of 
interview can be made here.154  The first interview was carried out in October 2004 in 
Reading, a city approximately forty miles west of London and a commercial centre for the 
Thames Valley region.  Over its history it has had strong industries in the production of cloth, 
beer and biscuits, and has benefited from its locati n on the main route from London 
westwards towards Oxford, Bristol and Wales. The four participants were drawn from the 
taxi-rank at the main train station, soon after lunch, and taken to a pub across the road.  They 
were: Murda, second-generation Pakistani background, early thirties; David, white, mid-
fifties; Shafeek, first-generation Pakistani background, mid-fifties, resident in Britain since 
the 1960s; and Habstunder, second-generation Pakistani background, early thirties.  The 
second interview was conducted a month and a half later in Swansea, a coastal city 
approximately forty miles west of Cardiff, near the old mining and copper industries of south 
Wales and once a maritime port of some significance.  Unlike further north in Wales, English 
is generally the first language of its inhabitants.  The participants were recruited – with some 
difficulty – at the taxi-rank next to the Quadrant shopping centre and taken to a nearby pub 
just as it was opening at 11am.  They were: Lee (white, early thirties); David (white, early 
thirties); Andy (white, early forties); and Martin (white, late forties).  The third interview was 
conducted a few days later in Norwich, an old Anglo-Saxon town in East Anglia with 
historical connections to continental Europe based on trade (mainly wool) and migration 
(including the arrival of large numbers of Walloons and Huguenots in the 16th and 17th 
centuries), and a history until recently of producing clothes, shoes and chocolates.  The 
participants were Mickey (white, mid-forties), Barry (white, early fifties), Leyton (white, 
mid-fifties) and Gavin (white, mid-forties), all of whom took little convincing to take part.   
 The German interviews took place in March and April 2005.  The first was in 
Lübeck, one of the old Hanseatic towns near the northern Baltic coast, famous for marzipan 
and Thomas Mann.  Recruitment began early in the morning at the main train station and was 
                                                
154 Some of the names have been changed. 
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met with considerable enthusiasm, some drivers expressing great regret that they were 
unavailable.  Those who participated were: Jürgen (white, mid-fifties); Wolfgang (white, 
mid-fifties); Ali (first-generation Iranian, early forties); and Nicholas (white, mid-thirties).  
The second interview was held a few days later in Kassel in central Germany – a city 
bombed heavily in World War 2, today known mainly for hosting every five years the 
Documenta exhibition of modern and contemporary art. The participants were drawn, easily, 
first thing in the morning from the large taxi-rank at the city’s modern out-of-town station, 
Kassel Wilhelmshöhe, and interviewed in an upstairs café overlooking the station.  Included 
in the discussion were: Dieter (white, mid-fifties); Sebastian (white, mid-thirties); Peter 
(white, mid-fifties); and Hans (white, mid-forties).  The third German interview, in early 
April 2005, took place in Erfurt, an old, well-preserved city in the former East, long famous 
for its connections to Martin Luther, who attended university there and lived on for several 
years as a monk.  Taxis were rarer here, despite the rain, but after an hour of searching three 
willing volunteers were found and taken to a café opposite the station.  They were: Hans-
Jürgen (white, mid-fifties); Uwe (white, mid-forties); and Mike (white, late-thirties).  Ten 
minutes into the discussion a fourth participant was added: Andreas (white, mid-thirties).155  
Recruitment for the last of the four German interviws – in Würzburg, a wine-producing city 
in northern Bavaria, heavily bombed in the Second World War – was very difficult.  Possible 
reasons for this are discussed in the Methodological Appendix.  The taxi-rank at the main 
station, a large one with a swift turnover rate, looked promising.  For several hours though 
only the enthusiastic endorsement of one driver had been secured – Rainer (white, early 
fifties).  He left occasionally to take jobs, returning each time to see how things were 
progressing, to restate his interest and to try and cajole some colleagues.  Long after the 
researcher’s lack of success had become a joke, a running joke, and beyond a joke, Rainer 
was able to win the participation of Oliver (white, mid-thirties).  Oliver subsequently enlisted 
by mobile phone a third driver, Uwe (white, mid-thir ies).   
 The Czech interviews were conducted in August 2005.  The first took place in 
Liberec, a city in northern Bohemia which enjoyed wealth in the nineteenth century on the 
back of its textile industry.  It was at the centre of the Sudetenland dispute in the 1930s 
(when its population was mainly ethnic-German), andlarge numbers of ethnic-Germans were 
expelled at the end of World War 2 in accordance with the Beneš decrees.  The participants 
were gathered easily at the main rank in the town ce tre and taken to a large, upstairs 
                                                
155 For details on Andreas’ late arrival, see the Methodological Appendix. 
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restaurant just as it was quietening down after the lunch-hour.  The participants were: Václav, 
(white, early-forties), Zdeněk (white, early-fifties), Radek (white, mid-thirties) and Onřej 
(white, late-twenties).  The second Czech interview was in Plzeň, a relatively prosperous 
business and industrial centre about half-way betwen Prague and the German border, 
famous for its Pilsner Urquell beer.  Experiencing considerable difficulty in recruiting, the 
researcher alternated between the two main ranks in the city, one on the main square and one 
at the bus-station.  Neither had much of a turnover.  Eventually one keen driver appeared, 
Petr (white, early-thirties).  He came and went for a while until the participation of Míra was 
secured (white, late-twenties).  Míra rang up a driver who was off-duty at the time, Román: 
(white, mid-twenties).  By that time it was early evening; the discussion was had in the only 
place quiet enough to make a recording, a rather grand, Habsburg-style café in the centre of 
town, in which the drivers and the researcher were the only customers.  The third and final 
interview was conducted in Ostrava, a former mining a d steel-making city in the east of the 
country, close to Poland and Slovakia, which has recently seen most of its industry closed 
down.  It was probably the poorest of the cities interviewed in, and – despite also being the 
largest – it had barely a taxi-rank anywhere.  In the city centre, the square where a few taxis 
would normally park was being dug up, so they were displaced.  Fortunately there was still a 
taxi hut there, and inside were three very willing drivers: Marek (white, mid-thirties), Zdeněk 
(white, mid-forties) and Josef (white, late-fifties).  There was no fourth driver easily 
available.  It was mid-morning; their local pub (pivnice) turned out to be closed, so a decision 



































Chapter 1 gave a brief outline of the idea of a politica  bond.  In such a perspective it is 
substantive political problems which are made the focal point for the collective bond, in 
substitution for alternatives such as interests, cultural markers, values or principles.  It would, 
in this perspective, be the sense of shared predicament that arises from facing problems in 
common with others that would act as the basis for collective ties.  One of the first questions 
this raises, and one with some significance for contemporary democracy more generally, is 
whether the capacity and inclination to articulate matters of common concern can be found in 
contemporary populations.  Is there the willingness to voice problems that relate to ‘us’ 
rather than just ‘me’, a sufficient level of engagement in affairs that extend outside the 
private realm, or are ordinary citizens too incompetent or too ‘depoliticised’ for this to be 
taken seriously as a starting-point?  Can one, to resume the vocabulary introduced in Chapter 
1, speak of there being a ‘political common’ – that is, the assumed existence by members of 
the collective of important common problems in need of address?  And if so, how best does 
one characterise its composition? 
 It is this first element of a political bond which is explored and developed in this 
chapter.  A theoretical perspective from which to understand the commonality of problems is 
elaborated, based on some of the ideas of the preceding chapter, and the empirical material is 
studied to examine how far common problems are constructed in discussion.  The chapter 
identifies a series of problems which were articulated and developed in each of the country-
groups – Britain, Germany and the Czech Republic – and, to put this in context, notes also a 
number of problems were articulated rarely or not at all.  Then, picking up the idea of 
‘problem domains’, we look at how certain problems were assumed to ‘go together’ and 
tended to be clustered together in discussion.  The analysis suggests three domains of 
particular importance – Economics, Society and the Law, and Relations between Peoples – 
and points to a fourth set of problems, to do with Quality of Life, which, though they were 
articulated with a degree of frequency, tended to be marginalised in these discussions.  With 
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these observations one has the contours of a political common, both as a theoretical concept 
and as an interpretation of one body of discursive practice.  This forms the basis for an 
exploration in subsequent chapters of the kinds of gr up positioning one finds with regard to 
these problems, the extent to which these problems are assumed amenable to organised 




Problématiques, Problematisations and Common Problems 
 
Let us begin with the format of the interviews.  Once each group of taxi-drivers had taken 
seats around a table, introduced themselves and ordered their drinks, the discussion was 
opened by directing attention to a series of topic cards which had been spread out on the 
table.  There were seventeen of these, each consisting of two images and a verbal caption, 
and each designed to refer to a topic with some connection to public life.1  The English-
language captions were as follows: Peace & War, Treatm nt of Outsiders, Overseas Aid, 
Medical Care, Education & Training, The Legal System, Policing, Health & Safety 
Standards, The Environment, Science & Research, Transport, Money & Prices, Purchase of 
Property, Markets & Production, Taxation, Corruption, and Work.  These were the 
researcher’s own creations, intended to combine breadth of coverage with openness to 
interpretation.  The list covered the major topics which it was felt participants might be 
inclined to develop, and excluded a number which in other spatio-temporal contexts one 
might wish to include (abortion in the US, for instance).  No such list can be comprehensive 
of the full range of conceivable substantive fields of politics, and it was fully expected that 
the cards might be of unequal interest to the participants; the intention was to provide a 
starting-point from which discussion could begin.  Some further blank cards were provided 
so that participants could add to the seventeen cards ny extra ones which they felt were 
missing, but this generally proved unnecessary.  
 The participants were invited to look at the cards for a few minutes, and then as a 
group to arrange them in piles according to ‘what goes naturally with what’, justifying their 
choices as they did so.  This tended to result in ten minutes or so of discussion.  As a second 
step, the participants were asked, for each of the piles of cards which they had created, to 
                                                
1 See the Appendix for reproductions of the cards.  The card exercise is inspired by Anthony Coxon, Sorting 
Data: Collection and Analysis (London: Sage, 1999). 
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provide a title which summed up why those cards belonged together.  Again, roughly ten 
minutes of debate followed.  The third step, which then constituted the bulk of the discussion, 
consisted in participants selecting certain problem-areas to talk about in more detail.  They 
were encouraged to focus on the problems and issue-areas which they considered to be most 
urgent, although each topic was touched on at leastbriefly, in some cases at the very end of 
the discussion at the prompt of the researcher.2 
 In the Wittgensteinian tradition, rule-based behaviour is understood not in terms of 
the application of theoretical rules to given situations but rather as competence in practice, 
the capacity of ‘knowing how to carry on’.3  This competence is understood as a social 
phenomenon, as a basic convergence in practices and the capacity for successful coordination 
and adjustment among peers, rather than individual distinction on an absolute scale.4  
Competence in conversation, by extension, can be seen as the ability of individuals mutually 
to coordinate their talk based on a certain convergence in discursive practices: to make 
interventions which others can respond to, and to carry on from what others say, so as to 
achieve some level of ordered and sustained interaction.  This is an important idea for the 
purposes of this chapter.  By convening participants i  an interview environment, supplying 
them with prompt cards, and asking them to justify the choices they make with these cards, 
one is creating a situation in which participants must ‘carry on’.  The cards themselves could 
by no means determine the discussion, any more than a collection of cards referring to equine 
diseases could structure the discussion of an unremarkable group of political theorists.  Some 
of the political topics on the cards would most like y ‘mean nothing’ to participants and 
would be neglected, whereas others might be the starting-point for a detailed and enthusiastic 
conversation.  Only if the participants were sufficiently competent to handle at least some 
such resources, and to ‘carry on’ by reaching beyond the situation to knowledge which they 
already had, could an ordered discussion emerge.  Tacit knowledge of this kind is crucial.  
                                                
2 Opinion surveys often ask respondents what they consider to be the ‘most important problem facing the 
nation’.  There is a danger that this approach overl oks those aspects of life which respondents consider 
important, but not problematic.  (Cf. Christopher Wlezien, 'On the Salience of Political Issues: The Problem 
with ‘Most Important Problem’', Electoral Studies, 24 (2005).)  In introducing these interviews a combination 
of wide formulations was sought such as ‘problems in public life’, ‘important issues’ and ‘things that need 
addressing’, so as to avoid narrowing the range of the discussions from the outset.  However, as will be made 
clear below, the focus in the analysis is on those things described not just as important but as a source of 
concern, since these are what tended to be articulated in discussion. 
3 Amongst the interpreters of Wittgenstein what follows draws in particular on Barnes, 'Practice as Collective 
Action'; and Schatzki, Social Practices (Chapter 2, in particular pp.49ff.). 
4 N.B. The word ‘competence’ may be prone to misinterpr tation: it should be understood to refer not simply to 
an elitist judgement by the researcher (‘have the participants got their facts right?’) but as the capacity of 
participants to coordinate successfully with one another, using the cards where necessary as tools.  Thi  point is 
picked up at the end of the chapter. 
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Likewise, in open discussion, participants would require a certain amount of know-that and 
know-how in order to respond to each other’s points and to develop them.  Without this 
competence, one would probably reach silence, or a fundamental shift in topic.  It is one of 
the considerable advantages of conducting group interviews that one is able to study the 
ability of individuals to mutually coordinate their talk in this way. 
 Before looking in more depth at some substantive fndings, it is worth clarifying 
some of our terminology.  The words and images on the cards can be understood as symbols 
which may or may not be received meaningfully by an observer.  To competent observers, 
who know how to read them, they refer – by convention – to a series of practices, material 
objects or situations which henceforth may be called problématiques.5  For example, 
‘Taxation’ refers to a set of practices which involve, roughly speaking, the State extracting a 
certain amount of money from its citizens.  When a problématique is talked about, and is 
talked about in negative terms (e.g. ‘How dare the State take that hard-earned money!’, or 
‘Why don’t those people pay higher taxes?’), one can s y that it is being problematised.6  Of 
course, not all problématiques will tend to be problematised.  But those which areon  can 
then refer to, in the everyday language sense, simply as problems.  Whereas ‘problématiques’ 
are abstract and undisclosed, ‘problems’ are formulations of a more specific sort; they come 
with a certain spin.  Nonetheless, they can be more specific or less specific: both ‘war’ in 
general or the ‘war in Iraq’ might be treated as problems, and it would be a question of 
judgement whether one sees them in the relation of category to item.  Problems, one may say, 
can be articulated in a plural but not unlimited number of ways.  To suggest there is just one 
way would be to revert to an ideal-language perspective, whereby the stuff of problématiques 
(practices, material objects and situations) can be problematised either correctly or 
incorrectly.  On the other hand, to say that there is an unlimited number of ways in which 
problems can be articulated would be to disregard the conventions of language usage and the 
historicity of discursive repertoires. 
 Our terminology, though slightly ‘p-heavy’, serves to remind of the relational and 
constructed character of problems: the ‘real world’ does not consist of a collection of pre-
existing problems which individuals subsequently discover and ponder, but rather it consists 
in raw, ambiguous things which can be read in different ways and for the interpretation of 
                                                
5 This term is preferred to the everyday word ‘topic’ used above, since ‘topic’ is strongly discourse-centred, 
whereas problématique may be taken to imply an experiential and situational basis as well.   
6 Of some relevance here, there is a small literature in social and political science on ‘problem definitio ’ – see 
e.g. Roger W. Cobb and David A. Rochefort (eds.), The Politics of Problem Definition: Shaping the Policy 
Agenda (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1994).  
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which individuals rely on transpersonal resources.  Problems are the things which emerge 
from an act of engagement with the world.  When, in the analysis that follows, something is 
referred to as a ‘problem’ (e.g. the ‘problem of immigration’), the implication is that it is 
treated as a problem, not that we – as the authorial voice – onsider it necessarily to be a 
problem.  One is not obliged – at least when engaged principally in analysis – to reach a 
position oneself on how accurate or appropriate each act of problematisation is. 
 Fortunately, these intricate distinctions do not need to be continually invoked in the 
course of the analysis.  What one encounters when studying discourse is not problématiques 
but problems (understood as problematisations).  Once i dividuals grasp at a problématique, 
sensing there is something important there, and once they put it in words and treat it as 
something problematic, already one may say that they are talking about a problem.  
Therefore for much of the empirical analysis in this and the following chapters, it will be 
possible to speak simply of ‘problems’: participants were invited to talk about ‘problems’ 
and their articulations can be referred to as problems.  But even if one does not have to 
invoke it frequently, it seems that one could not d without the concept of problématique, 
since the project involves the act of drawing comparisons between different discussions, and 
different sections of a single discussion, something which requires that the analyst be able to 
say, at least occasionally, ‘they’re talking about the same thing.’  When two groups complain 
about ‘asylum-seekers’, for example, both are problematising the problématique one might 
call ‘immigration’.  That they are both doing this is, of course, an act of interpretation rather 
than objective observation, and depends on the research r himself being a competent 
participant in the same language-games as those used by his interviewees.  The necessary 
familiarity has, one hopes, been built up over the course of the interviews, multiple readings 
of the transcripts, and life more generally.7 
 A political common would have to be formed of ‘common problems’.  Here it can be 
made clearer what is meant by ‘common’.  Again, the c oice of group discussions is crucial.  
The essence of conversation, one can argue, is sense-making.  Participants in conversation try 
to make sense, to ‘carry on’ in a meaningful way, and they must expect their partners in 
discussion to do the same, so that some kind of conversational development can take place.  
As H.P. Grice famously noted, there is a cooperational basis to conversation, such that 
                                                
7 Here one encounters the ‘Mauss problem’ which was alluded to in Chapter 2. 
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participants always orient themselves to the interventions of other participants.8  
Conversation is, in this sense, a question of agreement in discursive practice and of mutual 
coordination and adjustment.  By convening group interviews, one creates a conversational 
environment in which all interventions are subject to he judgement of peers.  Participants are 
encouraged to say things which they assume others in the group will be able to react to and 
develop, since ensuing silence is widely assumed to be the mark of a weak intervention.  
Successful interventions in the group interview, one may say therefore, are characterised by 
their public relevance.  Participants generally do not seek to make interventions which are 
highly idiosyncratic and which other participants would not know how to react to or develop: 
even autobiographical narratives must, in the group context, be presented in such a way that 
they hold common significance.  And should a participant diverge from this pattern and say 
something which appears ‘strange’ to the others, thi  oddness is likely to be evident.  The 
intervention may explicitly be rejected as odd, or more likely it will be ignored, resulting in 
another participant taking the conversation in a more meaningful direction or, in the worst 
case, resulting in silence and the need to ‘restart’ the conversation. 
 This is what allows one to say that those problems which are successfully introduced 
into a group discussion are, almost by definition, the kind of ‘common problems’ which can 
be associated with a political common.  They could not be purely private problems, problems 
affecting just ‘me’, since those problems will be screened out as the conversation develops; 
rather, they are likely to be the kind of problems which affect ‘people like us’, where the ‘us’ 
is some kind of we-formulation which may differ according to the problem at hand.  The use 
of ‘we’ pronouns is important, but crucial is not s much their occasional appearance – this 
may be due simply to an individual speaker wanting, for whatever strategic reason, to 
position himself as part of a larger group – but their acceptance and development by certain 
or all other participants to the discussion.  This is what expresses the common.  Likewise, 
when certain problems are repeatedly linked together in discussion, and when participants 
accept and develop the linkages which are made by others, one can treat this as indicative of 
a more basic convergence in discursive practice concerning what topics go with what.   
 Clearly what is needed at this point then are some crit ria by which to assess whether 
interventions in discussion are successful and thuswhether the problems described can be 
considered common.  Indicators of ‘success’ which are used to select passages for analysis 
                                                
8 On the ‘cooperative principle’ and its attendant sub-principles, rendered in the form of ‘maxims’, see H. Paul 
Grice, 'Logic and Conversation', in Peter Cole and Jerry L. Morgan (eds.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 3, Speech 
Acts (New York: Academic Press, 1975), pp.45-7. 
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include the following.  Evidently, where problems are talked about and developed in a 
considerable amount of depth by more than one participant, this indicates their common 
salience, particularly if all participants are active; likewise if the same problems are pursued 
in depth in more than one interview.  Significant is when interventions are closely tied to one 
another, in particular when one sees the joint construction of an argument by more than one 
participant.  The presence of cross-references in discussion is also important: when 
participants want to ‘go back’ to an earlier passage of discussion, or when they simply make 
a link to something which was said earlier, this implies the significance of that intervention 
and that the problem in question is closely interwoven with others.  Descriptions which draw 
on more than one source of information (for instance, both the media and personal 
experience) may indicate the importance of the problem in question.  Shared affective 
responses, such as more than one participant expressing a sense of injustice or frustration, or 
a particular enthusiasm to discuss a certain problem, can be indicative.9  Together with this, 
expressions of opinion about a problem, particularly when this occurs early in the interview 
when participants have been non-committal so far, cn be an indicator – as long as this 
statement of opinion is then followed up (even if just to rebut) by at least one of the other 
participants.  In the discussion in Norwich, for example, the card-arranging exercise at the 
beginning of the discussion was interrupted for some time by an irrepressible flow of 
interventions from Mickey, Barry and Leyton about the (in)adequacy of the police and 
judicial system in dealing with local crime.  In effect, the prompt-card was so successful that 
even this loosest of interview formats was disrupted. 
 Many problématiques were problematised in all or mst of the interviews, and these 
are the ones that will be focused on below.  Principal among them, to list them briefly in our 
own words, were: unemployment, crime, immigration, relations between majorities and 
minorities, extremes of wealth, military conflict, prices, wages, culture clashes, education, 
anti-social behaviour, the quality of policing / justice, corruption, taxes, debt, and regulations.  
It is the articulation of problems related to these that will be treated as the core features of a 
political common.  It is not proposed that these be treated as distinctly ‘European’ or ‘EU-
oriented’ problems.  In how far, and in what way, a European dimension is evoked in their 
discussion is something that will be considered in the following chapters.  Nor is it argued 
that these problems are distinctly ‘European’ in the sense that interviews with taxi-drivers in 
                                                
9 On the last two, see Gamson, Talking Politics.  These criteria subsume the two axes of centrality commonly 
spoken of in political psychology – ‘cognitive’ and ‘motivational centrality’ – though no strong distinction is 
made here between the two. 
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other parts of the world would not generate a similar array of concerns: our focus of attention 
is always on the possibilities which are held out by he discursive practices, rather than on the 
extent to which they are exclusive to a particular set of people; or, to recall the earlier 
distinction, on the potential for a collective bond rather than on membership criteria for 
inclusion and exclusion. 
 Importantly, several of the problématiques referred to on the prompt-cards were very 
little talked about, something which confirms that the presence of the cards could not 
determine the course of the discussion.  Topics were chosen with selectiveness.  For 
example, almost nothing was said in the open discussion  that could be linked closely to 
‘Science and Research’, and, in contrast to a card such as ‘Money and Prices’, it was never 
referred to, pointed at, or tapped during the discus ions.  ‘Health and Safety Standards’ was 
talked about rarely (there was some discussion amongst the Plžen group about who had a fire 
extinguisher in their taxi, but not much more).  ‘Medical Care’ was rarely problematised: 
none of the participants told of experiences with hospitals or doctors, although the economic 
aspects of healthcare (e.g. who contributes to its funding, and who gets it for free) were 
regularly discussed.10  Occasionally in the discussions one participant would deliberately try 
to bring one of these ‘neglected’ cards into the conversation – possibly in a spirit of 
politeness towards the researcher – but such a move w uld barely be met with follow-up 
interventions from other participants.  For example, in the Reading group, David made an 
intervention which he linked to the cards ‘Science and Technology’ (thus adapting the card’s 
title, ‘Science and Research’) and ‘The Environment’.  He began talking about how an old 
mill in Oxfordshire (Sonning Mill) was about to upgrade its power source so that it would 
run on hydroelectric power generated by the flow of the Thames, saving electricity for the 
                                                
10 Broadly speaking, the frequency with which different problems are articulated in these interviews 
corresponds to the findings of other studies.  Cf. in particular OPTEM, 'The European Citizens and the Future of 
Europe', pp.7-8, where the concerns found to be particularly prevalent amongst the populations of the 25 EU 
member-states in 2006 include: employment and working conditions, economic aspects of globalisation, decline 
of the welfare state, prices (including house prices), widening wealth inequalities, immigration, terrorism, petty 
crime and antisocial behaviour, and occasional mentions of environmental threats.  (Such data say little of 
course about how concerns may be connected to one another, which is the question we turn to below.)  The low 
salience in these ten interviews of healthcare as a medical rather than economic issue however may seem 
surprising, since polling data often suggest the opposite (see e.g. Sara Binzer Hobolt and Robert Klemm sen, 
'Responsive Government? Public Opinion and Government Policy Preferences in Britain and Denmark', 
Political Studies, 53/2 (2005), and a poll by GfK NOP in August 2006, which cites healthcare as the greatest 
priority to U.K. citizens: www.gfknop.co.uk/content/ ews/news/Challenges_of_Europe_UKrelease.doc.)  This 
could be to do with our all-male sample – conceivably men express less concern on this issue than women.  
Alternatively, it could be that healthcare is seen as an important issue (a ‘priority’), but that its provision as 
currently stands is treated as unproblematic.  Another interpretation would be that, because opinion plls can 
say nothing about opinion formation, they fail to distinguish between those issues such as healthcare on which 
respondents are merely registering a basic concern (‘ticking the box can’t hurt’), and those which are of day-to-
day significance to them. 
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company which ran the mill and doing something good for the environment at the same time.  
The other participants, who just seconds before had been engaging actively with him on the 
problem of unemployment, made no effort to respond here.  David started to ramble, and the 
anecdote became increasingly personal: ‘I used to deliver corn there when it was a mill, I 
used to deliver corn there … yeah, two and a quarter in the rape sacks of corn … I used to go 
in there with an old Bedford lorry … years ago …’.  Murda made a joke about David’s age, 
everyone laughed, and then there was silence.  It fell to the researcher to restart the 
discussion by asking a question which referred back to the passage of conversation on 
unemployment which had preceded David’s ‘tangential’ intervention; conversation flowed 
again.   
 Of course, one must be careful not to take such reasoning too far in a counter-factual 
direction: the fact that such problématiques were littl  developed in the interviews does not 
rule out the possibility that in further discussions they might be problematised a little more.  
The point is a comparative one: certain cards, and anecdotes framed in certain ways, tended 
to be developed much less than others.  One should add that the participants, i  this group 
and generally, were by no means averse to anecdotes rawing on personal experience: these 
were a regular feature, and could successfully generate plenty of discussion.  David, for 
example, told another autobiographical narrative a little later in the discussion, but this time it 
seemed to meet far better the criterion of common relevance.  Murda was discussing 
burglars: 
 
M:  … The problem that I think is ridiculous, right, say like you’ve got a trespasser on your property, 
you know, burglar or something, that comes into your house … and he’s probably got the intent 
that, if he’s caught, if he’s got a gun he’ll shoot y u.  But in the process of it all, if you were to 
shoot that person, if you were to harm him, or GBH, ABH him, any of those, in any way, you 
could actually be sued.  I mean, I find that ridiculous.  The fact that you can’t protect your …  [D:  
That’s always been, funnily enough …]  Well, it hasn’t always been … 
 
H:  You’ve got an example [points to David], you’ve got an example for this [chuckles] …
 
D:  Yeah, just exactly what he said.  [M:  Oh OK, I didn’t know …]  Caught a man in my house …  
The dog was going absolutely raving mad, we’d gone t  bed … we have this fox that walks along 
the wall, this fox … he knows when it’s there and he goes mad …  I’m laying in bed and the dog’s 
going absolutely bananas … ‘whatever’s up?’, I’ve got to get up and stop him barking, I’ve got 
up, come through into the kitchen, there’s a big French window there and there’s a bloke out there.  
The dog’s going mad at the window and there’s this fella stood there.  I couldn’t undo the door, 
my missus always locks it … couldn’t … in the mad panic … ‘Christ, if this bloke’s got a knife’ 
…   
 
This is an anecdote which David was able to continue at length with the full engagement of 
the other participants – note that Habstunder was already familiar with the story and was 
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encouraging him to narrate it.  Habstunder would subsequently steal the punchlines.  Key 
points in the narrative became clear: it turns out the police, when they arrived, were too 
casual about the incident, they were more interested in having cups of coffee, it took seven 
hours for them to collect David’s statement (‘That’s ridiculous though,’ says Murda), and a 
detailed group discussion follows concerning the problems of law enforcement and what 
should be done about them (to which Chapter 5 will return).  In this case and many others, a 
personal anecdote was picked up and developed at leng h, indicating that the problem in 
question was not an idiosyncratic one but rather th kind of common problem liable to affect 





The card-arranging exercise, in which participants were asked to place cards together in 
piles, brought out various assumptions about certain problems naturally belonging with one 
another.  The resultant card arrangements in themselves were instructive, and often one 
would find the same three or four core groupings of cards, along with other groupings which 
varied from interview to interview.  Perhaps most instructive was the accompanying 
discussion, in which participants justified to one another their suggestions and in which they 
discussed how best to summarise each group of cards with an overarching category.  The 
flow of the subsequent discussion also suggested that certain problems and ways of speaking 
might naturally cluster together – particularly evident in those moments when participants 
made links to earlier parts of the discussion, when t y agreed that a certain set of problems 
had already been covered, or when they felt that it was time to ‘move on’ to a new topic.  
Observations of this kind suggest that, rather than treating all the problems discussed as 
separate from each other, each with a distinctive rep rtoire of assumptions and typical acts of 
positioning, it is possible to speak of them as clutered together in ‘problem domains’. 
 Domains can be thought of as groupings of problems (understood as 
problematisations of problématiques), the concepts which are used to link them, and the 
patterned ways of speaking which are available to speakers as resources with which to 
discuss them.  They are the substance of a political common.  We shall approach them as 
features of discursive practice rather than of the sp akers’ psychology, although it is true that 
various participants used vocabulary suggestive of domain-based cognitive frameworks (e.g. 
‘problem-area’, ‘field’, ‘group’, ‘packet’).  By ‘patterned ways of speaking’ one should 
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understand not strict repetition and regularity, in the sense that certain problems are lways 
talked about in a certain way, with particular assumptions and we-formulations attached.  
This would be a crude and social-determinist perspective.  Individual speakers are always 
capable of innovation in the way that they articulate  problem, and it is always possible to 
draw unexpected links between one problem and another with a suitable amount of creativity.  
Rather, these patterned ways of speaking should be seen as brought together following the 
principle of ‘family resemblance’, just as Wittgenstein suggests is the case for those things to 
describe which we use the word ‘game’, which we treat as linked in some way but for which 
a single set of common properties does not exist.11  As Schatzki observes, ‘the unity of a 
discourse does not lie in the repetition of the same objects and concepts, but instead in the 
possession of delimited diversities of them.’12   
 Of course, an alternative conceptual move would be to treat ‘ways of talking’ as 
separate altogether from particular substantive issue .  Domains could be thought of, in 
principle, as just sets of problems in themselves, discussed in unpatterned ways.  Likewise, 
they could be thought of as patterned ways of speaking applied to any number of different 
problems: one could for example take as organising principles ‘class’, ‘morality’ and ‘race’, 
or one might speak, like Boltanski and Thévenot, of different ‘orders of worth’ or value, and 
make no particular link between these and specific s tuations of concern.  However, this 
approach can be rejected for several reasons.  Firstly, given that problems are treated here as 
constructed phenomena, as problematisations rather than unambiguous material facts, it 
would be quite meaningless to conceive them as separate from the discursive formations by 
which they are constructed.  Only problématiques could be treated in this pre-discursive way, 
but then the question of what links are made between th m, and hence of domain-clusterings, 
would not arise.  Secondly, treating domains only as p tterned ways of speaking without any 
association to substantive problems would not be suited to the overall purposes of this 
project, which include conceptualising the collective bond in an explicitly problem-oriented 
fashion, and exploring the polity implications of the types of decision-making authority 
which are invoked in connection with these problems.  Focusing only on the orders of worth 
which speakers invoke, without foregrounding the problems in connection to which these are 
expressed, would be an approach more of sociological than political-theoretical interest.  
Thirdly, there are strong empirical grounds, and not just in our own data, for suspecting a 
link between the two.  In an interesting study of citizenship in the US based on focus-group 
                                                
11 Cf. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations. 
12 Schatzki, The Site of the Social, p.13. 
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interviews with lay people, Andrew Perrin looks at the different ‘logics’ which citizens apply 
in discussion of political topics, where logics areconceived in terms quite similar to the work 
of Boltanski and Thévenot.  Important logics highlited include notions of interest, of 
morality and justice, and of feasibility.13  While Perrin notes that there is no intrinsic 
connection between these and particular political topics – economic issues for example need 
not necessarily be discussed according to the logic f nterests, and discussion groups with 
differing socio-demographic make-up may vary somewhat in the frequency with which they 
apply different logics – his main conclusion is nevertheless that ‘by far the strongest 
influence on how citizens talk in the focus groups was what they were talking about – the 
scenario they were discussing.’14  Problems and ways of speaking are found to be quite 
closely linked.  A domain-based approach which links the two is empirically as well as 
theoretically attractive therefore. 
 This perspective does not discount the possibility that some problématiques may be 
problematised in more than one way, such that they can be talked about as a problem of one 
domain or a problem of another.  The concept of ‘affordance’ is useful here.  Harré notes that 
‘the same material thing may have a great many different possible ways in which it can be 
used.  Each is an affordance.  … Thus a floor affords walking, dancing, placing furniture; a 
window affords a view of the lake, an escape from a threat, a view for a peeping Tom; a 
knife affords cutting, threatening, opening a window catch, and lots more.’15  Likewise, 
problématiques may be thought of as having varying de rees of affordance, such that some 
may be articulated as problems in multiple ways.  A problématique such as ‘violence’ seems 
amenable to problematisation in more than one of the domains that will be outlined below.  
However, as suggested earlier, given that the focus here is on talk and that talk features 
problems rather than problématiques, these considerat ons are ornamental to our work.  
 On the basis of an analysis of the interview materi l, three problem domains in 
particular can be identified.  These can be considered central aspects of a political common 
and are treated as tenable categories for all of the countries studied, though with some 




                                                
13 Perrin, Citizen Speak, pp.60ff. 
14 Ibid. p.102, p.131, and Chapter 7 in general. 




‘That one is easy,’ says Onřej in the Liberec group as he points to the pile of cards which the 
group has formed out of ‘Money and Prices’, ‘Taxation’, ‘Markets and Production’, ‘Work’, 
‘Health and Safety Standards’ and ‘Purchase of Property’.  ‘That one is easy, it’s a question 
of everything to do with finances.  It’s the cost of living, it’s consumers, it’s prices … it’s 
everything to do with finances.’  His comment finds a receptive audience in the other 
participants around the table, who make their presence felt not by disputing his point but by 
modifying it.  A brief debate ensues as to whether the best title is ‘financial problems’, 
‘financial situation’ or ‘financial system’, but agreement forms quickly that ‘they’re basically 
the same’.  ‘Financial Situation’ is adopted and the discussion moves on.  This experience 
can be considered typical of the groups interviewed, an  the first domain which we propose 
can be called the Economics domain.16 
 The initial card exercise offers strong grounds for this reading.  Often the first cards 
to be put together (the ‘first pair’17) subsequently became the basis for a pile labelled 
‘economics’, ‘finances’ or something of this sort.  A brief look at how the interview in 
Lübeck developed should serve to clarify this point.  Having had the protocol for the 
discussion explained, the participants were invited to think about how best to order the 
prompt-cards:  
 
JW:  Perhaps you could spend a couple of minutes thinking about how these cards might go together.  
If you had to make little groups out of them, how would you do so?  There’s no right or wrong 
way, whatever seems natural.   
 
J:  How many groups should it be? 
 
JW:  Up to you, up to you.  [90 seconds of general contemplation] 
 
J:  So, what would I say … start with the economy, with Taxes … they belong together, right, Markets 
and Production are directly linked with Taxes because taxes can strengthen or weaken the 
economy.  And … Science and Research … also has something to do with the economy, because 
innovation strengthens the power of the economy.   
 
W:  Yeah, I’d also put those together.  And Work too … [J:  Work too …]  Work too … [J:  Work too 
…] 
 
The vocabulary on the cards is not being clumped together aimlessly, it seems: Jürgen creates 
a small narrative to explain the relationship betwen them, and his narrative is validated by 
Wolfgang’s interventions, which are in turn accepted by Jürgen.  When asked to summarise 
                                                
16 For a visual summary of the card exercise, see the tabl  at the end of the Methodological Appendix. 
17 Coxon, Sorting Data. 
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the collection of cards with a title, the group considered ‘Markets and the Economy’, 
‘Working Life’ and ‘Financial Security’, but considered each to be too narrow: ‘Occupation 
and the Economy’ was the title eventually chosen, so as to express the link between daily life 
and more distant processes.  Of further interest is what happened a few minutes later: the 
card ‘Money and Prices’ had for some reason ended up in a different pile, but questions 
started to be raised as to why.  Jürgen said that he felt at the beginning it should have been 
placed with ‘Occupation and the Economy’; Niklas, Ali and Wolfgang agreed, and it was 
moved over.  The episode suggests the momentum generat d by the placing of cards is not so 
strong that it cannot be overturned by arguments that appeal to common expectations of what 
goes with what.  
When asked to go into further depth on the problems considered most significant, 
Jürgen invoked once more ‘the economy’ and, with the active support of Wolfgang and 
Niklas, used it to link together a whole series of c ncepts which had not been written on any 
of the cards:  
 
I think the biggest problem here in Germany at the moment is the economy.  [W: yeah]  The economy 
and work of course.  Unemployment and … zero economic growth, or hardly any economic growth, 
and the unemployment which goes with that.  Domestic purchasing power, the lack of domestic 
purchasing power.  Also under this heading with money and prices I’d say the introduction of the euro 
is very relevant, because the euro – due to the exchange rate – has brought disadvantages in purchasing 
power, considerable … [N: price rises] … Yeah, it’sled to price rises, and so also the purchasing 
power, the domestic demand, has gone down, because people have less money at their disposal. 
 
 
Some notion of ‘the economy’ or ‘economics’ clearly comes across here as an organising 
concept, a core element in the political common along with the more specific problems 
associated with it.  A later cross-reference (this ime by Wolfgang) suggests the naturalness 
with which the participants orientate themselves in d scussion using the concept of ‘the 
economy’.  The conversation had been looking at the problem of inadequate contributions to 
the system of health insurance: ‘The easiest solution for this problem would be full 
employment.  If there weren’t five million unemployed people there, if they were paying into 
the pension and health insurance, then we wouldn’t have all these problems … [N: yeah].  
We’re back to this first subject again – the economy.  It all links together.’  A passage from 
the Plzeň group is similar, in that a cross-reference is made which can only be meaningful to 
more than one participant (as it evidently is) if there is a shared understanding that certain 
problems are linked by the concept ‘hospodářství’ (the economy).  Román says: ‘Markets 
and Production, we’ve talked about that, that’s generally … [P:  I think ... yeah, the economy, 
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certainly ... ]  We talked about work, we talked about investment, what’s that, that’s the 
economy.  We can still talk about the economy of the Czech state as a whole, how it manages 
its resources.’ 
One sees here a distinction being made, as it was in other groups too, between the 
more daily or personal aspects of economics and the larg r-scale or more remote aspects, 
though these were generally closely enmeshed in discussion.  Not all groups, when asked to 
label the card piles formed at the beginning of the int rview, used the word ‘economics’ or 
its functional equivalent in the relevant language.  A range of candidate titles was generated, 
perhaps all with a family resemblance to the word ‘economics’, but with enough variety to 
suggest a plurality of ways of constructing the domain.  The Reading group had no doubts 
that the pile they had formed using the cards ‘Markets and Production’, ‘Work’, ‘Purchase of 
Property’, ‘Money and Prices’ and ‘Taxation’ was ‘all to do with money’, and this was taken 
as the title.  Likewise for the Würzburg and Plzeň groups, it was ‘all to do with money’ or 
‘all to do with finances’:  the Würzburg group explored ‘commerce and ‘economic policy’ as 
possibilities before settling on ‘Economy and Finances’, while Plzeň quickly opted for 
‘Finances’.  In Kassel, ‘Political Economy’ (Volkswirtschaft) was chosen over ‘Economy’ on 
the grounds that ‘it affects the whole people, not jus the economy alone but more deeply.’  
In an interesting twist, the Erfurt group explicitly rejected one participant’s suggestion of the 
label ‘economy’ for the three cards ‘Markets and Production’, ‘Taxation’ and ‘Purchase of 
Property’, opting instead to call it ‘Capitalism’.  Although they did not create a card pile with 
this title, Ostrava also invoked the term readily. 
 One concludes that an important domain of problems making up the political 
common has, despite the nuances, something more or less to do with economics.  Certain 
problems were articulated more frequently in some discussions than others: the banking 
system was an important issue only in the Czech discussions, and corruption (which, as 
several groups pointed out, straddles various areas of public life and which for analytical 
purposes will be discussed both as part of this domain and the following one) was given 
particular prominence by the Czech and the Erfurt groups.  However, there was a 
considerable number of economic problems which were articulated frequently across the 
groups, without noticeable variation according to nationality.  These included wages, 
taxation, unemployment, social security and insurance, prices, debt, relations between rich 
and poor, privatisation, the decline of local industry, and the adequacy of the education 
system in equipping people for employment.  These can be treated as the core problems that 
we shall be dealing with when studying the Economics domain.  Not only were they 
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articulated frequently and followed up by several prticipants, but they tended to be 
discussed in language that was impassioned.  One had little difficulty in identifying what 
Gamson has referred to as a sense of injustice when these problems were discussed.18  See 
for instance Mickey and Barry from the Norwich group, discussing rich rock stars who cling 
to their money:  
 
M:  You look at Bono, who’s stood in front of Blair and Bush, he fucked off on his private jet …  [B:  
He’s got a castle in Dublin.]  Bono, fucking get a life.  Strip yourself bare, strip yourself bare and 
leave yourself with a million.  Give the rest away, you toss-pot.  [B:  Yeah, that’s right …] [...] Elton 
John, at least he gives away his wealth.  He did, you know, he gave away his wealth.  That bastard 
McCartney earns £520,000 …  [B:  He earns £60 a second …]  How much money does one person 
need? 
 
Comments such as ‘that’s not right’ and ‘it shouldn’t be like that’ were common, as when 
Dieter in Kassel spoke of the problem of personal debt: ‘mobile phones for example, it’s a 
real problem for young people, there’s children of 13, 14 or 15, they’re already in debt 
because of the payments, it’s a trauma, something like that really shouldn’t be happening.  
There should be regulations so that something like that doesn’t happen.’  As will be seen in 
Chapter 5, the sense that a situation was unfair or int lerable by no means meant that clear 
remedies to it were identified, or even expected.  The ‘should’ was not always accompanied 
by a ‘could’.  But the inclination to problematise, and to treat these problems as affecting 
‘people like us’, was widely evident.  A sense of involvement, rather than ‘cynical chic’,19 
was the dominant tone. 
 
 
2.  Society and the Law 
   
None of the groups spontaneously offered the heading ‘Society and the Law’ to describe an 
arrangement of cards or as a point of reference in open discussion.  Both ‘society’ and ‘law’ 
were freely invoked in almost all discussions, and the clustering of problems and discursive 
resources suggests a strong overlap in the semantic r ge of each, but to label this domain 
‘Society and the Law’ is an interpretative act.  Moreover, a plurality of perspectives is being 
covered under this heading.  Similar words carry different connotations in different countries, 
and aside from the core problems and motifs whose clustering is evident in all the 
                                                
18 Gamson, Talking Politics, p.7. 
19 Nina Eliasoph, 'Political Culture and the Presentation of a Political 'Self'', Theory and Society, 19/4 (1990). 
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discussions there are some important variations according to country.  Treating ‘society’ and 
‘the law’ as constituting a single domain should serve to illuminate some of these 
differences. 
 The articulated problems which can be considered to be at the heart of this domain 
are those of neighbourhood behaviour, crime (including corruption), policing, the justice 
system, and education – the latter here understood as a social good which benefits the 
community as a whole rather than the economic prospect  of individuals.  All of these can be 
thought of as having something to do with rules, morality, or the institutions by which rules 
and morality are enforced.  For the discussions in Britain the concept of ‘law and order’ 
captures these rather neatly, as this passage from the Reading group indicates: 
 
M:  And then we’ve got here [looking at the card pile that the group has formed out of ‘The Legal 
System’, ‘Education and Training’, ‘Policing’, and ‘Corruption’] … I suppose that’s more along 
… Law and Order isn’t it, law.  Cos the policing, everything, is law […] it’s either you’re against 
it or for it … Corruption’s against it, Policing isfor it, Education and Training obviously … and 
the Legal System.  Law? 
 
JW:  How do you feel?  What’s the general consensus? 
 
S:  They come together … 
 
D:  In a way, yeah … I mean that’s law [points at bulk of pile] but that’s corruption [points at 
‘Corruption’ card; chuckles] … 
 
M:  Corruption yeah but it’s against the law isn’t it, so it comes under the same sort-of umbrella of 
law. 
 
D:  Well … in a way, I suppose, you could say, yeah … 
 
JW:  Education you’re keeping as part of the law as well? 
 
D:  Well, inasmuch as that’s where you’re first educated about all things.  You’re told off by your 
mum from the day you do something wrong, aren’t you, so I’d connect it. 
 
M:  And also, if you do something wrong out there th  police pull you over and what do they say, 
‘ignorance is no excuse’ or whatever.  You’re supposed to know it.  So you have to be educated 
and you have to be trained in certain aspects … everyday things … 
 
JW:  Sure, sure.  OK, so are we deciding on ‘Law’ for that group? 
 
D:  ‘Law and Order’, ‘Law and Order’ I’d say, ‘Law and Order’ … 
 
M:  Yep, no problem with that … 
 
If the police and the legal system are taken to be the institutions of enforcement (the ones 
who ‘pull you over’), corruption is taken to be a breach of the law, and education is presented 
as the means by which law-abiding people are raised.  Clear consensus is displayed: Murda 
and David exchange points smoothly, and at the end David reaffirms Murda’s original 
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heading ‘Law and Order’.  The discussions in Swanse and Norwich are in keeping with this, 
as should come through in the course of this chapter.  Swansea generated the heading ‘Justice 
/ Law’ to describe the corresponding card pile; theNorwich group made the same link 
between education and the law, emphasising the problem of discipline, and bringing in the 
concepts of ‘public disorder’ and ‘antisocial behaviour’ (including drug and alcohol abuse) to 
characterise the challenges facing the police.  The notion of ‘society’ that comes through in 
these British discussions is a fairly restricted one: the extent to which fellow members of the 
population are, in the legal sense, rule-followers rather than rule-breakers.  Crime is a very 
central problem in the British discussions, and the healthy society is the crime-free society. 
 This is a little different from what one finds in the German discussions.  While these 
groups do generate headings like ‘Legal Security’ (Lübeck), ‘Legal Order’ and ‘Legal 
System’ (Kassel), and ‘Rule of Law’ (Erfurt), problems of crime and inadequate policing 
occupy a smaller proportion of the discussions.  At the end of the Lübeck discussion, the 
group was asked specifically whether they had day-to-day difficulties with the police, a 
question which would have been provocative in the British context.  Niklas concedes merely 
that ‘there are occasionally a few small problems …’.  Jürgen and Wolfgang talk briefly 
about speed-cameras before concluding that it is difficult to think of any other particular 
problems, and Ali concurs.  Nor was this a particularly mild group – Kassel and Würzburg 
are very similar in this respect, the latter explicitly so in their views on policing, as will be 
seen later.  Rather than discussing crime and crime prevention, amongst the German groups 
there tended to be much more talk about other aspects of onduct in society.  Adhering to the 
rules is about showing concern for others and for public spaces, and the healthy society is the 
one in which a sense of community feeling has been retained, a society which has not 
descended into selfishness and egoism.  In this ‘social sphere’ or ‘social realm’, as the 
Würzburg group terms it, the emblematic villains, a will be seen in the next chapter, are not 
just the criminal law-breakers but the people who spit out their chewing-gum on the 
pavement, and the passive onlookers who fail to speak out against this kind of offensive 
behaviour. 
 In the Czech and the Erfurt discussions there is a particular emphasis on corruption 
and social hierarchy, and the police and the justice system are given prominence as 
institutions which embody these.  (The participants i  the Erfurt group appeared much more 
sceptical of the police than the western Germans, referring to them as ‘the poor dogs’).  
Corruption is considered so omnipresent that it is a reliable basis for jokes and sarcasm: 
Román in Plzeň declares to general laughs: ‘but please, that’s not a problem in the Czech 
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Republic!’ while Marek in Ostrava exclaims on seeing the relevant cards ‘Corruption!  My 
God, that’s a wonderful topic!  … Legal System – basic lly that doesn’t exist here!’  Along 
with this unquestionable assumption, in the Czech discussions one also finds a much tighter 
clustering with the law-making process, something which is perhaps consistent with there 
having been a weaker distinction between the legislative and the judiciary under 
communism.  Hans-Jürgen in Erfurt talks of politicians being ‘people who are elected and are 
supposed to build up the legal system’, and a passage in the Liberec discussion moves swiftly 
from ‘bad laws’ to ‘the legislators, the parliament, which functions really badly.’  A 
discussion of corruption in the police and the judicial system can thus merge with a 
discussion of corruption amongst elected politicians.  While there is repeated mention in the 
Czech groups of society (společnost) and the law (právo), the hierarchy motif of the former is 
never far from the rich vs poor motif of the economics domain, and the latter always carries 
overtones of state authority in a quite broad sense.   
 Amongst all the groups, this range of problems to do with the following of rules 
tends to be described as being experienced in a very local environment.  Much emphasis is 
given to the city, and in particular ‘the streets’.  David in Reading describes those ‘who don’t 
fit in’ and who ‘don’t want to most of the time.  That’s why they’re like that.  … You see 
them sitting on the streets, they’re outsiders, they’re drug addicts, they get into a system and 
they can’t get out of it and they need it … and they thieve and they do all the things … then 
you see them laying all round the town don’t you.  They’re outsiders, cos you wouldn’t want 
them living next to you cos you’d be frightened to tread on their needles or whatever, you 
know.  […]  You don’t want to be horrible, you say “oh I’ll give him a pound”, but you 
wouldn’t really want to touch his hand would you?’  During the discussion in Ostrava, Marek 
sees something happening outside the window.  He uses it to extend a point he is making 
about the thoughtless behaviour of those further up the social hierarchy: ‘Here’s a beautiful 
example of that.  The Mercedes here.  Along comes Mr. Businessman, lets out the children 
and parks so that no-one can park in the next space next to him.  That’s … you can see this 
guy wants to show off, “I’ve got a different kind of car, a Mercedes, and I’m going to put 
myself here.”  It’s a display.  And now the kid see it, the kid … I don’t know how old he is, 
but in ten years he’ll be doing the same.  Because “that’s how Daddy did it, so I can do the 
same.”  That’s Education and Training.’  Offensive b haviour is evident in the smallest 
things and the environment is intimately proximate.  This is a theme which will be 
encountered further in the following chapters. 
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3. Relations between Peoples 
 
With a great deal of indignation, Lee from the Swansea group recounts the following 
experience: ‘I took a soldier home in the week, he’d just come back from Iraq, seven months 
over there, and it’s five boys in his platoon, or battalion or whatever you call them, Welsh 
Fusiliers they were, and they’re based in Aldershot.  And they’d been back about three or 
four days and they’d lost a couple of their close fri nds, and they jumped in a taxi with a 
Paki, and the Paki started shouting “you lot …” – he knew they were in the army, he was 
taking them back to the base – “you lot there …” you know, giving it all that … And they 
pulled the Paki out, and they warned him two or three times “we’ve got close friends over 
there who’ve been killed, we don’t even want to be ov r there ourselves”, and he kept on and 
on, “you lot … you’re all over there killing innocent people” and all the rest of it.  Well, they 
pulled the Paki out didn’t they and leathered him.  They did him, and now they’re in prison.  
So it goes back to them again doesn’t it.’  Apart from being rather shocking, this anecdote is 
interesting in several ways.  Two social groups seem to be implied here: that of the soldiers 
(and their close friends), whose Welsh/British identity is foregrounded and with whom Lee 
seems inclined to associate himself by expressing sympathy with their fate, and the Pakistani 
taxi-driver who associates himself with the civilians who have been killed in Iraq.  Lee’s 
sense of injustice seems to be premised on the unwillingness of the Pakistani driver to 
distinguish between the soldiers and the orders they ar  carrying out, and on the fact that the 
soldiers end up in prison, simply, as it were, for defending themselves.  Treated as perfectly 
natural is the willingness of a Pakistani person to associate with the plight of Iraqis; indeed it 
is the fact that he is one of ‘them’ (last line), ‘giving it all that’ as they do (you know) which 
makes sense of the whole anecdote.  Thus an episode n a taxi is framed as part of a 
confrontation between groups.  This kind of discursive construction of ‘peoples’ and the 
relations between them is based on a distinctive set of interpretative repertoires, and these 
make up our third domain. 
Certain problems in the Economics domain and the Society and the Law domain 
prompt references to minority groups, as we shall see: the supposed economic cost of 
refugees, for example, or the supposed willingness of immigrants to steal.  But there are a 
whole series of problems and patterned ways of talking about them which are not reducible 
to the logics of these two domains, and where one finds different acts of demarcation with 
regard to shared predicament, and different understandings of the potential for agency.  The 
core problems in this domain are threat and intimidation as represented collectively by other 
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peoples; conflict, whether in the form of wars betwen nations or configurations of nations, 
or non-military conflict in the course of daily encounters; and the need to accommodate 
different cultural practices, and the perceived erosion of practices considered distinctive of 
‘our’ way of life.  Each of these is discussed at least to some degree by the three country 
groups interviewed, albeit with nuances.  In the Czch discussions this domain is less central 
than in the British or German ones: the assumption seems to be readily made that the Czech 
Republic has little significance on the international stage, and these participants are able to 
draw on a more limited range of personal encounters with resident non-Czechs since the 
country’s ethnic-minority population is small.  It is significant that both the Liberec and the 
Ostrava groups explicitly decide to leave discussion of these problems until last, preferring to 
focus first on the themes of the previous two domains.  Their discussion of Roma/gypsies 
tends to be framed according to the Economics and Society and the Law domains, although 
not exclusively, as will be seen.  The British and particularly the German groups, on the other 
hand, tend to discuss the problems of this domain rthe  early on, and make frequent 
digressions and interruptions so as to return back to them.  A further issue of salience in the 
British discussions is terrorism (and this well befor  the London bombings of July 2005); the 
German groups meanwhile devote considerable time to r flecting on their country’s history 
and the legacy of that history for today.  Despite th se variations, one finds a core set of 
basically similar problems being articulated across the country groups. 
Historically, the problems associated with this domain would probably be assumed to 
be distant ones rather than a part of daily life.  Conflict between peoples would perhaps have 
seemed a remote idea, the kind of thing undertaken by soldiers in far-away fields and 
resolved by diplomats in smoke-filled rooms.  To some extent this impression lingers – 
various participants speak of these problems as ‘not really affecting us here’ – but there is a 
counter-perspective, usually mentioned by someone else in the discussion, which emphasises 
the very proximity of these issues.  When David from the Reading group proposes the 
heading ‘Affairs outside our environment’ for the card pile consisting of ‘Peace and War’, 
‘Treatment of Outsiders’ and ‘Overseas Aid’, on the grounds that ‘we’re not at war 
particularly here in our environment if we’re looking at us sat here in the town.  So … that’s 
sort-of overseas affairs, I mean, I can’t do nothing about,’ Murda responds that ‘Treatment of 
Outsiders is not overseas affairs – it’s even in Reading itself.’  Titling this domain ‘Relations 
between Peoples’ is intended to capture the link which is so commonly made in lay 
discussion between what the political scientist might call ‘foreign policy’ or ‘international 
relations’ on the one hand and ‘race relations’ in a domestic context on the other.  The link is 
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fairly evident in Lee’s anecdote above, and can be seen as the Erfurt group discuss a heading 
with which to categorise the pile they have made consisting of the cards ‘Peace and War’, 
‘Overseas Aid’ and ‘Treatment of Outsiders’: 
 
U:  I’d say …I’d say … ‘Foreign Policy’, or something like that … 
 
H-J:  Yeah, it’s … here I’d put … you see, it’s not just foreign policy.  For me it’d be ‘Humanity’.  I’d 
have ‘Humanity’ as the title. 
 
M:  … With the person being in the foreground … 
 
H-J:  … ‘Overseas Aid’ … yeah, that belongs there too.  They all belong together somehow.  Yeah … 
but if I put that here then … ‘The Person’, or ‘The Future’, or something, it depends …  [U:  
‘Future Prospects’ …]  Yeah, but you have that over here too …  [U:  ‘Human Togetherness’ …] 
 
M:  Sure but humanity one could have here … 
 
H-J:  Yeah … need to think through carefully … 
 
JW:  You said foreign policy before …? 
 
H-J:  Yeah, foreign policy belongs in there.  But ‘Treatment of Outsiders’ I see as something not just 
abroad but here too ... [U:  Here …]  That’s a problem right here in Germany too.  Everywhere 
really, because in my view there’s nationalism everywhere.  Everyone has a certain national pride, 
and nationalism develops out of that.  Quite simply.  So that’s why it’s hard to order the cards.  
These things … [pointing at cards] … If there’s none of that [Peace and War] then there’s none of 
that [Treatment of Outsiders], and without that then none of that …! [laughs] 
 
U:  If that was OK [Peace and War] then you wouldn’t get immigrants … [H-J:  Exactly …]  If the 
poor countries weren’t so poor then people wouldn’t come to us, they’d rather stay at home.  
They’re driven away by war and so they come to us.  That’s why foreign policy is crucial. 
 
 
‘Humanity’ is a word which appears frequently here, and ‘Human Foreign Policy’ is a 
category heading which they consider a little later in the discussion.  Their (self-imposed) 
challenge is to express why foreign policy and immigrant populations in Germany are issues 
which ‘go together’.  When, for the sake of simplicity, they settle on ‘Foreign Policy’, it is 
stressed that this should be understood ‘keeping in mind the human dimension’.  ‘Culture’ is 
another key word which recurs, for instance when examining the rights of Muslims to build 
mosques in Germany.  It links together what happens in the local environment with places 
more distant: ‘When we’re abroad,’ says Uwe, ‘in an Islamic country, we’re meant to 
conduct ourselves in a reasonable way.  Women are suppo ed to cover their arms and not 
wear shorts.  But we have to build mosques here and everything for the Muslims.  That’s not 
right.  With us it’s always expected that we behave in a reasonable way, but here everyone’s 
allowed to behave however they want.’  The Lübeck and Würzburg groups both choose 
‘Foreign Policy’ as their heading for the two cards ‘Peace and War’ and ‘Overseas Aid’, but 
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in discussion link to these the question of immigration (the card for which was put with the 
piles ‘Internal Security’ and ‘Rule of Law’ respectively); for the same two cards, the Kassel 
group considers ‘Global Interaction’ and ‘World’ (‘it’s a topic which really spans the globe’, 
says Sebastian, with Hans’ agreement) before settling on the title ‘Inter-state Relations’.  For 
the Norwich group the appropriate heading is ‘the World’, whilst in Reading the participants, 
after a lengthy discussion which will be looked at later, choose ‘Conflict’, Murda explaining 
‘because, you know, you’re going to have conflict with outsiders; because of conflict at times 
you have to have Aid, and Peace and War is obviously again is conflict …’  In Swansea, 
having arranged the cards such that there is a pile consisting of ‘Peace and War’, ‘Treatment 
of Outsiders’ and ‘Overseas Aid’, the group is so eager to start talking about asylum-seekers 
that the category-generating exercise is put to one sid .  In the Czech groups, as might be 
expected given that the domain appears somewhat less central to them, participants do not 
arrange these particular cards together with the same consistency, and the category headings 
are hence rather disconnected: ‘Security’ for the Liberec group (referring to the cards Peace 
and War and Treatment of Outsiders), ‘Global Problems’ for the Ostrava group (referring to 
Peace and War, Overseas Aid and the Environment), and a rather amorphous category for the 
Plzeň group based on the concept of Education. 
 The link between ‘foreign affairs’ and domestic ‘race relations’ which comes 
through during these discussions of the cards, in particular amongst the British and Germans, 
is a spontaneous feature of the discussions as a whole.  Perhaps the most obvious example is 
the link made between Jews and the Israeli state, as visible in a passage from the Lübeck 
discussion: 
 
J:  ... But it troubles me sometimes when Spiegel [a news magazine] – it’s Der Spiegel isn’t it, where 
the guy at the top is a Jew? – when they always come ut with this stuff, when they raise the 
finger and say to us Germans ‘you evil ones have done something bad again’ …  [A:  … Yeah, 
he’s the financer …]  ‘We need to remind you of your past, otherwise you’d forget it again …’ 
 
W:  Yeah, and what are they doing with the Palestinians …? 
 
J:  Yeah … yeah, naturally you’re not allowed to bring that into the equation … [W: … yeah …] what 
they’re doing there.  The German press is naturally pro-Israeli … [W: … yeah …] 
 
In the Würzburg discussion, Uwe makes a point about the British public’s reaction to the Iraq 
war: ‘There was certainly a lot of outcry about thewar in Britain.  Have the English still got 
soldiers over there …?  [R: I think so, yeah]  … But … this policy isn’t much liked there 
either.’  Oliver then makes the link to minority groups: ‘It’s led to domestic problems there 
too, because there are lots of Muslims living in Britain [R: … yeah …] and they’re putting 
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the British under fire because of Iraq.  They still have it under control, and Blair is trying at 
the moment to extend his hand to them a bit.’  In adiscussion of the Balkans conflict of the 
1990s and the refugees who left there for Germany, A dreas points to the Serbian café across 
the road as an example of how the Serbs have unjustly prospered while it was the Albanians 
who were the legitimate refugees.20  Wider conflicts are played out and are visible just by 
taking a walk around town.  Lee in Swansea tells Andy to watch his words because there’s ‘a 
Paki’ in the pub: ‘in Swansea now, in a local pub, and you’ve got to watch what you’re 
saying.  [...]  Shouldn’t have to.’  The local pub in one’s own town is, it seems, the kind of 
place where these problems of intergroup relations should not have to be faced: the outrage is 
exactly that these problems are being encountered within the local environment.  The same 
immediacy comes through in a passage from the Kassel group: 
 
D:  […]  And there’s not going to be war between countries any more, instead war takes place between 
people(s),21 who sit directly next to each other but which have completely different cultures from 
each other, and I think … 
 
H:  It seems to me that … your own fears are coming out there … 
 
D:  Yeah, they’re certainly there, they’re there … 
 
P:  I mean … you can see it, just go out in the stret and have a look … 
 
H:  That’s … that’s exactly what I mean.  The fears ren’t just with you, the fears are also with exactly 
those people that you’re suggesting are threatening.  Why isn’t it possible for the reason that we’re 
all human beings to go over to them and enter into dialogue with these people?  […] 
 
P:  Germans, they don’t stick together.  Foreigners – just go along the Holländerstraße, if you hit a 
foreigner in the face there … [D: yeah] … within five minutes there are ten of them standing in 
front of you.  If you hit a German in the face then t  minutes later there’s still no-one there. 
 
Dieter’s reference to ‘war between people(s)’, which seems to be endorsed by Peter, is not 
accepted by Hans, either in this passage or in other sections of the discussion.  The grounds 
on which he rejects it however are generally that conflict is not inevitable rather than that 
such ‘peoples’ are a misleading construct.  His notio  of ‘dialogue’ clearly postulates two 
entities, to be encountered ‘on the street’ as wellas further afield.   
 A final point of importance concerning the compositi n of this domain is the 
assumed relationship between a country’s government and its people.  It was visible above 
that Lee (and presumably also the soldier who told him the anecdote) makes a distinction 
                                                
20 While this example might seem to blur the demarcation against Muslims which we shall see to be 
characteristic of this domain, there is no indication in this passage that Andreas or the rest of the group 
considers Albanians to be Muslims; even if this knowledge is available to them, it is given no weight. 
21 Original: no longer ‘zwischen Ländern’ but rather ‘zwischen den Menschen’. 
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between the views of the soldiers who have been based in Iraq and of the government which 
sent them there, whereas he naturalises the identification of the Pakistani taxi-driver with 
Iraqis.  A general pattern seems to be that for parts of the world considered geographically or 
culturally ‘proximate’ a distinction between states/governments and peoples is readily made, 
whereas for more ‘distant’ places they tend to be treated as one.22  Thus in the Norwich group 
one sees Mickey criticising US treatment of Ethiopia and explicitly drawing a distinction 
between government policy and the people by saying ‘don’t get me wrong, cos I like 
America, I think the average American is fine,’ whereas one sees Barry making no 
distinction at all between the government and the people when referring to an African 
country, even one whose government is acknowledged to be repressive: ‘the biggest rip-off at 
the moment, we’re actually paying overseas aid at the moment to Zimbabwe, where you’ve 
got the worst dictator … Certain parts of Africa deserve it for the treatment of AIDS and 
poverty, but I’m afraid Zimbabwe don’t.  Mugabe is a dictator … he’s got torture chambers – 
any opponent is oppressed.  So I’d abolish that one f r him.’  That AIDS- and poverty-relief 
should be withheld because the country’s leader does not deserve it indicates an elision of 
people and government in perception of this more distant location.  How the boundaries of 
the ‘proximate’ and the ‘distant’ are drawn is one of the first questions which will be 
considered in the next chapter. 
 
 These three domains – Economics, Society and the Law, and Relations between 
Peoples – can be taken as important components of the political common, whose existence 
they in turn serve to confirm.  Participants across all the groups were able to talk in depth and 
to coordinate well with one another in discussion of the problems associated with these 
domains, drawing on patterned discursive resources to do so, and – as will be seen further in 
the next chapter – they tended to articulate these as problems that were liable to affect 
‘people like us’.  This does not mean that all participants necessarily linked themselves to 
them as individuals: as taxi-drivers, none of the participants was unemployed or liable to be 
made unemployed in the immediate future, certainly not by the factory closures which were 
so often mentioned.  It was not a problem liable to affect ‘me’, but it was nonetheless a 
problem that could affect ‘people like us’.  The political common is shared not in the 
absolute sense of problems shared by all at all times, and with the same opinions held, but in 
                                                
22 The tendency to emphasise the homogeneity of out-groups and the heterogeneity of in-groups has been well 
documented in social psychology.  See e.g. John Duckitt, 'Prejudice and Intergroup Hostility', in David O. 
Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003). 
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the sense of a set of reference-points linked according to the principle of family resemblance 
and invoked as a means by which to carry on the discussion.   
 Roughly the same kinds of problem emerge across the et of interviews, and they are 
linked together using concepts which can be considered as functionally equivalent.  The way 
these domains are described here is not the only possible way.  There would be some grounds 
in the interviews for conceptualising the analysis according to institutional domains rather 
than problem domains, with headings such as ‘nationl government’ (perhaps even just 
‘politics’), ‘local government’, ‘European’, ‘global’ and ‘private’.  A domain along the lines 
of ‘State Provision’ would have been a natural one with which to read the Czech and the 
Erfurt texts (i.e. those from the post-communist cities): both the Ostrava and Liberec groups 
brought together ‘Transport’ and ‘Medical Care’, using the headings ‘State Sector’ and ‘State 
Services’ respectively.  Likewise there would be some support for adopting a principle of 
immediacy, with domains such as ‘day-to-day’, ‘emergency’, ‘past’ and ‘future’.  These were 
sometimes offered by participants, though less regularly than the thematic division which we 
shall take as the crucial one, and hardly at all were discussions structured along these lines.  
In the analytical reading we shall follow, guided by the concept of a political bond, questions 
to do with political institutions are approached separately in Chapter 5 in terms of the 
plausibility of a political project, as distinct from the substantive problems which such a 
project might address.  Questions to do with immediacy are integrated into discussion of 
problem-salience. 
 The three key domains – Economics, Society and the Law, and Relations between 
Peoples – should not be thought of as spheres with sharply demarcated boundaries, or as 
closed systems.  The most appropriate metaphor is that of the constellation.  Picking up what 
was said earlier, some problématiques (‘comets’, one might say) can be problematised in 
terms of more than one domain.  Take ‘immigration’ for example.  This problématique – the 
permanent or semi-permanent movement of people across state borders – certainly does not 
have to be treated as a problem (it can be welcomed as something positive), but if it is 
problematised then this can be done in more than one way.  For example, it can be talked 
about as something which costs ‘people like us’ our money or job security, or as something 
which makes ‘people like us’ more vulnerable to criminal behaviour, or as something which 
forces ‘people like us’ to live next to those who are culturally different to us.  Immigration in 
other words can be articulated as a problem in terms of the Economics domain (along the 
lines of ‘they’re a burden!’), in Society and the Law terms (‘they’re all criminals!’) or in 
Relations between Peoples terms (‘they’re completely different to us!’).  These different 
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kinds of framing will sometimes be contested, a fact which reaffirms the dynamic 
relationship between speakers and the resources upon which they draw.  When participants 
articulate a problem, they are talking about a problématique in a particular way, and are 
drawing on particular discursive repertoires, with associations to particular discursive 
domains, to do so.  As suggested above, one can suppo e that the relationship between 
problématiques and discursive resources is not a free-floating one – certain problématiques 
do, it seems, tend to be problematised in certain wys, and one can usefully inquire into these 
– but at the same time there is scope for some flexibi ity in the process of problematisation.  
At an analytical level, this means that occasionally there can be difficulty in deciding how a 
particular passage in a transcript should be read and with which domain(s) it should 
principally be associated.  This does not mean however that the domains merge into one, 
rendering the concept redundant.  Many everyday concepts have precisely this radial 
structure, and an analogy can be drawn with the domains used to talk about the weather – the 
seasons.  A sunny day – equivalent to a problématique – can be a feature of summer, autumn, 
winter or spring, resulting in occasional uncertainty as to how to talk about a particular 
phase: are these two days of sun the beginning of spring, or just a brief respite from the 
gloom of winter?  In the face of such difficulties, we continue to talk of the seasons, without 
feeling that we make ourselves absurd.  Domains are to be thought of in a similarly 
pragmatic spirit. 
  Interviewing groups other than taxi-drivers would no doubt have resulted in some 
different problems being brought to the fore and certain others being marginalised.  The 
participants in this study were exclusively male: one may speculate that a study involving 
female participants might involve not just the invocation of supplementary we-formulations 
applied to the same set of problem domains, but a clustering of problems distinctive enough 
to suggest the conceptualisation of a domain based on gender-related problems.  This is not a 
thought which we are in a position to pursue.  The supposition, based on the reasons for 
which taxi-drivers were chosen as the subjects of study, is that their discourse is likely to 
feature many of the problems and discursive patterns that would arise in discussions 
composed of different social groups, and that the domains which have been conceptualised 
here would be tenable descriptions more widely, notwithstanding the significant variation 
one might find at the more ‘superficial’ level of opinions. 
 Economics, Society and the Law, and Relations between Peoples are the domains 
which will be carried forward for further analysis then.  They are comprised of the problems 
which were talked about in greatest depth and with greatest frequency, and which were often 
 118 
described by participants themselves as the most important problems.  However, that they are 
not comprehensive of all the problems discussed in these interviews, and that they should 
therefore not be considered as definitive of the political common, can be made clear by 
looking briefly at a fourth, more marginalised, setof problems which one might treat under 
the heading Quality of Life.  We shall return to this set of problems in Chapter 6, when 
discussing how the political common might evolve ovr time. 
 
 
4. Quality of Life 
 
In the course of the initial card-arranging exercise, everal groups created a card-pile which 
they titled Quality of Life comprised of cards such as ‘The Environment’, ‘Health and Safety 
Standards’, ‘Medical Care’, ‘Science and Research’ and ‘Transport’.  Passages from the 
Lübeck and Würzburg discussions provide an indication of the links made between these 
issues.  In connecting environmental problems with transport pollution, the Lübeck group 
refers to a story which was in the news at the time of the interviews about the dangers posed 
to human health by ‘fine-particulate pollution’ (Feinstaubbelastung): 
 
N:  Transport is of course an issue for environmental problems … 
 
W:  Yeah, there’s a lot of talk right now about fine-particulate pollution from diesel vehicles, amongst 
other things … [N:  Mmm, yeah]  And I think where we are we’re certainly hit by traffic and 
environmental problems.  As far as traffic goes we’ve got the pollution from the A20, and until 
that was there the environmentalists spent ten years trying to block it. 
 
J:  Transport produces, as has been said, a lot of pollutants, and there are increasing attempts to cu 
back on the pollutants with technology that’s supposed to block them, like electric motors and … 
hydrogen motors and so on.  So in that sense … the Environment and Transport certainly do have 
something directly to do with one another I’d say. 
 
 
The Würzburg group also links pollution, transport and health when narrating how the 
introduction of a road toll for lorries on the Autobahn has led to heavier traffic in the city as 
drivers switch to smaller roads to avoid the charge.  The interweaving of problems one sees 
here suggests one might want to speak of a domain called ‘Quality of Life’, ‘Care’, or 
‘Health’.   
 
U:  It’s got something to do with quality of life, hasn’t it.  Also with transport.  Just here in Würzburg 
yesterday there was a report on ‘Antenne Bayern’ [a radio station] saying how hard people in 
Würzburg are hit by pollution due to this toll on lorries, how the whole city is afflicted.  It was on
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the radio.  [O:  It’s certainly very visible …]  Definitely … the middle orbital …  [R:  The middle 
orbital is the main problem, all the through-traffic of lorries …]  In Germany we’ve got a toll on 
lorries now on the Autobahn … you can save 3.50 euros and half an hour if you cut straight 
through the city and join the Autobahn again on the other side, and a lot of lorry-drivers have 
realised that – much to the sorrow of local residents.  It’s a problem we notice quite a bit too. 
 
R:  It’s very noticeable when you drive on the middle orbital how many lorries there are there.  It’s 
always blocked, the whole day long, it’s very striking, makes you think because it’s a municipal 
road but it’s one lorry after another.  
 
O:  […]  The residents are hit by the exhaust fumes … 
 
R:  There isn’t the same problem in Britain because Britain’s an island, it’s situated on the periphery, 
whereas Germany’s right in the middle of Europe … [U:  yeah, exactly]  Everything crosses 
through here in all directions, there’s a lot of foreign lorries involved – every second one probably.  
There’s a need to get to grips with the problem.  […]  The law says every kilometre on the 
Autobahn has to be paid for …  [O:  … Takings of 3 billion euros, I’ve heard …] [...]  The people 
in the villages, in the towns, they tremble and groan under the noise, the pollution … [O:  … the 
exhaust fumes …] … the fumes …  [U:  Quality of life is what’s at stake …]  That’s what this 
problem … this problem-area’s about, everything we’ve been saying, I’d say. 
 
However, despite passages such as these, which indicate a clustering of issues, such 
problems were generally not discussed in much depth by any of the groups.  Amongst the 
British groups they were hardly mentioned at all.  Amongst the German groups they were 
mentioned a little more.  Amongst the Czechs groups they were mentioned a little more still, 
pollution in particular, perhaps because the experiences of adaptation to the demands of EU 
membership acted as a spur to problematisation (a point that will be returned to in Chapter 
6).  But generally they were strongly marginalised in discussion.  One expression of this 
marginalisation is simply the avoidance of talking about them, as one sees most clearly with 
the British groups.  When Mickey in Norwich is looking for a heading to describe the two 
cards ‘Environment’ and ‘Science and Research’, he suggests ‘Try Not To Think About It!’  
One of his few remarks on the subject is presented as a joke: ‘things like brushing your teeth 
– Proctor and Gamble, they make a lot of coal for that stuff [toothpaste] and they blind 
puppies, but I try not to think about it when I’m brushing my teeth!’  Barry agrees that the 
environment is a subject ‘for the future, really’.  In the case of the German and Czech groups, 
where there was slightly more talk about these issue , marginalisation takes the form of 
downplaying the significance of environmental problems compared to the problems 
encountered in other domains, most notably Economics.  One sees this in a passage from the 
Lübeck group.  The discussion has followed the proposed building of a technologically 
pioneering high-speed rail-link (‘Transrapid’) whic was to have passed near Lübeck but 
which was scuppered by environmental concerns.  Wolfgang and Jürgen interpret this as part 
of a broader pattern: 
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J:  In France they’ve got the TGV, which goes even faster, over 300km/h … Here we just have the ICE 
which ambles along … 
 
W:  That’s right, but that’s also because … in France, for example, the Greens have no influence, or 
hardly any influence.  If the Greens in France had the same kind of support or lobby that they have 
here then it wouldn’t have gone through. 
 
N:  I think it’s also to do with the fact that Germany is so densely populated and that so many villages 
are passed through … [W:  yeah], and on open land you can also build faster. 
 
J:  That seems to be the case.  Although I also think t at the Greens and the environmental parties have
a great deal of influence on the economy.  And they’ve throttled the economy and have created 
lots of problems.  If one thinks for example of the airport here in Lübeck, the Greens and the 
environmental associations have always put a lot of spanners in the building process.  There were 
these toads or something, a family of toads living nearby and the building project had to be 
stopped because of it, and …  And so a large number of jobs couldn’t be created.  Because a pair 
of cranes had built a nest there … 
 
W:  Protection of the environment is very important to us, but … you can’t live off grass and nature 
alone.  We’re not cows who can just feed off grass.  And we can’t live just off tourism here either. 
 
JW:  Why are the Greens so strong here? 
 
W:  They began as a protest party … back at the end of the sixties … 
 
J: I think with the Greens, there’s a lot of people th re who have protected positions … [W:  yeah] … 
officials or teachers, or professions like analyst, judge, psychiatrist and what not, and they don’t 
have many worries about the future … [W: right] because they’re financially protected or because 
they’ve got the economic circumstances that allow them to afford it.  A father who’s got two 
children and both he and his wife are unemployed, h’s simply not going to understand that sixty 
jobs can’t be created due to a pair of cranes.  And the same holds for the whole country, it’s not 
just in Lübeck. 
 
N:  But as a counterweight I think the Greens aren’t bad at all.  It’s a good thing that not everything’s 
paved over and sacrificed to economic interests. 
 
J:  Sure, there are other opinions …  Personally this is my opinion, but that’s democracy, there are 
different views … 
 
N:  I certainly don’t agree with everything.  The pair of cranes is completely irrelevant.  But I do think 
that one mustn’t sacrifice everything to economic interests.  It’s important that nature is … you 
need to weigh it all out.  The Autobahn that’s being laid out now in the south of Lübeck …
 
J:  The A20, the Autobahn that goes all the way to Poland, that’s taken ten years, and it’s extremely 
important of course for the infrastructure of eastern Germany, that all the lorries can speed through 
and don’t have to come into the city …
 
W:  The alternative to the Autobahn would be to build a new wall, twice as high, to seal oneself off.  
So, everything which comes from the forests, not jus Poland but places beyond, Russia and the 
Baltic states, all of that runs along this Autobahn nd around Lübeck.  All the heavy goods used to 
pass through Lübeck, it was a major problem.  We see it very clearly today, particularly Monday 
mornings and Friday afternoons, in some districts of the city there’s hardly any traffic any more.  
Previously you needed half an hour to go three kilometres on some streets because they were all 
blocked with commuters and heavy-goods vehicles pasing through. 
 
The interventions of Wolfgang and Jürgen here both work to downplay the significance of 
environmental problems compared to economic ones, with the toads and cranes symbolising 
the triviality of environmental concerns next to human unemployment.  Only those who are 
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sheltered from economic realities – those with protected jobs – would take environmental 
problems seriously.  Niklas tries more than one counter-argument, but neither Wolfgang nor 
Jürgen really engages with what he is saying, and the discussion of the Autobahn with which 
the passage concludes involves economic arguments only. Problems to do with pollution or 
environmental destruction make no further appearance in the interview. 
The marginalisation of these problems in this way is evident across the German and 
Czech interviews.  Uwe and Rainer in Würzburg, discus ing measures mentioned on the 
radio to reduce fine-particulate pollution, immediately think about what their impact will be 
on the economy, of ‘all the euros that’ll have to go on that.’  Peter in Kassel meets Dieter’s 
approval when he argues that the media have blown the issue of fine-particulate pollution out 
of proportion: ‘The problem with fine particulates – we’ve had that for ages.  It was never 
talked about and now all of a sudden the EU has introduced some regulation – which isn’t 
backed up with fines, so it just limps along … But now suddenly everyone in all the 
newspapers, in all the TV news reports, everywhere fine-particulate pollution is being talked 
about, a Sunday car ban is suddenly mentioned, etc. etc. … [D:  There’s been this EU 
regulation since 1999]  Now after six years it all blows up because a few values have been 
overshot, values which were always being overshot anyw y …’.  Sebastian subverts the 
problem with the surprising information that ‘a smoker who smokes at home breathes in 
more fine particulates than someone on a heavily used road.’  Regulation is considered by all 
participants as ‘sensible’, but there is a sense that one should not make a drama of the 
problem.  When Zdeněk in Ostrava talks about the visible improvement in pollution levels in 
the city, he concedes it is ‘terribly important’ but feels that the Green Party rather 
exaggerates the problems; Marek follows this by arguing that the reason for these 
improvements is the decline of local industry, with all the unemployment this involves:  
‘That’s connected to the fact that lots of firms and factories doing manufacturing and heavy 
industry have died out, and no-one has come in who could employ those people.  Like Josef 
said, 80% of people here worked manually.  They’d carry on working but they’ve got 
nowhere to go.  Nowhere to go.’ 
Whereas the significance of the problems associated with our three principal domains 
– Economics, Society and the Law, and Relations between Peoples – is never seriously 
doubted by any participants in discussion, the seriousness of these problems to do with what 
one might, if it were better developed, call the Quality of Life domain tends to be doubted by 
at least some participants whenever they are mentioned.  One sees this particularly clearly in 
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the German and Czech cases; in the British case, so little problematisation of this kind takes 





The argument of this chapter has been that, when invited to talk about problems in public life 
and when given a few prompts to react to, our interview participants were able to develop a 
coordinated discussion using a series of shared concerns to orient them.  There was 
considerable consistency across the groups in the kinds of problem evoked, and evidence of 
widely shared discursive competence for at least three domains of problems.  It has been 
argued that the fluidity seen in the articulation and discussion of these problem domains was 
in contrast to the rather more disjointed efforts to be found in connection with other 
problématiques, as visible in the ignoring or the awkward acknowledgement of certain 
prompt-cards and peer interventions.  This diversity of outcomes makes it possible to 
distinguish with some confidence a series of problem-areas which may properly be thought 
of as ‘common’, and therefore to claim considerable empirical plausibility for the idea of a 
‘political common’.  To be sure, this political common is by no means a definitively 
determined entity, and the problems associated withEconomics, Society and the Law and 
Relations between Peoples undoubtedly do not exhaust the ways in which common p litical 
problems might be constructed.  There are problems which were articulated only sporadically 
in these discussions, such as environmental pollutin, and aspects of life which were not 
discussed at all, such as gender relations, which amongst different social groups or in 
different spatio-temporal contexts might be problematised in depth.  There are also the 
ambiguities of interpretation which are characterisic of all empirical study, in particular the 
study of discursive practice.  It is, however, a political common with enough clearly defined 
features to proceed to explore these in greater depth.  
The consistency with which common problems are put forward in these discussions 
seems to speak against an assumption of citizen apathy.  ‘Depoliticisation’, it seems, cannot 
be understood simply as indifference towards matters of common concern.23  Grievances 
                                                
23 In their study of the US, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse suggest that ordinary citizens care deeply about plitical 
processes but that their preferences on policy are quite weak (John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, 
Stealth Democracy: Americans’ Beliefs about how Government Should Work (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002)).  However, this second category of theirs (‘policy preferences’) fails to distinguish 
between views on the policies to be adopted and views directly on the substantive problems deemed in need of 
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remain easily articulated, and they are assumed to be shared with others rather than merely 
private.  Nor does one find reason to support a Schumpeterian account of the incapacity of 
non-elites to engage in substantive political issue.24  As has been suggested, and as should 
become further evident in the following chapters, one does not need to be of the inclination 
to romanticise ‘everyday life’ or ‘real people’ in order to find a considerable degree of 
political competence in these discussions – if one u derstands competence in the way we 
have chosen.  In the political-psychology literature, competence or ‘sophistication’ tends to 
be understood in ways that are easily quantified: in terms of cross-topic and cross-temporal 
consistency in polling responses (ideological constraint, and the presence of ‘attitudes’ rather 
than ‘non-attitudes’) or in terms of the capacity to demonstrate knowledge of the purely 
know-that kind by reproducing elite messages and publicly recognised facts.25  Treating 
competence as an individual phenomenon, and one to b measured against the standards of 
the ‘elites’, these approaches tend all too easily to lead to the abandonment of any 
meaningful idea of popular sovereignty.  Even scholars who wish to emphasise the capacity 
of ordinary citizens to hold opinions tend to take as their puzzle how this is achieved in spite 
of their lack of relevant knowledge.26  If there is a puzzle at all, one might see it rather as why 
certain individuals are willing to denigrate the competence that they do have by declaring 
themselves too busy to keep track of political issue .  In the face of a rich ability to articulate 
common problems, this would be the more surprising phenomenon.27   
Rejecting competence as it is understood in politica  psychology, one may likewise 
distance oneself from the tendency amongst deliberativ  democrats, albeit less 
individualistically and generally with less resignation, to conceive competence against an 
                                                                                                                                            
address.  In our interviews the richness of the latt r comes through clearly, while the former will be dealt with 
separately in Chapter 5. 
24 Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, p.257 and p.262, that for the average citizen, ‘mere 
assertion, often repeated, counts more than rational argument,’ and that the typical citizen ‘drops down to a 
lower level of mental performance as soon as he entrs the political field.  He argues and analyzes in a way 
which he would readily recognize as infantile within the sphere of his real interests.  He becomes a primitive 
again.’  For a review of such arguments, see Lynn M. Sanders, 'Against Deliberation', Political Theory, 25/3 
(1997). 
25 See the discussion in Chapter 2.  Relevant examples are Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion; 
Michael X. Delli Carpini and Scott Keeter, What Americans Know About Politics and Why It Matters (New 
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1996); and the s atistics-based contributions to Stephen L. Elkin and 
Karol Edward Soltan (eds.), Citizen Competence and Democratic Institutions (University Park, PA: Penn State 
University Press, 1999). 
26 Cf. the literature on heuristics, e.g. Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock, Reasoning and Choice. 
27 The definitive study on this is Eliasoph, Avoiding Politics.  In our interviews some such comments arose – 
Ali in Lübeck was not alone in declaring that ‘we’re so busy I think with our own lives that we don’t have time 
to follow foreign and domestic news … we’ve got hard work to do, 14 or 15 hours a day, and families to think 
about.’  For further consideration of how participants and non-participants reacted to the word ‘politics’ itself, 
see the Methodological Appendix.  
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ideal which rarely manifests itself.  This too can have elitist implications, discrediting styles 
of argumentation which do not conform to a certain model of rationality.28  Instead, taking 
competence as the capacity to elaborate discussion in coordination with peers – practical 
knowledge of the know-how as well as the know-that kind – one does not run up against the 
need to validate what one finds against an absolute standard, and can join those who adopt a 
talk-centred approach to citizenship in suggesting that ‘people aren’t so dumb’.29  This is not, 
of course, to propose that one accept uncritically whatever is to be found in lay discourse.  
But to the extent that one objects to the kind of discursive practice that one observes, either 
on moral or political grounds, the task is then, as will be argued further in Chapter 6, not to 
seek its exclusion from the political process, but to engage in a political endeavour to 
remould it. 
The intention in speaking of a political bond was to investigate whether substantive 
problems may be substituted for alternatives such as interests, cultural markers or values as 
the focal point of the common.  What has been observed in this chapter lends some backing 
to this perspective, in that the capacity to articulate and elaborate common problems in need 
of address seems evident in the empirical material.  The next chapter explores how the 
concept may be taken further. 
                                                
28 Cf. Sanders, 'Against Deliberation'. 




The Political Subjects, 




If the articulation of common problems is to form the basis for a collective bond, it is clear 
that special importance is attached to the kinds of ocial grouping invoked in discussion of 
such problems, and the relationships posited between them.  Problems bring people together 
and push them apart, and both dynamics need to be accommodated in a political 
conceptualisation of the bond.  This question of collective positioning forms the focus of the 
present chapter.  Our interest is in the various social categories which arise in connection 
with each domain, and the associations made with these.  These are discursive patterns in the 
same sense as described in Chapter 3 and, in theoreical t rms, Chapter 2: routinised ways of 
speaking which, though always susceptible to renunciation by individual speakers, 
nevertheless recur widely across the discussions, and whose adoption is generally ‘taken for 
granted’ rather than marked by hesitation or reflexivity.   
 The discussions, as always, are treated not so much as a glimpse at individuals 
(though naturally names will become familiar) but as a site of discursive practice.  What gets 
said is interesting not because it indicates the ‘id ntities’ of participants, but because it is a 
pool in which one finds accumulated some of the discur ive resources commonly drawn 
upon for collective positioning, and whose political implications one wants to study.  Two 
broad questions are of interest in particular.  Thefirst is whether these acts of positioning are 
consistent with a political bond of any kind – that is, whether they exhibit the basic tolerance 
of ‘the other’ which is necessary for a democratic political community.  The second is 
whether they are supportive of a European polity – that is, whether they carry a transnational 
dimension, and in how far this is specifically ‘European’.  Following the logic of exploratory 
research, the aims are double: on the one hand to use the empirical material so as to further 
develop the concepts associated with the ideal of a political bond; on the other hand to use 
these same concepts to make a reading of the contemporary situation so as to consider how 
far it corresponds to that ideal.   
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Sensitising Concepts for the Study of Collective Positi ning 
 
An extended extract from the interview conducted in the Czech town of Liberec provides a 
starting-point for laying out the concepts that will be used.  At the point where we join it, the 
discussion has been running for approximately fiftyminutes, with regular interventions from 
each of Václav, Onřej, Zdeněk and Radek.  The focus has been on problems of 
unemployment, job insecurity and the inadequacies and possible abuse of the benefits system 
– issues that can be associated with the Economics domain.  Problems to do with wages and 
working conditions are drawn into the discussion over the course of this passage.  An 
intervention from Onřej conjures up the figure of an unemployed person faced with the 
dilemma of whether he should accept a low-paid job: 
 
O:  ... You’ve got to remember though, if someone gets CK4500 on benefits or CK6000 in wages, 
that’s a difference of just 1500.  Who’s going to ... what will-power is going to make you work for 
6000 if the state gives you 4500? 
 
Z:  That’s exactly it, a young person is going to prefer to be on support than to go out and work for 
6000.  As a young person he’ll still get hold of a side-job.  So he’s better off like that than if he 
went out and did something, isn’t he. 
 
V:  And on top of everything he’d have to get up at 6 in the morning.  Like this, he doesn’t have to get
up at all.  [Z:  Hang on, at 6 he needs to be at work already ...]  So he gets up at 5 then ... 
 
O:  But it’s the same with everything.  Working time, which in the Czech Republic is now 181 hours a 
month ... [Z:  Yeah, we’ve got plenty of hours ...] We have the most in the whole of Europe.  But 
the problem is, like all of us know, it’s 181 hours which are obligatory and then on top of that you 
have overtime.  People have to go and work at the we kends too ... 
 
Z:  ... Those supermarkets etc., they run non-stop, right, from Monday to Sunday, it’s non-stop ... 
 
R:  ...  People don’t get much pay for it at all ... 
 
O:  ... Of course, it’s not enough pay to live on ... [R: ... It’s not ...]  
 
Z:  ... They’ve got a bit of security, but not much ... 
 
V:  Well, in exchange for that security they’ve got masses of hours to do.  [O:  ... Of course ...] 
 
Z:  Nothing’s for free.  And all these entrepreneurs who’ve come in from outside, they know we’re a 
cheap source of labour ... [O:  ... Of course ...]  so therefore they throng to the country.  They make 
sure the wages don’t go up fast so they don’t have to dip into their pockets.  
 
R:  Exactly, and there are companies where when they’re behind schedule they give you the chance to 
do overtime, so you do get more money but you’re still not gong to get what you’d need to satisfy 
you.  And there are some companies which ... 
 
Z:  You don’t have to do overtime and they pay you fairly, but you have to have qualifications ...  
 




Z:  They’d get a salary, but not as high as if they got the goods out on time … 
 
R:  ... Basic wages, but they don’t pay them overtime.  And I say: ‘Why are you working there so long?  
I wouldn’t do it, I’d go home at 3.30.’  And they whisper, ‘if you don’t like it ...’ 
 
Z:  There’s another five or ten waiting at the gate ... [R: ... yeah, exactly ...]  That’s always the way it 
goes, cos that’s how it is here. 
 
R:  The bosses don’t value people.  If they valued th m, they’d give them 50% higher wages. 
 
Z:  Why should they value them if they know that ouside there are another 15 or so waiting for each 
job?  [R:  ... Exactly, that’s why ...]  Why would they cry for you? 
 
O:  They should pay workers holiday-time like in the west ...  [Z:  Yeah, that too ...] [...] 
 
JW:  Can these problems be prevented somehow ...? 
 
O:  No ... first of all, these are companies from abro d which have come here to make a profit out of 
the cheap labourforce.  And as soon as that cheap labour runs out, they’ll pack up here and move 
on. 
 
Z:  Because that’s not a factory that manufactures ... That’s the problem, they just assemble here, they
don’t produce anything.  If they produced something then you’d have some certainty they weren’t 
going to run off … 
 
O:  It’s a clear example ... the mistake is the government’s, because they give them tax holidays.  There 
are firms here which ... Škoda, my suspicion is that it’s been only this year that they’ve started 
paying taxes, I don’t know ... it’s ten years that Škoda-Volkswagen have been running, isn’t it ten? 
… [Z:  Because they expanded, yeah.]  So in order to get Volkswagen to come here for Škoda, 
they got a ten-year tax holiday from the state and Škoda doesn’t pay a crown in tax, for ten years.  
That’s a huge amount of money.  So clearly they entic d them over, they paid, but if they do that 
for every company then the state really isn’t going to make any money.  And then they behave 
towards people ...  [Z:  Yeah, it’s the same in the Mošnov industrial zone …]  It’s the same.  They 
get given so many subsidies ... 
 
Z:  They can pick and choose now in the industrial zone, they don’t want to employ Czechs any more, 
Slovaks go there now, to Denso1, it’s all just Slovaks. 
 
R:  Yeah, Slovaks do it for a certain amount of money ... 
 
Z:  ... Under their conditions ... 
 
O:  ... Yeah, there isn’t as much work where they are as there is here ... 
 
Z:  ... Because there they haven’t got work and those conditions suit them, since that way they get 
more than if they were still over there.  [R: ... yeah ...]  [V: Thanks to the exchange rate of course 
…] 
 
O:  The problem is, here there’s 10% unemployment, a d there’s plenty of people who aren’t even 
registered ... [Z:  ... registered ...]  And politicians don’t admit to it ...  [Z:  ... That’s just the tip of 
it, those 10% ...]  That’s just the tip of it.  I’d calculate that here there’s 12% or 13% 
unemployment, definitely.  There are plenty of peopl  who don’t even go to register at the job 
centre.  [Z:  Yeah … look how many homeless people there are, they’re not registered anywhere.]  
Those are things which the state doesn’t admit, they just show off numbers to the world.  [Z:  Of 
course.]  For them it’s clear that every number which is visible, whether it’s 20% or however 
much – which would be awful … they assume there’s no hidden people there, they take it as a 
clear figure for unemployed, that it’s definitely 10%, so they say ‘yeah, people are doing fine,’ but 
the reality is completely different. 
                                                
1 A manufacturer of advanced technologies for the car industry. 
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We shall postpone until the next chapter on the political project two issues which are very 
much to the fore in this text: how the problems under iscussion are explained, and how far 
they are assumed susceptible to remedy.  Instead, the focus here is on the references one sees 
to those affected by these problems, and to those who stand as their opponents.  As regards 
the first, several instances in this passage highlight the difficulties of those in low-paid and 
insecure jobs, forced to work long hours with badly paid overtime.  Factory work is 
highlighted, with Radek’s reference to his wife forging a direct link to the participants 
themselves.  Onřej’s parenthetical ‘like all of us know’ positions the group as sharing in the 
problem of long hours and overtime, and the connection is affirmed by the usage of ‘we’ and 
‘you’ pronouns.  These people, it is suggested, live in the real world, where low wages and 
unemployment are major problems, rather than in the artificial realm of state statistics.  They 
are without special advantages, and do not have the qualifications with which to find more 
attractive work.  Though in this extract they are not summarised in a single term, one could 
easily adopt the term which Onřej uses elsewhere, ‘ordinary people’.  The ‘we’ also has a 
national dimension: Czech workers are distinguished from Slovak ones, though both 
represent a ‘cheap source of labour’, and both face the problem of being constrained to take 
undesirable jobs.   
 Those described in this way as being affected by the problems articulated can be 
termed the political subjects.  They are the social groupings that speakers construct so as to 
define their relationship with the problems under discussion.  While they do not constitute 
‘the identity’ of the participants (since speakers invoke different subject-positions at different 
moments in discussion as they move from one set of pr blems to another), they are 
categories and implicit groupings towards which theparticipants orient themselves.  The 
subjects are political in several senses.  Firstly, they are defined in relation to the problems of 
the political common which were set out in the previous chapter.  These are problems which 
are treated as shared rather than purely individual, and for which speakers demonstrate a 
transindividual competence when handling them in discussion.  The subjects are thus 
political by association with the shared substantive problems that could form the basis for 
political community.  Secondly, the subjects are political in the sense that they are the kinds 
of imagined groupings that political actors (such as p rties or social movements) might want 
to use to mobilise people to their cause, or which they might seek to redefine so as to make 
everyday discursive practice more compatible with their cause.  The subjects, as common 
discursive formulations, represent a political resource on the basis of which collective 
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political action may be organised – though the success of this will depend also on the kinds 
of discursive resource to be examined in the next chapter.   
 The construction of political subjects involves at the same time the construction of 
those who differ from the subjects.  ‘We’-description is always an act of positioning, and 
requires the evocation of ‘others’ so as to clarify and give meaning to the ‘we’.  Demarcated 
in this passage as opponents of the subjects, one sees in particular the entrepreneurs and 
companies which ‘come in from outside’ and offer bad conditions to their workers.  
Supermarkets and manufacturers are mentioned, taking dvantage of the attractive situation 
which the state affords them in the form of subsidies and tax holidays.  There are ‘bosses 
[who] don’t value people’, as expressed by the low wages and lack of holiday-time they 
offer, and by how they compel their workers to do overtime.  They are in control and they 
know it – they only have to ‘whisper’ a reminder of this.  These companies are here to make 
a profit, to fill their pockets.  As soon as the profits dry up ‘they’ll pack up here and move 
on’.  Because such companies are only assembling goods, they are always liable to ‘run off’, 
leaving people unemployed.  It is the actions of these opponents which exacerbate or cause 
problems for the subjects, and it is only through some kind of settlement with these 
opponents, consensual or imposed, that the problems which are articulated may be addressed. 
 The possibility that others within the political community may be positioned as 
opponents, without this being fatal for the collective bond, is one of the essential 
characteristics of our political-bond ideal.  Such a bond maintains the possibility of 
accommodating political disagreement and the absence of diffuse solidarity, so long as this 
disagreement does not lead to calls for the banishment of opponents from the community 
altogether.  It is a perspective which draws on Mouffe’s ‘agonistic’ conception of politics, in 
which the life of the political community involves multiple acts of the construction of an ‘us’ 
and a ‘them’.  Unlike in Carl Schmitt’s conception f the political, this is understood not in 
terms of a binary distinction between ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’.  For Mouffe, a key distinction 
must be made between two kinds of positioning of opponents: that which casts them as 
enemies, with whom a purely hostile, antagonistic relationship unfolds, and that which casts 
them as ‘adversaries’, with whom an agonistic relationship is maintained and with whom the 
life in common is possible.  ‘[A]gonism is the we/they relation where the conflicting parties, 
although acknowledging that there is no rational solution to their conflict, nevertheless 
recognise the legitimacy of their opponents.  They are “adversaries” not enemies.  This 
means that, while in conflict, they see themselves as belonging to the same political 
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association, as sharing a common symbolic space within which the conflict takes place.  We 
could say that the task of democracy is to transform antagonism into agonism.’2   
 The distinction between two kinds of opponent, enemy and adversary, is a useful 
sensitising idea for our purposes, though we appropriate it in a certain way.  It seems fair to 
assume that Mouffe’s distinction is elaborated with movement politics in mind, and is 
intended to conceptualise how the holders of opposing political ideologies must regard one 
another so as to be consistent with agonistic democracy, and the kinds of ideological position 
which can be ruled out as anti-democratic.  Although her concept of exclusion is not always 
clear,3 and although her terminology refers explicitly to categories of people (friends, 
enemies and adversaries), her perspective focuses mainly on the inclusion and exclusion of 
ideas, and of people only insofar as they associate themselves with these ideas.4  This is a 
little different from the kinds of positioning which one finds in everyday discourse of the 
kind we are looking at, where it is very often descriptions of people and their actions, not 
explicitly their ideas, which are to the fore.  In the extract above, for example, it is groups 
such as ‘bosses’ or ‘entrepreneurs’ which are positioned as opponents, rather than political 
ideas concerning how the life in common should be organised.  Indeed, it may be that this 
linkage to categories of people makes possible, or at least augments, the very sense of 
injustice with which these problems of the political ommon are articulated.  To ‘put a face’ 
on a problem is to make it tangible, to give it urgency, and to suggest courses of action which 
might be necessary to remedy it, whereas to treat it as an abstraction (such as ‘poverty’ or 
‘hardship’) may be to neutralise and normalise it.5 We shall thus give a rather literal sense to 
the categories of friends (political subjects), enemies and adversaries which accepts them as 
categories of people.  While this suggests we are using Mouffe’s terms with a slight 
difference of emphasis, this does not do violence to the political philosophy in which they 
operate.  After all, the ideas-people distinction is a fuzzy one.  In particular, whenever social 
categories are invoked, an array of category knowledge is brought with them (e.g. concerning 
‘what bosses do’, what they ‘represent’, under what conditions they thrive, etc.), and it is in 
                                                
2 Mouffe, On the Political, p.20. 
3 Cf. Arash Abizadeh, 'Does Collective Identity Presuppose an Other? On the Alleged Incoherence of Global 
Solidarity', American Political Science Review, 99/1 (2005). 
4 Mouffe, The Return of the Political, p.4. 
5 See Gamson, Talking Politics, p.7 for a similar point. 
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these clusters of assumptions, and the broader domains in which they are embedded, that 
ideas return to the fore.6 
 In empirical terms, determining whether in a given text those positioned as 
opponents are being treated as adversaries or as enemies is always a matter of interpretation.  
Some guiding criteria might be as follows.  Where th  behaviour of the opponents is assumed 
to be contingent on particular circumstances and therefore potentially susceptible to change 
or ‘correction’, the sense that they should be engaged with is likely to be stronger, and so one 
may infer their status as adversaries.  Where on the o er hand the behaviour of opponents is 
essentialised, such that it is assumed that their conduct will always be the same because it is a 
function of their fundamental nature (perhaps with connotations that this nature is not 
rational), this is likely to be accompanied by the sense that there is little point in trying to 
engage with them, and therefore their status as enemi s may be inferred.  Relatedly, the level 
of threat associated with the two kinds of opponent may be distinguished: those that 
compromise the well-being of the subjects, and about whom a sense of irritation is conveyed, 
can be thought of as adversaries, in contrast to those from whom the threat is of a more 
fundamental, existential kind, who are described more with a sense of fear than irritation, and 
of whom there is the sense therefore that they needto be banished.  In this passage from the 
Liberec group, the opponents (the companies and their bosses) are portrayed as causing 
hardship rather than a threat to existence.  There is also the sense that they are merely doing 
what any rational subject would do in their position, that is, taking advantage of a favourable 
situation.  Notice Zdeněk’s comment in response to Radek (to which Radek in tur  agrees): 
‘why would they value them [the workers] if they know that outside there are another 15 or 
so waiting for each job?’  There may be little that c n be done to tackle the opponents, but 
that is because of the assumed nature of the circumstances (wage competition, an 
accommodating state, etc.) rather than because of the assumed nature of the opponents 
themselves.  The category of ‘adversary’ therefore se ms to be a more appropriate one here.  
As will be seen below, this is characteristic of the Economics domain more generally. 
  Mouffe’s account of the political conjures up a rather sparse terrain peopled by 
friends, adversaries and enemies.  For the ontological reasons put forward with Ernesto 
Laclau in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy,7 she places a very strong emphasis on social and 
political conflict.  Her definition of ‘the political’ points to ‘the dimension of antagonism … 
                                                
6 Conversation analysts have shown particular sensitivity o how speakers’ selection of social categories draws 
accompanying ideational features into the discussion.  See e.g. Charles Antaki, 'Identity as an Achievement and 
as a Tool', in Charles Antaki and Sue Widdicombe (eds.), Identities in Talk (Sage: London, 1998).   
7 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (London: Verso, 2001). 
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constitutive of human societies’,8 and the role she assigns to democracy is that of the 
‘taming’ or ‘domesticating’ of such conflict.9  Though their existence is not explicitly ruled 
out, there are no fourth groupings of political importance in her account, beyond the friend 
and the two kinds of opponent.  The emphasis is on alliance and opposition, and the container 
within which the agonistic struggle takes place is generally unproblematised.  The notion of a 
political bond, on the other hand, does raise the prospect of at least one other politically 
significant kind of grouping.  This would be what one might call the ‘counterpart’.  
Counterparts, strangers living outside the home enviro ment, would be linked to the subjects 
in that they are assumed to be confronted with the same problem(s).  They share in the same 
predicament, though they live ‘there’ rather than ‘here’ – with these locations being a matter 
for definition in the text.  The bond between subjects and counterparts is not necessarily one 
of active solidarity, nor are they necessarily engaged together in collective political action – 
the counterpart is something less than a ‘friend’, though may become one – but nor is the 
relationship between them assumed to be of a ‘zero-sum’ kind whereby the one can benefit 
only at the expense of the other – the counterpart is something more than an enemy or 
adversary, though again may become one if circumstances change.  The significance of 
counterparts, from a political-bond perspective, lis in how their assumed existence serves to 
make sense of the political community.  The evocatin of counterparts broadens the reach of 
the political common, such that the problems of which it is comprised are seen to be facing 
not just an immediate ‘we’, an ‘our party’ quite narrowly defined, but a larger, more 
dispersed ensemble of ‘people like us’.  Where counterparts are assumed to exist, a wider 
political bond becomes a possibility. 
 A political bond in the European context would require then that at least some of 
those living outside the home environment, in other EU countries let us say, be assumed to be 
facing the same (or basically similar) problems.  This assumption of shared predicament 
would not have to extend to ‘all Europeans’ of course – for this would be to do away with the 
agonistic dimension all together – but it would have to extend to at least some groups 
associated with other European countries.  If counterparts were assumed to exist only within 
the home environment (in ‘our country’, for instance) but not elsewhere, then people in other 
countries would most likely be seen either as wholly irrelevant – no bond of any kind would 
                                                
8 Mouffe, On the Political, p.9. 
9 See e.g. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, p.100: ‘if we accept that relations of power are constitutive of the 
social, then the main question for democratic politics is not how to eliminate power but how to constitute forms 
of power more compatible with democratic values.’  And p.101: ‘The novelty of democratic politics is not the 
overcoming of this us/them opposition – which is an impossibility – but the different way in which it is 
established.’ 
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exist with them – or as enemies to be excluded from the community, or as permanent 
adversaries against whom the struggle is constant.  While the existence of adversaries is by 
no means contradictory of a political bond, if they were always demarcated in national 
categories then a political community coextensive with the EU would be unlikely to have 
common-sense plausibility.   
 The notion of the ‘counterpart’ is a conceptual one which does not translate easily 
into readily discernible features of the text.  Lacking the immediacy of friends, enemies and 
adversaries, counterparts are not often explicitly onstructed in discussion (though they do 
appear, as will be seen in the course of this chapter).  While ‘counterpart’ does seem to serve 
a useful sensitising function, a more empirical phenomenon for study is the nature of 
comparisons and references to places.  An important precondition for the assumption of 
counterparts is that other countries in the EU be treated not just as unitary actors but also as 
environments, as locations where events unfold.  Whenever, in the discussion of substantive 
problems, other countries are mentioned as actors (France or ‘the French’, for example), 
without internal differentiation, then the speaker is emphasising territorial boundaries which 
cut across the EU and treating these as the relevant facts in play.  While such a perspective of 
course does not necessarily lead to the fragmentatio  of political community – indeed, it is 
likely to have a place in any federal or decentralised polity – it would need to be 
counterbalanced by other acts of positioning which do not foreground these territorial 
divisions, else any sense of the common would be lost.  Moreover, not only must other EU 
countries be treated – at least in part – as enviroments, but they must be treated as 
comparable environments, in which problems arise and are encou tered in a similar fashion 
to those experienced by the subjects in the home environment.  Reference to the conditions 
found in other countries only for the purpose of c ntrast, i.e. to emphasise dissimilarity, 
would again be to undercut any sense of the common.  Only where there is this assumption of 
similar environments does the conceptual notion of the counterpart become possible, and 
thus the political bond as a basis for political community.   
 By highlighting the importance of comparisons, one can make a link back to the 
empirical material.  One can look at the places with which comparisons are drawn because 
experiences ‘there’ are held to be largely similar to those ‘here’ within the home environment 
with regard to a particular problem or set of problems.10  In the Liberec passage above, the 
                                                
10 In scientific language or formal logic, comparison involves three elements: X is compared to Y with respect 
to Z.  In everyday talk comparisons are likely to be looser in appearance, but the principle is much the same: a 
location X is compared to a location Y with respect to a problem Z.  One needs to remember that spontaneous 
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home environment seems to be the Czech Republic, as indicated by the figure for hours 
worked and the suggestion that companies are ‘thronging’ to the country.  Emphasis is 
particularly on developments in the neighbourhood of Liberec itself, with a number of 
references to local industry.  One sees some comparison with conditions in Slovakia, and a 
numerical comparison with ‘Europe’ on the question of hours worked, but neither is much 
developed.  Here are two further extracts from the Lib rec discussion: 
 
O:  You’ve got the state boasting about economic figures, how the economy is prospering, how we’ve 
got lots of exports rather than imports, how everything’s functioning as it should, but the problem 
is, a particular section of people, whether it’s firms or entrepreneurs, keep hold of that money for 
themselves, and it only gets through to the working class [Z: ... which is the majority ...] awfully 
slowly.  For us, the level hasn’t gone up in the last three years.  I’d say it’s gone down.  The 
official figures say that we’re getting better, but unfortunately that’s not what people are seeing. 
 
Z:  They say that wages are going up, but whenever someone gets into my car they’re complaining 
about how little money they’ve got ... 
 
O:  Exactly ... the average wage is meant to be CK18,000 ... 
 
Z:  But that’s too high because they take the average from the highest strata, not overall ... 
 
O:  ... You have to be a director or something, where the wages are completely different.  I don’t know 
how it is in the west, but I think this difference in wages like we’ve got here is really bad. 
 
R:  They raise the price of everything, but they’d never align the wages that normal people get. […] 
 
V:  Now Ireland for example, that was a really poor c untry and it got into the EU and look at them 
now, they’re doing well.  They’re rich now.  [O:  Wait ...]  Even those who work in factories … I 
went there to pick apples … the rents are high but they get by ok.  They’re even able to buy cars.  
You’re not going to get a car here. 
 
R:  Here you have to save your whole life in order to buy a car ... 
 
O:  There’s a programme on television now, ‘Here in Europe’ [U nás v Evropě] – I don’t know 
whether you’ve seen it – where they show how families in Europe live.  They showed Austrians, 
now they’ve shown French.  They get an income of CK150,000 per month, and 28,000 goes on 
food alone.  Those are sums which you don’t see her, they’re really somewhere else.  And leases 
and rents on a tenement flat are €1500, that’s CK40,000, that’s only a quarter of the 150,000.  
Here, to get a lease and a tenement flat, it’s more than your wages …  
 
R:  Yeah, you wouldn’t have enough even to mortgage.  [O: ... It’s just wrong ...]  They don’t give you 
loans, nothing ... 
 
Z:  Here no-one gives you anything if you haven’t go enough to give security for it.  [...] 
                                                                                                                                            
comparisons generally have a performative aspect: speakers are rarely making just an objective assessment of 
how the home environment compares to others but they are positioning the two, stressing similarities or 
differences as they would ike these to be noted.  In social psychology there is a literature on ‘social 
comparisons’ – see for instance Jerry Suls, René Martin, nd Ladd Wheeler, 'Social Comparison: Why, with 
Whom, and with What Effect?', Current Directions in Psychological Science, 11/5 (2002); Serge Guimond 
(ed.), Social Comparison and Social Psychology: Understanding Cognition, Intergroup Relations and Culture 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).  Applications of this to the question of transnational 
comparisons within Europe have been few, but for one example see Rupert Brown and Gabi Haeger, 
'"Compared to What?" Comparison Choice in an Internatio al Context ', European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 29/1 (1999). 
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JW:  You were talking about Ireland ... what’s the comparison ...? 
 
V:  It’s impossible to compare them, it’s impossible ... 
 
O:  To compare with the Czech Republic ... I think t’s impossible to compare any west-European 
country with us.  We can compare ourselves at most with the old eastern bloc, like Poland, 
Hungary, Slovakia ... [Z: ... Though all of them are starting to overtake us ...]  They’re all starting 
to have it better, all the eastern countries.  Of course, Belarus and those countries certainly not, but 
the Poles and the Slovaks are starting to draw away from us. [R:  I think so too.] 
 
Z:  Even though they have lower ... [O: ... A lower standard of living ...]  ... the crown is a bit stronger 
than theirs ... 
 
O:  But generally, I go to Slovakia, I’ve got family there, and I know that the Slovaks have a standard 
of living which is even lower than ours, but again the numbers say that it’s better.  I think the 
better the numbers are, the worse it is for ordinary people. 
 
Here one finds several references to the transnational context.  But before examining them, 
let us look at what happens a little later in the discussion when Václav picks up his reference 
to Ireland again, and once more draws the opposition of Onřej and Zdeněk: 
 
V:  They got into the EU and look where they are today.  I’ve been there, I know.  [O:  But to compare 
Ireland with the Czech Republic …]  I’m saying, I’ve been there, you understand, and I’m 
comparing it with here in Czechia.  [O:  But it’s different …]  It’s very different! … 
 
O:  If you think they’re doing so well because they’r  in the EU … [Z: It’s not that …]  It’s not that.  
[…]  
 
V:  I’m saying, I’ve been there and what they’re able to buy with their wages and what people here 
who work in factories buy … 
 
O:  You don’t need to go to Ireland, it’s enough to go to Germany, France – states which are really … 
[Z:  States which are right next to us …]  … all those western countries.  Whether the Irish have it 
a bit better than let’s say the Spanish or the Portuguese or those states, you can’t compare them in 
economic terms, those are massive differences compared to when you go to the east, to Poland, 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and further down.  There’s plenty of countries you can 
compare with each other – the Swedes, the Finns, northern countries … you might think there’d be 
a lot of poverty there … [Z:  Gets a bit cold there from time to time…] but they’re amongst the 
most advanced countries.  …
 
Z:  Except they’ve had 50 years to work with and we’ve only had 10 years … 
 
O:  Of course, but what’s worse is that those ten yars haven’t been positive … [Z:  … yeah, yeah …]  
In fact, we’re mostly complaining about these last ten years.  If things were always improving it’d 
be fine, but if we look at the 1990s, it was one grat fraud here … 
 
Z:  Whoever had sharp elbows, he ladled it in and then went off to sunbathe.  
 
O:  Now it’s stabilised a bit, but the gap I’d say is twenty years.  If western Europe stood still then I’d 
say it’d still be twenty years before we’re on their l vel.   
 
In these passages one sees two kinds of positioning taking place.  On the one hand one sees 
repeated contrasts with the economic conditions projected onto western Europe, where it is 
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assumed that certain familiar problems do not exist, or exist in much reduced form.  Income 
levels in western-European countries are assumed to be far higher in relation to the cost of 
living than they are ‘here’, and factory workers are ble to live comfortably to the extent that 
they can buy cars.  Economic corruption is implied to be much less of a problem in these 
countries, whereas ‘here’ the story has been of ‘one great fraud’.  ‘Here’ the subjects are 
most unlikely to be given a loan when they need one, with the implication (voiced elsewhere 
in the discussion) that in western countries loans are easier to secure.  Overall, the economic 
gap with those countries is as much as several decades, and differences between those 
countries are played down (see Onřej’s comment that ‘whether the Irish have it a bit be ter 
than let’s say the Spanish or the Portuguese or those states’, the ‘massive differences’ are 
with the east).  All participants seem to be agreed on this point.  Even Václav, who presents 
his interventions as comparisons rather than contrasts with western Europe, seems just as 
keen as Onřej and Zdeněk to highlight how fundamentally things are different there.  It is 
explicitly rejected that membership of the EU makes all these countries alike.   
 On the other hand, in a second act of positioning, other countries in central / eastern 
Europe are mentioned as places more worthy of comparison, in particular Poland, Hungary 
and Slovakia.  These are places that one ‘can compare’ with the Czech Republic.11  They are 
linked together explicitly by Onřej as ‘the east’ and ‘the old eastern bloc’, and implicitly by 
the contrast-based references to the west-European countries on the one hand and ‘Belarus 
and those countries’ on the other.  There is some agr ement that ‘the Poles and the Slovaks’ 
are starting to do better than ‘us’, but also the sense that there are ‘ordinary people’ in 
Slovakia who have a standard of living comparable (though lower) to ‘ours’, and who may be 
victims of deceptive official statistics just like ‘we’ are.  This evocation of places worthy of 
comparison with the home environment because conditi s are generally similar is very 
much of the sort that one looks for as the basis for a political bond.  What is problematic 
from a European perspective of course is that the range of ‘comparables’, while 
transnational, is rather less than coextensive with the EU: an east vs west division is 
emphasised.  This, as will be seen, is quite typical of the patterns of positioning one finds 
amongst the Czech groups in the Economics domain.   
 
                                                
11 Note that the idea that you ‘can compare’ two things tends, in everyday speech, to imply their assumed 
similarity, and the idea that two things are ‘incomparable’ implies their fundamental dissimilarity, despite the 
fact that logically when one makes a contrast one is do ng so also on the basis of a comparison.  To some extent 
we shall follow this everyday usage of the term ourselves: for instance, we shall occasionally use ‘comparable’ 
as a noun to mean an environment which, for the problems in question, is held to be similar to the home 
environment. 
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 Over the course of this chapter, we shall look at the three domains Economics, 
Society and the Law and Relations between Peoples in turn, analysing them for the 
appearance of subjects, opponents (adversary and enemy), comparable environments and 
counterparts.  The emphasis will be on the common features of the texts from the three 
country-groups, though inter-country variations arehighlighted where these are marked.  In 
addition to the quotations in the main text, supporting quotations which further illustrate a 
point are included in footnotes. 
 
 
Collective Positioning in Economics 
 
A) The Political Subjects and their Opponents 
 
The formulations for the political subjects noted in the Liberec discussion recur widely 
across the groups when problems to do with Economics are articulated.  ‘Ordinary people’ is 
an expression one finds in several of the discussion .  A second formulation which recurs 
across the interviews appears in the following extract from the Norwich discussion.  In focus 
here are the problems associated with supermarkets reducing their prices by importing goods 
from abroad.  The discussion is moving briskly with all participants contributing.  Mickey is 
using Barry to make a point about prices: 
 
M:  If Barry here made his own shoes and they were £5 more expensive than the ones that Asda buy in 
… Asda, all these supermarkets, are our great friends [sarcasm] aren’t they, buying all this cheap 
produce.  What they’re doing is, they’re crushing, they’re crushing people like us, and we don’t 
ever win … 
 
B:  … The little man, no, he never does, does he … 
 
M:  … Because the simple fact is, if the little man doesn’t have the money he can’t get in our taxis, 
can’t afford to go out.  If they don’t go out, can’t afford to get a taxi …  [L:  It’s an ongoing thing 
…]  Yeah, so what I’d rather do is I’d rather buy Barry’s shoes for £5, £10 more, knowing that I 
was helping a little man … 
 
B:  Yeah, go to the corner-shop. 
 
JW:  When you talk about cheap stuff coming in, where’s it coming from? 
 
M:  Well what it is, people like … strawberry farmers, yeah, all the promises from the buyers, from 
Morrisons … Now Morrisons are the biggest criminals for doing this, by the way, I’ll go on 
record, and they turn round, what they do is they go up to these people and say ‘right, I’ll give you 
x amount for this, that and that, yeah … You have to make it exclusive to Morrisons for six 
months, a year, two years, whatever, you have to make it exclusive to us.’  They even did it to 
Bernard Matthews.  They went down there – and I’ve had these people in my cab – they went 
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down there and they squeezed, squeezed, squeezed.  So Bernard Matthews just want to get rid of 
their stuff.  Bernard Matthews isn’t going to take a loss on revenue, so what he does is he puts an 
extra couple of hours on the day, gets rid of the ov rtime rate, worst working conditions, so these 
people suffer even more.  But they can’t just pack their jobs in, they’ve got wives and kids to feed, 
or they’ve got children to feed, or whatever, they’v  got mortgages.  So they carry on working for 
Bernard Matthews, thinking he’s the bastard, when h’s not, it’s these big supermarkets with their 
big car-parks that you can never get parked in. 
 
JW:  How are they able to get the prices so low? 
 
B:  Importing cheap jeans from abroad.  China, Taiwan, eastern Europe.  We had a big chocolate 
factory – Mackintosh’s – that was sold out to Caleys-Mackintosh, then what did it become after 
Mackintosh’s?  Rowntree? … no. 
 
G:  Just given up and shut down. 
 
B:  Yeah.  You see, we’ve produced chocolate here for a hundred years, but eastern Europe do it a lot 
cheaper … 
 
M:  They used to smell lovely as well, didn’t they … 
 
B:  Yeah.  So that was, again, someone rich has made the buck, moved it totally … Dyson the cleaner, 
he’s done it, he’s moved from Swindon to eastern Europe … 
 
M:  … Eastern Europe, yeah …
 
L:  Norwich Union is the same isn’t it … 
 
B:  Yeah, the call-centres … 
 
M:  I cancelled everything I had with Norwich Union.  Everything. 
 
JW:  Do you blame them? 
 
M:  Yes I do. 
 
L:  I tell you what I think it is, just say for argument’s sake they make one million pound this week, 
they’re looking for one million two hundred next week, and that’s how they go … [M & B.:  
Shareholders.]  And they have to find that money.  And they don’t care how they do it or where 
they get it from, whether it’s produce or whether it’s any kind of product whatsoever, they need to 
find that much more money. 
 
Here the main formulation for the subjects is ‘the little man’.  The little man comes in various 
guises: examples seem to be the taxi-driver (‘people like us’, who have ‘noticed a down-turn 
in our trade’), the person who can no longer afford t  get in the back of a taxi to go out, the 
small producer such as Barry would be if he made shoe , and as represented by Bernard 
Matthews (a local turkey-producer), or the workers for small producers who end up doing 
longer hours in worse conditions for less pay, or without a job at all.  The formulation is a 
rather passive one, and the little man is very much a victim – he gets ‘crushed’, he never 
wins, and he has a vulnerable family to look after.  He is also local (you would find him in 
the corner-shop), perhaps suggesting his reality and relevance to ‘people like us’.  The little 
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people, it seems, also need to look out for each other, hence Mickey’s willingness to buy 
from Barry. 
 ‘The little man’ and ‘the little people’ are common formulations for the subjects in 
the Economics domain.  In a similar fashion to Mickey, Uwe in Würzburg talks of how the 
lack of work in the city affects ‘us small guys’ because ‘the little people’ in the city generally 
no longer have enough money to go out, take taxis and give tips.  Oliver summarises with a 
comment based on a simple binary opposition: ‘what’s happening is the little people are 
being burdened more and more with costs while the big guys are being relieved of them.  The 
gap’s going to widen too.’  Amongst the Czech groups, a binary opposition of rich and poor 
people, or rich and ‘normal people’, or even just rich and ‘people’, is common, and a 
polarisation of the two is often stressed.  The Liberec participants use this distinction when 
talking about the difficulty of getting a mortgage: 
 
R:  I wanted a loan, I wanted CK200,000 [c. €7000].  But if you can’t show that you get more than 
CK300,000 in income each year they won’t give you anything, because they can’t be certain 
you’ll pay it back, even if you yourself know that you’d be able to pay it back.  They just won’t 
give it.  That’s really bad, they don’t give people any chance. 
 
O:  […]  At the moment there’s a rich layer and a poor layer being produced.  The middle is 
disappearing, it’s disappearing really quickly.  Because someone who has a bit of knowledge and a 
bit of education swings himself up to the rich ones, and someone who doesn’t falls down below.  
That’s what I see … 
 
R:  The rich layer push him down, they don’t give him a chance. 
 
Z:  It’s the same in other countries.  There’s rich and poor. 
 
The little people lack economic advantages.12  The little people also, as we have seen, live in 
the real world as opposed to the unreal world of numbers.  ‘What is money at the end of the 
day?’ asks Mickey.  ‘It’s only figures on a computer screen isn’t it. … Obviously … when 
someone gets in the cab we take money to pay our bills, cos that is the real world.  Everyday-
person-view world.  But when you go on a global thing, it’s only figures on a computer 
screen, it’s only gold bullion.’  ‘The western world really only hears what is presented, how 
those eastern states are going up economically,’ sas Onřej.  ‘They really don’t realise, 
because they come here and see we have shops full of goods, but that’s completely 
misleading.  If they think Czechs are going out andbuying smoked salmon, well they’re not.’ 
                                                
12 Amongst the Czech groups this includes the option to emigrate: Onřej in Liberec suggests that ‘someone who 
has education and knows different languages can go wherever they want.’  To Germany, to Austria – ‘to th se 
states’, adds Zdeněk.  ‘We can go to Russia’, says Onřej dismissively, reaffirming the difference between east 
and west.   
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 When the subjects are cast as the ‘little people’, ‘ordinary people’ or ‘normal 
people’, it is in contrast to those with money.  In the Norwich extract above one sees 
demarcation against ‘the rich’, private companies (the supermarkets Asda and Morrisons, 
sarcastically referred to as ‘our great friends’) and ‘shareholders’.  Barry describes 
shareholders as ‘different people to us’, and points to the hotel chain Travelodge to illustrate 
a fellow subject being conned out of her money by the rich: ‘they pay minimum wage, and 
yet you stay there at £70 a night, and they fill up the hotel and you’ve got some poor girl 
there who’s on £3.50 an hour.  So where does the money go?  Shareholders, rich people at 
the end.  Always the same.’13  ‘This is a great country,’ says Mickey from the same group, ‘I 
love my country, my heart bleeds red, white and blue, and that’s as simple as that …  But it’s 
only the working-class people.  The rich people, th financial institutions, they turn round 
and say “how much money can I make from these poor people?”’  Mickey hates 
McDonald’s: ‘I hate everything they stand for … They mploy spotty-faced teenagers, treat 
them like crap, promote another spotty-faced teenagr who can treat them like crap for the 
minimum wage, so they can feed us crap.’14  In the Ostrava discussion, the positioning as 
regards economic conditions is also frequently versus the Prague elites, who enjoy the profits 
of a tourist industry and the jobs provided by state institutions.  Across the groups, as in the 
Norwich extract above, large corporations are singled out as one of the main opponents the 
political subjects have to face.  Peter in Kassel demarcates the subjects against ‘the high-up 
guys’ (die Hohen), and observes: ‘everyone keeps harping on at the lit le man, “you must 
have less holiday, you must get ill less often, you m st accept less money …”.  The 
companies are earning billions, they’re earning more and more, and they don’t want to 
surrender any of it.  They say “yeah, we’ve made a profit of only 150 billion this year, so we 
need to lay off another 600 … no, 6000 people.”’  As he adds a little later, ‘today companies 
just want to sell things and everything else is irrelevant to them.  And the loser is always the 
little man.’  Hans confirms: ‘Yeah – he pays for it ul imately.’ 
                                                
13 Murda in Reading talks of the money which Britain has invested in fighting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq: ‘if 
you had any money in any of the arms factories, any shares, your shares would have gone up there,’ he says,
reaching up to the ceiling, ‘so you’d have made loads of money … But unfortunately the likes of you and me 
didn’t have any shares.’   
14 Notice the description here of the worker too: as a ‘ potty-faced teenager’ they cut a pathetic and helpless 
figure.  This is positioning against both those ‘above’ and ‘below’ – more on this below.  Mickey describes 
unskilled immigrants with a similar sense of pathos in an analogous act of positioning: ‘The rich peopl  used to 
send kids up chimneys and they’re still sending kids up chimneys, but the bigger kids, d’ya know what I mean?  
… I tell you what, you find a farmer, not your average “I drive a tractor” farmer, I’m talking about your big 
concern, they bring these people over, they know they don’t have the right documents, they put them in 
caravans, they put them in tents.  They don’t give a toss, as long as they can make more money ...’. 
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 We have seen then that the subjects are often cast as the little people in opposition to 
the economically more powerful who are able to dominate and exploit.15  A second type of 
formulation, also very common, sees the subjects described as those who contribute or who 
are economically productive, in contrast to those who just ‘take’.  The formulation ‘working 
people’, which carries the connotation of those who undertake their share of labour, is 
common amongst the British groups.  When Andy from the Swansea group talks about the 
rising costs for running a taxi, he explains: ‘we’ve had to put our prices up.  The insurance 
has gone up, the fuel’s gone up, that means we’re passing it on to the working man like us.’  
This formulation based on the idea of contribution is a more active one than that of the ‘little 
people’, and one with which participants readily associate themselves.  In Norwich, Leyton 
talks of how ‘all our money goes in the pot, and it’s all shared out with people that are taking 
it.’  The rich are occasionally cited – they give little to charity, says Mickey: ‘for every 
pound that’s collected for charity, the working-class people give 83p.  83%’ – but cited more 
frequently, particularly amongst the British groups, are those in a weak economic situation 
who live at the expense of the state.  An extract from the Reading discussion illustrates the 
sense of injustice expressed when those who do not work are given financial help, whereas 
those who do work are left to face their economic problems on their own: 
 
D:  … But generally to blame for what’s going on now, it’s the government.  To allow people, as he 
says, to have a lovely bungalow with parked five or six cars and all that, and he deals in drugs and 
he don’t go to work and the government’s giving him money. 
 
M:  If somebody is fit and healthy, they shouldn’t be getting any help.  If they’re, like, handicapped, if 
they’re old-age pensioners or something like that, or single family – like a woman on her own or 
something – fair enough.  But normal healthy people, if there’s nothing wrong with them 
physically and mentally, they can’t take hand-outs.  They have to go and work!  So really the 
government should discourage, and not even give to anybody who’s, you know, fit and healthy. 
 
D:  And when you work all your life and retire you get a kick up the rear end at the end of it all, 
because what they give you is pittance money for a pension.  And I can tell you cos I’ve just 
started it. 
 
It is the distinction between the deserving and undeserving poor.  One sees it replicated in the 
following passage from Norwich, which begins with Mickey expressing his anger at the 
neighbours two doors up, ‘the ming-mongs, scumbags.  She doesn’t work, she’s got two kids 
by two separate fathers, and neither contribute a pnny’16: 
                                                
15 Note that this pattern extends across the groups and is to be found amongst the British as much as amongst 
the Germans and Czechs.  Lamont notes a similar pattern amongst her French interviewees, but finds it to be 
much weaker amongst her American ones.  Michèle Lamont, The Dignity of Working Men: Morality and the 
Boundaries of Race, Class and Immigration (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), p.239. 
16 The word ‘ming-mong’ can be read as ascribing idiocy and pathos; it does not have a racial aspect.  
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M:  Take, take, take.  The whole family.  They all get disabled packs, they all get … seriously … [L: 
… I can believe it …]  [G:  … They know the system …]  They know the system.  They bleed, 
they bleed … we’re talking about one interbred family, right, there’s about twelve of them, put 
their friends in as well and we’re talking about a group of about twenty people, times by a hundred 
pound a week each, times by no council tax … 
 
L:  And that’s just one family.  There must be hundreds and thousands of them all over the place.  You
know.  And you wonder why the National Health Service won’t work. 
 
B:  1997, I voted for Mr Blair because he said ‘Education, education, education’.  I had two kids in the
system then.  Plus he said ‘welfare is not going to be a way of life’, it’s got to be a support system.  
Which I believe in.  When you’re injured, you should have welfare.  [M:  Don’t get me started on 
that …]  But, we don’t get it.  These people, I don’t know if you saw Evening News last night, 
separate issue, you know Harvey Road, up Biker’s Lane, and there’s a paedophile, which is 
nothing to do with it but they had an interview with all these mothers and their kids … All these 
mothers – big picture of them – and they were all single mothers.  It’s all … [M:  Social Security.]  
Social Security. […]  The ones at the bottom get it, he ones at the top have got it, and us in the 
middle are subsidising both.   
 
 As the contributors, the political subjects are liable to be conned by those who have 
learnt how to avoid paying their share, and to be let down when they are in legitimate need of 
help.  The obligation to contribute falls on everyone: Mickey himself is a single parent, and 
frequently implies that he is living proof that single parents can still contribute.  The last line 
indicates a motif found with some frequency in the British discussions: that the subjects are 
those ‘in the middle’.  It evokes a sense of reasonbleness (the subjects are not one of the 
extremes), also that they have opponents both ‘above’ and ‘below’ them on the economic 
ladder.  ‘You see, we’re caught in the middle, peopl  like us,’ says Barry, ‘because you’ve 
got all the scumbags who make life a misery, and you’ve got the rich at the top, who make 
your life misery.  Basically us in the middle, we sub idise everybody and we pay the penalty 
for everybody.  You know, the rich don’t see the scumbags, the scumbags don’t see the rich, 
but we get penalised.’  Leyton agrees: ‘do you know, it’s always the working people that 
suffer the most.  Always.’17  The ‘working people’ are not what one might call proletarians 
(or the working class) stationed at the bottom of the hierarchy: they are positioned between 
those above who have the money but do not contribute, and those below who have neither 
the money nor a willingness to contribute.   
 One does not find the term ‘working man / people’ with the same frequency amongst 
the German and Czech groups as amongst the British, nor do these groups refer quite so 
                                                
17 Also in opposition to the contributors, the Swansea group puts students: ‘there are some genuine cases,’ 
suggests Lee, ‘they study and knuckle down and get their degrees etc. etc., but a lot of them are just on the piss-
up.’   
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trenchantly to the ‘scumbags’ below them – this tripa tite scheme is not found.18  But a 
distinction between contributors and non-contributors, or productive and non-productive, is 
certainly used.  The Würzburg group points the finger at those who have money but who 
choose to sit on it, such as the elderly, who in Uwe’s words ‘simply don’t spend the money, 
for security reasons.  I mean, I get that a bit with old people too when I drive them, the really 
very old ones, they still hoard their money.  You notice it particularly with this old people’s 
home, that’s where the ones with lots of money live, th se old people don’t give a cent in 
tips.  I mean, I often have the feeling with these people, not with all of them but with a lot of 
them, that they could take it all to the grave with them, all the money.  As though everything 
carried on six feet under …’.  In the Erfurt and the Czech groups, the non-contributing rich 
are often equated with the corrupt, and those in a position of public authority are equated 
with both.  In Erfurt, Uwe follows up a comment from Mike with this: ‘And if they’re elected 
twice and are in the Bundestag for eight years theny go off with a big pension.  They need 
to be 28 years old and then they get a pension, 16,000 euros per month for the rest of their 
lives, plus they carry on in business, on supervisoy b ards, they carry on making something 
on the side, they earn themselves silly.  Whereas us, we have to save, save, save, while 
they’ve got their pockets so full of money.’ 
 On a number of occasions the opponents are cast in nat onal or ethnic terms, with 
immigrants and minorities often marked off and criti ised for not contributing.  (Note that the 
criterion of evaluation here is that of contribution and productivity; criteria to do with 
cultural otherness and collective security we shall come to when looking at Relations 
between Peoples.)  The idea of national funds being drained comes through strongly in the 
Lübeck discussion: ‘when a Turk comes here,’ says Jürgen, ‘he brings five Turks with him.  
The children, the wife, perhaps the grandparents ... And all that adds nothing to the GNP [W: 
yeah].  And they’re not even allowed to work in thefirst period, are they.  So that means they 
get social benefits, or Hartz IV.19  And naturally that puts a burden on the public purse [die 
Staatskasse], through taxes.  So to that extent it’s not going to pan out well in the long run.’  
Wolfgang continues: ‘Exactly, and this is where we come to the question of health and public 
health.  It puts a burden on public health as well.  The contributions which the employer and 
                                                
18 A similar distinction is noted by Lamont when comparing how American and French workers position 
themselves in economic terms: the French tend to draw weaker boundaries towards the poor ‘below’ them than 
the Americans.  Lamont, The Dignity of Working Men, p.239. 
19 Hartz IV was the name given to a batch of changes to the German labour market proposed to the German 
government in 2002 by Peter Hartz, a Volkswagen executive, and which started to be introduced around the 
time of these interviews.  The changes included reductions in unemployment and social-security benefits, and 
new restrictions on eligibility.   
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employee have to pay end up rising.  The costs go up, and today you can hardly afford a set 
of teeth or a pair of glasses because you receive practically no subsidies from the public 
purse.  And then things which really do your head in – family dependants who aren’t 
employed but who are co-insured for free through those who are working or receiving social 
benefits.’20  It is always the contributor who is directly affect d: Mike in Erfurt notes ‘that’s 
also the problem, that Germany for the last sixty years has felt obliged to take in these 
foreigners, right, and to support them, so that they come here and then bring their whole clan 
with them and they too have to be all given social insurance and the State has to pay for all 
that …’.  Hans-Jürgen interrupts him: ‘Not the State, you!’  ‘Of course, from my taxes!’  The 
tax burden, here and elsewhere, is treated as falling equally on all the contributors: that some 
might – legitimately – contribute more or less than others is a notion rarely voiced.21  
 Only certain immigrants and minorities are demarcated as opponents in the 
Economics domain: ‘eastern Europeans’ are a common reference-point across the groups; 
‘Turks’ recur in the German discussions in this context, but not for example ‘Arabs’ or 
‘Muslims’ – terms that will be found later in this chapter.  Immigrants from east-European 
and central-Asian countries are highlighted in thispa sage from Ostrava: 
 
Z:  They don’t know how to work.  They know how to say [Russian accent]:  ‘I’ll let you do the work, 
and you can give me money for it.’  …  They’re not hard-working … they won’t work like they 
should.   
 
J:  I’ll give you an example, I drove recently to the asylum home, about 40km away.  There’s 
Ukrainians there and those who’ve fled the former Russian republics … [Z:  yeah, yeah]  
Turkmenistan and those places … and I drove one of them and we understood each other a bit, he 
was speaking Russian, I took him from the main station to the asylum home, and I went past the 
collieries, past the mines where they do the coal – big mine, three thousand people work there – 
and I said to him as a joke: ‘What are you going to do, are you going to work here in the mines?  
That’s hard manual work.’  And he said to me: ‘No, I’m not going to do that work.’  Not him – 
he’s already admitting that he’s not going to work here.  He doesn’t have work and he’s coming 
over …  But one of our people, if he goes abroad, to Belgium or whatever, then he’ll work in the 
                                                
20 David in Swansea notices the good work of the contributors being undone by non-contributing outsiders: 
‘like, your father, or my father, or your grandfather or their grandfather, they pay taxes all their lives.  And now 
it’s coming to the stage where when we come to retire in twenty to thirty years’ time there’s no pension funds is 
there, for us like.  State pension and that.  [A:  That’s right.]  Well where’s all the fund gone?  How come all of 
a sudden can it be drained, like?  And then you’ve got all these asylum seekers coming into the country, like.’   
21 An indication of the strength of the assumption that non-contributing immigrants benefit at the expense of 
‘people like us’ is suggested by a short exchange elsewhere in the discussion between Murda and David t 
Reading: Murda remembers meeting a friend a few years ago who was offered council housing, ‘this lovely 
house, beautiful back garden … length and width of it fantastic … hadn’t done a day’s work in his life … And 
just for the record, he was white.  He wasn’t even black or Asian. [David: ‘Yeah, I know what you’re saying.’]  
Lots of townspeople say “oh, they get the housing” but not necessarily.  I mean, they probably get a house down 
in Junction, right, which is a two-bed little terraced two-foot by two-foot … This guy had a nice place, man.  
But good luck to him, you know [laughs].’  Comments made during the Swansea discussion suggest Murda has 
gauged the common-sense assumptions well: Andy says ‘they get a house straightaway, before us.’  
‘Furnished,’ adds David.   
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mines, he’ll work in the toilets, the bathrooms, it’s all the same to him.  But those who come in 
from over there, they don’t want to do manual work.  [Z:  Just social benefits …] 
 
When Petr in Plzeň wishes to highlight the positive qualities of foreign students in the city, 
he evaluates them according to the same criteria of contribution and productivity: ‘Here it’s 
full of foreign students.  We have plenty of experience with them.  But those are people who 
are teaching themselves something, and as far as society’s concerned the financial 
contributions to them are minimal.  They go to school, they pay, they spend money, so 
they’re contributing to society, and so for me personally they’re not doing any harm at all.’22  
When the participants in the Norwich group want to speak positively about immigrants, they 
adopt the same approach: ‘If they’re decent people and they’re prepared to work, that’s fair 
enough,’ says Barry.  ‘It’s a great thing because [th n] there’s more money,’ agrees Mickey.  
‘My view on them kind of people,’ says Leyton, ‘is that anybody can come here providing 
they do their bit.  Like we have to do.  And pay their bit, and not take.’  Immigrants are by no 
means debarred from the status of subjects in this domain – providing they fulfil the duty to 
be productive and to contribute.  As Mike in Erfurt puts it, ‘in a pizzeria an Italian belongs, 
and in a kebab place a Turk belongs.  If he works for his money then that’s ok.  […]  If they 
work for their money then they should be allowed to work, to earn themselves a living and to 
live here in an orderly fashion.  [H-J:  Exactly].’ 
 The assumption that those who are currently opponents could be encouraged or 
coerced to make their contribution (by working) is important.  It suggests that they are not 
positioned as ‘beyond redemption’ – their opposition t  the political subjects is not an 
essential one, but one based on contingent habits of behaviour.  One may perhaps be 
                                                
22 David in Reading uses the same criterion for negative purposes: ‘Again, … if you go to Heathrow and look at 
all the buildings and places that are being built, the hotels that there’s no-one can go on the top floors because 
they’re all asylum-seeking people and that, the buildings they’ve built have been set fire to … the drain on the 
economy … and those people have been in the country years, haven’t they … they’re sitting in the country 
years and they’re sitting in a hotel … that hotel on the M4, the top of that hotel is not used, it’s taken over by 
the government [hostile tone] …  [H:  But they’re charging more money than the normal people …]  Yeah, 
yeah.  And they get … what sort of living’s that?  They’re having it off, aren’t they.  It’s like being at … well I 
don’t know what sort of holiday camp!  I think a lot of them that come here should have a job at leastto go to, 
instead of all piling in here …  And it’s going to affect your pocket, it’s going to make taxes go up, through 
having so much dead wood to carry …  I mean, they’ve got to live somewhere and you can’t blame them for 
getting a betterment, but it’s  no good to this society that you’re contributing to, such as the National Health, 
same thing …  Look at the beds you can’t get, the operations you can’t get and all the rest of it, it’s nsane, isn’t 
it …  If you go to the doctor’s you still pay your duty, your pay your National Insurance contributions, you’re 
entitled to it …’  Notice the criteria of evaluation here: the ‘asylum-seeking people’ drain the economy rather 
than contributing to it, constituting ‘dead wood’ for ‘us’ to carry.  On the other hand, if they had a job to go to 
then their presence might be more acceptable, and ‘you can’t blame them for getting a betterment’.  Mickey in 
Norwich speaks in very similar terms: ‘What we don’t want – and we’re all the same on this – we don’t want 
people from the outside, who are not genuine, coming in and fleecing us.  It’s a constant drain.  If next door 
were getting free electricity from me, I’m not going to take that, am I, I’m not going to pay their bills.  And 
that’s what we’re doing, we’re paying other people’s bills.’   
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uncomfortable with Mike’s easy reliance on certain category associations to position 
immigrants as legitimate, but it is nonetheless an expression of some tolerance.  Even where 
there is a stronger adversarial dimension, these groups are treated as a cost rather than an 
existential threat, and it tends to be emphasised that if such people pay their contributions 
(taxes, health insurance, and so on) they are acceptabl , but that they should not be allowed 
to refuse work and live off the state.  This is true likewise for the rich and for the 
unemployed.  Calls are not made for their expulsion from the country or for their 
imprisonment: their behaviour is treated as oppressiv  or as a drain on resources, but they are 
generally to be engaged with rather than banished altogether.  In this sense, the opponents in 
this domain are best thought of as ‘adversaries’ rathe  than ‘enemies’.23  Adversaries are 
unlikely to be welcomed into the home environment, but if they are already there they are 
tolerated and engaged with.  Of course, on the basis of interviews alone one cannot explore 
how such discourses might be applied in individual cases: one can imagine that a Turkish-
German man might be treated as ‘working for his living’ when serving Mike a kebab, but as 
‘piling in here’ when spotted at the airport in the passport-control queue as he returns from 
his summer holiday.  The important thing, to begin w th, is the availability of a discourse by 
which to legitimise his presence in the community. 
   
 
B) Comparables and Counterparts 
 
As these passages indicate, the extent to which the political subjects and their opponents tend 
to be constructed in national or European terms is limited.  Certainly no speakers talked of 
economic problems which faced ‘us Europeans’.  But nor were there many economic 
problems described as affecting the ‘British’, ‘Germans’ or ‘Czechs’ in broad, 
undifferentiated terms: the ‘people like us’ tend to be demarcated with formulations such as 
‘the little people’, the ‘people in the middle’, or the ‘people who contribute’, while their 
opponents tend to be evoked with formulations such as ‘the rich’, ‘shareholders’, ‘big firms’ 
or, mainly amongst the British groups, ‘those at the bottom’.  It would probably not be an 
abuse of the material to suggest that these are all class-based categories.  National categories 
are sometimes entwined with these, but these are often us d as shorthand for a narrower 
                                                
23 The marginal case would be the ‘ming-mongs and scumbags’ that Mickey in Norwich identifies, but they are 
a feature mainly of his interventions alone, and mark an overlap with the Society and the Law domain which 
will be considered below. 
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group of ‘people like us’.  They may be applied to demarcate opponents, as seen with regard 
to problems of unemployment, where concern is expressed about ‘cheap workers’ from 
eastern-European countries – the East starting, for the Czechs, a little bit further to the east 
than for the British or Germans.  But in these cases it is not the nationality itself which is 
taken to be problematic but the behaviour with which it is associated.  Indeed, there is the 
idea that, if immigrants of this kind work for their l ving, under ‘our’ conditions, and pay 
their tax contributions, then their presence is acceptable.  While one should not forget the 
performative role of such statements – they help to osition the speaker as tolerant and fair-
minded, and thus have a local function in the discus ion – they are nonetheless quite different 
from the discursive patterns that will be encountered later in this chapter when looking at the 
Relations between Peoples domain, where a much tighter, essentialising link is made 
between the social category and a certain type of behaviour.  For most problems to do with 
Economics, nationality is just one, relatively minor, element in the repertoire of demarcation. 
 One problem-area which was articulated predominantly in national terms, though it 
was little discussed, was overseas aid.  Amongst the Ostrava participants there was a 
consensus around Zdeněk’s point that ‘we Czechs’ are a little over-generous with the amount 
of money sent abroad, ‘because we’re such a little s ate and there are lots of big states which 
give less than our little statelet gives …’  Another issue which consistently drew country-
based formulations was the finances of the EU.  Amongst the British and German groups 
there was recurrent, dissatisfied talk of ‘us British’ or ‘us Germans’ being the major 
contributors.  Even in this context, however, the subjects would often be cast not just as ‘our 
country’ but as a broader grouping of similarly economically-developed European countries.  
A succinct statement of the economics of the EU is provided by Jürgen in Lübeck: ‘The ones 
who profit are the poorer countries with the low GNP.  And the industrial countries, they 
basically have to step down from their level, surrender their achievements.’  Later he says, to 
the full agreement of Wolfgang: ‘As an industrial country, we can’t expect anything there 
[from the EU].  They always try to make it palatable to us with the argument that our 
economy will then also profit because these countries can then buy things here.  I don’t know 
though whether that argument holds.’  
 This explicitly EU dimension will be returned to in Chapter 6, but the main point to 
note is that when other European countries are mentioned in these discussions, it tends to be 
less as rival actors and more as the nvironments in which problems arise, either where 
conditions are assumed to be comparable to the home environment or where they are 
assumed to be quite different.  Although the economic problems discussed tend to be 
 148 
described as affecting the subjects in a quite local home environment, a broader context is 
evoked by the frequent application of transnational comparisons.  These tend to be connected 
to problématiques such as prices, wages and taxation rates – i.e. the most quantifiable of 
economic problems – but also (mainly in the German discussions) to consumer spending 
patterns, loss of social-security benefits, bureaucracy, and even macro-economic policy.  
They also tend more often to accompany the passive formulation than the active one.  Such 
comparisons tend to be made with other nearby countries in Europe, with this meaning 
different things according to the groups in question.  As was seen early in this chapter, in the 
Czech discussions the comparisons on economic problems tend to be with other countries in 
central and eastern Europe.  Conversely, the comparisons made in the British and German 
discussions with regard to economic problems tend to invoke countries of western Europe.  
The positioning is rather the opposite in other words, with a strong division between the east 
and west of Europe being emphasised across the country groups.  In the following extract, 
the Swansea group makes a series of typical comparisons between the home environment 
(Swansea and Britain) and comparable environments (various places in western Europe):  
 
D:  But again, the reason … why is British fuel a lot more expensive than in other countries?  It’s all 
tax. 
 
L:  Well, why … why is it 40p, as an example, 40 odd pence I think in Europe for a litre of fuel, 
interest rates is 2% … 
 
A:  Well it’s cheaper in Ireland and that’s only across the water isn’t it.  It’s cheaper in Ireland. 
 
L:  Cos they’re all in the euro.  […]  They say things have gone up in Europe, they will go up in 
Europe because they were a lot cheaper than in Britain anyway.  Things can’t go up a lot more in 
Britain, they can’t put beer up £4, £5 a pint, peopl  would never be able to afford a drink or 
whatever […].  About eight to ten years ago over in Spain things were dirt cheap.  Now it’s a very 
reasonable, very similar price to over here.  So all those countries that were cheap, they’re not 
happy because they’ve joined the euro and their prices have gone up.  […] 
 
D:  You know, we say that we’re more expensive than other countries in Europe … France is a lot 
more expensive than here.  For everything.  I don’t say so much property, I don’t know, fuel is 
similar to ours, but you know food, and drink, it’s quite expensive. 
 
M:  They say in Dublin and everything else as well. 
 
D:  You know, you go to Paris and you’re talking 4 or 5 pound a pint.  Go to London and it’s three 
pound, three pound fifty.  Well he lives in London, what’s it in London …? 
 
JW:  Yeah, near three pounds. 
 
A:  But your wages are better.  And your mortgage is higher as well, so it’s all relative at the end of the 
day. 
 
L:  Well, they do bloody forty-year mortgages and things like that.  Which they’ve started … that’s 
never been known of in Swansea.  But cos the house pric s have gone so much they’ve even 
introduced that now.  Thirty, thirty-five year mortgages. 
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D:  For example, in Switzerland, Switzerland has got m re millionaires for the population than any 
other country.  And in Switzerland house prices are very expensive, and the majority of people in 
Switzerland only rent.  And people who’ve got mortgages now, they’ve got these fifty-year 
mortgages, that if you die you get inherited to your kids.  And they can carry on the term, like.  If 
prices keep going like that here, they’ll go like that here eventually, won’t they. 
 
Notable is how the participants entwine the experiences of people in Swansea and Britain 
with those in Ireland (and Dublin), Spain, France (and Paris), Switzerland, and ‘Europe’ 
generally.  On the one hand people living in these ‘comparables’ are reported to be 
experiencing the same problems as those in the home environment; on the other hand people 
‘here’ are held likely to encounter some of the problems (e.g. ‘fifty-year mortgages’) which 
are already apparent elsewhere.  A high level of detailed knowledge is also on display, 
suggesting these comparisons come naturally to the participants.  
 Near the beginning of the extract one finds the notio  that places which are close 
together ought to be similar to each other, at least as regards prices – ‘it’s cheaper in Ireland 
and that’s only across the water’.  This idea is quite common.24  The groups do not always 
correspond substantively with one another on the comparisons they make: while David from 
the Swansea group downplays the cost of living in Britain, the Norwich participants suggest 
that Britain is ‘one of the most expensive places’ because VAT rates are high.  But even if 
they voice different opinions, they agree on the places which are relevant for drawing 
comparisons – other nearby European countries – and there is clear recognition that certain 
economic problems are common to people in all of them.  Interestingly, comparisons with 
North America and other industrialised parts of the world are very rare in this domain for all 
the groups.  Occasionally the US is invoked as a contrast, as a symbol of the future and the 
extremes.25  But one does not find comparisons drawn with the US on day-to-day things like 
prices and wages. 
 The notion of there being counterparts in other European countries comes through at 
various instances in the text.  Barry in Norwich, for instance, comments that ‘if we’ve all got 
the euro, all of Europe including us, then everything’s got to be the same prices, like your 
petrol abroad, your petrol here, your fags, blah blah.  And I’m pretty sure, whatever 
government is in in this country would never give up the revenue off cigarettes, beer and 
                                                
24 For example, Murda and David in Reading agree that i  is ‘weird’ and ‘unbelievable’ how the price of the 
same car can be so much lower in Belgium and France than in Britain. 
25 ‘America lives everything ahead of us and we come along behind,’ declares Peter at Kassel.  ‘We’re heading 
towards American-style relations,’ worries Rainer at Würzburg.  ‘The scissors are opening ever further, p ople 
are earning ever less, more and more are being socially marginalised … and they’re hardly in a position any 
more to make ends meet.’  
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fags.  So we’d be getting the same wages as our European counterparts but we’d be paying 
more, so our standard of living would go down yet again.’  There are conditions ‘here’ and 
conditions ‘there’, for ‘us’ and for ‘our counterparts’, and it would be the intervention of the 
national government which would prevent their prope equalisation.  In Würzburg, Rainer 
talks of how German workers are facing cutbacks in job security and benefits:  ‘More and 
more cuts, more and more cut-backs.  That was just the beginning.  […]  I mean, many 
people think of the CDU-CSU as plainly being the alternative to the current confused 
policies, but what will happen to people then, what will happen to the little man?  A lot of 
people don’t seem to realise …’.  Uwe broadens the point: ‘I think it’s the same in Britain 
[…], and … I mean, the English employee is not goin to be too different from the German 
employee in principle, or the French one …’.  Meanwhile in Reading, Murda and David 
compare the differing reactions of the British and French to the problem of rising prices.  The 
sense is clear of an ‘over here’ and an ‘over there’ where people are faced with essentially 
the same difficulties, even if they choose to respond to them differently: ‘You watch though,’ 
says Murda, ‘over there, right, they’re going to have riots.  They don’t have it.  … It’s weird 
how most things, we just take it lying down over hee.  Like, the French, they won’t.  They’ll 
have a revolution, get the guillotines out …’.  David chips in: ‘Yeah … Stop the boats, stop 
everything … every single thing … yeah …’.  Murda continues: ‘But no matter what happens 
over here, you know, goes up another 5p, 10p, pound, “oh yeah, OK …”  Bit like sheep here 
in that sense aren’t we, plod along …’.26 
  
 In sum, for the problems associated with the Economics domain one finds a broad 
degree of continuity across the groups as regards the political subjects and their opponents.  
The subjects are generally cast either in passive terms as normal, simple, and real people, 
who have none of the special advantages enjoyed by the rich, or in more active terms as the 
contributors, those who – barring exceptional circumstances – work for their living and 
thereby assist the general economic good.  The two formulations, it is worth noting, seem to 
differ somewhat in the extent to which they are accompanied by the evocation of a 
                                                
26 When David talks about working conditions and consumer safety, a transnational comparison again comes 
naturally: ‘In France, you can go to a taxi in Paris, ght, and on the back window it’ll say what time the driver 
started work, there’ll be a little disc and he puts it on that he started work at five in the morning, and at five at 
night he’s going to take you to Marseilles, say.  But you look up there and say “huh, this bloke has been up 
twelve hours, think I’ll get someone else … been driving as long as that …”.  It’s sensible because that man 
could fall asleep, couldn’t he, so the law says: “you’ve got x amount of hours, you can’t do any more than a 
twelve-hour shift.”’  The Kassel group, meanwhile, spends some time comparing house prices and rents in 
London with those in Germany, and the Lübeck group does so with those in neighbouring Denmark.   
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transnational context.  The active formulation is generally elaborated in sub-national terms, 
with little reference to contributing counterparts in other countries.  That to which the 
subjects contribute and others do not seems to be som  notion of a national savings fund or 
balance-sheet, into which the tax system feeds and out of which social-security payments and 
other benefits are drawn.  In the exception to this rule – when the finances of the EU itself are 
discussed and the purse is a European one – the contributors tend to be described as being 
‘our country’ together with perhaps a few comparable countries of similar economic 
development.  Neither instance invites a sense of transnational shared predicament.  On the 
other hand, when the more passive formulation is foregrounded – the ‘little’ or ‘normal’ 
people, faced with opponents such as large firms – conditions in neighbouring countries (e.g. 
prices, wages, levels of unemployment) are invoked very readily.  The assumption that there 
are comparable environments where the same kinds of problem are being faced is quite clear, 
with those cited mainly as western-European countries n the British and German 
discussions, but central- and east-European countries in the Czech discussions.  With this 
transnational dimension frequently introduced, and with the ‘people like us’ being 
constructed not purely along national lines, there se ms to be some basis here for a political 
bond supportive of a European polity.  That the range of comparisons tends to be less than 
coextensive with the current EU, with an east-west di tinction within Europe highlighted to 
indicate places of fundamental contrast as well as comparable environments, represents a 
challenge to such a bond, a point Chapter 6 will return to.  Such a bond would also be 
compromised if the passive overtones of this formulation of the ‘we’ were accompanied by a 
more general sense of fatalism regarding the possibility of addressing these problems.  This 
question we shall explore in the following chapter. 
 A second point which has been noted is that those p itioned as opponents resemble 
adversaries rather than enemies.  They are generally not treated as posing an existential threat 
to the subjects, rather they are a source of hardship and a drain on resources.  They are 
disliked, but their presence is grudgingly accepted.  When immigrants and minorities within 
the home environment are mentioned, it tends to be eastern Europeans and (in the German 
case) Turkish people.  Note that there is little demarcation based on race or colour here.  
Gamson, in his study of lay discourse in the US, notes the ease with which ‘black means poor 
and white means rich.’27  One can imagine that when boundary-formation draws on physical 
markers in this way then acts of ‘othering’ are much stronger and fundamental: there is less 
                                                
27 Gamson, Talking Politics, p.103. 
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likely to be the sense that those who face economic problems, or those who rise above them, 
‘could have been me’, and perhaps a stronger likelihood that those positioned as opponents 
are treated as enemies.  Conversely, in the discussions we have looked at, the absence of a 
clear linkage of this kind is probably conducive to the softer positioning that one finds. 
 
 
Collective Positioning in Society and the Law 
 
A) The Political Subjects and their Opponents 
 
In the domain of Society and the Law, the key problems include crime, antisocial behaviour, 
increasing egoism, and a general decline in ‘standards’.  The common thread is the attention 
which is given to rules, and how they should be approached and maintained.  In this domain, 
the political subjects are best characterised as tho e who play by the rules and stand up for 
the rules.  They are honest citizens.  They are contrasted with those who break the rules 
(especially major rules), and in particular with those rule-breakers who are armed with 
excuses and do not have to face the consequences of their actions.  They are also 
distinguished from those who are unaffected by such behaviour, or those who fail to enforce 
the rules properly, with the resultant unfairness a ource of much frustration. 
 One sees these patterns in discussion of crime (i.e. the breaking of legal rules), to 
which much attention was devoted amongst the British groups in particular.  A phrase often 
heard here is that ‘it’s one rule for some and another rule for others.’  ‘We’ve had enough of 
general yobbery,’ says Barry in Norwich, and responding to the perceived vagaries of 
criminal sentencing he makes a plea which is typical: ‘you know, enforce all rules the same.  
Basically, we all abide by them don’t we.’  The subjects are the ones who are willing to take 
a stand, and who look out for each other: ‘If he [Barry] ever called me,’ says Mickey, ‘don’t 
mind what time of morning it is, even if I have to put my daughter in a blanket, I’ll come and 
help him.  Because we need, as a society, to start st nding up.’  If the subjects themselves 
ever break a rule, it is likely to be an honest mistake and probably a very minor rule, perhaps 
even a bad one.  These motifs are evident in the following extract from the Norwich group.  
This passage of discussion took place early on, almost as soon as the record-button had been 
pressed on the recorder.  (‘At the end of the day it’s the most important subject,’ Mickey later 
explained.)  The card-arranging exercise could wait for a moment; Barry was ready to put 
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forward an opinion: ‘well the legal system’s in favour of the criminal at the moment.’  We let 
the discussion flow: 
 
M:  The police are out there, doing the best they can, in general, yeah, but the legal system … [L:  … is 
letting them down …] … the judges, handing down pathetic little sentences … [B:  … Or none at 
all …]  We were promised ‘three strikes and you’re out’.  Now, everybody is allowed to make 
mistakes, but when you got these people going round, burgling houses over and over and over and 
over again, and then they get a fine or a bit of Community Service, and then they’re stuck back on 
the streets to go and make someone else’s life a misery.  And that puts the pressure back on them 
[the police] again to get them back in again. 
 
L:  That’s right, very much so.  I mean, policing is very, very good really, there’s quite a lot going on 
round here, really top stuff, but when it comes down to them doing their job, it backtracks to this 
[taps the card Legal System] and they’re failing in big ways.  Big time, really.  […] Now I’ve had 
two incidents with the police, the police have been v ry good, and they’ve even sent up back-up, 
to talk it through .. but these [Legal System], you don’t hear nothing.  They [taps Policing] can’t 
do nothing because of them [Legal System].  The sentences they do, either the kids are too young 
or something’s not quite right. 
 
M:  And then you get a letter through the post which says ‘we will not be pursuing the matter’ …  [L:  
… That’s right, yeah …]  Because it’s not important to them, because it didn’t happen to them …  
At the end of the day, if someone smashes your taxi-window, they get in and they steal your stereo 
and they steal your … stupidly left my cash bag there one day, they took my cash bag …  Now 
that might seem like ‘oh well, it’s not the most important crime in the world’ … At the time my 
daughter was six …  It’s a burglar, it’s a man in a hood with a swag bag and arrows.  That 
absolutely terrified her for weeks afterwards.  AllI get is a letter through the post – and it’s not 
just me, a lot of people, and it stinks, absolutely stinks. 
 
JW:  Who do you blame for that?   
 
B:  The legal system, the magistrates, I don’t think they take the fears of the – what his daughter go 
through – into consideration.  When someone’s burgled or mugged, they always try ... the defence 
lawyers always try that he had a hard upbringing, he was on drugs, he was whatever …  If you do 
a crime you do the time, that’s the way it should be. 
 
M:  The problem with them lot is that they don’t live in the real world.  They literally live on 
Newmarket Road, yeah, which is just an example, every city’s got a Newmarket Road, exclusive 
place to be, they live in a place like that, where th y have big drives and they have big gates, and 
they sit behind there and they get taxis everywhere so they don’t have to get public transport, they 
don’t have to put up with these scumbags, yeah, and it’s like ‘oh, we know there’s a drug problem 
because we read about it in the newspaper, we have it in the court every so often’.  Every so often 
you will  come across a magistrate who hands down a harsh sentenc , and then the solicitors, who 
want more money, and I think a lot of it does come down to the solicitors, they want more money 
so they appeal on behalf of the scumbag … his hundredth crime of the month.  He goes back in 
again and they quash it and he walks free.  And as soon as he’s free he goes back up the Guildhall, 
every city’s got a Guildhall …  [L:  His solicitors are on him again …]  Scoring drugs, he can’t get 
the money for the drugs so he goes and robs somebody else.  Put them on a farm somewhere. 
 
B:  The really sad thing is, when you do get a hard judge or a hard magistrate who do give them five 
years, we all know they serve two and a half.  They don’t do the full time. 
 
 
The subjects are those who expect – and were promised – a system of rules based on clear 
principles and fairly enforced.  The subjects are perhaps passive and vulnerable, as the 
foregrounding of Mickey’s daughter suggests.  Their life can be ‘made a misery’.  Worse, 
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they may be unable to rely on the protection afforded by the institutions of law enforcement, 
because punishments may be light and barely served.  The opponents are clearly demarcated.  
They are the decadent magistrates who live in gated communities, who take only private 
transport and who read about social problems in the newspapers, and the solicitors whose 
interest is to profit from these problems.  The magistrates live on a different road, on 
Newmarket Road, the ‘exclusive place to be’, away from the ‘real world’ where the subjects 
encounter crime and misbehaviour on a regular basis.  The opponents are also, naturally, the 
offenders themselves.  Emphasis is on the repeat offender, the criminal who is ‘burgling 
houses over and over and over and over again’: not someone who has simply made a mistake 
(anyone can make those), he is someone who involves him elf in a new crime as soon as he 
walks free.  He tends to have excuses on his side, like a ‘hard upbringing’, but his principal 
characteristic is that he never learns.  The only solution it seems is to imprison him.  As will 
be seen further in the next chapter, one often finds the assumption that such behaviour can be 
corrected if caught at a young age with education.  Opponents in this domain can be thought 
of as adversaries to the extent that they can be encouraged to ‘mend their ways’, but insofar 
as some will always be criminals and will need to be removed from society for the safety of 
the subjects, as enemies.  ‘Everyone’s allowed to make a mistake, yeah,’ says Mickey, ‘in 
with the wrong crowd blah blah blah, whatever excuse it is, they’re allowed to make a 
mistake.  Second time, “tut-tut, you should have learnt by now but go on, I’ll give you one 
more chance, this time you’re getting five years”.  And then, the next time, “three strikes, 
you’re out, ten years, hard labour, no remission, nthi g, you’re being done for it, learn your 
lesson.”  Get them off drugs for ten years.  You know, whatever.’ 
 A similar pattern of positioning is evident when discussion focuses on the breaking 
of social rather than legal rules – problems which are lingered on in particular amongst the 
German groups.  The subjects are set up as the public-spirited people who play by the rules 
of proper behaviour, but also the ones who stand up for the rules.  Their opponents are the 
transgressors, but also those who are indifferent towards the transgressors.  Peter and Dieter 
in Kassel take the example of their colleagues on the taxi-rank who throw their cigarette butts 
out of the window, and who curse you if you tell them to pick them up; complicit in the 
problem are those who distance themselves and say ‘th t doesn’t affect me!’  Hans agrees, 
and argues that for that reason ‘it’s important thaeveryone’s aware that it does affect them.’  
A passage from the Erfurt group, in which the social and the legal are entwined, gives a fuller 
flavour of this: 
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A:  … I was on the tram, there were two small children around seven or eight years old, it was around 
3pm.  They were making a lot of noise on the tram, like they do.  There was a woman there and 
she got really worked up about it.  And then her mobile phone went off and she had a 
conversation, but so loudly that the whole tram could follow.  And she was the one complaining 
about two small children making a bit of noise.  That’s simply bad manners and you need to tell 
these people that.  You need to open your mouth and tell them that either children are not allowed 
to make noise or they must leave off … Each person … everyone must start with themselves. 
 
H-J:  Sure, that’s right.  But also everyone’s got to have enough education and intelligence so that they
don’t do certain things when they’re not within their own four walls.  In private they can do what 
they like. 
 
U:  It depends how old people are … old people don’t do that kind of thing. 
 
A:  I know of a guy, his mother was a teacher and his father was a professor, and what does he do all 
day long?  He burps and belches.  
 
U:  Consideration for other people, that’s what it’s about really … [H-J:  yeah, definitely], whether it’s
mobile phones or someone burping … 
 
A:  Or if I push to the front on the rank because colleagues are slow in moving up.  [H-J:  It’s a whole 
load of things …] 
 
U:  Consideration for others … [H-J:  yeah, yeah …], whatever you’re doing … Or giving up your seat 
on the U-Bahn for a grandmother.  […] 
 
H-J:  It’s no longer valued any more.  It’s a vulgaris tion (Verrohung) of society, it can’t carry on …  
[A: That’s it.] 
 
M:  You see it with boys, the older ones, when they get in the cab, you get a twenty-year-old 
sometimes, he puts his feet straight up on the windscreen.  That’s just not right.  I’m doing my 
work … 
 
H-J:  The respect for other people’s work isn’t there any more.  [M:  No …]  There’s no regard for 
other people, no regard for property … [M:  All gone …]  All gone.  You sit on the tram and the 
person opposite has his feet on the seats … [M:  It’s not right …]  It’s really not right.  [A:  And 
what do you do?]  Well, I tell him to take his feet down! 
 
A:  And there’s too few people willing to do that.  Too few.  This goes back to the legal system.  That 
case in Halle or wherever where the guy was killed, the guy who showed moral courage and asked 
whether the music could be turned down and then got knifed to death.28  And what did the judge 
do with the defendant?  [H-J:  He freed him.]  He freed him.  And there, I mean, the judge himself 
needs to be put in … [H-J:  Put in court …] put in court.   
 
For all the participants, and clearly with some centrality, a whole series of problems are 
evident here, linked by the notion of falling standrds.  Hypocrisy, rudeness, inconsideration 
and indifference are all given emphasis, as well as the insufficiency of protection from the 
law.  It is treated as beyond dispute that too many people are ignorant of the rules of social 
conduct, that there are certain things which one dos not do when outside the four walls of 
one’s home.  There is no social determinism here: each individual has a responsibility to act 
                                                
28 The case involved a man objecting to his neighbour’s playing of loud Nazi music, leading to an argument in 
which the former was fatally stabbed.  The judge reach d his verdict on the defendant two days before this 
interview. 
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properly, and even those from the best backgrounds (child of the teacher and professor) can 
fail in this.  Hans-Jürgen positions himself as onef the subjects, offended or irritated by the 
person on the tram who puts their feet up and willing to do something about it, and unlike the 
passive majority.  There is even a word with which to capture the proper behaviour of the 
subject in this context: ‘moral courage’ (Zivilcourage).  The positioning of the opponents 
seems to be more of the adversary- than the enemy-type.  These people need to be shown the 
errors of their ways, they need to be reminded of what civilised behaviour entails, with the 
implication that they are not ‘beyond hope’ and that t ere is still the possibility of engaging 
them.   
 The criterion of playing-by-the-rules, whether legal or social, is liable to be deployed 
against immigrants and minorities.  Lee in Swansea ‘know[s] of a copper,29 he says they’re 
too scared to arrest the blacks, because the blacks will turn on them and say automatically 
“he’s racial”.’  Moreover, these minorities ‘know it, they’re making full use of that.’  David 
agrees that non-whites have excuses before the law (‘they’re treated differently to us’), and 
for Andy: ‘Don’t give a toss for them as long as the rules are the same for everybody. […]  
Seems at the moment they have the advantage over us.’  Amongst the German groups, ‘East 
Europeans’ and ‘Turks’ in particular are often viewed as corrosive of the social and legal 
rules, as having excuses to protect themselves from the consequences of their behaviour (of 
the legal system Peter in Kassel says ‘it doesn’t apply to Turks’), and their behaviour is to be 
assessed according to stricter standards.  In a discussion about the criminal tendencies of 
those from Turkey, the Balkans and eastern Europe, Ali in Lübeck (who describes himself as 
of Iranian origin) argues that Germans have greater lic nce to break the rules because ‘that’s 
their homeland!’  Jürgen agrees that if he were living in a foreign country he would keep a 
low profile: ‘I’d start with simple ambitions [dann würd’ ich erstmal ganz kleine Brötchen 
backen].’ 30  Oliver in Würzburg, with much agreeing from Rainer and Uwe, emphasises the 
vulnerability of ordinary law-abiding citizens by contrasting with the secure lives of 
politicians: ‘I think reality sometimes passes politics by.  When for example a politician says 
“we need multi-culti”, he only knows multi-culti from the restaurants in Berlin.  When he 
goes in they say “Ah hello, how are you? … leave your money just there and you’re my good 
friend …”.  But your little citizen, if he has a son at school and along comes a Turk and says 
                                                
29 ‘Copper’: a policeman. 
30 Hans-Jürgen and Andreas in Erfurt agree that ‘not all [Turks] are criminal’. Hans-Jürgen suggests: ‘It doesn’t 
matter a bit whether a Turk lives in Italy or a German lives in Denmark or whatever … If he abides by the laws 
there then he can be a foreigner if he wants to be.  It doesn’t matter at all what kind of job he does, that’s 
completely irrelevant.  If you abide by the rules …’  and Andreas repeats: ‘I must abide by the rules th re …’. 
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“give me money or I’ll smack you in the face”, well he’s really affected by it, the little 
citizen.  But the politician stands there prettily and says “we’ve got multi-culti, we’ve made 
laws, they’ve all been naturalised …”.  Maybe there’s also votes in it, from Turks or those 
from other countries … they want to raise their share of the vote.  And at that point it’s 
irrelevant whether the little man has problems, whether his son gets smacked one in the face.  
There’s even protection money being collected in schools, and reality passes politics by, it’s 
that simple.’  Likewise, the criterion of playing-by-the-rules is quite frequently applied in the 
Czech discussions to the Roma (‘gypsies’).  Petr in Plzeň argues that gypsies need to 
‘integrate themselves normally into society and not g  around robbing and stealing.’  In an 
anecdote which he says is based on his experience, he argues that if ten whites and ten 
gypsies took rides in his taxi (‘not Roma, for me th re’s no such thing as Roma, I know only 
gypsies’), nine of the whites would pay their fare nd three or four of the gypsies would pay 
theirs.  ‘And as for how those three got the money, that’s another question.’  This 
demarcation against the gypsies is quite specific: the Czechs talk about a range of minority 
groups (eastern Europeans, as was seen for the Economics domain, and Muslims, as will be 
seen for Relations between Peoples), but it is principally ‘gypsies’ who are cast as 
adversaries of the political subjects in the Society and the Law domain.   
 There is another formulation of the subjects, one which seems particularly common 
amongst the Czech discussions, whereby the subjects are understood not so much as those 
who play by the rules but as those who break only the minor rules.  The following extract 
from the Ostrava group provides a good elaboration on this theme.  Note how the pronoun 
‘we’ is used in connection with the willingness to break legal rules of various kinds: 
 
Z:  I wanted to add something on the question of the law.  This is the typical Czech attitude: whenever 
there’s a law on something, a Czech person doesn’t thi k about how to comply with it but how to 
avoid it.  That’s extremely important.  Us Czechs are specialists at that.  So if you tell me that I’m
not allowed to do something then I’ll cross over to the other side and I’ll do it anyway.  
Regardless.  I’ll change my path so as to get around the obstacle.  That means there’s never a law 
which really prevents you doing something, it’s alwys possible somehow.  In this country. 
 
JW:  Why do you think it’s like that …? 
 
J:  It was like that here already under communism.  There was always someone who wanted to get 
around something. 
 
Z:  You say to me:  I’m not allowed to pass here, not allowed to, mustn’t enter.  And I say: ‘Fine, I 
mustn’t, I won’t.’  But somehow I have to … 
 
M:  So I enter through a different door. 
 
JW:  And that’s how it’ll always be …? 
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Z:  It’s a national tradition [chuckles] …  Say I’m faced with a red light.  I wait, I don’t go, then maybe 
I try … 
 
M:  That’s how it is here.  Beautiful example is what we see on the roads.  I’m driving along, next to 
me there’s a cyclist, we arrive at a red light, I stop, as a cyclist he’s part of the road traffic, a 
driver, but the moment he sees the red light he goes onto the pavement, turns himself into a so-
called pedestrian, but keeps on his bike and cycles across on green because the other traffic’s on 
green, and then after the crossing he puts himself back in the lane and he’s a driver-cyclist again.  
So … we all do the same all over the place, it’s in our temperament, it’s in our temperament.  [Z:  
So it’s possible to cross on red …]  Yeah, that’s how it works.  Always.  He’s got to go somehow 
and that’s how he does it.  … If a policeman sees someone doing that, well he has a little look 
upwards [lifts head] to see whether by any chance there happen to be some birds flying overhead 
… [Z:  He …]  He doesn’t want to chase some cyclist, he’s not interested, he doesn’t see the point. 
 
From an external perspective, the behaviour of the cyclist here is perhaps unremarkable, but 
the willingness to treat it as symptomatic of a ‘national tradition’ of rule avoidance in which 
‘we Czechs’ are ‘specialists’ is interesting.31  The disinterest of the policeman serves to 
normalise the rule-breaking – punishment is unlikely.  The offence is a very minor one, of a 
kind hardly likely to generate outrage: if the subjects are themselves not always followers of 
rules, they are demarcated more by the pettiness of the rule-breaking in which they engage. 
 They are also demarcated by the kind of rule-breaking from which they are excluded 
due to their position in the social hierarchy.  One se s this in the discussion of corruption.  
The subjects, it tends to be said, have nothing to do with major corruption because they are 
too ‘small’ to be involved.  They hear about it on television, but they have no first-hand 
experience of it.32  In the Ostrava discussion the innocence of the ‘people like us’ when it 
comes to major crime is emphasised: corruption takes place behind their backs, and they 
simply assume that ‘there are trustworthy people at the top’.  In the Czech and the Erfurt 
discussions there is a clear link made to the opponents in the Economics domain – the corrupt 
rich, the kind who are able to escape justice and are relaxing somewhere on a beach in the 
Bahamas.  This ability to escape the consequences of behaviour is, in the Czech discussions, 
indivisible from the question of economic power.  Marek in Ostrava explains:  ‘Here the 
legal system supports those who steal 100 million – they’ve got lawyers who they go halves 
with, he pays the judge and everything, and they have 50 million for themselves, they lose 50 
million but that’s not going to hurt a businessman. That’s the legal system.  And if you steal 
10,000, they lock you up.  That’s how it is here.  Or at the minimum you get some kind of 
                                                
31 That a willingness to avoid or break the rules is – to a degree – normalised seems to be evident also in the 
Liberec discussion. When Radek suggests that physical punishment be used against criminals, Václav considers 
this inappropriate on the grounds that one might end up a victim of it oneself.  ‘Don’t tell me you’ve never 
stolen something in your life,’ is his response to Radek.   
32 Petr in Plzeň makes this explicit: ‘For my part I’ve never seen any particular sign of influence, with the traffic 
police or whatever … But certainly generally, on television and everywhere it’s always being talked about 
every day.’  And later: ‘But as I say, probably none of us has had any close experience with that.’ 
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penalty to pay.  Someone small gets it, someone big doesn’t.’  The honest citizens break 
more minor rules, but are more likely to be punished for it.33   
 
 
B)  Comparables and Counterparts 
 
Quite in contrast to problems to do with Economics, transnational comparisons for problems 
to do with Society and the Law are almost entirely absent.  The problems of criminal 
behaviour take place on the streets of the city, perhaps under the gaze of a CCTV camera, 
and problems of rudeness and selfishness are describ d as taking place in trams, in theatres, 
in taxis, and on the pavement.  The experiences are sometimes generalised as being 
symptomatic of conditions in the country as a whole (‘every city’s got a Newmarket Road’), 
but hardly ever do participants raise the question of whether similar problems of crime and 
bad behaviour are experienced in cities abroad.  Probably relevant to this is that – as will be 
explored in the next chapter – most of the problems in this domain are explained in terms of 
factors exclusively within the city or the home country, such as the mentalities of local 
actors.  This seems to diminish the relevance of the experiences of those in other 
environments.   
 The Würzburg group does at one point consider whether the breakdown in 
community feeling is any worse in Germany than in certain other European countries, but it 
is a contrast rather than a comparison which is made.  At stake is Germany’s descent into 
what they have characterised the ‘elbow society’: 
 
R:  Perhaps the German mentality again.  Only recently I had this discussion, you always hear in other 
countries – it made an impression on me – that the Germans, very generally speaking, are very 
gruff with each other in their daily lives, that in other countries it seems they find people here very
inconsiderate and gruff towards each other.  On a daily basis, or in society … that in other 
countries it’s not so bad.  And then naturally that expresses itself in the social domain. […] 
 
O:  The more money there is in play, the more people get ripped off, I think. 
 
R:  But Italy, for example, I mean, it’s almost the same economic level, almost the same living 
standard, if not the same.  But I still get the impression that this southern mentality, that they’re a 
bit more friendly and laid-back with each other than we are here.  I think that has an effect. 
 
U:  They’re very family-oriented, the Italians. 
 
                                                
33 Míra in Plzeň also talks, with the agreement of his fellow participants, of how the rich-and-corrupt can buy 
justice: ‘A poor person does something and they lock him up, and a rich person does something and he finds a 
good lawyer and he gets him out of it.’   
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R:  Yeah, but that’s something positive, that’s … a value in society.  Here it’s gone so far that one 
simply packs off old people, parents, older relatives and says ‘we don’t need them any more’. 
 
The conclusion is that Germany is a special case, that there is a German mentality which 
either accounts for or embodies the decline of community feeling, and that people living in 
other countries are not facing the same problems as those in Germany.  In some discussions 
the US is mentioned in this context, as the extreme of the broken-down society, where the 
streets are dangerous and where criminal sentencing is absurdly harsh.34  Such contrasts are 
presented as curiosities however, without any suggestion that it really matters what goes on 
in the US in this respect.  Corruption is the one problem which is generally not given a local 
emphasis (it takes place unseen, and away from the lives of ordinary people) and which 
sometimes provokes a few transnational comparisons.35  Perhaps this is understandable given 
that it is a problem heavily entwined with the Economics domain, where as we have seen a 
transnational dimension is readily evoked.  Corruption is exceptional in this sense though, 
and should not obscure the localism which is more generally evident. 
 Where speakers do wish to draw a comparison, it is more likely to be cross-temporal 
than cross-spatial.  The past, as the era of effective discipline and a clearer delineation 
between right and wrong, is invoked quite frequently as a point of orientation.  ‘We used to 
get scrubbed and the cane at school,’ says Mickey in Norwich, to Barry’s agreement.  Leyton 
joins in the reminiscence: ‘I used to get the bloomin’ cane, knuckles and everything!  I 
learned, I learned properly.  I feel sorry for teachers today, I really do.’  ‘Years ago everyone 
was afraid of the local bobby [policeman], weren’t they,’ adds Gavin.  Of course, cross-
temporal perspectives can be found regarding problems of Economics too, but they tend to 
have the flavour more of contrasts than comparisons.  That the past was quite different in 
economic terms is treated as normal (technology was less advanced then, economies were 
less developed, etc.), whereas what is more remarkable is that contemporary conditions in 
                                                
34 One sees a brief reference of this kind in a short passage from Liberec.  Radek begins:  ‘My cousin was
staying on holiday with relatives in America for a month just now and there no-one dares to steal anything 
because if the police catch you they immediately put yo  on an offenders’ register, and if you apply for a job 
then they say “you’ve been an offender” and you’ve got no chance.’  Onřej disputes there is a comparison to be 
made:  ‘To compare it with the US, that’s a totally different place … [R:  I know but …]  First of all that’s a 
police state, you can’t even …  [R:  But they’ve got order there.]  They haven’t got order.  Radek, it’s the worst 
state with the worst crime you can possibly imagine.’ 
35 The Ostrava group is keen to locate the Czech Republic’s position in the hierarchy of corruption amongst 
post-communist countries: ‘in Russia it’s even worse,’ ays Josef; Marek says the comparison should be made 
only with ‘normal peoples’, not with ‘those fantastical countries’ like Russia, Bulgaria and Romania.  Poland is 
the main yardstick, with some debate about whether thei corruption is worse than the Czechs’ or not.  Several 
times one finds the assumption that corruption, and disrespect for the law more generally, is not much of a 
problem in western-European countries; that the same problems are shared is explicitly rejected.  Bulgaria, 
Romania, Russia and ‘those kinds of states’ are also mentioned as contrasts, as the ultimates in corruption, but 
these are mainly passing remarks.  
 161 
nearby countries should be different.  For problems to do with Society and the Law on the 
other hand, that the past was different is treated s anomalous: conditions ‘then’ and ‘now’ 
are pretty much the same, and human nature cannot have changed.  But that experiences 
should be different, or alike, in other countries at the present moment is attributed barely any 
significance at all. 
 
 On balance, the kinds of collective positioning one fi ds concerning the problems of 
this domain conform partially to those associated with the ideal of a political bond.  The 
positioning of opponents is generally as adversarie who may be persuaded, by various 
means, to change their behaviour or who, even if they cannot be changed, represent a 
nuisance more than an intolerable presence.  Those who ‘do the crime’ will have to ‘do the 
time’, as the English saying has it – a perspective which allows for the possibility that 
punishment may be followed by reintegration into society.  Nonetheless, there is a tendency 
to construct some opponents as requiring removal from the community, perhaps following 
the principle of ‘three strikes and you’re out’, and here one seems to have more of an enemy-
type positioning, since little expectation is express d that these dangerous and persistent 
offenders may later return as reformed citizens.  They are essentialised as being ‘simply like 
that’.  More specifically as regards a European polity, the reluctance to make transnational 
comparisons and evoke counterparts in other European countries clearly contributes little to a 
political bond on this wider scale – though nor is it incompatible with such a bond, given that 
one need not make a strong demand for coherence across p oblem-domains.  Positioning of a 
localised kind in one domain would be consistent wih such a bond provided it were 
augmented by positioning of a wider kind in other domains. 
   
   
Collective Positioning in Relations between Peoples 
 
A)  The Political Subjects and their Opponents 
 
Whereas the subjects were identified fairly easily for the two domains looked at so far, for 
the Relations between Peoples domain some further interpretation is required.  Perhaps given 
that the open identification and judgement of peopls – which is central to most of the 
problems articulated in this domain – has come to carry a stigma in liberal democracies, due 
to its obvious association with racism, speakers generally do not make explicit their 
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assumptions concerning with whom they see themselve as sharing their problems.  Insofar 
as there is racism, it is ‘euphemised’.36  Indulging however in some interpretation, one may 
say that the common-sense subjects for each of the countries studied are the national 
majority, often ascribed connotations of peacefulness and good sense, and often implied as 
being white (though the subjects themselves are ‘not racist’).  Of course, not all participants 
would have included themselves in such a description (s me were non-white); the argument 
is rather that this would be commonly recognised by the majority if not all participants as the 
dominant assumption to be engaged with, the background against which any expression of 
opinions and arguments takes place. 
 A passage from the Swansea group takes us straight to the heart of matters: 
 
M:  Like I said, I’m not racist against blacks, but I’m frightened of, you know, the Arab people, the 
fanatics, the ones who’re living in this … the way they’ve been brought up as youngsters … to me 
they’re a threat, like … the way they live and that … 
 
A:  What was that fella in Clyne Park, look how long it took to get him off the street, and he was 
slagging people off left, right and centre.  Threatening he was going to kill us and everything, 
know what I mean? 
 
L:  They only got him off the street in the end because he was behind the terrors, and there’s a big 
thing now … 
 
A:  But if you put your soap-box there and started gobbing off like that about Pakistanis and that, 
you’d be in and gone.  […] 
 
L:  Careful what you’re saying now, there’s a Paki behind over there … 
 
A:  Bollocks.  [pause] 
 
L:  Such a thing, you’ve got to say that …  You know, in Swansea now, in a local pub, and you’ve got 
to watch what you’re saying.  Going back to that.  Shouldn’t have to.  And you’re scared.  Scared 
…  You know, you mention one wrong thing and you’re going to be up in court. 
 
M:  You imagine how they feel, when they come over to this country, they must be frightened 
themselves.  Got to be, haven’t they. 
 
L:  Well why come over then? 
 
M:  Well, rather come over here than live out there. 
 
D:  Why do you feel that they feel threatened over here? 
 
M:  Well they’re bound to, aren’t they. 
 
L:  No I don’t think so. I don’t think so one little bit. 
 
M:  Because they know so many people are against them.  And they do know it, don’t they. 
 
                                                
36 Lamont, The Dignity of Working Men, Chapter 3. 
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The problem is that of ‘intimidation’ by outsiders.  Clearly this is a different problem from 
those found in the Economics domain (although Andy’s reference to asylum-seekers might 
easily have taken the discussion towards a problematisation based on the ‘burden’ motif), and 
it differs from those found in Society and the Law in that the threat is perceived to be a group 
threat based on group difference, rather than an individual threat based on an individual’s 
choosing to break the rules.  The subjects which emerge in this passage are the ‘white 
people’ who feel ‘intimidated’ and who are being prevented from saying what they want to 
even in their local pub in their own city.  (‘It’s as if we’re becoming the minority,’ says Andy 
later.)  Note that there is no debate about this: Martin, who is expressing sympathy for ‘them’ 
and who is challenging the arguments of the others, does not contest the reference to the 
intimidated whites; the clash of opinions takes place t a secondary level, on the question of 
whether ‘they’ also feel threatened and to what extent hey have a right to feel threatened.  
The opponents are cast by Martin as ‘Arabs’ or ‘fanatics’, and Andy (quickly followed by 
Lee) connects ‘Pakistanis’ to them.  What links them is their tendency to threaten the ‘people 
like us’.  Elsewhere in the same discussion, their ‘fanaticism’ is highlighted by foregrounding 
their religion.  Swansea again: 
 
A:  Well they walk round with attitudes.  A lot of them … gangs and things …
 
D:  Alarming people …   
 
L:  The ones with … all the old head-gear and the rest of it … [D:  … You know, at the end of the day 
…]  There’s been a thing on in the schools recently, where they want them to, you know, show 
their faces, so that when the teacher’s talking to them they can see ’em … [D:  Yeah, can’t just see 
their eyes, like …]  Whereas, you go to their country and you got to … you can’t go out in shorts, 
you got to put things on.  For instance, Turkey andplaces like that, when you go to special places 
…  and Arab countries … you got to wrap up. 
 
A:  A mate of mine moved his daughter from Narberth primary school because they banned Christmas 
celebrations there, because there are so many Muslims there.  They banned it all.  He moved his 
daughter from school … Well he shouldn’t have to move his daughter from school, cos he’s 
Narberth born and bred. 
 
D:  No, you know, we’re not in Iraq, so, in the British country … British citizens … [A:  … should 
abide by our …] 
 
M:  Well it happened a few weeks ago didn’t it, with the Ramadan, when they blocked all top end of 
town off.  Because it was their special day they stopped all the cars from coming into Swansea.  
[D:  They caused congestion for two hours, like … delays, like …]  Two or three hours, like.  And 
they’re putting mosques and everything else over here: you try putting a church out there and you 
got no chance … no chance at all … 
 
L:  Going into racial and that … 
 
A:  They’re more racist than we are. 
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L:  You know, they say we’re racist and all the rest of it … They are more racist than anyone.  I mean, 
they can say what they want to you, but you mention the word ‘black’, for instance, and you’re in 
trouble.  Big trouble, really, through racial and everything … and they make everything out to be 
racial.  ‘Oh, he’s racist, he’s racist’, you know.  […] 
 
A:  There’s a couple of Pakistanis on the – well, more than a couple – on the taxi-rank over there, and 
they get out of their cars, and they stick to themslves, but they speak their own language.  Well 
that’s out of order.  You’re over here, speak our language.  Do you know what I mean?  Over here, 
should be speaking our language. 
 
Opponents are conjured up using a number of terms – ‘Pakistani’, ‘Arab’, ‘Muslim’, ‘black’ 
– and although no clear reasons are provided for linking these it seems evident that they are 
assumed to be expressions of the same.  These opponents are delineated from the subjects by 
their intimidating appearance (‘the head-gear’, their r fusal to show their faces, even their 
eyes), and by their desire to impose ‘their’ cultural practices on the local people (putting up 
mosques, refusing to speak the local language).  A racial dimension is foregrounded, and the 
friction between the subjects and opponents is interna ionalised by the reference to the 
demands on visitors to Turkey and Iraq.  When, a little later, the group talks about the Iraq 
war, their discourse is remarkably similar: ‘It’s going to take years to clean it all up,’ says 
Martin, ‘because as I say, at the end of the day the ’re fanatics from a very very young age 
and it’s been drilled into them …  They’ve sat down in school and read books, “this is this, 
that, this world we live in is a load of shit, it’s not the right world, we shouldn’t be here …”’.  
‘They’ve been brainwashed haven’t they,’ continues L e.  ‘You know, that they’re going to a 
better place when they die, and they can’t wait to die.  And they’re prepared to die.’   
 The discussion in Swansea was particularly explicit, but many of these discursive 
patterns occurred more widely.  Across the interviews, ‘Arabs’ and ‘Muslims’ are cast for 
this domain of problems as the principal opponents of the subjects, with the latter understood 
to be something along the lines of the peaceful and sensible white majority.  These are 
opponents who are very clearly positioned as enemies.  They present an existential threat, 
(note Martin’s comment that he is ‘frightened’ of them, and the multiple references to 
‘intimidation’) and they are uncompromising.  The rligious element is often underlined.  
While ‘Pakistanis’ are mentioned briefly in the Swansea discussion, and ‘Turks’ occasionally 
in the German discussions, the category of ‘Muslim’ is much more common.  They cover 
their faces and they do not speak ‘our’ language.  As will be seen in the next chapter, the idea 
that mutual toleration is possible with such people tends to be rejected, and unlike for Society 
and the Law, there is general pessimism about the possibilities that education might hold: the 
differences are held to be essential.  When opponents are constructed in this way, the 
reduction of mutual exposure is generally assumed to be the only answer.   
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 A favourable interpretation would be that when speakers use terms such as 
‘Muslims’ or ‘Arabs’ what they are positioning themselves against is not all Muslims / Arabs 
but only those who are especially ‘fanatical’ and uncompromising in their behaviour.  If one 
could say that only the xtremes amongst these categories are positioned as enemies then one 
could draw the conclusion that things are much as they should be: tolerance, after all, can be 
regarded not so much as a good in itself but as dependent for its value upon that which is to 
be tolerated, and speakers who express intolerance of the fanatical are perhaps simply 
speaking up for tolerance.  Such an interpretation is hard to sustain however, since one sees 
little attempt to make distinctions of this kind: rarely for instance is there talk of a ‘milder 
majority’ of Muslims who might be engaged to combat the actions of a ‘dangerous minority’, 
and in the few cases where such distinction is made it tends to be to suggest that the majority 
is in league with the minority.  Furthermore, the occasional direct references to race seem to 
run counter to the making of distinctions: they serve ather to emphasise the unity of the 
opponents.  Here is Uwe in Würzburg on the subject of relations with ‘Arabs’:  
  
They want to destroy the whole western world.  Europe in many respects, but above all the arch-
enemy the US.  That’s the ultimate arch-enemy for them, and … I’m definitely very critical of these 
people.  I mean, the Arab mentality, it’s not everyone’s cup of tea.  It’s just a rather different world 
from ours.  It’s the same in Britain or France.  If I meet an Italian or a British person or a French 
person, that’s my mentality, I’ve got no reservations with them, or an American, it’s all basically the 
same for me … [R: yeah, yeah]  But these people I do find completely different … [O:  A different 
culture …] Completely different.  And … I have the feeling that Germany is being more and more 
overrun, with all this scavenging going on at the moment.  Everyone comes in and everyone tries to 
extract the most for themselves.  Now there’s simply no more left, it’s like a huge winter sale here in 
Germany … [R:  Yeah, yeah …]  That’s how it looks to me.  Everyone just comes, especially from 
the east.  From Britain no-one comes [R. chuckles], or from France, or Italy.  But all these lot come 
here and want to suck the country dry until there’s nothing left.  That’s how it looks to me.  Little by 
little.  So, I don’t see … I say to my son too, ‘Son, Thomas, if you can, go abroad later.  Because 
here it’s going to get much worse.’  I’m quite serious.  I don’t know how it’s supposed to be 
sustainable.  There’ll be one great mishmash, each group with its culture and each wanting to install 
its religion.  After a while you just don’t understand it at all.  
 
The group as a whole agrees that ‘Arabs’ (again, seemingly elided with Muslims, given the 
references to religion) represent ‘a different culture’, and Uwe is by no means the only one to 
invoke the category ‘the western world’ to describe th  subjects.  Innocence and vulnerability 
are alluded to with the introduction of Uwe’s son Thomas; the Arab mentality, by contrast, is 
an aggressive one, bent on destruction.  Again, the positioning of the opponents is as enemies 
who pose an existential threat to the subjects.  They have an intrinsic mentality which is 
constitutive of who they are.  The way Uwe speaks scornfully of an imminent ‘mishmash’ in 
Germany, characterised by a plurality of cultural and religious groups, suggests that he 
understands ‘the west’ in its true form to be culturally and religiously homogeneous; a 
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reference to race is conspicuously absent, although ne feels it is not far away – race, one 
might say, is being euphemised as religion, ‘culture’ and ‘mentality’, allowing the subjects to 
maintain the aura of reasonableness.  What to make of Uwe’s reference to ‘the East’?  One 
interpretation is that half-way through this passage Uwe begins to draw on the discursive 
resources of the Economics domain: note how his reference to those who ‘try to extract the 
most for themselves’ is reminiscent of the opponents of the subjects in that domain – those 
who take but who do not contribute – and note the explicitly economic metaphor of Germany 
as the site of ‘a huge winter sale’.  As will be seen in the next chapter, the motif of ‘the 
cheaper East’ is a common one for talking about problems in the Economics domain, and is 
therefore a natural digression from what is here the main act of demarcation based on culture, 
religion and race. 
 Individuals occasionally seek to counteract these dominant acts of positioning, a fact 
which deserves to be highlighted so as to weaken any determinist implications in our 
argument.  Hans-Jürgen in Erfurt, for example, in adiscussion of whether mosques should be 
allowed in the neighbourhood, is emphatic in his defence, despite persistent objection from 
Mike: ‘One has to tolerate another culture.  It’s a imple fact that they’re there, you can’t 
wish them away, and you can’t do away with them using laws and regulations either.  
They’re different cultures and anyone who wants to go to a mosque … [M: But it can’t be 
right that the state builds the mosque …]  On the contrary… [M:  … That can’t be right …]  
One has to tolerate it … [M: Yes but …] … one has to tolerate it if they want to build up 
their own culture here.’  Such expressions were rarhowever, and tended to be made by 
individuals alone. 
 As well as against ‘Arabs’ and ‘Muslims’, the subjects are often demarcated against 
the extremes within the ranks of the national majority.  In the German discussions, for 
instance, it is underlined that the subjects have nothi g to do with the events of the Third 
Reich, nor with today’s skinheads, and nor do they wish to be associated with those who are 
excessively tolerant.  The political subjects are th  reasonable middle.  In the words of Uwe 
in Würzburg: ‘it’s a problem here in Germany with all the Muslims and stuff we have.  
They’ve simply come over here and now they want to enforce their culture exclusively and 
they’re unwilling to toe the line at all.  And the problem is that in Germany we tend to go in 
either for blind racism, with our skinheads who go ar und smashing everything up, or we 
have this complete deference towards foreigners, “our dear foreigners”, this super-tolerance, 
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which is equally bad.  So I’d want to see things change a little – and I’m no racist [laughs], I 
simply don’t understand it.’37   
 Germany’s past is a crucial element in the construction of the subjects in those 
discussions.  It informs the notion that the subjects are barred from talking openly about the 
problems they face, something which seems to be felt even more strongly amongst the 
Germans than amongst the British.  One sees it at several moments in the discussion in 
Lübeck.  Ali, recognised by all present as being of Iranian origin, at one point makes a strong 
statement which seems to make the others uncomfortable: ‘But the Jews have the money!  
It’s clear, the Jews have the money.  Look, who’s the head of Deutsche Bank?  A Jew.  All 
the power in the world, it’s held by Jews …’.  On its own this is just a provocative utterance, 
but what is interesting is the reaction which follows, more indicative of collective 
assumptions: after a few silence-breaking chuckles, ‘Ali, you’ve got the advantage that you 
can say something like that!’ says Jürgen, referring to Ali’s ‘foreigner’ status.  ‘Yeah,’ says 
Wolfgang, ‘just what I was going to say.  We’re not allowed to say such a thing.’  Elsewhere 
in the discussion, Jürgen talks of how ‘many people’ (it seems he knows a few) are 
dissatisfied with being associated with the acts of previous generations of Germans: 
‘Anyway, a lot of them aren’t even alive any more, the ones who were involved in it back 
then.  Hardly a person left.  Subsequent generations should remember what a calamity it was, 
but that they’re always labelled as scapegoats and that accusations are made again and again 
and so on, that’s going too far for a lot of people.  Because they say: “I had nothing to do 
with that.  My great-grandfather, he lived it, but me …”.’  Ali makes a comment similar to 
his other one: ‘even today the Germans have to live under that.  Every year this whole stuff is 
wheeled out, again and again.  Weeks are spent on it, a d think of how much money flows 
from the whole thing.  Every year …’.  After a pause, Jürgen replies with: ‘Ali’s opinion as a 
foreigner is sometimes noteworthy.  A German’s opinion on that couldn’t be any better could 
it, or couldn’t be any different.’  (Niklas, it should be added, explicitly dissociates himself in 
both these episodes, saying that whether or not he is ‘entitled’ to say such things, he has no 
wish to.) 
                                                
37 At Erfurt, Uwe notes that ‘whenever German politicians go abroad, everyone holds their hands out, and if 
they don’t give them anything then quickly they getcalled a [very quietly] Nazi, you see?’  Andreas argues that 
‘this responsibility, it was shed fifty years ago.  At some point it needs to be recognised by other countries that 
the Germans of today are no longer those of fifty years ago.  And I mean, one mustn’t forget what took place, 
that’s logical, it mustn’t happen again.  But nor can it be the case that everyone must carry on paying for it.  In 
fifty generations, they’re not going to know anything about …’.  Hans-Jürgen and Mike add their agreement, 
likewise positioning the ‘people like us’ between two extremes and resisting the idea of transgenerational unity. 
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 In the Czech discussions, the delineation of the subjects is fairly weak, mainly 
because there is less discussion of such problems.  At times one almost gets the impression 
that the Czech participants are rejecting any sense of subjectivity in this domain.  Míra in 
Plzeň, for example, says ‘I think the Czech Republic is pretty uninteresting for terrorists,’ 
and when responding to the ‘Peace and War’ card says ‘that’s something which doesn’t 
affect the Czech Republic much, because no-one here really engages in that, we don’t shoot 
each other across the table.’  Notable in a passage from the Liberec group, aside from a 
repetition of this theme, is the way the presence of Czech soldiers in Iraq is treated as a rather 
ridiculous notion: 
 
JW:  On this area here, security, what kind of problems are we talking about?  I think you said 
something about terrorism, or the war in Iraq … 
 
O:  All of that’s a problem, but our society doesn’t engage itself much with those things. 
 
Z:  Our society is struggling to accustom itself to having professional soldiers.38  We’re not used to it.  
How many times do young boys get into the car and it turns out they’re professional soldiers … 
When I look at them I think ‘Fuck, I can’t believe my eyes!’ 
 
O:  It’s something which is beyond our borders.  Our nation doesn’t think of going and protesting in 
front of parliament about whether we do or don’t need to send soldiers somewhere.  We leave it up 
to the state how it’s going to present itself. 
 
 Despite this weaker sense of subjecthood, many of the same discursive patterns are 
found in the Czech discussions as in the British and German ones.  The subjects are 
positioned as essentially peaceful: when the Plzeň group talk about the presence of Czechs in 
Iraq, Míra emphasises that these soldiers are ‘not figh ing, they’re just securing the region’, 
and the whole group agrees on the point that they ar  ‘not aggressors’.  Muslims, despite 
their relatively minor presence in the Czech Republic, are treated as a particular source of 
difficulties.  Zdeněk in Ostrava emphasises:  ‘We’re not racists, but it’s a major problem that 
there’s a lot of foreigners around, and a lot of them are Muslim foreigners, and Muslim is a 
different nature from Christian … Shiites, Christians, they’re all different.  So therefore 
problems arise.  There’ll be problems here in a while like the problems around the world 
generally.  Already they want to build a mosque, because a lot of them go to the spas.  That’s 
what they want.  And they don’t know how to compromise, Muslims … that’s the Muslim 
for you.  It’s a problem, it’s always a problem, and even if it looks like it’s OK they’re still 
thinking something different behind your back.  It’s a different mentality, different 
upbringing, different everything.  They treat their wives and children differently.  Here a 
                                                
38 The Czech army was fully professionalised in 2004 with the ending of compulsory military service. 
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woman is equal, an equal partner, but not with them.  And it’ll never work well together, 
there’ll always be problems.’   
 While discussion of the Roma tends to connect them more to economic or law-and-
order problems, and to find them evaluated according to criteria of economic 
(un)productivity or criminal habits, a passage from the Ostrava group shows how on occasion 
they are also enveloped with the repertoires characteristic of Relations between Peoples, in 
the suggestion namely that gypsies are essentially of foreign extraction and should perhaps 
be sent back to from where they came: 
 
M:  Sládek and his party,39 they had really extreme opinions on everything … 
 
J:  … On expelling the gypsies and sending them to Romania and to India … 
 
M:  Extreme, extreme, very extreme, badly presented.  He said what the majority of people think here 
… [Z: But vulgarly and arrogantly …]  But yeah, you can’t just say it like that, that’s not on. 
 
J:  Hang on.  They say that we’re racists.  We’re not racists.  This guy got into my car, British guy 
from a humanitarian organisation, they look after gypsies, and this guy’s a gypsy from India.40  I 
drove him to the district where the gypsies live, I took him there.  And then these people swore at 
him and abused him.  They broke glass, they made all sorts of problems.  Of course they say those 
are normal general problems, but they say that we’re racists.  We’re not racists.  There was a 
competition here, a really popular nationwide competition on TV called Eurostar … or whatever 
it’s called, Superstar … it’s a music thing, it’s al o in Britain and Germany, and here a gypsy won 
it.  So are we racists, are we?  If we were racists then this gypsy, even if he knew how to sing, we 
wouldn’t have given it to him.  We’re like this: the one with the best voice wins. 
 
The idea that ‘gypsies’ should be expelled to India or Romania is presented as a ‘very 
extreme’ expression of what most people think (but which they cannot say quite so openly).41  
This does not prevent Josef positioning the subjects (‘we Czechs’) as sensible and open-




                                                
39 Miroslav Sládek, leader of the far-right Republican Party and known for his strongly provocative statements 
concerning the Roma and the Sudeten Germans.  The party was dissolved in 2001. 
40 This may be a reference to Kumar Vishwanathan, an Indian human-rights campaigner based in Ostrava who 
is known for his work with the Roma community.  He is neither Romany nor British, but may have been taken 
for this on the basis of his darker skin and use of English.  
41 Interestingly, in the middle of a discussion about the misbehaviour of ‘gypsies’, Petr in Plzeň asks ‘is there 
racism in England?’  The word racism had not appeared t all before this mention. 
42 This reference is to the second Pop Idol competition held in the Czech Republic (in 2005).  It was won by a 
Roma singer, Vlasta Horvath, though not without controversy: another Roma singer, Martina Balogová, said to 
be of good voice, was voted out of the competition in an earlier round, provoking criticism in the British press 
for anti-Roma bias.  Some concluded that the victory f  Horvath owed something to a desire amongst the 
voting public to put this record straight. 
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B)  Comparables and Counterparts 
 
The motifs used to denote opponents in this Relations between Peoples domain are not 
applied to all peoples mentioned, in particular not to those who seem to form part of ‘the 
West’ – for example, when participants talk about ‘the French’, ‘the Italians’, ‘the 
Americans’ etc.  While these are sometimes described as having ‘national characters’, it 
tends not to be assumed so readily that these are fundamentally irreconcilable.  Onřej in 
Liberec gets the backing of the group when he says that the English, as a ‘nation’, are 
‘excessive’ and ‘silly’ when they come to Liberec, wanting only to get heavily drunk, but 
they are described as a nuisance rather than a menace.  Nationalities associated with Europe 
and the West are not assumed to threaten each other in any existential way: as Uwe from the 
Würzburg group says above, with the agreement of Rainer nd Oliver: ‘If I meet an Italian or 
a British person or a French person, that’s my mentality, I’ve got no reservations with them, 
or an American, it’s all basically the same for me.’  Likewise, the possibility that 
disagreements amongst such peoples might lead to war is generally ruled out.  As Rainer puts 
it, ‘conditions like those that led to the First World War, to the Second World War, or also 
even in the century before, where there were hostilities within Middle Europe, Central 
Europe, that led to the world wars: they’ve been completely eliminated, gone forever, or at 
least for a long time.  Such a peaceful, harmonious exi tence together, no more threat 
towards the outside … The only conflicts which are left are far away from us, and here in 
Central Europe, in Europe, in the EU area we have a ry peaceful shared existence.  I think 
that’s very important, that’s a historical step forwa d.  Germany-Britain, the bombardment in 
the Second World War, this hard enmity is gone, gone ce and for all.’  War, says Petr in 
Plzeň, ‘is today a problem of the Third World.  Africa, there are always wars of some kind 
there.  In South America there’s nothing.  In North America of course not at all, nor in 
Europe.’  Míra supports him: ‘yeah, in the south they have wars with each other, they have 
civil wars.’  When opponents are constructed within t e West for problems in this domain – 
which is not often – they tend to be positioned at most as adversaries.  Also, a distinction is 
more readily made in these cases between peoples and governments, with aggression 
sometimes ascribed only to the latter.   
 Instead, when other European countries are referred to, it tends to be as places of 
comparison rather than as actors.  Unlike the Society and the Law domain, a broad range of 
comparables is evoked with regard to problems in this domain: transnational comparisons are 
common, at least amongst the British and German groups.  A white national majority is at 
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least one of the features shared by the countries which the Swansea group describes as facing 
the same problem to do with ‘invasion’: 
 
L:  I mean, the status of a refugee … a refugee flees his country and goes to the nearest safe place.  I 
presume that’s what refugee means.  And I mean, whyare they coming over to Britain?  
Obviously we take our fair share and help them out,b  I mean places like Australia and all that 
have got strict rules … 
 
D:  Germany, France … these countries have said no to them all, haven’t they. 
 
L:  Well France, there’s was a programme on telly, the police in France … it was all about haulage, 
and the police in France are chucking the asylum-seekers on the back of the lorries to get them out 
of the country.  To get ’em over here. 
 
[And a few minutes later:] 
 
M:  What about these asylum-seekers, are they going t  America then?  [L:  Yeah, they’re …]  Are 
they being caught?  I mean, it’s open for them to go to America, is it?  Asylum-seekers?  [L:  
They’re going all around the world …]  Australia doesn’t take ’em, does it. 
 
L:  That’s what I was going to say, the only one who really seems to be putting a stop to it and saying 
‘no, we’re not letting you in’ is Australia. 
 
M:  Sent them back on a boat, didn’t he. 
 
A:  And it’s Finland or somewhere where they put them in like an exclusion area, and if they step 
outside that … [D:  Switzerland.]  No, Sweden or Finland. 
 
D:  Yeah, I’m sure it’s Switzerland, that.  There’s a mile away from everything … [A:  And if they step 
outside that …]  There was a programme on the tellyabout a week or fortnight ago.  There’s a 
mile away from everything, and they can only go within that mile. 
 
 
The otherness of refugees and asylum-seekers is emphasised here to the extent that they are 
almost dehumanised, whereas a range of countries are mentioned as comparable – Australia, 
France, Germany, America, Finland and Switzerland.  What is it that links these latter?  
There is of course a difficulty here in what (if any) collective term to give them: whether one 
infers that they are all representatives of ‘white majority’ countries, or ‘the West’, or ‘liberal 
democracies’, or ‘historically Christian’ countries.  A passage from the Würzburg discussion 
exhibits several of these as markers for the places of comparison: 
 
U:  I recently read again how the British are supposed to have trashed the Germans [in newspapers like 
The Sun and The Daily Mirror].  I said to myself, well, you know, I’m not going to get caught up 
in this hysteria.  I’ve met enough British people and I’ve always got on really well with British 
people and I think it’s all rubbish.  Racism or whatever, it’s basically stupidity I think … [R: 
yeah].  Because … think about it, what is the difference between a British person and me?  
Basically there’s none at all.  He was born over the and I was born here. 
 
O:  They’re partly blood-related, through the Angles and Saxons … they also had German origins.  
[…]  As far as what he’s saying, with the Germans ad British, I don’t see that as a problem at all.  
The only thing which I see as a problem in Germany is the religion issue, Muslims and Christians 
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… [U: yeah].  That’s the only, fundamental problem, that Muslims are anchored here in the 
society, and on the one hand the women behave and dress like German women and on the other 
hand there’s the danger of attacks.  Muslim fundamentalism … [R: yeah, yeah].  And anyone, if he 
wants to, can commit a suicide attack here.  You can’t even expel them any more because a lot of 
them are already German citizens.   
 
U:  You have that problem as well, especially in Lond n.  The same problem.   
 
O:  ... In the whole of Europe … the Netherlands …  
 
R:  Yeah, exactly … they’re getting the same in Britain too, that’s right … [U:  ... The same problem 
...] 
 
O:  ... Britain ... London ... Very difficult.  A lot of Muslims there too … 
 
U:  ... And they’re also perverse.   And the problem is, OK I’m generalising a bit, if you have a 
hundred Muslims, one makes an attack, but the other 99, who know about it, they don’t speak up.  
They’re harmless, sure, but they wouldn’t say anythi g even if they knew, I think.  That is the 
danger [R:  Yeah, I agree …] For everyone, for the w ole western world, whether it’s Germany or 
Britain or the US.  I really see that as a problem.   
 
R:  It must be very pronounced in France too, I think the problem there is even greater.  In France, 
because of the close connection with Arab countries … Algeria … Morocco etc.   
 
U:  They’ve also got themselves to blame there, the French.  They raged around down there like 
maniacs back then.  That’s a dark chapter in French history, the Algerian war … [R: yeah, yeah]  
They slaughtered, they exploited to the extreme.  
 
O:  That goes back to colonialism – the Dutch, the British, the French, they were colonial powers.  
They whipped these countries back then and now the boomerang is coming back at them.  The 
Muslims are incorporated now and they’re trying to force through their interests. 
 
 
Comparable environments where people face the same problems of exposure to those 
collectively dangerous or intransigent are clearly mentioned in this passage: London, 
England or Britain, the Netherlands, France, the US, and ‘the whole of Europe’.  The 
differences between the subjects within these enviro ments are explicitly minimised: the 
distinction is merely that one was born here and the other was born there, there is even a 
blood relationship between them, and to be prejudiced towards them would be an act of 
‘stupidity’.  They are abbreviated to ‘the western world’, ‘Christians’ and former ‘colonial 
powers’.  The concept of ‘the west’ or ‘the western world’ is widely deployed (cf. a passage 
from Uwe above), but the religious element should not be eliminated, given how commonly 
it is deployed to heighten the sense of difference.43  Rather than seeking a meta-concept for 
the environments and comparables, it is perhaps best once again to think in terms of a series 
of concepts sharing a family resemblance.  The white-majority countries, the west, the 
                                                
43 Peter in Kassel uses it to emphasise the peacefulness of the environment and comparables: ‘you won’t see 
here a Protestant saying to a Catholic “we must have a duel” or “I’ll kill you because you’ve got different 
beliefs.”’  When Hans mentions the counter-example of Northern Ireland, this is treated as a rather odd 
exception.   
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Christian world and the peaceful world would be core concepts in this; the ‘colonial powers’ 
(mentioned only here) and ‘liberal democracies’ (mentioned nowhere) would be very much 
subsidiary ones. 
 One might think that the experience of the Third Reich, whose sui generis nature is 
keenly appreciated in the German discussions, would render transnational comparisons 
difficult.  A passage from the Lübeck discussion suggests rather that it merely problematises 
them: 
 
W:  Whoever disputes the Holocaust and claims that … that there was no annihilation of the Jews and 
the rest, then they’re completely far-right, they’r beyond credibility.  Because we can’t deny that, 
the Holocaust took place.  But I think, in the meantime sixty years have passed in this country and 
there’s far too much banging on about it today.  In other countries where there’ve been similar 
problems (not to the same extent) it’s handled quite d fferently.  If I look at France for example, 
Le Pen, who’s emerged as a right-wing, more or less right-wing radical figure … In France it’s 
never been the same problem as it’s been here with the NPD or the Republicans …
 
J:  Even to mention the past … because of the past we have, it’s particularly difficult for us to be far-
right, or to develop in that direction.  It’s particularly difficult for us, that’s certainly clear.  [W: 
yeah]  
 
N:  And it’s important that one deals with that.  And that one draws the lessons of it, and … avoids that 
radicalism, that one should always keep what happened back then at the back of one’s mind, and 
meditate on it … how one discriminates … 
 
J:  Because there’s never been anything comparable to the Holocaust in history, you really can’t 
compare it with France or Le Pen, it’s a completely different level … 
 
W:  I didn’t want to compare them in that respect, I just wanted to point out that Le Pen, for example, 
he was against foreigners, against Moroccans and Algerians who’ve come to France, and … that 
… in France he was able to say it, but if we here in Germany say ‘OK, we want to have fewer 
Turks here …’ or ‘We want to have fewer Iranians,’ or whatever, then immediately we’re neo-
Nazis.  No politician would say that here. 
 
Here one sees Niklas, not for the first time, intervening to disrupt a portrayal of the Germans 
as victims.  Germany is held to be distinctive in the extent to which open criticism is 
tolerated, and Jürgen and Wolfgang subsequently affirm that the Holocaust cannot be 
compared; but Wolfgang still maintains that France is a comparable to the extent the French 
share the same problems associated with immigration s the Germans. 
 Amongst the Czech groups comparisons with experiences in other countries are 
much rarer.  The home environment is seen as a peaceful place where open conflict does not 
take place – as doubtless the British and Germans would agree, were it not for the arrival of 
immigrants from outside.  Whilst the Czech groups certainly do not imply a strong boundary 
between eastern and western Europe in this domain (unlike in Economics), they do 
distinguish between big states and small states, and doubt is expressed as to whether certain 
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problems experienced in the former can be expected in the latter.  ‘Why would there by 
terrorism in the Czech Republic?’ asks Míra in Plzeň.  Pressed as to why Britain had recently 
been targeted, he makes the link with the invasion of Iraq: 
 
M:  Because Britain was the main ally of America in the war against … 
 
P:  Yeah, but it’s possible another conflict will come up and certainly countries will put themselves 
either on one side or the other.  We’ll put ourselves again on the side of the West and then just as 
in Britain, France and the rest … today you’ve got attacks in Germany … [M:  I think Poland is 
…]  Poland is now the main boss in Iraq … 
 
M:  Poland’s in a worse position than we are as far as the threat of terrorism goes. 
 
With a fair measure of interpretation, one might conclude that for the Czechs the comparable 
environments are other small (perhaps white-majority) countries which are assumed to play 
little active role in international relations.  The relative thinness of the material here makes a 
nuanced conclusion hard to ground though.   
  
 As we survey these passages to do with Relations between Peoples, some of them 
undoubtedly quite disturbing, it is worth recalling the purpose of the study.  What the goal is 
not is to suggest that taxi-drivers are incorrigibly prejudiced, or to point the finger at 
individuals and establish that ‘David in Swansea is racist’, or merely to provoke the reader 
with colourfully outrageous bits of transcript.  The aim is rather to identify common types of 
discursive practice and their implications for political association, including the ways in 
which they run counter to a democratic political community.  To summarise what has been 
seen, the subjects in this domain are generally formulated as the white national majority, with 
connotations of good sense, peacefulness and the avoidance of extremes.  Their opponents 
inevitably take on the inverse of these qualities: they tend to be described as being of 
fundamentally different appearance (elements of which include colour and / or religious-
cultural expressions), as being uncompromising and perhaps aggressive, and as doing things 
to the extremes.  These motifs are widespread in the British and German discussions in 
particular, even though individual speakers occasionally choose to repudiate them.  Unlike in 
the Society and the Law domain, here the main opponents of the moment are easily cast as a 
transborder unity, as a single ‘Muslim people’, and u like in the Economics domain they are 
repeatedly positioned as enemies, threatening the coll ctive security and the ‘way of life’ of 
the political subjects.  Whereas the key idea to describe eastern Europeans, which we saw 
when looking at the Economics domain, is ‘they don’t know how to work and contribute’, 
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and one of the key criticisms made of certain other groups, as we saw when looking at 
Society and the Law, is that ‘they don’t know how to behave properly’, here one of the key 
criticisms of Muslims – the main opponents in Relations between Peoples – is ‘they don’t 
know how to compromise.’   
 With emphasis on the irrationality, aggression andintransigence of the other, there is 
a strong tendency to construct essential attributes which are unsusceptible to change and 
which do not permit the possibility of compromise.  These patterns of demarcation represent 
a strong divergence from the type of collective positi ning associated with a political bond.  
Transnational comparisons are made with some frequency, and counterparts are explicitly 
evoked in these comparable environments, but the effect is to harden the categories of ‘we’ 
and ‘them’.  Furthermore, it is not specifically a European context which is being described, 
but a broader one based on the notion of ‘the West’ and the supposed predicament of 
‘western peoples’.  Whereas the range of comparisons drawn for problems to do with 
Economics is rather narrower than the contours of a European polity, and for problems to do 
with Society and the Law transnational comparisons are mainly absent, for prblems to do 
with Relations between Peoples they extend considerably beyond the boundaries of any 
putative European polity. 
 
   
Overview 
 
This chapter has introduced the concepts of ‘political subjects’ ‘opponents’ (adversaries and 
enemies), ‘counterparts’ and ‘comparable environments’, and has used them as the basis for a 
reading of the source material designed to elaborate on the second element of a political 
bond.  It has outlined the main acts of positioning found with regard to the three key problem 
domains of Economics, Society and the Law and Relations between Peoples.  A 
recapitulation is provided in the table below.  
 In line with our conceptualisation of the political common, we have arrived at a 
discursive repertoire which is rich and complex, but not unpatterned.  To render it in the 
stark, uncompromising square boxes of a matrix inevitably risks conveying an exaggerated 
sense of uniformity and overtones of determinism.  Once more one encounters an important 
theoretical tension: discursive practices are patterned (that is, they are partially rule-bound), 
yet any attempt to express that pattern will inevitably be incomplete and procrustean, since 
speakers may sometimes diverge from that pattern, and since new patterns are always being 
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generated.44  Any basic notion of free will must allow that individuals may want to reject the 
‘we’ that other participants construct (as we have seen some do, especially as regards 
Relations between Peoples), and that speakers may venture into discursive territory which is 
not rule-bound, where patterned ways of speaking are less apparent (as is the case with 
problems to do with Quality of Life, to which Chapter 6 returns).  Nevertheless, as an 
indication of prominent discursive features rather than as a rendition of tightly-bound 
structure, an overview carries heuristic value: 
   









Active formulation: the 
contributors, the working people. 
(More) passive formulation: 
normal / simple / real / little 
people, without special 
advantages; the people in the 
middle (esp. for British). 
 
 
Those who play by the 
rules, or who break only 
minor rules. 




The peaceful and 
sensible majority, often 











The oppressive – the rich, 
private companies, shareholders. 
 
The non-contributors: 
scroungers (for British), the 
corrupt (esp. for Czechs – see 
next section); ‘cheaper’ workers, 
esp. from eastern Europe. 
 
Status: adversaries rather than 
enemies, to be encouraged to 




egotists, incompetent / soft 
judges and police; certain 
minority groups (esp. of 
Turkish or Balkan origin in 
Germany; esp. Roma in 
Czech Rep.). 
 
Status: mixed.  Adversaries 
if they can be educated, 






fanatics, often with 
religious difference 
emphasised.  Esp. 
Muslims. 
 
As adversaries: the 
overly tolerant (inc. soft 
politicians); powerful 
peoples and 
governments within the 










Nearby European countries of a 
similar level of economic 
development. 
For British / Germans: countries 





Virtually no transnational 
comparisons, except 
amongst Czechs on 
corruption.  Occasional 
comparisons and contrasts 
with the past. 
 
 
Other western countries  
- states of Europe, US, 
Australia and others. 
Amongst these, for the 
Czech groups mainly 
other small states.  
Summary of Collective Positioning 
 
Perhaps one of the key points which emerges from this s udy of collective positioning is the 
importance of taking seriously the conflictual dimension when conceptualising the kind of 
                                                
44 Cf. Tully, 'The Agonic Freedom of Citizens', in particular p.164. 
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collective bond that could underpin a polity.  The problems of these three core domains, the 
discussion of which formed the bulk of the interviews as a whole, are articulated not in 
detached or consensual terms but with a strong sense of ‘we’ and ‘them’.  In articulating a 
political common, participants construct and orient themselves towards certain social 
groupings while positioning others as hostile to these.  There is no reason to suppose that this 
is purely an artefact of the interview format – after all, it was problems, not people, that 
participants were encouraged to talk about, and it was generally to abstract issues rather than 
social groups that the topic cards made reference.  And yet, as they discussed these matters of 
common concern, quite clear boundaries came to be marked out between those who shared in 
these problems as ‘people like us’ and those whose p ition on them was quite different, 
either generative of the problems or contributory in some way.  For our wider purposes, the 
importance of conceptualising the collective bond such that one can accommodate this 
political adversarialism seems clear.   
 Conversely, the difficulties attendant in conceptualising the collective bond either in 
terms of shared values (a values bond, as described in Chapter 1) or in terms of diffuse 
feelings of trust and solidarity across the citizen body (a social bond) also seem to emerge in 
this study.  Note for example the absence, almost total, of the invocation of ‘Europeans’ as a 
subject position.  There is virtually no problem-are  – with the possible exception of the 
marginalised problems of Quality of Life, to which we shall return – where it is assumed that
‘we Europeans’ hold a common perspective and are aff cted by problems alike.  
Unemployment, for example, is not treated as a problem for ‘Europeans’ in general, as an 
affliction which all share a common purpose in seeking to overcome, but as a problem for 
‘the little people’ or ‘the ordinary people’, where these exist both in ‘our country’ and in 
other European countries, and where in both they ar at the mercy of a range of economically 
more powerful actors.  Problems of social atomisation and increasing egoism likewise are 
treated not as abstract and undiscriminating developments before which all are equal, but as 
hitting in particular the minority of people who both ‘play by the (important) rules’ and ‘stick 
up for the rules’.  Of course, the prevalence of this kind of positioning does not imply that a 
broader sense of the common good is altogether missing: the calls are generally for ‘fairness’ 
and for a restoration of ‘the middle’, not for the absolute ascendancy of ‘people like us’.  But 
it is generally assumed that this pursuit of a better s ate of affairs would have to unfold in 
circumstances where a set of opponents are blocking the way, and with whom some form of 
conflict would be necessary.  In the face of this tendency to adversarialism, those arguing for 
a values or a social bond would perhaps have to argue that it is the discussion of political 
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problems itself which opens up these divisions, andthat they may be closed and consensus 
restored by shifting the focus elsewhere, to the values that bind or to practices of cooperation.  
Such a move is difficult though, since it would imply a diversion from one of the essential 
concerns of a political community, perhaps even theparamount one, which is the 
contemplation and amelioration of problems which have been articulated as public rather 
than private in nature.  To overlook them would be to remove the ‘political’ from political 
community. 
 However, what also emerges from the empirical material is that certain acts of 
collective positioning incompatible with a political community characterised by liberal 
tolerance are made with some degree of regularity, and with regard to one domain of public 
life in particular.  When problems of Relations between Peoples are raised, there is frequent 
evocation of enemies – those whose very presence is treated as illegitimate.  ‘Muslims’ 
represent the category most frequently thus invoked in these interviews, though one can 
imagine that in other periods other terms would perform the same role – the specific referent 
of the positioning act can be thought of as contingent.45  At first glance this pattern seems to 
open up a significant line of critique against a political bond as a promising conceptual 
response to the question of the common.  In proposing it as a normative ideal, we contrasted 
it not just with values-based and trust-based approaches to the collective bond but also to 
culturalist approaches, which it was suggested were always liable to be exclusionary and/or 
repressive.  Having concluded from empirical research that a significant body of the 
problems which make up the political common invite acts of positioning which are likewise 
exclusionary and uncompromising, have not the same dangers which we wanted to avoid 
returned ‘through the back door’, severely weakening the appeal of this ideal?  The objection 
is not compelling.  The crucial point is that, by speaking analytically in terms of problems 
one holds out the possibility of change, since it is clear that different kinds of 
problematisation and ways of understanding these problems are possible, and indeed that – as 
will be seen in the next chapter – a plurality of discursive motifs concerning their origins and 
nature are already in circulation.  A problem-oriented perspective, speaking for instance of 
problems such as group conflict or the unwanted exposure to alien cultural symbols, holds 
out the possibility that opposition is based on substantive disagreement, and that 
compromises are possible if those problems are addressed or redescribed.  Thus the 
                                                
45  Lamont brings this point out clearly in her study of American and French working men: the racial andclass 
boundaries drawn are quite different for the two grups, with the implication that ‘nothing is inevitable’ about 
how such boundaries are drawn. Lamont, The Dignity of Working Men, p.6. 
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possibility of some form of political action, based on fostering an alternative and more 
appropriate set of discursive practices, is fully recognised and a critical stance can be 
maintained.  If, by contrast, one takes a cultural bond as one’s ideal, one is liable to accord 
too strong a degree of permanence and acceptability to he acts of positioning one finds, 
acquiescing in the assumption that they are constitutive of the we-people and that ‘others’ 
(opponents, in our terminology) are constitutively different.  Normatively unattractive 
formulations for the ‘people like us’ become, from this perspective, much more difficult to 
shake off.  The question of discursive change will be dealt with in more depth in Chapter 6, 
but it is as well to highlight the advantage of trea ing problems, not cultural markers or 
beliefs about such markers, as the reference-point for collective positioning. 
 Furthermore, problems to do with Relations between Peoples constitute only one 
aspect of the political common, and the acts of positioning they give rise to are but a subset 
of a wider set of discursive practices.  These discus ions indicate the importance of taking 
seriously the issue-context in which positioning occurs, for it varies from one domain to the 
next.  That there is plurality of this kind has a normative appeal since, as has been suggested, 
it implies multiple possibilities for inclusion as well as for exclusion.  It prevents the 
emergence of one over-arching axis of conflict, based on a single category of ‘we’ and a 
single category of ‘them’, of the kind that might lead to the fragmentation of the political 
community.  Instead, the construction of opponents is always specific to a particular set of 
problems, and there is always the possibility (the realisation of which is a practical matter) 
that those ‘really-existing people’ who come to be positioned as opponents by association 
with one set of criteria can be repositioned as ‘peopl  like us’ through association with 
another.  Those positioned as economic adversaries may be ‘redeemed’ as rule-abiding folk, 
and those positioned as opponents as regards the deployment of religious symbols may be 
repositioned as sharing the same predicaments in the domain of Economics.  A plurality of 
concerns and ways of speaking has the potential to bind together, in a web of overlapping 
conflicts, those who take up these discursive practices.   
 If this plurality itself is attractive, it may be that here one has grounds to abandon the 
model which is idealised in the traditional language of the nation-state, where the emphasis is 
on a single national ‘identity’ or a coherent hierarchy of identities.46  The variety of acts of 
collective positioning one can observe in discussions such as these, some of them quite 
localised while others evoking counterparts in a range of different countries, seems to open 
                                                
46 Wagner, 'Crises of Modernity'. 
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out the possibility of something more complex, of a poly-dimensional political project in 
which different struggles and contests are played out with regard to different problem 
domains, potentially with appeal to multiple sets of p litical institution.  If a European polity 
were to fit comfortably into this vision, it would require that a European context be invoked 
more frequently, and on more problems, than has generally been found the case in this 
chapter, where it has been noted instead that the context is more often a local one, a semi-
European one, or a broader-than-European one.  It would also require a conducive set of 
assumptions regarding the worth and plausibility of a political project.  Organised collective 
address of the problems of the political common needs to ‘make sense’ if a European polity 








In a community one could properly call political, rather than a cultural community with 
political features, or a thinly tied assembly of individuals, the noteworthy allegiances would 
be those of a problem-oriented kind.  We have explored this claim in terms of the allegiances 
of citizens to other citizens.  The same proposal can now be made on the related question of 
allegiances towards the institutions of the polity.  The appearance of a political bond would 
depend on these institutions and their demands making sense to people in problem-related 
terms.  There would need to be an awareness that these institutions provide significant 
opportunities for the pursuit of common purposes.  There is no need to imagine citizens as 
spending their daily lives locked in public debate nd seeking fulfilment of all their goals by 
political means: nothing so grand is intended.  Butthere would need to be some sense that 
political institutions can answer to at least some of the concerns of ‘people like us’.  This is 
what one wants to express by referring, as the third element of a political bond, to the 
plausibility of a political project.  Seeking to address the problems of the political common in 
an organised, collective fashion would need to be treated as a sensible and feasible 
proposition.  If the sense of shared predicament in the face of common problems is what 
could bind citizens to their ‘counterparts’ further afield, it is a sense of the worth of a 
political project which could both augment this and couple it with a certain allegiance to the 
institutions of the polity.   
In this chapter these ideas are developed further by exploring two kinds of 
assumption in the empirical material: assumptions to do with what is relevant for the 
explanation of problems, and assumptions concerning the extent to which they are amenable 
to organised address.  Both allow one to think more clearly about what it is for a political 
project to ‘make sense’ to people.  Certain kinds of discursive practice, it is suggested, serve 
to ‘prepare the ground’ for a European polity, while others may diminish its credibility.  The 
kinds of explanation commonly given for problems are important because they express 
expectations concerning the parameters within which political agency can be effective.  How 
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a set of problems is explained opens up certain possibilities for their remedy while at the 
same time closing down others.  Furthermore, where there is a lack of explanatory resources 
altogether, this may have the consequence – even if the problems are taken seriously and the 
desire for change is stated – that they are treated with a sense of fatalism that puts in doubt 
the worth of organised action.1  By looking at the repertoire of explanations for problems to 
do with Economics, Society and the Law and Relations between Peoples, we can therefore 
establish some general guiding principles regarding what kinds of political project will be 
received as appropriate.  Then, by looking directly a  the patterns of assumption concerning 
the possibilities for action, we will be able to identify more specifically what tends to be 
expected in terms of organised address for each of t e problem domains.  At stake here is 
what can be achieved and the means which are most applicable.  Having explored the 
empirical material in this way, we hope by the end of this chapter to have indicated at a 
theoretical level what may be meant by referring to the plausibility of a political project, and 
more empirically what kinds of commonly-made assumptions one finds concerning politics 
as a problem-solving process.  This will enable us then in Chapter 6 to trace out the 
implications for a European polity, and to consider the extent to which the accommodation of 
such a polity may require changes in discursive practice. 
 
 
Explanatory Motifs and the Possibilities for Action 
 
‘Explanation’ as a feature of everyday talk can be conceptualised in a number of ways.2  
Instinctively, there might seem good grounds to treat it strictly as a matter of reported 
causality: explanations involve the giving of a reason or multiple reasons for the emergence 
of a problematic situation.  By way of example, one can take the instance of a ‘particularly 
hot summer’.  Someone treating this as a problematic situation and wanting to account for it 
might supply a reason as follows: ‘This has been a particularly hot summer because of the 
build-up of CO2 emissions.’  It is a straightforward example, and the element of reported 
causality is quite clear: it is the fact of a build-up of CO2 emissions which is being treated as 
                                                
1 This point is well made in Gamson, Talking Politics, p.6. 
2 The discussion here naturally excludes explanation as a puzzle in the philosophy of science.  Further, within 
the field of lay explanation, it excludes ‘mentalist’ or psychological approaches such as attribution theory for 
the reasons outlined in Chapter 2, and draws instead mainly on approaches emerging from ethnomethodology.  
A useful overview of some of the ways in which lay explanation has been explored is Charles Antaki, 
'Explanations, Communication and Social Cognition', in Charles Antaki (ed.), Analysing Everyday Explanation: 
A Casebook of Methods (London: Sage, 1988). 
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the reason for this summer being hot.  The statement acts neatly as a reply to a ‘why’ (or a 
‘how come’) question.  One could, if one wanted to,extend the analysis further by 
considering the underlying idea or warrant (in Stephen Toulmin’s terminology3) that build-
ups of CO2 do generally cause hot summers, and indeed the possible reasons for maintaining 
that this is so (the backing for the warrant), for instance a newspaper article which describes 
consensus opinion amongst scientists as holding that build-ups of CO2 have this effect.  This 
kind of logical analysis of isolated statements has an attractive air of the methodical, and with 
carefully designed utterances it works well to highlight the reason-giving aspect of 
explanation.   
 There is more to explanation, however, than the mere presence of reasons and 
reasons for accepting reasons.  Issues of language sage and of context are crucial.  In the 
example above, the explanation is constituted at least in part by the assumption that this was 
indeed a particularly hot summer in need of explanatio , with the consequence that it 
becomes important to explore what is commonly understood by the notion of a ‘particularly 
hot summer’, and likewise what one understands by ‘build-up’.  Definitions (conventions of 
usage, that is) are as much a part of explanations as reasons.  Furthermore, there is the 
assumption not just that build-ups of CO2 emissions cause hot summers, but that this is the 
most relevant fact in play in this particular instance: as opposed e.g. to changes in wind 
patterns or solar activity, or as opposed – more disruptively – to the possibility that the 
problematic situation was in fact indoors, that it was a particularly hot summer due to a 
failure of the air-conditioning.  Assumptions about relevance are critical.  Thus a good 
portion of the explanation lies not so much at the surface level of the utterance in the explicit 
expression of reasons, but in the assumptions of appropriateness which are embedded in the 
utterance and in the way one reads it, where these are matters of social convention and 
discursive context.  Indeed, one may plausibly come to the conclusion that almost any 
utterance can count as an explanation, and not just that which exhibits explicit reason-giving, 
depending upon the context in which one finds it and the questions which one asks of it.4  
What is more, when one is looking not at contrived and idealised utterances such as the 
above, or those generated in a tightly constrained experimental environment, but at 
spontaneous group discussion such as that which forms ur research material, one may have 
particular grounds for adopting a conception of explanation which is looser than that simply 
                                                
3 Stephen Toulmin, The Uses of Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958). 
4 Cf. Stephen W. Draper, 'What's Going On in Everyday Explanation?' in Charles Antaki (ed.), Analysing 
Everyday Explanation, p.16. 
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of reported causality.  As we have seen, in the group environment points are often made 
jointly by more than one participant, based on multiple interventions, and ostensible 
contradictions even within the single intervention may appear as a consequence of the 
deployment of different types of discursive resource.  To restrict oneself only to the 
identification of consistent reports of causality may be to exclude a large body of 
illuminating material. 
 Charles Antaki suggests that ‘perhaps the safest thing is to take no strict line on what 
will count as an explanation beyond the very general principle that it be some stretch of talk 
hearable as being a resolution of some problematic state of affairs.’5  While ‘resolution’ is a 
rather strong word, and one might prefer to speak perhaps of the response to a 
problematisation, the spirit of the suggestion is sound.  The guiding notion of explanation in 
this chapter will be likewise a quite general one, oriented broadly to what one can call 
patterns of assumption concerning what it is that is relevant to understanding problems.  This 
is by no means to overlook the reason-giving aspect of explanation – reasons and their 
absence are an important part of what we shall examine – but one should avoid a strict 
emphasis on these alone.  Faced with the contrapuntl rhythms of everyday conversation, the 
term ‘explanatory motif’ is probably more suitable than ‘explanation’.  Unlike the study of 
reason-giving in its ideal form, the examination of patterns of assumption is not a simple 
question of analysing what follows a ‘because’.  Assumptions are not flagged up by a clear 
set of syntactical markers, and it does not pay to focus too rigidly on the grammatical 
structure of utterances.  As an interpreting actor, the analyst naturally does not put an equal 
emphasis on all assumptions identifiable in the text, but highlights some in particular as these 
correspond to the theoretical concerns of his/her work. 
 While in principle one can select any passage of text and usefully analyse it for 
explanatory motifs, those that are explored in this c apter have been chosen for their richness 
– that is, for the presence in concentrated form of m tifs which are dispersed more widely 
throughout the material.  Many such passages appeared quite naturally in conversation, as 
participants articulated and talked through the problems under discussion.  Free-flowing 
conversation provided many opportunities to study repo ted causality, the ascription of 
characteristic traits to people and situations, the invocation of reference-points, and the usage 
of important concepts.  In addition, during the interviews themselves, certain interventions 
from the researcher were designed so as to elicit assumptions concerning the facts relevant to 
                                                
5 Antaki, Explaining and Arguing, p.4. 
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the problems at hand.  Some were quite direct, including questions such as ‘how do you 
explain that problem?’ or ‘why does that problem arise?’; some were more indirect, 
exploring related issues such as the attribution of responsibility with questions such as ‘who 
is to blame for this problem?’  These questions are ambiguous on the criteria of what is 
relevant, and so – given that no response can include all the possibly relevant factors – 
participants would have to discriminate between the rel vant and the less so.  This produced 
material fertile for analysis: one then studies whether, for instance, connections are drawn 
primarily to local factors centred on actors and mechanisms within the home environment, or 
whether they are made to broader processes assumed to play out at a transnational or global 
level.  By examining the reference-points invoked, one is able to explore the spatial context 
in which the problems of each domain are assumed to unf ld.  Alternatively, one might find 
that such questions drew puzzlement or uncertainty in response, implying the unavailability 
to participants of explanatory resources with which to handle the problems in question.  On 
occasions one finds interesting instances of the non-attribution of responsibility, when it was 
conceded that an actor’s conduct had led to a problematic state of affairs, but they were not 
blamed on the grounds that they had no choice.  
   
 Consideration of the repertoire of explanatory motifs acts as a prelude to looking at 
what possibilities for action are assumed to exist.  That something should be done about the 
problems of the political common is generally implied in the urgency and often the 
indignation with which they are articulated.  That something can be done about them is a 
separate issue.  Problems affecting ‘people like us’ could be cited with a strong degree of 
involvement without this necessarily being matched by a sense that they might feasibly be 
addressed.6  As with explanatory motifs, one looks at the assumptions which are embedded in 
the flow of discussion, as well as at responses to direct interventions from the researcher 
designed to elicit the taken-for-granted.  Probing questions included ‘can that problem be 
avoided?’, ‘can anything be done about it?’, and ‘what kinds of action can be taken?’  Where 
the possibility of action was affirmed, of interest then would be the agent deemed appropriate 
to leading it. 
 Chapter 6 will look specifically at how the EU is invoked in these discussions.  Here 
we shall be making a preliminary set of distinctions concerning a) whether possibilities for 
                                                
6 One can of course imagine that, were such scepticism to be practised over a substantial period of time, t could 
lead to the normalisation of the problems involved to the point where they are treated as ‘facts of life’ and 
thereby deproblematised.   
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action of any kind are recognised, and b) if so, which of three different approaches tends to 
be emphasised.  Andrew Perrin has usefully proposed that citizen expectations concerning 
the remedy of political problems be clustered into three broad methods, ‘governmental’, 
‘public’ and ‘private’.7  Where the governmental method is called for, this involves the 
expectation that government officials can adopt policies that tackle the problems in question, 
that political parties can be judged according to their willingness to pursue such policies, and 
that those that fail to do so can be rejected at the polling booth.  The public method, by 
contrast, seeks to involve other people rather than government itself in the remedy of the 
problems in question.  Society-led collective action such as the formation of social 
movements, the organising of boycotts, or the use of the media to communicate with a wider 
public, would be the kinds of move advocated in this approach.  Unlike the other two, the 
private method is not based on organised collective action: rather like Albert Hirschman’s 
concept of ‘exit’,8 it involves moves to avoid the problems in question rather than to make a 
concerted effort to resolve them.  The private method of action, one may therefore note, 
contributes nothing to a political bond: being unorganised and individualist, it plays no role 
in making sense of a political project intended to address the problems of the political 
common.  The governmental method has a clear role to play, in that the expectation of 
purposeful governmental policies immediately suggests a longer-term project that enacts 
these.  The public/societal method is of some relevance too, in that societal action suggests 
communication with those assumed to share in the problems in question, and thus may 
contribute further to the integrative acts of collective positioning that were looked at in the 
previous chapter.  Thus when possibilities for action are emphasised in these texts we shall 
be alert to which of these three categories of action seems to best capture the kinds of 





A)  Explanatory Motifs 
 
One of the first things to note about problems to do with Economics is that many of them 
tend to elude explanation.  They form a large propotion of the discussions and are discussed 
                                                
7 Perrin, Citizen Speak, pp.63-4; pp.116ff. 
8 Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States 
(Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1970). 
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with considerable urgency, as by now should be clear, but there is often a sense of mystery 
concerning their origins.  Particularly for problems with a numerical dimension, such as 
rising prices, a widespread lack of explanatory resources seems to be evident.  The 
participants from the Swansea group are not untypical as they struggle to explain a rise in 
fuel prices, house prices and mortgages: ‘Now how can they justify this in Britain,’ asks 
David, ‘not just in Swansea, in London or in other cities, the purchase of a house can go 
from, for example, from £50,000 to £200,000 in two years.  It’s ludicrous … more debt, more 
stress, more everything …’.  The researcher took the opportunity to intervene with a 
question:  ‘Why are the prices going up so much do you think?’  David again: ‘Why has it 
gone up? … I don’t know, I can’t answer that.  Maybe cos five or ten years ago the cost of 
shares went up and everyone thought “oh this is a good bet, let’s jump on it”, and it all went 
back then and they all lost thousands of pounds.  It’s the same what happened with the 
properties.  Whether it’ll start coming down I don’t know. […]  But you know, everything’s 
got to come to a head, hasn’t it …’.  David’s refernce to shareholders adds a further element 
to the mystery, an extension of the pattern, but does little to make sense of it.  All he has to 
guide him, it seems, is the very general notion that t ings ‘come to a head’, and perhaps that 
what goes up must come down. 
With similar uncertainty, when the Norwich group reports improvements in the local 
economy, these are accounted for not so much on the grounds of a successful organised 
revival as on the idea that luck inevitably changes.  Leyton refers to economic recovery in 
Wales and the north-east of England: 
 
L:  … But them particular areas at the time went through bad times on that change.  As you say, 
they’ve changed now, they’ve gone through other avenues.  They’ve built the city up now, they’re 
doing other things. 
 
JW:  How did that happen, how did they recover, do you think? 
 
M:  Well we had no other choice.  We had absolutely no other choice.  She took literally …she took 
everything, she took everything. 
 
L:  She took the rug completely from under their feet. 
 
M:  We used to have to go to the football matches … it’s funny when you look back … I left school in 
1981 and I was called one of ‘Thatcher’s children’, and that was the saying in them days, 
‘Thatcher’s children’.  Over three million people unemployed.  We’d never had that before.  
Never.  [L:  Yeah, that was a bad … very bad time …] [ ] And what that bitch did, she broke 
families up, people were literally committing suicide because of her.  Because they were getting 
big insurances out, getting in their cars and driving at walls, basically, because they’d lost all their 
dignity.  And the funny thing about it, yeah, is tha  going down a mine is one of the most 
disgusting things you can do.  She even took that off them.  You know, hanging from a bit of rope, 




JW:  What do they do now, what are the industries that they’ve recovered with …? 
 
L:  With life … I mean, you know as well as I do, with life itself, where one door shuts … [B:  Another 
one will open.]  Another one will open.  And these ar  typical changes.  Because their door shut, 
others opened, otherwise that would never have happened.  And all these bad times will always be 
in their minds until they end up wherever they end up at the end of the day … whatever they 
decide to do.   
 
B:  I don’t know if you know Norwich, but we had a big shoe industry here, massive shoe industry, I 
mean there was fifteen, sixteen factories, wasn’t there.  And as soon as we had the Common 
Market, cheap imports, we’ve just got the one factory now … 
 
G:  Valleys has shut down … 
 
L:  It’s happening everywhere now.  Industry now in Britain is virtually zero. 
 
B:  False economy … A big leisure centre, and insurance and office-work, that’s all Britain is these 
days. 
 
L:  But where does everybody work?  …  Apparently the working … what’s it, quota, has never been 
so high.  It’s higher now than it’s ever been …  [B:  What are they doing?]  You know, it’s a 
mystery.  There’ll always be sad thoughts in his mind and millions like him, you know.  But as I 
say, at the end of the day, you’ve got doors shut, others open. 
 
Even taking a loose understanding of what constitutes an explanation, there is rather little of 
it in this passage.  The regions recovered because they ‘had no choice’.  Things got better for 
the reason that they could not get worse.  A sense of obscurity surrounds the improved 
employment figures – ‘apparently …’, ‘where does everybody work?’ ‘what are they doing?’ 
‘you know, it’s a mystery’.  The economy is ‘false’.  Barry’s reference to ‘cheap imports’ is 
potentially more fruitful (this motif will be returned to below), but it is undeveloped, and 
Leyton’s motto about opening and closing doors – which Barry completes – seems to be 
primarily an acknowledgement of contingency, and also a consolation for contingency, in 
that good things can come out of bad (at the end of the day).  Why the doors might open and 
close is undiscussed: the doors seem to swing on their hinges, like doors in a draughty 
corridor. 
 While explanatory motifs are often thin on the ground for Economics, they are by no 
means absent.  Importantly – and this is the second point to emphasise – where they are 
present they tend to be broad and transnational, indeed global, in scope.  They invoke a 
whole range of factors extending far beyond the ‘home environment’ in which the problems 
are encountered.  Of course, local factors are not disregarded – there are certain themes 
which one sees with some frequency.  We have already seen that a link may be made 
between a country’s economic wellbeing and the willingness of people to contribute to the 
system, and that the problem of unemployment is explained at least partially in terms of the 
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(un)willingness of individuals to devote themselves to finding a job.  As Murda and David in 
Reading put it, ‘there are those who won’t work, and that don’t work’ – ‘and who won’t 
never work!’9  Excessive and wasteful bureaucracy, ill-judged regulations, and corruption 
(both in the private and public sectors) are further motifs which refer principally to factors 
centred in the home environment.  What is interesting, however, is how often these local 
aspects are explicitly connected to factors much further afield.  In the following extract, the 
Reading group explores why it is that some people choose not to look for work.  They start 
by looking at local explanations (distorted incentives for the unemployed) but progressively 
widen the scope of their explanations: 
 
M:  Fifteen, twenty years ago, a West Indian friend of mine, and we were just discussing things, and he 
said one of the worst things, living on the dole money, one of the worst things for the West Indian 
guys he said at the time was this dole money, becaus  it didn’t give them any incentive to go out.  
They had their house paid, they had a little bit of d le on top, and at that time, for that little era, 
they was quite happy and content.  So they didn’t have any incentive to do anything.  And that’s 
what’s happened with a lot of people now as well again, you know.  I mean, as long as your rent’s 
paid and a few things are paid, people have got no incentive to get off their arses and do anything.  
[…] The other thing, I think they’ve changed now, haven’t they: when somebody leaves school 
they can’t go on the dole straight away or something, I think it’s a couple of years or something?  
Which is good.  Because before, as soon as people are aving school at sixteen – Bam!, next thing 
they’re going down to the Social [Security] and signing on.  And I’m glad that they … you know, 
if it’s true that they have done away with that … I think it’s a couple of years before you can sign 
on, it’s good.  You know, in that time … 
 
S:  Yeah, but couple of years ago, plenty of work, all the factories, everything, yeah?  The people, as 
soon as they come out of college, they’re not going o  the dole money because there are many 
factories and they find a job working.  But now there’s no work left … 
 
M:  No [surprised], there’s still work left!  It’s how much you want it.   
 
D:  Students go to work part-time …  If you want work you find it.  If you are really destitute … 
 
S:  You’re a qualified man, you charge £10 an hour.  They come from India and Pakistan, they charge 
£4 an hour.  They’re not going to give you a job.  That goes to them.  Where do you get the money 
for eat for yourself, your children and missus?  You go dole money sign.  That’s the problem in 
this country. […] Afghanistan … and Bosnia …  They come for cheap!  They come for cheap!  
Cheap workers.  That’s the problem.  […] 
 
M:  But then it goes down to – where’s it gone [looks for card Education & Training] – Retraining.  
Because say like everybody, ten years ago, thought ‘oh, computers, I’m going to make loads of 
money.’  And everybody went into computers.  And then the whole thing became a little bit 
saturated, like with the IT and everything …  Now, there’s people out there crying for plumbers, 
crying for bricklayers, crying for something else, and they can’t get ‘em.  So: retraining.  You 
                                                
9 Or as Lee in Swansea has it, ‘there’s plenty of employment out there, people just don’t want to get off heir 
arse.’  Amongst the Czech groups, such comments often feed into a discussion of the Roma.  When asked who 
is responsible for unemployment, Míra and Petr in Plzeň put the blame ‘90% on those people themselves’.  ‘It’s
also the reluctance of people to move elsewhere,’ says Petr.  ‘If now … if you take the car factory in Kolín, they 
really lack people there but those ones in the north simply won’t go there.  And I think a lot of those people 
from the north, they’re simply never going to do anything.’  Petr fades out with a reference to towns ith a 
large gypsy community: ‘From Most and Chomutov …’.  ‘Ah, like that you mean,’ responds Román, evidently 
catching where the discussion is drifting. 
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can’t just go … It’s like the taxis now, just because everybody knows that ‘ok you can make a 
little bit of money on the black cabs’, everybody jumps in the black cabs …  Find something else!  
There’s loads of things out there.  […]  England for example is not a manufacturing country any 
more.  Hi-tech, yes, but like the old [unclear], it’s moved away from that into these lovely nice 
business parks and things and everybody’s in a nicesuit and everything …  Everything’s 
changing, and you have to like sort-of … If you say‘I’m a rag-n-bone man, I want to stay a rag-n-
bone man’, you can’t be because rag-n-bone man’s out the window.  Same like with the guy that 
used to have the horse and cart and drives the coal …  You know, it’s all changing, so you have to 
change with the time. 
 
H:  There used to be a Huntley-Palmer factory [in Reading], I’ve seen …  They make biscuits … [M:  
Huntley-Palmers, yeah.]  But the biscuit is still in demand, yeah.  So why does …? 
 
M:  But not particularly those biscuits … 
 
D:  They’ve still got an operation in Huyton up in Liverpool, there’s still a place there, Huntley-
Palmers’ve got.  It may have changed its name … 
 
M:  Also for example now, right, like with the new one, Prudential, right, they’ve taken their call 
centres over to India.  Why?  Because it’s cheaper.  Same with manufacturing.  I mean, if I had a 
factory and I was paying … 
 
S:  So, like, hang on, they pay the work to the India s.  So it’s less work in England then, isn’t it? 
 
D:  ’Course, yeah … but the economy for that company Prudential … they’re having a laugh …
 
S:   … Because Thatcher’s put up too much tax … the problem … they run away some other country.   
They have so many facilities over there … Pakistan, India, they have so many facilities and 
they’re not pushing for tax or anything …  They know if they ply the people for work that’s 
alright, they’re happy.  Over here, Thatcher get th knife in hand and she want to cut the throat … 
 
D:  Well not now … can’t really bring her up for everything … she’s been out of it for a while now … 
 
M:  It’s management skills …  If I had a factory, right, here, and my outgoings was worth say a million 
pounds, right, and then I could have the same factory in Pakistan, India or wherever, right, and my 
outgoings were going to be a thousand pounds, yeah, it’s management sense for me to pick up my 
stuff and move over there and still be able to bring my stuff over here …  It’s management sense, 
it’s nothing to do with Thatcher, it’s supply and demand and, you know, it’s where you can get 
your goods cheaper …  Like you - if you could get something cheap from Pakistan and come over 
and sell it for twice as much over here, you would do it.  Why?  Because it just makes sense for 
you to be able to make that profit margin.  […] OK, India’s very big and everything, it’s opened 
its doors and everything, but if you ever go shopping around you’ll find that everything – clothes, 
toys, tools – is made in China.  Now when China actu lly does get friendly with the west and 
opens the doors you’re not going to get nothing over here.  Every single factory is going to close 
down …  But that’s just the way it is, though.   They pay pittance over there and we want 
minimum £10 an hour.  So of course it’s going to go over there and things, you know, 
manufactured stuff, is going to come from over there … [D:  Yeah, yeah …]  Only hi-tech stuff … 
I mean, there was a time when anything made in England, people thought ‘Made in England’, 
wow.  Isn’t that any more.  Just hi-tech stuff now. 
 
An explanatory chain is being constructed here betwe n the local and the global: there is 
unemployment in the city because, even if the jobs are out there, they are not easy to walk 
into and require specialised skills; there is a lack of straightforward manual labour due to the 
decline of industry in the area (such as the closure of the biscuit factory), which is the result 
of companies moving their production processes elsewhere.  This, in turn, is to do with 
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‘management sense’ based on supply and demand: wages in places such as Pakistan, India 
and China are cheaper to finance than in Britain (‘they pay pittance over there and we want 
minimum £10 an hour’).  The problem is compounded by immigrants coming to Britain who 
are also willing to work for lower wages.  Global price and wage inequalities are directly 
linked to the problems experienced at home.  Even when Shafeek makes a rather 
idiosyncratic comment blaming Margaret Thatcher for raising taxes in Britain, and thus 
encouraging industry to move to Pakistan and India, he makes an argument which is 
premised on an inequality or imbalance between the home environment and the world 
outside.  India, Pakistan and China come through in this extract as what one might call 
relevant contrasts – places whose fundamental otherness is of significa ce for explaining the 
problems faced at home by the subjects.  As Murda in Reading declares, Britain ‘is no longer 
a manufacturing nation’ because Asian countries have t ken over that role thanks to their 
lower costs.  This corresponds with what was noted in the Norwich extract, where Asian 
countries and eastern Europe were mentioned in the same role.   
 A passage from the Würzburg group displays this broader spatial dimension clearly, 
with all participants emphasising the transnational when exploring the reasons for 
unemployment and the decline of industry, and citing a similar set of contrasting countries: 
 
R:  I wanted to say something more on the subject of work, something which seems important and one 
hears a lot in this context: globalisation.  Very much linked to unemployment because it’s possible 
for companies to go abroad relatively easily and simply to say – which wasn’t quite so easy before 
– ‘we’re going to the Czech Republic, we’re going to Poland, the jobs are cheaper there, the labour 
in Romania etc. and … we’ll do our manufacturing in China, Taiwan, it’s cheaper everywhere.’  
Globalisation’s the keyword, I’d say, another of the causes of high unemployment …  
 
U:  Yeah, and it’ll get worse too.  After a while, ven among these cheap countries, the Czech 
Republic becomes too expensive again … There are countries which do it even cheaper …  [R:  … 
Yeah … India, or Russia …]  … So one of these days a worker is going to be working all day long 
for a handful of peanuts ... The gap between rich and poor is getting bigger and bigger ...  [R: 
mmm, mmm].  I often think that some day – unless new factors come into play, you never know 
what may happen – that some day you’ll have the massively wealthy and the utterly destitute ... on 
one side of the city you’ll have the rich all living together, and on the other side you’ll have all the 
poor, passively going about their lives ...  [O:  Like back in the Middle Ages ... ]  Yeah ...  [O:  Up 
in the castle ...]  Up in the castle all the rich will be living ... [O:  And down below ...]  the plebs ... 
 
R:  Yeah, just like in the Middle Ages.  Really sharply polarised, so that there’s no middle layer any 
more.  It’s already going in that direction, it’s already looming here now.  Rich and poor are 
drifting further and further apart ...  
 
O:  And it’s going to intensify too, because for example in China another 200 million people are 
waiting for jobs.  The costs and the wages aren’t going up yet because they still have 200 million 
people who want work.  The wages aren’t going up.  In ten years … who’ll still be producing here 
then? 
 
U:  Right now in Germany we have this problem of wage dumping.  With the lowest wage …
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R:  These are splendid times for employers, it’s clear, because they can really extort the employees.  I 
mean, what’s going on here in Würzburg with Siemens-VDO, you know … [U: yeah], ‘either you 
work longer hours and take home lower wages – wage dumping – or we go abroad’, they want to 
go to the Czech Republic I think … [U: yeah].  And that’s the pattern with a lot of companies, 
isn’t it.  That they can say ‘we’re going abroad,’ or to individuals: ‘if you don’t want it there are 
five others behind you, another ten at the job centre, they’re all waiting to take over your job.’  
That’s simply how it works today … for the companies these are splendid times.  The employers, 
the companies, they’re rubbing their hands … employees have never been so properly extorted 
here before.   
 
 The motif of the ‘cheaper East’ pervades the discus ions in all countries.  Uwe in 
Erfurt singles out the company Trigema (a sports-clothes manufacturer) because ‘they 
produce only in Germany.  Not like others, like Nike or whatever who produce in China and 
places, places where the pay is 1 euro or 50 cents p r hour …’.  Peter in Kassel suggests that 
‘All people want to buy things more cheaply … [D: yeah, that’s clear … “greed is great” 
[“ Geiz ist geil”].]  Look, go back ten years, how few Aldi shops10 there were then and how 
many there are today.  [D:  We’re cutting off our own …]  Everyone wants to buy things 
more cheaply so a huge amount of mass production moves abroad.’  Elsewhere he notes: 
‘VW, Mercedes … every car company has gone abroad smewhere.  And it carries on – now 
they’ve gone to Poland, then the wages in Poland becom  too expensive so they go to 
Lithuania.  And further and further if there are peo le working for two euros …’.  The further 
east one goes, the cheaper the conditions become. 
 Sometimes one feels that these comments have an orientalising flavour and that the 
logic of the Economics domain is being mingled with that of Relations between Peoples.11  
An association is sometimes made between the cheapness of price found in these relevant 
contrasts (‘the cheap countries’) and a cheapness of value: Wolfgang in Lübeck remarks that 
‘it’s often a problem that when we develop something a d bring it onto the market then far 
too quickly it’s copied in south-east Asia and put on o the market by someone as a cheap 
product.  And … quality is all very well, but in today’s economic situation less attention is 
paid to quality than before, today it’s mainly a question of price.’  But while there is arguably 
an intersection of domains here, with multiple evaluatory logics being applied, it is worth 
highlighting how a more purely economic language can reassert itself.  The Lübeck group, 
for instance, in a discussion of employment and working conditions, begin by talking of how 
immigrants from the east are willing to do: 
 
                                                
10 Aldi – a discount supermarket chain. 
11 At Würzburg, for example, in a discussion about Germany’s falling exports, Uwe reports: ‘I was recently 
talking with some top brass from Ulm University and he said, “the Chinese students, what they study an learn, 
as opposed to the Germans, there’s absolutely no comparison.”’ 
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N:  … The jobs that the Germans don’t want to do.  [W & J:  yeah, yeah …] 
 
A:  It’s still the case – Germans don’t want to do every kind of job.  That’s still the case …
 
J:  The Poles, for example, they work in the fields a lot, for farmers on the land.  You hardly see a 
single German there, because they don’t want to do it. 
 
N:  The work is too difficult … 
 
Just, however, as one thinks that the point is about t  be made on the basis of intrinsic 
cultural differences, reasons of an economic kind come to the fore: 
 
W:  The work is too difficult and also, for the going rate here it’s very badly paid.  Compared to the 
Polish rate it’s very good.  There was a report on TV recently, about how job agencies – mainly 
over in the East, in Mecklenburg etc. – how they hire workers through a subcontractor in Poland 
because they’ll work for 5 euros an hour, whereas here they’d have to pay a German worker 8 
euros.  So … and 5 euros per hour is very, very little. 
 
 The Czech groups, though they are geographically to the east and are sometimes 
mentioned as such in the British and German discussion , are no different in the frequency 
with which they deploy spatially wide explanations based on the motif of the ‘cheaper East’.  
Onřej in Liberec links unemployment to the movement of industry away from the area: ‘all 
the jobs that there were under communism with the textile industry, the seamstresses, we had 
so many of them here and all kinds of businesses, they’re no longer around, that’s why 
there’s unemployment.  If someone trained as a seamtress and all that came to an end in the 
Czech Republic, clothing’s imported from China and the seamstresses don’t have any work 
here, then it’s logical that she’s going to be on be efits.’  The Plzeň group, in a discussion 
about foreign investment, present a similar account (though in this case Míra suggests an 
interpretation not as bleak as the usual): 
 
P:  I’d probably be in favour if you had mainly firms originating from here, with Czechs being 
employed on some kind of research let’s say, and performing more complex operations than today, 
where like at Panasonic for example they’re just tuning the monitor screens and pulling wires 
through one after the other – something which absolutely anyone can do.  [R:  Mercedes have got 
a research centre …]  Right, exactly, Mercedes is one.  But all the mass firms, 90% of what’s over 
at Borska Field industrial park, they’re just looking for people who bend a bit of wire and push it 
through like this [hand gesture]. 
 
M:  Yeah, those firms went there because there’s a che p labour force, that’s why … 
 
P:  And now they’re threatening to say cheerio in five years and all move off to China. 
 
M:  Yeah, and already they’ve moving away to Belarus and those places … because they’re calculating 
that there’s another chunk over there for them, that the labour force there’s so cheap that it’s better 
for them … 
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P:  And they say that when the tax holidays end … [M: Or to Latvia …] that they’ll all stop and the 
question then is how things by that stage will look here.  [R:  Of course.]  [M:  Well, I don’t think 
they’ll stop …]  But there are firms in Moravia, it was somewhere … there was a factory there like 
there is here and they shifted it somewhere else.  They abandoned … 
 
M:  Ok, but that area’s going to be attractive to someone else, isn’t it …  [P:  Of course …]  One plant 
closing or one branch closing doesn’t mean anything, because someone else’ll come along and do 
something else there. 
 
Developments taking place within the home environmet (the Czech Republic, and the 
region therein) are presented as dependent upon events outside in places of relevant contrast 
such as eastern Europe – which for the Czechs begins east of the Czech Republic and 
includes Belarus, Latvia and ‘those places’ – and China.  The explanatory motif of 
‘cheapness’ is the usual one, even though Míra is disputing here the common assumption that 
the quantity of ‘east’ exceeds the quantity of industry and investment.   
 What is rather different in the Czech discussions is that western Europe represents 
another of the relevant contrasts as regards economic problems.  In the Liberec discussion, 
the health of the Czech economy overall is seen to be strongly bound up with that of its west-
European neighbours.  ‘We’re starting at last to export more than we import from abroad,’ 
says Onřej, ‘which is something positive, but if Germany ever goes into recession, that 
means the economy stagnates, then the problem is they won’t want to buy our products so 
we’ll sell less.  And Germany is next-door and it’sour principal neighbour …  [Z:  And 
they’re proud and they like to buy their own stuff …]  That’s the problem.  We’re very 
dependent on the states around us, especially Germany …’.  There are no references to the 
impact on the economy of factors in North America, either here or in the British and German 




B)  Possibilities for Action 
 
This repertoire of explanations and explanatory motifs has important implications for the 
credibility of a political project.  With economic affairs within the home environment treated 
either as a matter of puzzlement, or deemed to be heavily dependent on the outside world, the 
possibilities for action are assumed to be tightly constrained.  Although, as has been seen, 
several participants suggest that the government can encourage individuals to adapt to the 
situation by giving them the appropriate incentives to ‘get off their arse’ and to follow the job 
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vacancies – a mixture of governmental and private means by which to react to problems – 
very few positive proposals for organised action emerge in the course of the discussions (in 
contrast to at least one of the other domains).  The fact that many of the explanatory factors 
extend beyond the home environment is something that most likely accentuates this.  
Generally speaking, only where explanations contain at least some more local elements are 
they accompanied by proposals for action. 
 All groups express a very weak sense of governmental agency on the question of 
industrial decline, a problem treated in a broad spatial context.  Several of the British groups 
point out that, while the country still has coal mines with coal in them and while in theory 
these could be reactivated, in practice this is unworkable because imported coal will always 
be cheaper.  The kind of measures that can be adopted within the environments are dependent 
on what goes on outside, and the notion that the East is always cheaper is repeated with 
vehemence.  As David in Reading says, ‘Wales and Yorkshire, still full of coal-mines, I 
mean, the coal’s still down there …  [M:  But I think it’s cheaper …]  … cheaper … [M: … 
to come from Poland … ]  It’s cheaper, yeah …  [M:  It’s what you just said, it’s cheaper to 
bring the coal, import it from Poland, than to have guys digging it in this country …]  That’s 
right.’  ‘That’s how it is with manufacturing as well,’ says Murda.  ‘Unless you start paying 
everybody 10p an hour for their jobs, right, you can’t compete with other countries now.  
[…] All the little kids wanted to be coal miners.  But coal mining died.  They can’t say “I still 
want to be a coal …”  No, you got to go and find something else.’  The ease with which 
David and Murda see ‘cheapness’ as trumping politics will be recalled from above: Shafeek’s 
attempt to blame Thatcher for destroying British industry is met with the reply, ‘it’s 
management sense, it’s nothing to do with Thatcher, it’s supply and demand and, you know, 
it’s where you can get your goods cheaper …’.  As a justification for decline one hears not 
only the irresistibility of cheapness but also the naturalness of change and evolution; Murda 
again: ‘You can’t just blame Thatcher, you know, times change.  Like in the old days you 
had the smoke coming out of the chimneys and stuff, you don’t have that anymore.  Times 
change …  You had a horse and cart years ago, [today] you don’t have a horse and cart.’ 
 A similar scepticism about what politicians are able to achieve generally in response 
to economic problems comes through strongly in an extract from the Lübeck group, which 
begins by the researcher asking who is responsible for the provision of jobs: 
 
W:  Who has the responsibility for creating jobs?  The … the … industry … and … politicians.  
Politics has to create a sensible framework … a sensible framework, the basis, that makes it 
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possible … that makes it possible to create jobs, and industry has to create jobs at home rather 
than abroad. 
 
J:  That’s the problem of course.  Industry goes abro d because jobs are cheaper there.  And industry, 
or the economy, has to be in agreement with politics, they need to pull in the same direction.  I 
sometimes have the feeling that the current governmnt – Red-Green – doesn’t conform properly 
to the economy, that on the contrary they even work against it and that private enterprise would 
rather have a different government, that they’d rather work with the CDU.  And if private 
enterprise doesn’t go along with the politicians then it’s hopeless, then the government can make 
as many pretty speeches as it wants but nothing’s going to happen.  If industry – the really large 
companies … if they don’t cooperate then it all comes to nothing.  The big lobbies are too 
powerful. 
 
N:  Many of the large, very profitable industries, they … you can’t really blame the government there.  
These companies run up huge profits and even so they relocate abroad … 
 
J:  The profits … they’ve gone up ever more in the last few years.  But the number of jobs has been 
reduced.  You see it with Deutsche Bank, they’ve made  30% bigger profit compared to the year 
before and at the same time they want to make 6000 people redundant.  [W:  Yeah, 5000, 6000 
people …] 
 
JW:  So the solution would lie in changing industry or changing the government?  You said the 
relationship between the SPD and industry isn’t right …  [J:  … That’s what I believe, yeah …]  
 
N:  Well actually I think the CDU would play even further into the hands of the economy and make it 
even easier for them to increase their profits. 
 
W:  Yeah, and for that reason it’d probably be best if we had a grand coalition at the federal level … 
 
N:  Then nothing would work at all! 
 
W:  Well … have to see. 
 
Here the limits to organised collective action are expressed in two ways: in Jürgen’s 
argument that if business or industry is sceptical or hostile towards a government, if the 
government does not ‘conform’ to the economy, ‘then it all comes to nothing.  The big 
lobbies are too powerful,’ and in Niklas’ willingness both to absolve the current government 
of blame and to suggest that any change of government is likely to make things worse 
because the CDU will ‘play into the hands’ of the economy even more.  There is no 
contradiction between the two; Jürgen, it seems, is imply more comfortable with the idea 
that a CDU government will not try to dictate its wishes to the business world.  Clearly it is 
the capacity of the government which is at stake – there is no reference to public/societal or 
private approaches – and Wolfgang’s call for a coalition government, plus his initial 
attribution of responsibility to politicians for creating a ‘sensible framework’, are two notes 
of positive agency, but both are reactive in character.   
 In Würzburg, Rainer refers to the ‘job summit’ betw en Chancellor Schröder and 
CDU leader Angela Merkel, which had taken place a few weeks before the interview, in 
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which the heads of the two major political parties met in an attempt to find solutions to the 
unemployment crisis: 
 
R:  There was this attempt recently with the summit a few weeks ago, where the government met with 
the opposition to try and regulate … to intervene, so that corporate taxes – which are already low – 
are lowered even further to encourage companies to invest more and so create more jobs. 
 
O:  Yeah, well the pressure comes from outside, because neighbouring countries like Austria, they’ve 
already got a tax-rate of 19% … the Netherlands is lower too … In Bavaria the problem at the 
moment is that companies are moving abroad because corporate tax in Austria is lower than in 
Germany.  19% compared to 25%.  So we have to trail behind and ultimately at some point it’ll 
probably all level out across Europe … the prices, the taxes … [R:  Mmmm, mmmm] and so on.  
There’s this slow process whereby it all levels out … 
 
R:  Yes … but … to come back for a minute, the taxes are lowered – the corporate taxes – and what 
happens then?  The companies accept it all gratefully and skim off the tax benefits, but they don’t 
create any new jobs.  [U:  yeah]  That’s how it’s probably going to go … 
 
U:  It’s about nothing but profits.  And if they can make more profit then they will.  So I just think, in 
these big companies, with all the shareholders and bosses, it’s just about creaming off more and 
more, as always.  […] 
 
O:  It all hinges on the global market and shareholder value … [U: yeah].  Whether it’s Deutsche Bank 
or Daimler Chrysler.  They have to measure themselve  against Toyota or Citibank.  It’s global 
competition, and if they become too weak or if their investment returns are too low then they get a 
slap on the head from their shareholders who say ‘To ota’s got 100 billion, Daimler Chrysler’s 
only got 20 billion,’ or whatever, ‘you need to put the pedal down, because otherwise …’ 
 
Oliver’s interventions explicitly emphasise the influence of outside factors on decision-
making – ‘the pressure comes from outside’, and the competition is ‘global’.  Governmental 
decisions (e.g. the lowering of corporate taxes) do have consequences, but the emphasis is on 
their negative consequences (the loss of revenue without the creation of jobs), and those with 
the real decision-making power are assumed to be the companies. Subsequently, the group 
reaches a clear consensus on an assessment made by Oliver that politicians are just ‘puppets’ 
when it comes to the economy.12  Indeed, they also invoke the freedoms of democracy to 
argue that firms must be allowed to leave the country if hey want to: ‘Because, what exactly 
is the government going to do?’ asks Uwe.  ‘It’s a democracy, you’d have to introduce some 
kind of dictatorship … “You stay here, full stop.  Otherwise you go to prison.”  You’d have 
to introduce some kind of a dictatorship like in the past.  One Germany, nothing comes in 
and nothing goes out, as bluntly as in China … You can’t do it any other way, but what do 
                                                
12 Mike in Erfurt also mentions the ‘job summit’: ‘does anyone still speak today about the job summit between 
Schröder and Merkel?  Of course not, that was a one-day thing, nice big slot in the newspapers and that’s the 
end of it.’  Hans-Jürgen in Erfurt criticises the way companies take tax-payers’ money to train workers, ‘just so 
that the statistics are good’, without subsequently employing them, but Mike and Andreas counter by suggesting 
that the government has little say in the matter.  ‘What could be done differently though?’ asks Mike, ‘you can’t 
fight against the state or against the economy.  You can’t sue someone for not taking you on.’  Andreas adds: 
‘There can’t be an obligation handed down from the state that says “you have to take on a hundred trainees.”’ 
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you want to do in a democracy?’  Rainer agrees – governmental interference would constitute 
‘authoritarian measures.’ 
 A common motif is that while yesterday’s politicians might have had the opportunity 
to prevent these problems, for example by choosing not to privatise industries, today’s 
politicians are powerless and it is too late to alter the situation.  The Kassel group emphasises 
that the government is unable to control the movement of companies: ‘That doesn’t work any 
more,’ says Peter, ‘it’s simply too late …’, says Hans, ‘in the past … in the past …’, chips in 
Dieter, ‘we’ve got no chance now.  The train has left the station.’  ‘It was always going to be 
this way,’ argues Hans, ‘with all the multinational corporations we have.  That means firms 
have no limits any more, there are no boundaries …’. ‘And why?  Capital,’ responds Peter.  
In the wake of technological change, unemployment is here to stay.  ‘The car companies 
began it,’ says Peter.  ‘Along came a new machine and it replaced 10 workers, then along 
came the next one and it replaced 100 workers.  […]  So, now we have a minimum of 6 
million people, probably 7 million … we’ll never get unemployment back down again.  […]  
Our economic development no longer allows us to employ so many people.’13  In this 
passage the Swansea group, starting out from the question of coal mines, likewise arrive at 
the conclusion that it is ‘too late’ to take measures: 
 
L:  There’s enough coal in South Wales. 
 
M:  Yeah but thing is, overseas, it’s far more cheaper isn’t it. 
 
A:  Yeah, it’s too expensive to get it out of the ground here.  But that’s all because everything elseis 
too expensive over here.  You can’t get a man going down a mine for £100 a week when that £100 
a week is going nowhere.  You know. 
 
D:  If you take now for example industry in Britain, t’s finished.  If it’s not finished, in ten years it will 
be finished.  [A: …  No steelworks, no coal …]  If you go back when I was at school, fifteen years 
ago, industry was strong.  Engineering was good then … industry, manufacturing … but it’s now 
all too expensive to produce the stuff.  They’re all going to third-world countries.  Like the Czech 
Republic and all these countries like … 
 
A:  But then a lot of it is out of this government’s control.  Like HSBC, the bank, they took all their 
call-centres to India. 
 
D: There’s only one person to blame, for the lack of industry in this country now, and that’s Margaret 
Thatcher.  Because she privatised everything, she sold everything off, didn’t she.  [L:  Arthur 
                                                
13 Social security is, in Dieter’s view, just another mistaken attempt to put up barriers against the tide: ‘It was all 
crap,’ he says of the post-War system of support, ‘how can I work off the assumption that the amount of people 
always remains the same and the amount of work always remains the same?  It’s a completely absurd idea,
since these three factors – the number of old people who receive a pension, the number of people who are 
productive, and the amount of work available … all of these have to stay the same if this loop is to work 
properly.  And the moment the loop breaks down … as the old people become older and older … It’s complete 
shit, this way of thinking, really.’ 
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Scargill was right, wasn’t he.  Everything he said.]  She privatised everything.  Why didn’t Britain 
keep doing what they were doing? 
 
JW:  And what, now it’s too late to change the situation? 
 
D:  Yeah, it’s gone too far, hasn’t it. 
 
A:  … gone too far …  Unless the government open up the coal mines and subsidise it themselves!   
 
Here, unlike in the Reading group, Thatcher is blamed for the decline of British industry, but 
this extension of agency to a politician of the past is not matched by a sense of agency for the 
politicians of today.  Andy’s notion at the end that the government could subsidise the 
mining industry seems to be a consciously ridiculous proposition.  When asked his view of 
HSBC’s decision to move their call-centres to India, he says: ‘Oh you can’t blame them for 
that.  They’ve been able to make money.  It’s a bank t the end of the day, it’s a private 
concern, it’s a bank.  They closed the call-centres over here – they got two hundred people 
over in Llansamlet – and opened the call-centre over in India.  Because it’s cheaper to 
employ them over there and set up a new call-centre than keep them over here.’14   
 Inevitability is one of the dominant motifs of the Economics domain, unsurprisingly 
given the thinness of explanatory resources one sees.  Price rises are treated as an 
inevitability.  As David in Reading says, ‘It’s a never-ending thing, innit … the petrol goes 
up, everything goes up … no matter whether you think you’re bread and butter don’t, it do 
…’  ‘Everything goes up,’ confirms Shafeek.  Murda adds: ‘Well, someone said the water’s 
going to be bloody expensive pretty soon.  I’m goin to have to dig a well at this rate, I 
think.’  State debt, spoken of as another major constraint on a government’s ability to pursue 
policies favourable to social security, is talked about in similar terms of inevitability.  Notice 
how spatially wide explanations for problems can feed into scepticism about the possibilities 
for action: in this passage from the Kassel discussion, it is explicitly pointed out that while 
state debt is a surmountable problem when national economies are fairly isolated from one 
another, in today’s world these environments are economically interdependent and so the 
traditional options for managing the problem are unavailable: 
 
H:  It’s traditionally been the case here in Germany that the state intervenes a great deal.  And now 
what’s happening is that this state involvement is being reversed quite sharply … [D: yeah].  That 
means that the social safety-net gets bigger and bigger holes in it.  In other words, more and more 
                                                
14 Leyton in Norwich conveys a similar sense of the determining impact of prices: ‘If they [large producers] can 
find it cheaper, wherever it comes from, they will get it.  And they make sure it’s for them only.  That’s what 
Heinz does.  Do you know Heinz, baked beans, they produce their own beans but they also produce beans for 
these, like, Morrisons.  All they do is change the bloody tin.  And the same contents goes into the same bloody 
tin.  And that happens all the time, all these companies do it.’ 
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people are now falling through the net and getting into circumstances which are very painful for 
most of them. 
 
P:  Fine, but then you get back to the point that te State is taking in less and less and so it’s able to 
give out less and less.  […]  I mean, ultimately what this comes down to – and we haven’t said a 
word about this yet – ultimately it’s about our debts, our state debts.  [H:  That’s a very interesting 
dimension, definitely, because …]  Our state debts increase every day, we need to pay more and 
more interest on them, the State has less and less of what it takes in at its disposal, and at some 
point … I mean, the balance … We’ve been building up debts since Adenauer was Chancellor, 
since back then, despite the fact that our pension funds are being emptied by them … [D:  Kohl … 
by Mr. Kohl …]  And basically, no matter what we’re talking about here, it boils down to these 
State debts.  And as long as they’re still there, until we’ve got rid of them, we can’t really make 
demands of the State.  Whatever amount goes into these debts, that’s how much less we get back. 
 
H:  So the question then is, why are the debts so … 
 
P:  Because the State … because the State supported everything … 
 
H:  Not just that but because it also didn’t pay enough attention to making sure that money comes up 
from below again.  Because …
 
P:  A normal company would have gone bankrupt decads go, but not the State.  I really don’t see … 
I can’t see where they get the money from.  Where does the money come from?  Even the rich oil 
countries are supposed to be in debt.  Where does the money come from?  [H:  Imaginary, as they 
say …]  I mean, every day we have less and less … the S ate has less and less at its disposal … 
[…]  And everyone who gets voted into government says ‘yes, we want to remove the debts.’  
That goes on for a year and then next year they’re twice as high … [D: Exactly]  That’s … at some 
point there’s going to be a collapse. 
 
H:  It’s going to happen sometime.  It can’t carry on.
 
P:  Yeah, and then what happens?  Currency reform.  Very simple: currency reform.  […] 
 
H:  And that’s exactly the point, today it’s no longer so easy to bring about currency reform.  That 
doesn’t work any more, because this interlocking, this international interdependence is far too 
extensive to allow such a thing. 
 
The sense of powerlessness here, born of the presumption of the State’s financial constraints, 
is linked to the feeling of mysteriousness – what is i that keeps the State afloat, where does 
the money come from?  The idea that most things cost to  much for the public purse, and the 
absence of positive proposals for changing this (e.g. raising the top rate of taxation), is 
characteristic of discussions across the country groups.  Amongst the Czechs in particular, it 
is regularly emphasised that the State has little money at its disposal and so its ability to act 
strongly is limited.  As Zdeněk in Ostrava says: ‘The public purse doesn’t have enough in it 
to give money out.  Infrastructure is inadequate for a good transport system.  We’ve got so 
few motorways, really slow railways, and air transport is inappropriate for a small country.  
There’s never enough money there, it’d gobble up everything.’   
 There are added reasons on top of these for pessimism about the possibilities for 
governmental action voiced amongst the Czech groups and the Erfurt group.  One of these is 
the sense of dependency on the economies of western Europe, as highlighted in the Liberec 
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passage above.  Uwe from the Erfurt group expresses this perspective: instead of casting the 
home environment as Germany as a whole, he casts it as the former East, and highlights its 
dependence on the West: ‘in the East we’re practically dependent on the development aid of 
the state.  We’re not lifting out of it though by way of capitalism, because that’s messed up 
our whole economy.  So we’ll forever be dependent on he development aid of the State until 
the economy at some point recovers – but that’ll last forever.’  A second basis for these 
groups for a low sense of agency in the Economics domain, different to the other German and 
British groups, is their inclination to see the State as blighted by corruption and 
incompetence.  Public officials are accorded little rust when handling large amounts of 
money, and so their interventions in the economy are generally regarded with suspicion.  
Note that, whilst this is a common assumption about politicians in general, it tends to be 
expressed in a way which is domain-specific; corruption is not foregrounded, as will be seen 
later, when the discussion is about foreign affairs.  Marek in Ostrava tells a story, familiar to 
all in the group, of how an Israeli firm charged with constructing a stretch of motorway was 
given a contract so generous that the State lost huge s ms of money.  The error is presented 
as typical of the financial incompetence of minister  and their advisors, and is seen as 
compounding the fact that government policies are al ady highly constrained by limited 
finances.   
 
 Positive proposals are not entirely absent in these di cussions.  Participants in the 
Kassel and Erfurt groups are both very much in favour of the idea that any firm that leaves 
Germany has to repay whatever subsidies it has received.  Hans-Jürgen in Erfurt suggests 
how one should treat such firms: ‘if someone has a need to enlarge his company and thinks 
he has a better chance abroad then he should go – but without a cent from here.  That’s how 
it should work, and not how it works now, with threats like “if you don’t want us then we’re 
off.”  If I was Chancellor I’d say, fine, let’s have a tête-à-tête then, bring me your passport, 
we’ll put a stamp in it here: “Not wanted in Germany – go!”’  Similarly, Barry in Norwich 
argues that ‘if you move your business lock, stock and barrel then as far as I’m concerned 
you’re gone.  You shouldn’t import them things back over here, you should ban it.  Don’t let 
them sell it on our market.’  Some speakers, pointing more to a public-cum-private approach, 
recommend that consumers exercise discrimination in their purchasing – Mickey finds 
general agreement on this point: ‘You go to Comet, right.  Now, what happens is, when a 
new product comes out, like a DVD player, I paid £185 for my DVD player three years ago: 
now you can get them for thirty quid.  But you could always get them for thirty quid!  They 
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make the money … they overprice them because everybody wants something that’s brand-
new.  If people would stop being so bloody stupid – me included – would stop being so 
stupid and turn around and say “hang on a second, we’re not going to be fooled into any of 
your marketing crap any more,” we’d have them for thi ty quid.  [L:  But people won’t do it, 
will they.]  [B:  They’ve got to have one first, haven’t they.]   
 To the extent that this is a problem of consumer ignorance, the possibility is 
maintained that something can be done about it.  Dieter from the Kassel group laments, to 
Peter’s agreement, that ‘everyone wants to buy things more cheaply’ and ‘if people just had a 
bit of brains they’d say “we’ll go without these firms’ products”,’ but carries on to argue that 
this is potentially something that can be addressed through education.  Advertisers are 
blamed for encouraging people to take on debts they cannot manage, with Peter 
characterising the madness like this: ‘Everywhere it’s being suggested to us: “You need this, 
you need that, you need the newest computer, you need the newest bedroom, you need the 
newest kitchen, this oven’s got air circulation, it’s not just a grill, you can stick your head 
inside and use it as a sunbed.”’15  Compulsory schooling in basic day-to-day economics is 
therefore put forward as a worthwhile policy, to pre are people to ‘think twice’ before they 
buy.  However, to the extent that the problem is not just to do with the mentality of actors 
within the home environment (consumers) but is to do with economic processes extending 
further afield, the possibilities for action are constrained again.  ‘The economy demands 
sheep,’ says Dieter, ‘that simply want to [P: yeah …] stuff themselves all the time. [P: 
Exactly!]’  Peter suggests there is a limit to what consumers can do, however enlightened 
they are: ‘if I had an account with Deutsche Bank, I’d cancel it.  I’d boycott such firms.  The 
thing is, everything’s so interwoven these days, you d n’t really know … [Dieter: yeah] … 
where they all work, where they produce …  Whatever you do, the glasses will come from 
somewhere, you can’t say “I’m not drinking that any more because the glass doesn’t come 
from Germany.”  That’s the problem, because ultimately you simply can’t separate it out …’. 
 Not only this but organised action of a social kind such as a collective boycott is 
sometimes cast further in doubt with an expression of scepticism regarding the willingness of 
others to show firmness.  For example, Leyton in Norwich predicts that one day ‘you’ll have 
one company who own all the food chains.  One big massive block will own the lot.’  Barry 
agrees, and Mickey says it is happening already in the form of price-fixing.  ‘We should go 
in there,’ says Mickey, ‘we should go into Asda or Morrisons or whatever and we should turn 
                                                
15 In a similar vein, Hans-Jürgen talks of the ‘law of capitalism’: ‘give people credit, give them credit, so that I 
can bind them to me.  In GDR-times you had to pay for something if you wanted it.  [U: yeah]’ 
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round and say “Get that foreign crap out of our house.”’  ‘But until everybody decides to do 
it,’ responds Leyton, ‘it’ll never happen.  They’ve got the upper hand all the time and they’ll 
do what they want to do.’  Even if ‘people like us’ were to take the lead, the rest would 
probably not follow us.   
 Having expressed considerable doubts about what can be achieved collectively, 
either through governmental action or society-led approaches, it is perhaps no surprise that 
Leyton and Barry arrive at arguably the least agential of possible remedies to their economic 
problems: the luck of the lottery.  The following passage is remarkable for its combination of 
a strong sense of injustice and urgency (rooting the speakers’ financial problems, and 
economic inequality more generally, firmly in the political common), and some clear acts of 
collective positioning (summoning up well-defined political subjects and opponents), and yet 
a notion of the possibilities for action which is limited to making alterations to the probability 
that one pulls out a winning ticket: 
 
L:  Now, if they made them prizes [the top prizes] smaller, and just kept the money for prizes, for 
people … cos it was actually designed for the working class anyway … and if they’d done that, 
people would win more, the money would be ploughed back in, and everybody would be living a 
far, far … If I had a £5000 cheque fall on my back every so often, I’d be bloody over the moon.  I 
don’t need millions of pounds.  [B:  If the top whack was a million …]  I’d have a couple of days 
off work, and get rid of a few bloody bills lying around … 
 
B:  Top prize a million, three numbers a thousand pounds.  Give more to the lower numbers.  [...] 
 
L:  I know, that’s what I’m saying.  This is what annoys me with the lottery, because the lottery could 
make everybody – not just  … it was made for the working class, why do we have to keep bunging 
money for all these bloody ‘good causes’?  The good cause is the people who are bloody playing 
the game. 
 
   
 The central point of this section, to recapitulate, is that all groups see very few 
possibilities for action in the Economics domain.  When discussing what can be done about 
the economic problems facing ‘people like us’, speakers generally invoke ‘the government’ 
and ‘politicians’ as the most relevant points of refe nce, but usually then only to write off 
their capacities.  The reasons for this are largely the same across the groups, though the 
Czechs and the Erfurt group have the added reasons that they see their state as especially 
financially weak and economically dependent on west-European countries, and they see the 
state’s involvement in the economy as being marked by corruption and incompetence.  The 
second key point is that while some possibilities for action are recognised when problems are 
attributed to factors within the environments (e.g. the mentalities of unemployed people and 
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the incentives they face; the educational background a d the skills of those who are 
struggling to adapt to economic change), a particularly weak sense of agency is apparent 
whenever the causal links are traced to the world beyond – which is often. 
 
 
Society and the Law 
 
A)  Explanatory Motifs 
 
For problems to do with the Society and the Law domain, explanations are found quite 
reliably – there is less of the sense of mystery that so often encircles problems to do with 
Economics.  Just as we saw in Chapter 4 that transnational comparisons are very rarely made 
in this domain, so one finds that most explanatory motifs focus on actors within the home 
environment, which means mainly within the city itself.  None of the groups mentions 
organised cross-border crime for instance.  To the ext nt that wider factors are invoked, these 
may be connected to the country as a whole, but tend not to be connected to the world 
outside, and explanations hardly ever include places of relevant contrast abroad.  The sense 
of political space is, in this sense, much narrower.  P oblems such as crime and society’s 
response to it are generally not considered in a transnational context.   
 One might instinctively respond: how could this beotherwise?  Are not the 
problématiques in question – crime, anti-social behaviour, the decline of the family – 
essentially local in nature?  But one should be sceptical of the notio  hat there are 
problématiques which are ssentially local, and one can quite plausibly think of broader 
explanatory ideas which are not used.  The decline of r ligion would be one (a natural one 
given the countries studied), and it would be entirly feasible in principle for a discussion to 
frame law-breaking, antisocial behaviour and the lack of community feeling as being due to 
the fact that ‘no-one fears God any more’.  Such a perspective would then enable the 
problems articulated to be treated as consequences of transnational processes of 
modernisation experienced in many human societies – a perspective implying a much wider 
sense of space.  But this is not found.  Nor does one find discussion of technological change 
and its implications for the atomisation of society or the decline of the family, another 
potentially wide-ranging, transnational perspective.  Instead one finds a much narrower 
focus.  The exceptions are the link made by groups from each country between immigration 
and an increase in criminal behaviour, and the borrowing of explanatory motifs from the 
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Economics domain, especially amongst the Czech and Erfurt groups.  Both of these open out 
a wider sense of space, albeit largely by associating w th the logic of other domains.   
 Considered crucial across the groups for people’s willingness to play by the legal and 
social rules is the way in which they were brought up as children.  A bad upbringing, both in 
the family and in school, is the main explanation given for irresponsible behaviour.  Onřej 
from the Liberec group complains of the inadequacy of the school curriculum in preparing 
children to live harmoniously in society: ‘The curricula in schools are badly designed 
because education – moral education, how people should behave in society – is something 
they really don’t teach at all in schools.  That’s a problem.  They’re always having to read 
articles or whatever, but how reality works, how the laws function, they just don’t take that 
into consideration at all … [R: How life works …]  They don’t prepare children for that at 
all.  They have to learn that for themselves later, and either they end up on the right side of 
the line, they achieve something and they’re intellig nt, or they end up on the wrong side and 
they’re just rogues.’  Likewise, those who have been taught well at school ‘know the 
difference between right and wrong’, argues Mickey at Norwich.  ‘It’s the same with 
parenting.  If you scream and shout at your child an whack ’em about, what are they going 
to do?’  ‘Grow up silly,’ says Barry.  ‘At school,’ Mickey continues, ‘you can tell the parents 
who read to their children and talk to their children, and the parents who just ignore them.  
Because of their behaviour.’  Problems set in when both the household and the school 
experience a decline in disciplinary standards.    
 The importance of upbringing is a theme across all of the groups.  The comment 
made by Marek in Ostrava about the Mercedes parked across two parking-spaces drew an 
explicit link between antisocial behaviour and upbringing: the child was being set a bad 
example by his father and would learn to copy him when he grew up.  Dieter in Kassel 
emphasises the importance of upbringing and role models when talking about the 
development of ‘moral ideas’: ‘it’s a matter of education, of the personal development of the 
child.  There needs to be proper guidance there, from the school or the parents.’  He goes on 
to link this back to the distortion in people’s values: ‘parents today, their view on life is that 
“I must work, work, work,” our society is fundamentally sick in that sense, because we all 
simply think we need to obtain money and goods and we completely lose sight of life – real 
life, the point of life, we completely lose sight of everything.  And someone who’s developed 
this way of thinking, and who’s old enough to bring children into the world, how’s this 
person supposed to teach his children?  It’s fundamentally counterproductive – from his 
perspective – to educate his children.  So that child’s hardly got a chance.’   
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 The importance of upbringing is affirmed by Hans-Jürgen in Erfurt in a similar 
fashion to what one finds amongst the western-German and British groups – ‘here’s where 
life begins, if you like: in the kindergarten’ – but with a twist corresponding to the changes 
experienced since the fall of communism: ‘You can still notice the difference today between 
people who grew up here in the East and people who grew up in the West.  Let’s take the 
same age-group, that’s probably the best way to compare.  Here you got an all-round 
education at school, and you took an interest in thi gs yourself because various things were 
forbidden.  Because whatever was forbidden, that was something you had to know about.  
“Why is it that here I’m not allowed …?  What’s different over there …?  How’s it going to 
hurt me if I go over there?”  OK, and in the other education system, in the western one, it was 
more “This is what you need to know for your life and that’s it, no more.”  Because whatever 
goes beyond your knowledge, well there’s some other person who knows it.  You don’t need 
to look beyond the edge of your plate.’  Uwe agrees: ‘They bred nerds, one-track specialists.’  
Education is seen as defining people’s horizons and is therefore central to the health (Dieter’s 
metaphor) of society.  It builds morality as well.  For Hans-Jürgen, what is important for the 
enforcement of rules is not so much institutions and structures themselves as the morality of 
the people within them.  One might regard this as an assertion of the moral/social over the 
legal: ‘I always say, with all the things that are on the cards here, at the end of the day it’s 
always a person who does it or causes it, it’s a person, not some law.  If that person says “I 
don’t want to,” then he’s decided it.  He’s given the option to do it or not to do it, he always 
has that. … And so it all goes back to education, t the kind of morality which is given to 
individual people.  That’s where it all really begins.’ 
 We have seen already that one of the key problems raised in the German discussions 
is a perceived lack of community spirit and a reluctan e on the part of individuals to help one 
another, and we have seen that one explanation offered is that this could simply be the result 
of a ‘German mentality’ of rudeness and indifferenc.  In the following passage from the 
Kassel group, the participants discuss the same problem with reference to another possible 
explanation to do with luxury and indulgence: 
 
P:  […]  You only need to look at the taxi trade: twenty years ago – I’ve been driving 28 years now – 
twenty years ago if you made an emergency call, ‘I need help’, within a minute there’d be at least 
three taxi-drivers there and within ten minutes there’d be fifty.  Do that today and not even one 
will come!  [D:  It’s true, it’s true …] 
 
JW:  Why’s there been this change? 
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P:  There’s no standard any more.  Somehow everything’s splitting apart.  Everyone speaks just for 
themselves now.  You see it here too … 
 
D: … Yeah, but there’s many reasons for that …  [P:  Yes but in Germany …] 
 
H:  But that’s exactly the point you made earlier, this each-for-himself … that everyone’s his own 
master and wants to keep it that way, that that’s where the tendency is.  That’s how I understood 
you anyway.  … I mean, that’s the point, why this … this togetherness is getting weaker and 
weaker.  I think it’s also got something to do with the fact that society here in Germany is glutted, 
that desires or, or … that some notion of where I’d like to end up is no longer as strong as it was 
forty years ago.  
 
D:  And so what you need exactly then is that peopl step back and say ‘wait a moment … [H: … 
Exactly …] I don’t have need of this any more …’.  The problem I think is rather that they’re 
forced to have them … 
 
P:  Yeah, desires always correspond to the economic level.  Fifty years ago if you had the chance to 
afford a go-go or whatever it meant something.  Today the economic level is much higher, today 
everyone wants … ‘I need a CD-player, ooh I think I need one for the other room too.  Doesn’t 
hurt.  Ah wait, I’m lacking a television.  And a television belongs in the bedroom too …’.  One 
simply wants everything.  One gets … 
 
S:  And just listen to your words, it’s always ‘I’.  Forty, fifty years ago, after the war, you always said 
‘we’ and you helped each other.  Now it’s ‘I’. 
 
The question of consumer behaviour is one which we encountered in the Economics domain.  
In the logic of that domain, the problem was that people were spending too much money and 
thereby getting themselves into debt, ultimately making them reliant on the financial support 
of the state.  In the logic of this domain, the problem is of a moral and social kind: frantic 
buying is an expression of greed and egoism, the selfish fulfilment of one’s personal desires.  
Individuals have been spoilt by the luxury which is on offer in modern society and therefore 
no longer recognise the need for a sense of ‘togetherness’.  The past acts as the point of 
comparison: ‘I’ was once ‘we’.  Other groups talk in similar terms.16  At Erfurt, where very 
much the same point is made, the explanation is unambiguous – it is to do with the 
entrenchment of capitalism.  ‘In GDR-times people were more sophisticated in the head than 
they are today,’ says Andreas, ‘because today it’s only consumption which counts – everyone 
with his chair, his table, his bed, his TV, which has always got to be better and better.  
Whereas before, this community … the public-spirited way of thinking, it was all a little bit 
different.’  Uwe picks this up: ‘The people from the old West Germany, they have a horizon 
                                                
16 At Würzburg for instance: for Uwe, whereas ‘the wealth of a person lies in their heart and in their had,’ in 
practice ‘it’s money that’s become our beloved god.  That’s all it’s about now.  And even so they [rich people] 
are unhappy because naturally there’s always something missing.’  Oliver immediately makes explicit the 
connection between this and the condition of society: ‘society’s no longer so integrated, it’s getting more and 
more anonymous – the more successful it becomes, th more anonymous it becomes.’  Rainer suggests that 
morality has declined to the extent that the old biblical motto has been inverted: ‘To take is more blessed than to 
give.’  Today’s society has become ‘the elbow society’.   
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that extends up to the garden fence.  “My little world, nice high fence and whatever’s outside 
I don’t care about.”’   
 Besides these influences on the willingness to foll w the rules, the conduct of those 
charged with enforcing the rules is another key explanation given for problems in this 
domain.  Problems arise insofar as they fail to fulfil their duties.  While it was the magistrates 
who took the blame in a Norwich extract explored in the previous chapter, the police – 
particularly amongst the British groups – also tend to face criticism.  They are regularly 
described as being fussy, immature and having the wrong priorities.  Mickey in Norwich 
speaks fondly of the days when a policeman would just have said ‘“oi, cut that out”, slap 
across the head, end of story.’  The same motif arises n the following extract from the 
Swansea group.  As is evident, the problems are explained partly in terms of the individuals 
involved and partly in terms of the institutional constraints within which they work: 
 
A:  The coppers now are all youngsters, and as soonas you put a uniform on them they think they are 
God.  And they come at you with attitude.  If someon  comes at you with attitude, you’re going to 
give it straight back, aren’t you.  What gives them the right, know what I mean?  Just cos they got 
a uniform on. 
 
L:  They train … they train them to have an attitude.  They train to be the boss.  They train to speak to 
people to let them know they’re in charge, they’re trained to do that.  The police ten, fifteen, 
twenty years ago, was in a better way than what it is now.  […]  If they caught a little thief they’d 
give him a little clip around the ear, and they’d take him home to his father and his father would 
give him a little clip as well.  [A:  Exactly.]  Now, they take him into a cell, they do their little bit
of paperwork, they go to court … what does that achieve?  That little kid wouldn’t do it again.  If 
he goes to court he’ll do it again. 
 
JW:  You mention paperwork, do you blame the police as individuals …? 
 
L:  No, it’s the government.  It all boils down to the government … 
 
D:  They set all the regulations, don’t they.  For the country. 
 
A:  They set the rules, they set the rules, they want the police to enforce them.  They’re getting too
much paperwork to do, you can’t blame the police entir ly, but at the same time there’s a way of 
doing the job … 
 
L:  They’re too scared to do it now, aren’t they … Even though they do it, but they do it for the wrong 
reasons … [A:  Yeah, that’s right, yeah …]  They’re too scared to do it because their job’s on the 
line or whatever …  If I’d have done something wrong I’d prefer to have a clip, it’d be quite … 
you’d have a clip on your ear and you wouldn’t do it again … [M:  For the minor things …]  
That’s what I’m talking about.  If you’ve done something major well obviously you’ve got to face 
the consequences then.   
 
A:  If you read the Evening Post all you hear about is people getting done for speeding and minor 
offences … 
 
L:  The courts are full, the courts are full.  My missus used to work at the magistrates’ court.  They’re 
full.   
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Part of the explanatory motif centres on the individuals and their mentalities: the police are 
seen as having the wrong attitude, overusing their authority, and pursuing minor offences 
such as speeding which clog up the machinery of justice.17  Rather than representatives of an 
institution that carries authority they are ‘youngster ’ in ‘uniforms’.  The explanation is 
broadened a little with the reference to paperwork and bureaucratic procedures; the 
invocation of the government means there is a natiol dimension.  The Norwich and 
Reading groups give similar accounts.  David at Reading, that night he found a burglar in his 
house (Chapter 3), found the police too casual.  ‘And all these pieces of paper …  The girl 
that came, she kept giggling …  She wrote [the statement] down, she said “how’s that?”, I 
said “well, quite honestly, you’ve spelt that wrong …”.  She said “what have I spelt wrong 
…?”  She got a little thing out that rectifies the spelling mistakes, little electronic thing …  
I’m not lying, I bet there was four sheets of A4 paper, she’s made all this stuff out, she says 
“would you like to read it before you sign it?”  And I’ve started again and I say “To be quite 
honest it’s all mistakes.”  She said “could you signature above the mistakes?”’  They were 
‘over-powered with paperwork’, he adds, and concludes ‘the trouble is, the police forces are 
being run like a business, aren’t they.  They’re being run like a pub, and they all got to show 
a profit at the end.  “Reading’s doing really good – oh the crime rate’s down, we’ll take a 
note of that.”  […] The police are made to make the figures look good …  It’s a business, it’s 
a business.’  Murda, from the same group, supports David’s narrative, and later augments it 
with a different perspective based on a television programme he has been watching called 
The Secret Policeman.  Here again one sees an understanding of the relationship between 
local conduct and national target-setting.  Asked to escribe it, he explains ‘it’s just about the 
treatment of … like for example, like the police, right, one of the things – just showing their 
racist side, basically, you know …  They would, say, stop 50 Asian guys and black guys, and 
then, right, they’d have to stop a couple of white guys and say “alright, I’ll let you off John, 
let you off Paul”, just for the stats, you know.  So “no, no, it’s not all Mohammed, 
Mohammed, Mohammed and Winston, we’ve got John here, and we’ve got Peter and Paul 
here …”.’ 
 The conduct of those who enforce the rules is highlighted amongst the Czech groups 
with added dimensions – notably the significance of mentalities which have been inherited 
                                                
17 This parallels a point made by Mickey at Norwich: ‘if someone effs and blinds, “I’m not paying your effing 
fare” … the copper might turn a blind eye to that, but somebody has a little minor dispute with his bet mate 
over something pathetic and tiny, he’s cuffed, thrown on the ground and shoved in the back of the van.’ 
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specifically from the communist period, and the financial weakness of the state.  These 
factors emerge in the discussion in Liberec on the question of criminal behaviour: 
 
Z:  Before it used to be individuals, today you’re starting to get gangs, mafia groups and whatever. 
 
O:  Yeah, but you had them before.  It’s a question of money again, because for your average 
policemen on the beat, preventing crime isn’t easy.  Police can’t be everywhere, and as soon as 
their standard of living goes low … 
 
R:  Criminals nobble them to keep them quiet …  [O:  Corruption …]  They corrupt them, they give 
them money to silence them. 
 
Z:  And if they’re really young policemen they do it themselves, they run it themselves … 
 
O:  Preventing that requires a completely different approach.  I think it needs a completely different 
approach from flinging money and hiring policemen until you’ve gone from 20,000 of them to 
50,000.  I think far better than flinging more money at it is prevention and education and waiting 
until that generation dies out … [Z: Until that generation dies out …] and is brought up 
differently.  But unfortunately that’s not happening.  […]  The judiciary doesn’t work properly 
either.  You’ve got cases which take years to get to court …  [Z:  So much trivial stuff and so 
much money …]  And criminals know if they steal something they can do what they like for three 
years without any problems, that’s just the average, th y can move about in freedom without 
harm.  And if finally it gets to court then there’s procrastination again … everything, everything 
takes ages.  The prisons are full, they don’t have anywhere to put them, now they’re going to build 
some and that construction will cost billions, that’s not small money at all, and we’re throwing 
billions at it so that we can lock someone up again. 
 
Z:  And if the prisoners don’t have work then for every criminal you’ll get another criminal. 
 
The motif of the corruptness of the older generation, morally tarnished by its association with 
communism, is a recurrent one (and one that can exist in parallel with ideas about the greater 
public-spiritedness of people under communism).  Note Zdeněk’s repetition of ‘until that 
generation dies out’, an indication of the ease with hich he recognises Onřej’s theme: one 
of the reasons why the police are considered heavily susceptible to corruption is that they 
were brought up to have a ‘completely different attitude’, in conditions where different 
behaviour was normalised.  The assumption of corrupt values is made of officials in all forms 
of public office, including the judiciary, the police and the law-makers.  ‘There’s absolutely 
no moral responsibility there’, says Zdeněk at Ostrava, ‘we can’t govern it, we can’t control 
it, it’s a proper madhouse, to put it in Czech.’  Like the Liberec group, the Ostrava group ties 
this in with the generation problem and a weak legal system.18   
The explanatory motifs which have been traced so far assert the relevance of factors 
which are domestic or local.  Very occasionally, a transnational dimension is also raised.  
                                                
18 When the Plzeň group confronts the problem of the judicial system, their first point is that it is biased.  Asked 
to explain this, Míra says that 80-90% of the peopl working in the system are survivors from before the 
revolution, ‘people brought up in a completely different way,’ he says (with almost identical language to 
Onřej’s comment above).   
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The notion of a declining ‘threshold’ as regards willingness to engage in criminal activity is 
associated by both the Lübeck and the Würzburg group with the arrival of immigrants from 
outside the home environment.  The principal places of relevant contrast here seem to be 
eastern Europe and the Balkans, whilst Turkey has an ambiguous status – both groups 
mention it in this regard, but Würzburg mention it more as a device to put the behaviour of 
eastern Europeans into relief.  Here one is moving towards the Relations between Peoples 
domain which will be considered further below, but there is a distinction: the threat being 
described here is to the security of the individual rather than to the collective.  In the first 
extract, Wolfgang and Jürgen in Lübeck frame the problem in terms of ‘the readiness to use 
force’: 
 
W:  … I think – the statistics show it too – that among a lot of foreign nationalities [speaking slowly], 
whether it’s eastern Europe or let’s say the Turkish area, that the readiness to use force is 
considerably higher there than is normal in Central Europe.  I mean, punch-ups you’ve always 
had, that’s nothing new, but that one goes straight at someone with a knife or that one reaches 
immediately for a pistol and shoots someone down, let’s just say that’s not normally the order of 
the day in Central Europe. 
 
J:  You could be right.  When someone comes from Kosov  or somewhere, and he’s experienced the 
chaos of the civil war there … [W:  Exactly, yeah] and he’s seen deaths and he’s seen how one 
person murders another, that surely brutalises these p ople a bit, and perhaps for him the value of 
life is not put quite so high any more.  Who knows.  I’m not in a position to say, but … 
 
W:  The threshold of inhibition is lower … [J:  Yeah, the inhibition threshold is lower.] 
 
Niklas subsequently contests this point by reframing the problem according to the Economics 
domain, arguing that violence is always most common amongst the poor, whether they are 
outsiders or Germans.  But the fluidity and responsiveness with which Wolfgang and Jürgen 
develop their point suggests that the discursive resource on which they are drawing is one 
which is easily available to them.  The Würzburg group begins its discussion of crime by 
debating whether crime is really rising or not, and the extent to which this corresponds to the 
economic situation, before connecting to the immigrat on question as well: 
 
O:  And crime is going up too. 
 
R:  Apparently not.  [O:  What?]  Apparently not.  If one reads through the police statistics … Certain 
types of crime have gone up.  That’s the interesting hing.  It also connects back to the topics 
‘Work’ and ‘Economy’ again, in that theft and violent offences have gone up a bit.  The others 
haven’t though, according to the statistics that are published in the papers from time to time – now 
of course, statistics here, statistics there, fine, but one needs some kind of orientation – and these 
… that’s the interesting thing, those offences which have to do with the social situation, with this 
tense situation, they’ve gone up, that’s evident in the statistics.  Like I said, violent crime, property 
crime, burglary, robbery etc., they’ve gone up.  And they’ll probably carry on going up.  You 
know, that the people in society who are coming off badly, to put it simply, that they go and fetch 
themselves what they’ve been deprived of [U: yeah].  That the inhibition threshold for breaking 
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laws drops lower and lower.  The worse, the more extreme the social situation becomes, the lower 
the inhibition threshold goes, to go into a department store and walk out with something in your 
pocket, or to bounce a check, or to mug a pensioner in the park to get hold of some money … 
these are pretty primitive things of course … but they’re going up. 
 
O:  The inhibition threshold sinks … [R: yeah].  The mentality that says ‘it’s all the same to me’.  […] 
 
U:  Fine, I mean, it links in also with ‘Treatment of Outsiders’ [points to card], these crimes, theft and 
so on … that naturally a lot of … from the East especially – I wouldn’t say for Turks perhaps – 
that they come over, they see this rich country … 
 
JW:  From the East – you mean from East Germany or …? 
 
U:  From eastern Europe … [R: … Russia …]  … eastern Europe … [R:  Key word!] … and they think 
this is the land of cockaigne, where the roasted goose flies into your mouth, that everything lands 
automatically on your palette for free, and then – isn’t it so? – and then these conflicts come up, I 
think these robberies and attacks will continue goin  up … 
 
R:  Here in Würzburg there’s a district, slightly outside and up on the hill, lots of high-rise buildings 
there and … [U:  … Really horrible …]  Really horrible, yeah, and there’s a lot of Russian 
emigrants living there – there’s quite a few in Germany – and they’re living all in a great mass.  
Whenever there’s a crime in Würzburg, whenever someone gets beaten up or gets robbed, 
whenever a shop is broken into, than everyone listens up – oh-oh, it was the Russians, that’s what 
people say.  So … and often it turns out to be true, unfortunately one has to say …
 
By linking crime with economic and social desperation (generally, ‘the social situation’), a 
potentially much wider sense of space is made possible through association with the 
discursive patterns of the Economics domain.  The eastern Europeans make their appearance, 
together with the poverty which is expected of them.  These are not so much the eastern 
Europeans who would compete for jobs but the ones who do not know how to work, in 
particular the Russlanddeutschen who have difficulties with alcohol.19  With their 
expectations of wealth disappointed, they turn to crime. 
 Explanations based on economic factors are particularly in evidence amongst the 
Czech and Erfurt groups.  As suggested in Chapter 4, in the discussions of these groups in 
particular, elements to do with Economics and Society and the Law are entwined.  Josef in 
Ostrava exhibits a widespread assumption when he links a person’s liability to legal 
punishment with their economic status: those who have friends, a lawyer and some money 
will be ok.  The Erfurt group presents policemen as governed by economic motivations: ‘I 
the little policeman, I want to earn my money.’  Explanations of declining social order based 
on economic factors are evident in Liberec:  
 
O:  Those are huge gaps, and the second thing is then university: I think we’ve got a good level, but the 
problem is the places.  Few places, little money for people, a poor student either has some kind of 
stipend …  
                                                
19 Later in the discussion, Oliver repeatedly emphasises the problem of alcohol for the Russlanddeutschen and 
argues that ‘the combination of alcoholism and unemployment is fatal’. 
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Z:  He needs a stipend.  If he’s good then the school recommends him and he gets it off the state.  [O:  
How many of those people are there?]  There’s not many.  A normal mortal, even if he’s average 
rather than first-rate, might enjoy it and get more ut of it if he went, but he doesn’t have the 
parents for it. 
 
R:  Yeah, and maybe because his parents can’t afford it that kid is going to end up in a gang … [O: 
That’s it! …]  [Z:  That’s exactly it …] and they’ll think up some shit, five young lads’ll get 
together and maybe one’ll say ‘let’s steal a car’ or ‘let’s attack someone’ … 
 
Z:  They don’t go and steal a car immediately, first they go and nick an antenna … 
 
The economic dimension of these explanations (the inability of the poor to get access to 
good-quality education in schools; the decline of standards in the household due to the 
precarious economic circumstances of parents, and – elsewhere – the decline of standards in 
schools due to the emigration of teachers) opens out a wider sense of space through 
association with the Economics domain.  Otherwise, however, the explanations remain rather 
local.  Insofar as the Czechs habitually associate riminal behaviour with minorities, it is with 
the ‘gypsies’ (not, for example, with the Vietnamese, one of the largest minority populations 
in the country), and the gypsies are treated generally as a domestic problem – they are not 
recent arrivals from the outside world, and cannot be connected with a particular sponsoring 
state.  To point to them is again to rely on a ‘domestic’ explanation for crime.    
 
 
B)  Possibilities for Action 
 
As noted in Chapter 3, all of the groups interviewed express a clear sense that something 
should be done about the problems associated with this domain.  A sense of injustice is 
strongly evident when the British groups talk about v lnerability to crime and the lack of 
adequate protection, when the German groups discuss various forms of antisocial behaviour 
and the weakness of the public’s response, and when t  Czech groups talk about 
institutional corruption.  The sense that something could be done varies somewhat, but is 
generally stronger than in the Economics domain.  One sees calls both for government-led 
approaches and for initiatives originating from ‘society’ as a whole.  All of these possibilities 
for action are connected to national or subnational actors, which is consistent with the fact 
that the problem explanations tend to be limited to factors within the home environment.  
Indeed, and significantly, it may be that there is a tronger sense of agency here than in the 
Economics domain precisely because the sense of space is rather narrower.   
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 One of the specific reasons it is stronger relates to the emphasis placed on 
upbringing.  To the extent that misbehaviour is associated with the distorted values and 
attitudes of individual actors, better education – whether at school or in the home – presents 
itself as a convincing remedy.  Andreas in Erfurt argues that ‘certainly more money and time 
need to be devoted to the future of children’, and children should be encouraged ‘to develop 
their own opinions and to know roughly what’s right and what’s wrong.’  Mike makes an 
allusion to an event three years earlier when a pupil from the local Gutenberg Gymnasium 
went on the rampage, killing seventeen people: ‘the connection (Zusammenhalt) between the 
parental home and school teachers, it’s no longer there like it used to be.  I can still remember 
when I was at school, my schoolmistress and my father used to meet at least once a week 
[laughs from the others] … No but really, if it was still like that today then what happened at 
the Gutenberg Gymnasium would definitely never have happened.’  Hans-Jürgen adds his 
agreement.  Mickey in Norwich argues that ‘at the end of the day, most of the taxation comes 
down to one thing, or should: a lot of it should go on education.  Cos if people have been 
educated they’re less likely to be ming-mongs.’20  The British groups talk a great deal about 
‘nipping bad behaviour in the bud’, and in this Norwich extract one sees the national 
government referred to as a convincing agent for doing this: 
 
L:  … I mean, youngsters today, walking around here, sometimes, it’s a nightmare.  I saw two lads the 
other day, they had their eyes on a young lady there and if I hadn’t said something to one of the 
lads I don’t know where she would have been.  I actually backed into a bus because they all 
zoomed in on me.  I backed into a bus cos of it, and they all ran off laughing and going on, but she 
had a chance to get away.  And they were all a bunch of young lads up for no good, you know. 
 
M:  As I say, I think if you could nip the small things in the bud – and I think the government are 
beginning to do this now, aren’t they – if you can nip the anti-social behaviour in the bud …   
Now, it’s like, I’m a one-man wall around where I live, and I finally got my own way, it’s taken 
me nigh three years, but I go out after people and say ‘get off my garden, stopping kicking my 
fence, get away from this, get away from that,’ because you phone the police up and they’re not 
interested.  You get these wardens coming round, an h lf these wardens are getting paid to do 
nothing because they never come round.   
 
B:  All comes down to education doesn’t it … [M:  Yeah, educate people …] …  Children, parents, 
teachers from the word ‘go’, you know, right and wrong. 
 
M:  You stand outside the first school and you have some kids coming out effing and blinding, 
screaming and shouting, then you look at the parents a d you see the reason why.  You have other 
children come out and all they want to talk about is what they want to do and how many books 
they want to read, ‘I’ve had a really good day at school, Mummy and Daddy.’ 
 
 
                                                
20 Andreas in Erfurt argues that children should attend school for as long as possible – twelve years, as in the 
Gymnasium system, rather than ten, as for the Realschule – because ‘this feeling of belonging together is built 
up from the first class onwards.’   
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If people can be caught ‘from the word go’, then it seems there is a real chance of bringing 
them up as honest citizens.  It is, one may say, an assertion of the importance of civic 
education, and it persists despite the scepticism of certain State institutions such as the police.  
At the same time, education can only achieve so much: Mickey’s last intervention implies the 
importance of the family as well as the school, since different children will be more teachable 
than others. 
 Education, while emphasised across the groups, is treated as a long-term approach, 
and changing the behaviour of adults is viewed as more difficult.  Especially for those groups 
which consider crime to be a major problem, education needs to be supplemented in the 
short-term with better enforcement of the rules.  The potential of punitive action to tackle 
crime is a second government-led way in which a sense of agency is affirmed.  It is true that 
there is much ambivalence expressed regarding the organs of the law such as the police and 
magistrates.21  The participants in Swansea are keen to describe themselves as ‘always the 
target’ for the police, and we have seen Murda in Reading reading a television programme as 
informing him about ‘the police’s racist side’.  But this reflex cynicism coexists with plenty 
of calls for action.  Stronger sentencing is an obvi us one, as seen in Chapter 4 with the calls 
for a policy of ‘three strikes and you’re out’.  ‘I watched a programme,’ says Mickey at 
Norwich.  ‘The average drug-dealer affects and destroy  forty lives.  Destroys forty lives.  
Simple way to stop that, isn’t there.’  Barry responds: ‘yeah, take him out.’  ‘Lock him up,’ 
continues Mickey.  ‘Nip the supply in the bud.’  A principle of enforcing the rules harshly on 
‘true criminals’ and gently on those who have been caught out for a minor thing also seems 
to have an instinctive and widespread appeal.  ‘I think basically you need to separate out the 
criminals who are unreformable and really tighten up the punishments for them,’ says Onřej 
in Liberec.  ‘There has to be that law here, three tim s and that’s enough.  I approve of that.  
If someone murders three times, Jesus, it’s impossible to rehabilitate him, there needs to be 
an end to it.  He needs to be locked up for life.  But if someone steals something, for 
example, if someone steals a car and gets five years, for that person, if you send him to 
                                                
21 Cynicism towards the agents of law enforcement is much less evident though amongst the western German 
discussions in Lübeck, Kassel and Würzburg.  The Lübeck group’s own satisfaction with police conduct was 
noted earlier, while Rainer and Uwe at Würzburg see widespread trust in the police as the natural state of affairs 
in Germany:  Rainer mentions having recently read ‘that the police as an institution still enjoy a very high 
degree of trust here.  That made an impression on me.  It was a public opinion poll, it said that the police … 
how shall I put it, that they’re not seen as particularly corrupt, that they’re very well trusted.’  ‘I can believe that 
too,’ continues Uwe.  ‘I mean, I can imagine that a small official – policemen are also officials – isn’t corrupt, 
because it doesn’t pay to be.  If someone tried to grease a policeman’s palm with 2000 euros, I’m surehardly 
any of them would take it up.’  The consensus on this is total.  Such confidence in the conduct of the institutions 
of enforcement, coupled with a generally relaxed attitude towards the problem of criminal behaviour, sggests 
the Germans do not see a problem of agency here.  
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prison, you’re going to train him into the criminal profession.  After five years he’s not going 
to come out reformed.  He’s going to go out and put into practice everything he learnt in 
there …’.  Zdeněk agrees: prison sentences for minor crimes are what turns car-thieves into 
bank-robbers.  Consistent with this, the participants of this group strongly oppose proposals 
for the age of criminal responsibility to be lowered.  A fifteen-year-old child will do what he 
wants, it is argued, and locking him up will not improve him. 
 Worth highlighting is that these calls for stronger law enforcement are sometimes set 
in the context of the national political system.  A political party is needed which is willing to 
‘enforce all the rules the same’.  Note Mickey’s use of the word ‘promise’ here, and his 
reference to his own political involvement: 
 
M:  We were promised three strikes and you’re out, weren’t we.  And that was one of the reasons that 
I’ve voted for this government, yeah, we were promised three strikes and you’re out, and I think 
the reason why we’ve all picked on this subject is because at the end of the day it is the most 
important subject.  We would pay more of that [Taxation] to get better that [Legal System].  [B:  
Definitely.] 
 
L:  We would yeah, that’s right.  I mean, who’s worrying about paying more of this [Taxation] when 
everything else comes into play?  D’ya know what I mean?  And this is where the Liberals score, 
don’t they.  Because their policies, what they’re coming out with now, is what people are going to 
be thinking about.  The Conservatives, I mean, they’re not that bad but at the end of the day who’s 
going to produce the most for everybody’s safety?   
 
The expectation that something should and can be done is evident in the tone of 
disappointment and the willingness to see higher taxation, as all three participants affirm.  
Leyton’s reference to British political parties is hard to read – the Liberal Democrats do not 
traditionally score well on law-and-order issues as he suggests, but the reference could be to 
their position on taxation.  Either way, his last sentence conveys a sense of expectation: the 
ability to guarantee safety on the streets is one of the key criteria for assessing the worth of 
politicians.  The possibility of transnational forms of action is undiscussed; the problems are 
national or local and need to be dealt with as such. 
 The possibility of society-led approaches is raised in several of the groups.  If people 
will stand up for the rules – rather like Leyton was doing above when he backed into the bus, 
or as Hans-Jürgen did when demanding that the person opposite take his feet off the seat – 
then there is the possibility that society can be made a better place.  There are two difficulties 
cited with this however.  First, it is quite likely that one will be ignored.  Dieter in Kassel 
says: ‘Think of our stupid colleagues, they chuck their cigarettes out of the car here, onto the 
rank where they’re standing, in other words their immediate environment.  And if you 
approach them and ask them, if you say “Listen, you’ve just thrown your cigarette butt out, 
 217 
that’s littering” ...  “Yeah well the street-cleaner needs work, doesn’t he.”  That’s … when 
you think how stupid that is …  Are you really going to expect that these people can develop, 
that they can change …?’  The second fundamental challenge is that social etiquette stands in 
the way.  ‘If you say something,’ says Andreas at Erfurt, ‘then you’re cursed as a trouble-
maker.’  This compounds people’s apathy and fear, says Uwe, so they say to themselves ‘oh, 
there’s no point, let’s leave it,’ and the deviant behaviour continues.  The motif of people’s 
timidity before the transgressor is evident in the following, and the final comment seems to 
imply a limit to how much one can expect to control hese social trends: 
 
H-J:  … Let’s take the mobile phone, for example, a re lly simple normal thing: would you go to the 
opera or to the theatre with your mobile and let it ring and then start a conversation? 
 
A:   And why don’t eight hundred people speak out against the person who’s on the phone?  Because 
he’s speaking so loudly that no-one dares to speak to him.  That’s how it is.  […] 
 
H-J:  We experience it every day.  If someone comes into my car and takes my phone then I get really 
fed up.  He should ask me, he should ask me.  I don’t go to the hairdresser’s and settle down with 
my phone and carry on a conversation and then say ‘goodbye and see you’.  It’s just not what you 
do.  These are basic rules of decency.  But they don’t exist any more … [U: … It’s a madhouse 
…] 
 
A:  This kind of decency needs to come from the parental home though … 
 
H-J:  But there are people who get into our cabs, 40 or 50 years old, lawyers, doctors … What are you 
going to do, call their parents? … No, it’s their lifestyle – ‘I’m not interested in other people.’ 
 
A:  No, it’s not their lifestyle, it’s the times … 
 
 Confidence in either a political or a society-led approach only goes so far, and 
ultimately the only solution may be immediate, private action to extinguish the problem.  Just 
after the passage above in which the merits of different political parties are considered, 
Mickey’s next comment twists things in a rather different direction: ‘And I tell you, I’ve 
already had this conversation with you Barry, it’s only a matter of time before there’s 
vigilantes.’  If education fails, if individuals continue to break the rules and politicians are 
unable to get a grip on the problem, then ‘people lik  us’ will need to resolve things on the 
spot.  ‘Whoever’s in power,’ says Barry, ‘we all look to the government and the council for 
what we want … [M:  Yeah …] but they seem to have abandoned us.’  The only alternative is 
to take a stand: 
 
B:  What you want is a political party which speaks li e us.  Someone who was actually committed to 
what they say.  I mean, they give you all this ‘I’ll do this’ but when they get there they become 
one of the brothers in Parliament …  [M:  [of B] I’d follow him.]  Cos we all want the same 
things, don’t we.  We want fairness across the board, but you don’t see it, you don’t see it. 
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M:  He’s like me, he wants …  [B:  Fairness, don’t we.]  We had a really good discussion one day, 
didn’t we.  We were actually talking about vigilantes.  He had problems with scumbag neighbours, 
I had problems with scumbag neighbours … [B:  We all h ve …]  … You sort mine, I’ll sort 
yours.   
 
Nor should such talk necessarily be dismissed as posturing.  A later passage of conversation 
finds Mickey recounting an incident to do with noisy neighbours where the police refused to 
act and where a solution was achieved – ‘and I don’t mind telling you this on tape’ – only 
with the intervention of ‘two mad, big, muscley, bouncer Geordies,’22 old acquaintances of 
his from Newcastle, who explained to the miscreants ‘if you ever fuck with him again we’re 
going to kill you.’  This is clearly at the radical end of expressions of agency; agency which 
avoids formal channels of authority and which can hardly be described as organised.  
However, it is consistent with the general sense that problems to do with criminal or 
antisocial behaviour are soluble.  There is none of the sense of inevitability which one finds 
in the Economics domain, and no attempt to normalise the problems.  They can be tackled, 
one way or another.  
 The assumption of agency is in some ways weaker amongst the Czech groups.  That 
it might be a Czech national tradition to avoid submitting to the law is one sceptical position 
which has already been noted.  More detailed arguments are to be found also, mainly focused 
on two major problems: petty crime and high-level corruption.  Greater spending on the 
police is described as legitimate in principle, although there is doubt about its affordability, 
plus a sense that – as state employees – the police already get better protected salaries than 
most.  A call for more psychiatric help for criminals when they come out of prison runs up 
against the major barrier to action which is distinctive of the Czech discussions, the lack of 
state finances.  This is the counter-argument raised whenever the usual points are made about 
improving the education system or the quality of law enforcement.  ‘The biggest problem is 
the lack of finances,’ says Onřej from the Liberec group.  ‘Whether it’s how much goes on 
healthcare, on the police, on transport, on the legal system … the money problem is the 
biggest one.’  Without better wages, the quality of the police force will remain low and the 
likelihood of corruption will be strong, but no change can be expected ‘if the state doesn’t 
take in enough money to be able to give out.’  
 There is another restraining factor, and this links to the second major problem, that 
of corruption.  Whereas the British and the western-German groups treat the legal system as a 
means of rooting out corruption (insofar as they are concerned about corruption at all), for 
                                                
22 Geordies – people from Newcastle. 
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the Czech groups the legal system – stretching all the way back to the law-making process – 
is instead seen as one of the primary expressions of corruption, the locus rather than the 
solution.  Corruption is considered a barrier to all kinds of institutional response to the 
problems of law and order.  As Marek in Ostrava puts it, ‘corruption, I don’t think there’s 
any way to get rid of it as long as the people making the laws here are the ones who live off 
corruption.  You see, I can’t make a law which is against myself.  That’s what I mean when I 
say that if we copied a law from another state … Here they always make a law which is 
favourable to one side and there’s no recourse, or it’s done very badly so that a clever lawyer 
can unlock it and get around it.  Laws in Germany for example, they make it so that there is 
recourse of some kind, so that no-one can escape.  Whereas here it’s only half-complete.’  
Rather than being seen as a defender of the public interest, the legal system is often 
considered one more means of advancement.23  In the face of loopholes and the ability of 
those at the top of the hierarchy to circumvent the law with the help of a sharp lawyer, what 
matters then is not the legal constraints but the personal morality of the individuals who hold 
office.  And their morality, of course, is the morality of society more broadly.  Onřej and 
Zdeněk in Liberec both say that it is impossible to point the finger of blame at individuals, 
that the problem is with the society from which these individuals are drawn: ‘it’s the 
upbringing, it’s the morality of those people, but that’s how the whole of society functions,’ 
says Onřej.  This brings us back to the notion of a whole generation which has been tarnished 
by its association with the old regime.  Is it considered possible to change their mentalities 
and behaviour?  The assumption seems to be that it is not.  ‘People brought up completely 
differently,’ is what Míra in Plzeň calls them, and all one can do is ‘wait until they go off into 
retirement and a new lot comes along.’  The problem will endure until these people retire and 
are replaced by a younger generation – ‘and you have to hope,’ adds Petr, ‘that the new ones 
don’t learn off the old ones.’  Zdeněk and Onřej likewise assert the need to wait patiently 
‘until that generation dies out; the main thing is to educate the new generation differently’.  
This is clearly a statement of the absence of possibilities for action in the short term, but it 
should not be equated with pessimism: there is an evident sense that, given enough time, 
things are likely to change.  Indeed, the Plzeň group sees progress already: ‘corruption was 
huge after the revolution,’ says Míra, with the vocal agreement of Petr and Román, ‘the five 
                                                
23 The Erfurt group treat the legal system as another exp ession of social hierarchy.  ‘It’s like a stairc se,’ says 
Hans-Jürgen.  ‘When you’re at the top, just picture it: you’re standing over the others, if you don’t take your 
foot away then they can’t come up.  I can do what I like with those under me.  That’s how it is with everything, 
whether it’s in the economy, in politics, whether it’s n the army or in prison, if you’re the arse at the bottom 
who can’t move upwards then that’s your bad luck.  There’s someone up above, you have to trample him down 
or else you won’t get up there.’  ‘It’s a hierarchy everywhere,’ confirms Mike. 
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or six years after the revolution were by far the worst.  Now it’s been intercepted; compared 
to what it was it’s minimal now.’   
   
 The sense of agency in this domain, while still qualified, is noticeably stronger than 
in the Economics domain.  Especially amongst the British and German groups, education and 
law enforcement are widely assumed to be convincing governmental approaches – though the 
government involved is the national one, and there is no sense of a transnational context here.  
Society-led approaches are mentioned too, though with rather more cautious optimism. 
 
 
Relations between Peoples 
 
A)  Explanatory Motifs 
 
Problems in the domain of Relations between Peoples, uch as conflict, threat and 
intimidation, provoke two main kinds of explanation.  Neither of these implicates the 
political subjects themselves, of course, since they are generally assumed to be peaceful 
people.  The focus is on other peoples: one set of xplanations is based on other peoples 
seeking to compensate for what they lack – in particular, power and resources; another set is 
based on these peoples expressing what are perceived to b  their essential characteristics, for 
example an unwillingness to compromise.  Conflicts ari ing from the first, for example over 
the control of resources, are presented as rational a d may sometimes involve western 
governments.  Those understood to be of the second kind, whether involving terrorists or 
intransigent minority groups within the environment (and this link is often made), involve at 
least one party which is considered in some way irrtional.   
 The military intervention in Iraq (2003-) is often discussed at least in part in power-
political terms.  The West is seen as contesting power with the ‘Arab-Muslim’ people, as 
symbolised by individuals such as Saddam Hussein or Osama bin Laden.  The latter, as they 
challenge for power, present a threat which the West then has to act against.  Martin in 
Swansea on Saddam: ‘Well I think it was right to be done.  Right to be done.  Cos he’s a 
threat and always will be a threat, and I think the longer he’d been left in power …  You 
know, obviously they didn’t find nothing then, but in time he could have quite possibly made 
a nuclear bomb or whatever.  He is a threat.  […] If he’d had a chance of making a bomb 
he’d do it.  I think the Iraq war was right, myself.’  ‘It’s all to do with power, isn’t it,’ he says 
 221 
a little later, which suggests a conclusion to David: ‘You know, at the end of the day, the 
most powerful country in the world is America.  So at the end of the day, cowardly as it may 
be to say, I’d rather be with America than against America.  [murmurs of agreement]  Given 
now in the next six months to a year … George Bush has just been re-elected, within six 
months to a year they’ll be going in on Iran next.  Don’t worry about that.  And Iran have got 
nukes.  He [Bush] is a Texican, isn’t he …’  Lee responds: ‘He is a man who’ll start a world 
war.  No question.’  Bush is portrayed as a potentially aggressive actor, perhaps even 
foolhardy; the subjects may not like him, but prefe to align with him for power reasons.  
When Petr in Plzeň presents the Iraq war as being ‘theoretically’ about bringing freedom to 
people, Míra succeeds in convincing him ‘yeah, but ideals ... it’s money and oil in 
everything.’  Particularly for wars where the US is involved, ‘all about money’ and ‘all about 
oil’ are common refrains.  An indication of a power-based perspective is found when the 
same group discusses the strength of the Czech army: Míra suggests it is ‘paltry compared to 
other states’, and ‘compared to the rest of the world it was much stronger before the Second 
World War, and we still couldn’t beat off the Germans.’  Román points out ‘to say to the 
Americans “don’t do that!”, if the Czech Republic say  that then of course it won’t have any 
effect.’  At Erfurt, Hans-Jürgen uses the power motif t  interpret Germany’s past:  ‘You 
don’t get any other country – take Britain for example – being reproached for colonialism.  
Same with France, Portugal and Spain.  Think about what they did in South America.  These 
things have happened in history.  That one must never forget it is logical.  But one can’t keep 
pointing the finger all the time.  […]  No-one reproaches the Americans when they do 
something.  … What’s the difference?  The difference is designated by the more powerful 
one.  And once again that’s not the Germans.’   
 Who has the power is deemed one of the keys to understanding relations between 
peoples.  A global contest for power and resources is posited, with complete consensus, by 
the Kassel group when accounting for international conflicts:  
 
H:  I think the crunch with this whole thing is tha the distribution of resources here on Earth is very 
varied, that most wars take place due to this distribution.  Whether it’s basic economic goods like 
oil or other raw materials, or as is going to happen also with water, which some day is certainly 
going to have to be divided.  Doesn’t affect us so much yet, but it may certainly hit us later.  
Perhaps very soon.  
 
D:  That’ll come too.  …  With oil we’re probably already there … With water it’s coming.  […] 
 
P:  It’s always a matter of distribution … [H: yeah].  Wars happen because things are wrongly [falsch] 
distributed.  But that’s completely normal.  If I have something, why should I give it up to you?  
Tell me.  That’s just how it is, isn’t it.  And you say ‘why don’t you give me some, you have a lot, 
you don’t need it all.’  Yes, but I say, ‘sure, but why?  Bad times might come, then I’d need it.’ 
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S:  I think with war and peace it’s more that certain countries want to keep their position of power … 
 
D:  Yeah, that’s exactly what he’s saying.  Simply to hang onto their personal or country-specific 
advantage and secure their position … 
 
P:  Or, then there’s these wars which in Africa … a lot … that some general launches a putsch and is 
brought to power … [D:  … Power, power! …]  And then we’re back at the same stage like when 
we had Hitler who killed the Jews and … in the one case the Tutsus [sic] get killed, in the other 
case the others get killed …
 
S:  Sure, but these African wars, for example, the Americans aren’t very interested in those.  [P:  Right, 
because there they can’t …]  Yeah, because they can’t extract anything there. 
 
P:  And probably soon the cost of the raw materials, even if they could get something out there, it’d be 
too expensive to ship it over to America …  [S:  … No raw materials in Africa …]  Yeah, exactly.  
[S:  … That’s how it is …] 
 
One seems to see two kinds of explanation of conflict here, one explicit and one implicit, and 
relevant to different kinds of war.  The first is the more structural one to do with relations of 
power: if resources are distributed unequally, there will be conflicts as those who have them 
try to fend off the challenges of those who do not.  These wars are rational, and they may 
involve western actors such as the US.  The second is a more essentialising explanation: wars 
in Africa are not about resources because there are non  there, rather they are more to do 
with meaningless violence (like that of Hitler against the Jews – though the point is not 
developed).  Note the phrase ‘some general’, as though the occurrence were so common that 
the details were unimportant. 
 Unless the West is specifically targeted, or unless the US chooses to involve itself, 
these conflicts over power are played out in the places of relevant contrast.  Aside from the 
odd exception like Northern Ireland, Europe is considered a place of peace, as we heard 
Rainer in Würzburg affirm in the previous chapter.  It is in places like Africa or the Middle 
East that wars take place.24  A description of the Israel-Palestine conflict bythe Lübeck 
group displays both the power explanation and something close to an essentialising of 
conflict amongst the peoples of that region: Jürgen (with Wolfgang and Ali emphatically 
agreeing) says: ‘The Israelis are armed to their teth.  The Palestinians have a lighter set of 
weapons – they throw stones for example, or maybe they’ve got a gun in their hand, but the 
imbalance is simply too great.  […]  You certainly can’t condone everything the Palestinians 
do, setting off these attacks and blowing innocent people into the air …’  Wolfgang: ‘the 
                                                
24 Or in the past.  At Würzburg there is talk about Spain and Portugal as having been ‘imperialists’ – ‘they 
divided up the world’ and Oliver makes here a rare explicit mention of race, perhaps made easier by the fact 
that the events in question are far back in history: ‘to put it simply, the white race wanted to dominate other 
races.  To make gains for itself and to exploit places like Africa.’ 
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problem is exactly like you say: both sides are … [A:  stubborn …] stubborn, they’re not 
willing to sit down with each other and work out a compromise.  And without a compromise 
you can’t solve anything.’  Jürgen (with Wolfgang repeating ‘exactly’ in the background): 
‘it’s basically always a reaction and a counter-reaction, and they get each other more and 
more worked up until it becomes really extreme.’  Niklas: ‘Yeah, almost all wars are 
religiously motivated in some way, aren’t they.  There’s fanatics on both sides.’  Again, 
religious fanaticism – barring the exception of Northe n Ireland – is held to be what 
originates in the contrasts rather than in modern-day Europe.  It is another way of 
emphasising irrationality and difference.25   
 Some conflicts then are driven by (rational) considerations to do with the distribution 
of power, some by (irrational) proclivities to engage in war, and presumably some by both.  
Insofar as the West is generally assumed to be peaceful (with the possible exception of the 
US), these conflicts would take place just in far-away places of contrast; what makes certain 
places relevant contrasts is that what happens there can intrude on life in the home 
environment and comparables, integrating the sense of pace.  Andreas in Erfurt gives one 
indication of how, raising the example of Rwanda, which he and Hans-Jürgen agree is an 
archetype: ‘it’s the best example, it’s the example … [H-J: Definitely, the very worst …] 
Rwanda, where these Tutsis and Hutus … [H-J: Hutus and Tutsis] … Hutus and Tutsis, 
where they got in each other’s hair and basically slaughtered each other … where this 
Canadian General said – said to the UN – that we need to act immediately … Politicians 
were told that we need to act, we need to keep themapart.  Otherwise we get a huge refugee 
problem, that’s the consequence of murder and slaughter and whatever else.’  Peter in Kassel 
indicates a different way in which developments may impinge upon the home environment, 
based on aggressive intentions: 
 
For me … Not in the near future but sometime in the future the great bogeyman [Feindbild] is going to 
be the Chinese and the Muslim.  [H:  yeah]  ... In any event it’s going to happen that the Chinese bursts 
out and attacks.  I think there’s no way around that.  And the Muslims all over the world, they’re all
peaceful like we said but you see what happens everywhere with their attacks and all.  The Muslims, 
they’re in every country, and some day they’re goin to take over – this is my opinion – they’re going 
to take over world supremacy.  Because the potential is there.  This belief is there – this fanatical be ief 
is there …  So there’s enough potential for war, there’s enough for the next hundred years.  Question 
is, how long will it all survive?  Until someone, some kind of madman presses the button and 
everything goes up.  Pakistan – all you need is for someone who’s a bit hysterical to come to power 
                                                
25 As Peter in Kassel says, ‘look at how the Koran is i terpreted …  You can interpret it in a peaceful way and 
you can interpret it in a violent way, and generally it’s the violent way.  There’s nothing in it, for example, that 
says a woman should be put to death [ed.: probably a reference to various high-profile cases of honour killings 
in Germany around the time of the interviews], but they do it anyway because they interpret it differently.  And 
I think that’s a huge danger, really.’ 
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and some day he presses the button.  China overwhelms Taiwan – the Americans have said they’ll 
defend Taiwan, what would they do then? [D: yeah]. 
 
Aside from contingency (represented by the notion that a madman, or someone in Pakistan, 
could come to power and press the nuclear button), here are the two main explanatory motifs 
evident here.  There is the motif of power relations (the struggle for world supremacy); and, 
entwined with it, the essential character of the contrasting people (the ‘fanaticism’ of 
Muslims who are trying to take over countries).  The passage is reminiscent of the comments 
made by Uwe in Würzburg noted earlier, where he suggests ‘they want to destroy the whole 
western world.’  When these people come to live with ‘us’, they bring their irrationality with 
them, and their behaviour is simply the expression of their natures.  The same sense of 
irrationality was evident in earlier passages from the Swansea group, where Arabs were 
referred to as ‘fanatics from a very, very young age’ who have ‘had it drilled into them.’  
 With (slightly) less alarmism, the Lübeck group expresses clear consensus when 
discussing the problem of ‘Germanness’ being undermined: it is to be explained in terms of 
the unwillingness of other peoples to make the effort to integrate: 
 
J:  When for example you stand here at the station taxi-rank on Sundays and as a German you’re in the 
minority, and there are nine foreigners there and oe German, then you also start to feel a little bit 
like an outsider, somehow it’s … it’s somehow not nrmal.  […]  I don’t think that’s going to 
develop in a positive way, in fact I’m concerned about my grandchildren … [W: yeah], that 
they’re actually going to be living as a minority here in Germany, or at least that there’ll be areas 
where they’re in the minority.  That worries me.  If Turkey comes into the EU then there’ll be 
further colleagues coming over.  You can understand hem, if they live in poverty and they want to 
have a better life here, the east Europeans too … But at some point German children also have a 
right to a national … 
 
N:  The problem is also that there’s little interaction, the groups stay amongst themselves, which one 
can understand too, that they keep to themselves, form parallel communities, that there’s little …  
 
J:  It’s very visible in the US, where there’s actually whole town districts where only Russians live, 
only Chinese live, where only … whatever, Turks or something, and they’ve really sealed 
themselves off.  And in their areas, the areas where they live, they speak their national languages, 
don’t they.  That can’t work either, I don’t think, you get friction-points then … 
 
N:  The Turkish women have been here thirty years and they don’t speak any German ... 
 
J:  Yeah, and they go around veiled up so that no communication’s possible ... 
 
A:  The new generation too, they’re not allowed to a tend school.  I didn’t want to mention it but why 
are there a lot of taxi-drivers, you know them too, who’ve married again, the wife is eighteen or 
nineteen … I’ve campaigned so hard but the woman doesn’t go to school.  I’ve campaigned so 
hard … I’ve been able to get her to go to school for three days, so that he collects her and takes her 
and after three days he forbids it.  She’s the wife of one of our colleagues, I won’t name names …  
These women have been here a year, a year and a half, nd there’s already a second child on the 
way and they don’t have any German.  Not a single word.  Later the children speak German so 
they’ll translate for the mothers when the mothers go to the doctor or … 
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J:  … They generally translate for their parents at the doctor or with the authorities, they take the 
children along … 
 
A:  …Even now.  Even the new generation of Turks, they still don’t speak any German …
 
While eastern Europeans are mentioned once, it is clear that the focus here, in a discussion 
about group difference and ways of life, is on Turkey and the Turks.  The problem is the lack 
of communication, of peoples who stay amongst themselve  in parallel communities, who 
refuse to make the effort to integrate – the emphasis on language heightens the sense of 
otherness.  Even Ali, who has tried so hard to convey the importance of schooling, has been 
unable to break down this resistance.  Niklas, ever sc ptical of the willingness of his fellow 
participants to talk in the logic of this domain, elsewhere in the discussion explains the same 
problem of uneasy relations between peoples with reference to an economic argument: ‘the 
worse the economy goes, naturally the worse the rivalries between Germans and immigrants 
[Ausländer26] become.  Because a lot is pushed onto the immigrants, they’re blamed for the 
fact that there’s so few jobs.  It’s a problem.’  Niklas, however, is rather on his own with this 
argument.  
 The problematic point tends to be presented not as that other peoples have different 
traditions and ways of living (to object to that would be ‘unreasonable’), but rather that those 
peoples are unwilling or unable to compromise on their differences.  They seek to impose 
their customs and way of life on the inhabitants of the city.  It is part of the motif ‘they’re 
more racist than we are,’ which is a favourite of the participants in the Swansea group, as if 
to say ‘they are the ones with irrational prejudices’.  Even in the Reading group, considerably 
less hostile in its general tone, we see this suggestion of stubbornness, although this time not 
with regard to Arab-Muslims: 
 
D:  Cos a lot of people who come to the country, always … ‘oh we’ve been treated’ … I just heard a 
programme on the local radio – and it was Radio Berkshi e – talking about black people from Ba- 
… from the West Indies, came to Reading.  And when they got here in late 1950s, 1960s, they 
worked in Reading, and one lady has said on there that when she worked for Huntley Palmers, that 
make the biscuits here in Reading, they had a separate entrance for the black people.  They never 
did.  I worked for Huntley Palmers at the garage thre, one entrance, you went in the main 
entrance …  She wanted to be an outsider, she was talking on the radio, she was making herself … 
 
M:  I’m surprised about that … 
 
D:  Yeah that’s right, now I thought that sounded … 
 
                                                
26 Ausländer is a complex term to translate: ‘foreigners’ would be more appropriate in some contexts, and 
‘immigrants’, while it seems suitable here, is imperfect to the extent that speakers may also be referring to the 
descendants of immigrants. 
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M:  That’d be going back maybe a hundred years or something maybe … But not here, no, I wouldn’t 
have thought so. 
 
D:  No, no, and it was only one person, the others were all saying ‘oh we worked there and we all went 
in the same gate’ …  [M:  … South Africa in the 50s …] … special doorway because they were 
black … funny that […]  Funny isn’t it, how’s it portrayed or whatever, or how people … You 
know, I was about there then and I never heard of any secret doors. 
 
 
David presents the woman in question as wanting to be different, as presenting a kind of 
conspiracy theory based on ‘secret doors’ and ‘special doorways’ to make herself seem a 
victim.  Whatever the truth in the particular case, what is significant is the willingness of 
Murda (incidentally, himself non-white) to accept the account as being plausible and to be 
able to develop it consistently with David’s perspective.  The explanation for uneasy 
relations is fixed on the minority. 
 We have also seen amongst the Czechs an explanation of conflict based on 
fundamental difference.  Zdeněk in Ostrava spoke above of Muslims not knowing how t  
compromise, of it being their ‘mentality’ and of their having a ‘different nature to 
Christians’.  Gypsies also, when not being accused of choosing not to work or choosing not 
to play by the rules, are sometimes accused of having ‘a different mentality’.  That there were 
not more examples amongst the Czechs of threat and co flict being explained in these terms 
could be down to several things.  It could be that e number of interviews was simply too 
small; it could be that, having heard of western media criticism – particularly around the time 
of EU accession – of Czech attitudes towards minorities, the participants interviewed were 
wary of presenting themselves in these terms to a British researcher.  Certainly Román of the 
Plzeň group several times during discussion of these problems tried to reverse the interview 
by asking the author about race relations in Britain nd London.  Perhaps just as likely, 
however, is that the lack of exposure (at the time of the interview – the situation may change) 
to unfamiliar groups who might conceivably be thought of as constituting a collective threat 
provides little opportunity for a discursive repertoire of this kind to be deployed. 
 
 In studying explanatory motifs, special attention has been paid to the sense of space 
which tends to be evoked, to the territorial spread of factors deemed relevant to 
understanding the origins of problems.  Both of theprincipal explanations traced for 
Relations between Peoples – the one based on power and differences of power, th  other 
based on the characters of contrast peoples – imply a sense of space which is wide.  In the 
first case this is quite evident: one sees evoked a world of peoples with more or less power 
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who try to improve their positions.  The second, one might think, is a perspective which is 
non-spatial or deterritorialised, since it is based on characteristics rather than structural 
features.  Yet on the contrary, one feels it is highly spatial because these peoples, and the 
conflicts which they give rise to, are associated with particular parts of the world.  Relevant 
contrasts in this sense are Africa, the Middle East and (though mentioned only a few times) 
China, and the peoples who are encountered within the home environment and comparables 
are explicitly associated with such regions in the sense of them being ‘from there’ or 
‘belonging there’.  The sense of space is, again, very wide therefore. 
 
 
B) Possibilities for Action 
 
Rarely in these interviews does one find the idea that relations between peoples can be 
improved through dialogue or through better mutual nderstanding.  We heard Hans in 
Kassel make this suggestion in Chapter 3, but it is certainly not common.  A few individuals 
amongst the German groups (Niklas in Lübeck, Rainer and Oliver in Würzburg) call for 
German language lessons to be made compulsory for immigrants: ‘with integration,’ says 
Oliver, ‘it’s up to politicians to take them by the and and say “here’s a language course for 
you to take.”’  The sense that these should be obligatory – not just offered – may be read as 
implying however that the emphasis is more on enforcing conformity to ‘our’ practices than 
on establishing the means for dialogue.  The absence more widely of progressive ideas is 
most likely because conflict between peoples is seen to be out of the hands of the political 
subjects: as generally peaceful people, it is not they who are responsible, their behaviour is 
merely reactive.  Those whose aggression is understood as a challenge for power and 
resources are subverting the status quo and the problem is of their own making; if a western 
country like the US is the active party, this tends to be treated as a greedy government 
looking for money and oil, little to do with the subjects themselves.27  When antagonism is 
attributed to the character or nature of other peoples, their intransigence or irrationality, 
again the subjects are positioned as those responding to rather than initiating the problem.   
                                                
27 Note however that if a government withholds itself from an aggressive conflict then its association with the 
political subjects can be affirmed.  When Oliver at Würzburg talks about Germany’s abstinence from the Iraq 
war, the pronoun is ‘we’ all the way: ‘Germany is slowly coming out of the post-War situation, bit by it
starting to develop some autonomy.  Before we were the little brother of the USA, and whatever the USA said 
we agreed with.  Now since Iraq that’s changed.  Wehave our own opinion on that now, we’ve said we don’t 
want war.  It’s the first time in German history tha  we’ve taken an independent line.  Before that we really were 
just the USA’s little brother.’ 
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 In neither case does the notion of ‘dialogue’ get very far.  Admittedly, the research 
was conducted at a time of much talk in the media about a ‘clash of civilisations’, a term 
which could easily act as an organising concept for those inclined to see conflict as 
inevitable.  The term was not used in these discussion , though a comment by Dieter in 
Kassel encountered earlier has a similar ring: ‘this whole thing with the takeover by Muslims 
– or them achieving parity I should say, there won’t be a takeover – they’re everywhere and 
they install themselves everywhere and ... I’m not against Ausländer, but this way and means 
by which it’s all happening, I find it really unhealthy.  And there’s not going to be war 
between countries any more, instead war takes place between people(s), who live side by side 
but who have completely different cultures from each other …’.  Whatever the impact of one 
particular discourse of the moment, the fact remains that conflict tends to be normalised, 
across all the groups.  Of course, this should not be read as evidence in support of a ‘clash of 
civilisations’ or ‘clash of peoples’ thesis: our focus is on common-sense assumptions, and it 
is a quite separate question whether one would wantto buy into the common-sense position 
that conflict between peoples is unavoidable.28 
 A recap of the material confirms this assumption of the inevitability of conflict.  
‘Unless you can zap people for thinking,’ says Mickey, ‘you will never ever have peace.’  
‘You’re never gonna stop war,’ says David in Reading, and ‘I can’t do nothing about it.’  
Radical contingency is one aspect: we have heard Peter in Kassel suggest that ‘all you need is 
for someone who’s a bit hysterical to come to power and someday he presses the button.’  Or 
as Petr in Plzeň puts it, ‘just like 11th September, two planes struck a sky-scraper and the next 
morning there was suddenly a war going on, in Afghanist n.’  The scarcity and unequal 
distribution of resources is another determining aspect we have seen.  Then there is the 
problem that the attitudes of certain peoples are not conducive to harmony.  When the 
Würzburg group is asked whether there are ways of encouraging the integration of 
minorities, the immediate response is: 
 
O:  The integration process … it’s difficult.  With Russian-Germans alcohol’s involved.  And with 
Muslims it’s that their religion’s a problem.  They want their own thing, their own soup-bowl.  
What was it that Beckstein29 said? – some kind of state within a state, their own caliphate.  And 
that makes them hard to integrate. 
 
U:  Yeah, and as far as their beliefs go, one needs to be quite honest and say that their goal is world 
domination.  So I mean … sometimes I think that they really want to infiltrate the country … [R:  
                                                
28 Also, at the micro-level, these repertoires are deployed unevenly: only when a situation is problematised and 
conflict is foregrounded are they likely to be invoked, a fact that allows plenty of exceptions to be made. 
29 Günther Beckstein, the CSU Interior Minister of Bavaria. 
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 This set of assumptions clearly limits the perceived range of possibilities for action.  
There are some however, with slight variations betwe n countries.  For the British groups, 
dealing militarily with high-level threats when they arise is one necessary course of action.  
Tackling the threat means eradicating it rather than engaging with it, a job for the country’s 
armed forces.  Mickey at Norwich, with the backing of Gavin and Barry, says the Iraq war 
was ‘a necessary evil, we had to go in there, we had to do something,’ as a response to the 
attacks on the US of 11th September 2001.  The logic of the ‘war on terror’ is accepted 
unproblematically.  ‘There’s only one thing, there’s only one thing I ever ever agree with in 
the whole of the Bible – I think it’s the greatest book of fiction ever – what it is, is “an eye 
for an eye”.’  In this domain, action is not guided by rules but by what has to be done to show 
power and to remove the threat.  ‘Now at the minute, th  biggest war we got in the world at 
the moment is terrorism.  Now we got the greatest soldiers in the world, the SAS … They 
could have murdered these terrorists in their sleep, they know where they are …  Do away 
with them!  I don’t want to hear about it, I don’t want to know about it, just do it.  […] If I 
get on an aeroplane, yeah, say next week, and two years later it comes out, in Ally McNabb’s 
book or whatever, that that same aeroplane didn’t blow because the SAS went in, dragged 
these dirty, stinking, cowardly, murdering bastards out their beds and put a gun in their heads 
and blew their stinking rotting brains out, yeah, am I going to complain about that?  Am I 
hell!’  In this approach of cutting out the threats, there are no rules to follow.  ‘War is war, 
isn’t it,’ says Martin at Swansea, ‘simple as that.’30  In the Erfurt discussion, Hans-Jürgen 
refers to the case of the so-called Caliph of Cologne, an Islamic leader whose possible 
extradition to Turkey on criminal charges was a point f heated debate in Germany in 2004.31  
‘Just say what people really think.  Put him in a pl ne and let him crash.’  He then links this 
to the case of Ayatollah Khomeini, ‘who lived in France for years and then they sent him 
back and what happened afterwards?  You had a war there.  That’s why I said if he’d crashed 
then you’d probably never have had a war there.  It’s these individuals – we had one 
                                                
30 The Swansea group express this thought when criticising the British government for prosecuting one of its 
own soldiers for a misdemeanour in Iraq.  Andy: ‘he’s up on the charge for killing somebody …  Well, war is 
war, once you’re out there you don’t know what’s coming towards you.  You don’t know whether it’s a fanatic 
or just a tiny …  If they’re coming at you in a speeding car, what do you do?  Do you take a chance and let them 
blow you up or do you just pop ’em?’  Lee feels the injustice: ‘Now, the Metropolitan Police have brought 
charges against him and he has been taken to court n w on a murder charge.  For being over there, and there 
was a war going on.  You know, what’s all that about?’ 
31 Cf. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1705886.stm, accessed December 2006. 
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ourselves here in Germany and if he hadn’t been an idiot then everything would have been 
different.’32 
 A second approach raised in several groups is to reduce the amount of mutual 
exposure between peoples.  One way to do this is to take a tougher line on the number of 
outsiders let into the environment.  As noted above, th  Swansea group credits other 
countries in Europe, and Australia, with being firmer.  Such a policy, as one can imagine, is 
favoured not just for the benefits it can bring forthe problems of this domain (reducing the 
unwanted encounter with those held to be intimidating and uncompromising) but also, in the 
logic of the other domains, as a means of cutting crime and reducing the economic ‘burden’.  
Murda in Reading suggests: ‘say for example the warin Bosnia, and then the war in 
Afghanistan, yeah?  Now, once everything’s been sorted out and it’s no longer a war zone, 
now these people that have come over here as political asylum, can’t they be like sent back?  
You know, not in a horrible way, deported or anything, but another country that likes 
England, that aren’t well off, do something over there, make it better for the people …’.  The 
proposal is presented as an act of charity.  David ‘know[s] what he’s saying.’  At Swansea, 
such a move would no doubt be welcomed, though there is some concern about feasibility.  
The chief obstacle is taken to be the softness and craftiness of the national government.  
According to David and Andy at Swansea, the governmnt does not act against immigrants 
because ‘everyone’s afraid to step on them’.  The authorities are secretive, doing things 
behind the backs of the subjects: 
 
L:  […] There’s so many [asylum-seekers] in here now, what do you do, you can’t really ship them 
out. 
 
M:  They’ve put a stop to it now, haven’t they. 
 
A:  They can put a stop to it now, can’t they, so no others get in. 
 
D:  But have they put a stop to it, at the moment?  Haven’t they put a freeze on it?  [A:  I think so …]  
There’s a certain percentage, isn’t it … 
 
L:  It was in the paper, on the news and everything, that they stopped ninety asylum-seekers coming to 
Swansea, about three weeks, four weeks ago, because one asylum-seeker got killed in Swansea.  
On a night out.  And they stopped it then for safety r asons.  That was on the Friday.  On the 
Tuesday …  Big headlines, you know, they tried … the government obviously had to … big 
flashpoint, ninety asylum-seekers won’t be coming to Swansea …  Literally four or five days later 
                                                
32 This emphasis on no-holds-barred military action against salient threats is generally found less amongst the 
Germans or Czechs.  Both see the deployment of their troops overseas as a radical move and out of keeping 
with national tradition.  The Czechs also emphasise the limits of their capabilities: ‘we’re so meaningless,’ says 
Petr in Plzeň, ‘from our position our country’s unable to influence things,’ says Míra.  A role as part of NATO 
is mentioned (Román mentions Czech expertise in anti-chemical-weapons manoeuvres), but one within 
parameters set by the US. 
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there’s a little bit in the Evening Post, where nobody’s going to see really: they’ve now let the 
ninety asylum-seekers come into Swansea.  You know, f ur or five days later.  All of a sudden 
there’s a big bit in the news …  [D: About the safety crisis and everything …]  And then five days 
later there’s a little tiny piece in the Evening Post saying it’s been over-ruled and the police think 
it’s safe now for the ninety.  So what difference has four days made? 
 
The government, the police and the newspaper are presented as in collusion.  The news of the 
arrival of the ninety is suppressed, almost in a guilty manner, and any opportunity to protest 
is circumvented.  Amongst the German groups one also finds calls for the national 
government to be stricter on how many outsiders are let into the country, with the success of 
such calls likewise qualified.  The motif of weak and sly national politicians is widely 
present, in the German case entwined with the discour e on the country’s history.  An 
interesting discussion of this appears in the interview in Lübeck, following on from a passage 
cited earlier dealing with the ability of (mainly Turkish) immigrants to speak German:  
 
A:  … It’s not just Turkey.  Where I live is a foreign land – there’s just Turks and Russians living 
there, and now the majority is white Russians.  They don’t speak a single word of German but 
their great-grandfather was German, so they’ve all been given entry permits to Germany and then 
they immediately get German passports.  They’ve never been to school, so they don’t speak a 
single word of German, and they live here like kings.  They have … Just go to the carpark to see 
what kind of luxury cars they have. 
 
W:  … They could prove they had a German shepherd dog and then Fischer gave them a visa ... 
 
J:  Fischer gives everyone a passport.  And that’s the problem, because the politicians, in my opinion, 
they live somewhere in cloud-cuckoo land and they can’t see reality any more.  I mean … now 
you’re sitting down to talk with us, now you’re finding out what the people think.  But if you 
speak to a politician he’ll talk quite differently. 
 
JW:  Why are they so blinkered?  [J:  The politicians? …] 
 
W:  They want to be re-elected.  It’s … it’s the desir  for power.  Whoever’s had some kind of office 
and a large chair to sit on, he clings to it and doesn’t want to give it up.  Also … also to blame is 
this block arrangement we have with the political prties.  On the one side there’s the block with 
the Christian parties – the CDU / CSU, with the FPD as an appendage – and then over here there’s 
the Social Democrats with the Greens, and … 
 
J:  Yeah, and politicians here, they immediately get a lot of hostility if they talk about foreigners.  It’s 
such a hot subject, so dangerous for the politicians, that they really don’t want to touch it, and if 
they do then they generally run into problems because … because it’s immediately assumed that 
they’re xenophobic, radical-right, fascist etc.  [W:  yeah, exactly …]  and that’s not always the 
case.  If one speaks objectively about foreigners … you’re not immediately a Nazi just for raising 
the topic.  But a lot of Germans – a lot of those I’v spoken to – think that there is a problem with 
immigrants, and they’d quite like to have a party here in Germany that was a little bit more to the 
right, that draws up laws … [W: yeah] … that clamps down a little harder – but without going too 
far to the right … [W:  Into the brown corner …] … exactly, without going into the brown corner, 
not into the brown corner.  Take that Schill Party for instance, they got 20% straight off in 
Hamburg, and they were to the right, located a bit more to the right, but from the very beginning 
they distanced themselves from the brown corner … They said ‘Security is important to us, we 
want people to still be safe on the streets at night.’  And that’s what people want … 
 
N:  In reality they were brown though! 
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J:  Yeah but like I said, people would like to have  party which was further to the right than the CDU.  
But they’re afraid of becoming a slave to these pied pipers, the skinheads, the brown neo-Nazis … 
[N:  yeah] … And that’s always a thin line of course … 
 
In two connected moves, politicians are treated both as contributors to the problem 
articulated,33 and as being insufficiently willing to address the problem, out of touch with 
what ‘the people’ think.  The extremeness of their tolerance is matched by the extremeness of 
neo-Nazi hatred.  A very similar point is made by Uwe in Würzburg, backed up by Oliver: ‘I 
think we Germans should still allow ourselves to criticise foreigners.  I mean, I’m not going 
to punch someone in the stomach about it – that’s nonsense – but that doesn’t mean one has 
to accept everything that comes along, it can’t be lik  that.  No, and we have these two 
extremes.  On the one hand, we’ve become an effeminate touchy-feely society (Bussi-Bussi-
Gesellschaft) which always loves the offender – really loves the offender, the weak one is 
always right whatever he does.  [...]  On the other hand, because that’s then fertile ground for 
the extreme right, there’s the nationalists who then go around saying “get them all out now”, 
and they strike out wildly.  The reasonable middle is lacking in this country at the moment.’34  
The sense of inadequate representation on these problems is very similar to that found 
amongst the British, though it is assumed to be a distinctively German phenomenon.35 
 Another approach to maintaining a ‘healthy’ separation of peoples, mentioned with 
some regularity in the British and German discussions, is to send aid to the countries from 
which peoples are moving.  Africa and other places as ociated with war and disaster are 
highlighted.  Murda in Reading argues: ‘most of the countries [immigrants come from] have 
actually had like a war or something …Some of the African countries where they’ve had 
war, even in Iraq where they’ve had a war …You’ve got to get the aid out there.’  ‘At the end 
of the day,’ he says later, ‘everyone just wants a better standard of life, don’t they ... [David: 
Everyone wants that, yeah.]  So if you could get tha in the places where they live in the first 
place, they probably wouldn’t need to move,’ and ‘then you won’t have a lot of the outsider 
problems.’  Hans in Kassel, from a less subject-oriented perspective, makes the point about 
                                                
33 Shortly before the interviews, then foreign minister Joschka Fischer had accepted responsibility for German 
embassies being over-enthusiastic in the issuing of tourist visas 
34 The day before this interview, Chancellor Schröder had called upon Germans to acknowledge the lessons of 
the twentieth century in a speech commemorating the sixtieth anniversary of the liberation of the conce tration 
camp Buchenwald.  Cf. the Methodological Appendix. 
35 Amongst the Czechs, former president Václav Havel receives some criticism from the Ostrava group for not 
telling Cubans and Vietnamese residents to ‘go home’ at the end of the socialist period and for accepting 
immigrants from other eastern-European countries which did adopt this policy.  But the bulk of complaints are 
framed economically and refer to eastern-European workers.  When at one point Josef, having built up a he d of 
steam talking about lazy Ukrainians, tries to extend the discussion to ‘the Indians and Pakistanis’, Marek is 
dubious: ‘But how many of them are there really?’ 
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the importance of sending aid: ‘perhaps not so much for now but for the future.  Because the 
more you relieve economic dependency in the Third World, the less danger of war there is.  
The tension’s reduced.’   
 All such arguments face the objection (in Kassel supplied by Peter) that such aid is 
often so diluted by corruption that there is little point in sending it.  Murda even makes the 
point against himself: ‘I was talking to somebody once, right, and they were talking about the 
Red Cross, right, and they said “If you started off with a million pounds here, right, just as an 
example, and by the time it gets to somebody like Mother Theresa in India there’s probably 
about fifty quid left!”’  Another counter-argument is to point out that sending money abroad 
means less money for people at home.  ‘Charity begins at home,’ says Andy at Swansea.  ‘I 
mean, there’s people starving and freezing in the winter over here, I think the money should 
go to them rather than to people coming in.’  Lee agrees: ‘I mean, we complain how our 
country is in the state that we’re in and then we’re letting more people in and giving them 
money all the time.  When, as you said, charity start  t home.  I mean, you should be 
looking to sort your own country out first.’  A consensus amongst the Czech groups is that 
the country’s government is already too generous in sending overseas aid.  This ties in with 
the ‘small-state’ narrative: Josef at Ostrava, with Zdeněk’s agreement, suggests: ‘we’re a 
small state, but we’ve got a big heart, and we givemore than we get.  We had the floods here 
a few years ago, massive floods, the floods of the century, the square was covered and there 
was big damage, but we always receive less than we give.’
 
 In sum, the problems of Relations between Peoples are generally assumed to be best 
avoided by minimising relations with the relevant contrasts rather than by working to 
improve these relations.  Forcibly limiting immigration is considered one option, though 
dependent on politicians overcoming their reluctance to act; discouraging migration and war 
by means of overseas aid is another option considered, though always liable to be discredited 
as a waste of resources.  Both of these are treated as policies for the national government – as 
will be seen further in the next chapter, the EU is rarely mentioned as a possible means of 
collective action.  The possibility of resolving problems by means of a conciliatory approach 
towards opponents tends to be rejected, not least because these opponents are assumed to be 
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and overseas aid; can use 
force where necessary 
(esp. British). 
 Chapter Summary 
 
 
Juxtaposing our findings like this, the differences across domains become clear.  One sees 
that one domain of problems – Economics – is characterised by a combination, on the one 
hand, of general uncertainty about how to account for he emergence of problems, and on the 
other hand, when explanations are supplied, by the construction of a wide spatial context in 
which the determining factors lie far away from the ome environment in which the 
problems are experienced.  To simplify just a little, it tends to be suggested either that 
problems arise for reasons that are mysterious, such as the strange tendency of prices to rise 
faster than earnings, or that they arise due to developments on the other side of the world, 
such as the cheap cost of labour in ‘the East’.  Although the transnational dimension is of 
potential significance for a European polity, neithr perspective in its current form lends 
much credibility to a political project designed toackle such problems, since neither 
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perspective invites a clear sense of what could be one and by whom.  It is little surprise then 
that one finds considerable scepticism about the possibilities for action in this domain.  The 
pattern is rather the reverse, however, as regards Society and the Law.  Here one does find a 
fairly clear set of explanatory motifs, and rather than invoking reference-points which are far 
removed these tend to be mainly local.  Problems arise due to factors close to home.  This 
more readily available set of explanatory resources, and the tendency to evoke a narrower 
spatial context, seems rather more conducive to the credibility of a political project, and 
indeed one does find a reasonably positive set of assumptions about what can be achieved to 
alleviate these problems.  The most commonly heard proposals (education and stronger 
enforcement of the rules) do not point in any obvious way towards a European polity, though 
would be compatible with one were certain powers of decision-making suitably 
decentralised.   
 The third domain of problems – Relations between Peoples – is notable again for the 
wide spatial context in which the problems in question are seen to be unfolding, and for 
ambivalence about the extent to which they can be addressed.  The tendency to assume that 
problems experienced at a local level also play out on a wide scale is likely to be a 
contributing element in the scepticism here regarding the possibilities for organised address, 
in that it implies that such problems are always likely to cut across polity boundaries.  They 
are neither purely local and therefore susceptible o local address, nor are they purely distant 
and therefore susceptible to a policy of disengagement and withdrawal.  However, here there 
is also a distinctive factor involved.  As seen both in this chapter and the last, a strong link is 
made between the problems articulated and the nature of the opponents, with a marked 
tendency not only to assume that differences between p oples are real and essential, but that 
dialogue is unfeasible and that conflict most likely is unavoidable.  This friend-enemy 
dynamic is not only an assertion of intolerance, as suggested earlier, but also of the 
impossibility of tackling problems of inter-group conflict.  The opponents, it is assumed, 
cannot be engaged with so as to overcome such problems.  They are not included in the 
solution to the problem; rather, they are pretty much equated with the problem itself, and the 
solution depends on their being absented from the home environment.  This rather clearly 
undermines the prospects for a democratic political project in this domain, whether centred 
on the national or the European level. 
 Both when raising doubts about the possibility of organised action, and when 
affirming its feasibility, it is principally action by governmental means which participants 
invoke as the reference-point.  As we have seen, interventions by the researcher to inquire 
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‘what can be done about such problems?’ tended to draw responses that foregrounded the 
role of ‘politicians’, of ‘the government’, or of ‘the State’, whether to demand further action 
be taken, to give credit (occasionally) for certain initiatives, to express concern at a failure to 
act or the breaking of ‘promises’, or even just to write off officials as ‘puppets’.  It is the 
government, it tends to be assumed, which is the actor of greatest relevance to the remedy of 
common problems, even if much ambivalence about its pro pects is conveyed.  Where the 
authority of the government is judged weak, we have se n that private and societal means of 
action may be proposed, whether it be adaptation by individuals to the market economy, or 
an attempt to get others to boycott certain goods.  But these are options of last resort, and 
there is no mention of action through civil-society bodies such as NGOs.  If the message of 
much contemporary political science is that politics today no longer takes place through the 
traditional institutional channels, and that ‘civil society’ is the principal reference-point for 
taking action on matters of common concern, this is a message which seems not to have been 
absorbed by our speakers.  Perhaps in contrast to the kind of assumptions to be found in lay 
discourse in North America,36 amongst these European groups it is the government and the 
state which is to the fore. 
 While this suggests that the principle of popular sovereignty is still in some sense 
taken for granted – governments, as the things one v tes for, are treated as the most relevant 
actors to the problems which should be addressed – the unevenness with which faith is 
expressed in their capacity to tackle these problems is undoubtedly a matter for concern.  
While the principle of popular sovereignty is always deeply complex to institutionalise, and 
perhaps especially in the pluralist context of contemporary Europe, its vitality depends in the 
last instance on a certain strength of expectation that common problems are susceptible to 
address.  As we have seen, for political agency generally, such expectation persists but within 
a limited set of parameters.  It is stronger for some policy-areas than others, and one cannot 
rule out that it may be stronger elsewhere on the European continent than in the places of 
interview,37 but some need for its revival seems necessary.  What has been excluded from the 
                                                
36 Cf. Perrin, Citizen Speak, in whose focus groups public/societal action assumes a more prominent position.  
In Gamson’s study, societal or ‘citizen’ action is al o to the fore, though with some variation according to issue-
area.  See Gamson, Talking Politics, chapter 4. 
37 In the qualitative study by OPTEM, Britain, Germany and the Czech Republic are noted to be amongst tho e 
EU countries where at the time of interview there was a high ‘general level of pessimism’ concerning the years 
ahead.  (OPTEM, 'The European Citizens and the Future of Europe', p.9.)  One might infer that these are 
therefore also the ‘hard cases’ more specifically as regards faith in the possibilities for collective agency.  While 
this is conceivable, one does need to be sceptical about arguments which put a strong emphasis on national 
boundaries as containers of discursive practice: our int ition is that the patterns we have noted in our interviews 
are likely to have wider extension. 
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analysis so far is how the EU as such fits into the picture described, how it relates to the array 
of discursive practices that have been traced.  It is to this, and to the implications for a 






















































Having proposed a political bond as an appropriate perspective from which to approach the 
question of the common in the context of contemporary Europe, the strategy has been to step 
back from the EU as such so as to explore the broade  web of meanings into which it is set.  
This has meant avoiding an approach which treats acontextual ‘attitudes to Brussels’ or 
‘feelings of European identity’ as the key ideational fact; the move has rather been to 
‘decentre’ the EU by taking discussion of political problems as the starting point.  
Accordingly, we have explored in depth the kinds of problem which get talked about, the acts 
of positioning which they inspire, and the assumptions made about the worth of trying to 
tackle them.  We have observed a large number of prblems regularly articulated in 
discussion, amounting to a substantive core of concerns around which a political bond might 
develop.  While inferring therefore that the notion f a ‘political common’ finds some 
immediate validation in existing patterns of discursive practice, we have also noted how 
certain patterns of talk diverge from our ideal conceptualisations of the ‘political subjects, 
their opponents and counterparts’ and a ‘political project’ of organised address.  Hence our 
concepts, of necessity, have started to acquire a more diagnostic function. 
 This chapter connects these considerations back to the question of a European polity.  
The first section examines how and when ‘Europe’ and the EU are invoked in discussion.  
We shall observe that these tend to become entwined with the discursive patterns which are 
now familiar, as the motifs characteristic of political discussion more generally come to be 
applied to this specific phenomenon.  Discussion of the EU, as the historical manifestation of 
a European polity, attracts ways of speaking which, w ile in some respects consistent with 
the ideal of a political bond, in others serve rather to undermine it.  The second section, 
having noted the important divergences in this respect, looks more closely at what would 
need to be different in discursive terms if a political bond supportive of a European polity 
were to have better resonance.  As a kind of routinised behaviour, discursive practices are 
likely to be enduring but by no means impervious to change, and it may be that there are 
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existing features which can facilitate such change – ‘platforms to build on’, as it were.  In 
considering these questions, we shall adopt a more explicitly normative, critical mode of 
argumentation towards the empirical material.  The third section turns to the question of how 
this change might be effected.  It discusses the need for actors who can lead such a process – 
‘discursive architects’ as they might be called, whether they be parties, social movements, 
media organisations, or others – whose role would be to make available new ways of talking 
politics which could act as resources for discursive practice.  Also considered is the role of 
institutional structures, a question which invites di cussion of the kind of institutional regime 
towards which our exploration of the political bond points. 
 
 
Europe and the EU in discussion 
 
The appropriateness of the move to decentre the EU in the design of this research seems 
confirmed by the fact that explicit mentions of ‘Europe’ or the European Union are not 
especially common in the discussions.  In each of them these did appear spontaneously at 
some point, and were prompted by interventions from the researcher towards the end, but in 
total such references could be associated with – as a very approximate estimate – no more 
than about 10-15% of the interview material.  As noted in the preceding chapters, in two 
problem domains at least there was frequent evocation of a transnational context, but 
references to Europe as such represented only one of vari us ways in which this could be 
done. 
 For the purposes of analysis a distinction can be made between two kinds of 
reference to the European.  The first involves the dir ct expression of opinions concerning 
the EU – its institutions, and the very idea of theUnion – separate from the context of 
concrete political problems.  These are questions of the institutional set-up and of the 
legitimacy of the polity.  An emblematic example of one would be the complaint made by 
Andy in Swansea about the money which is wasted (‘£20 million or something’) every time 
the European Parliament moves between Brussels and Strasbourg.  Such references will not 
be the focus here.  One reason is that many such ‘out-of-context’ references relate to rather 
contingent, second-order phenomena – a particular institutional configuration which might 
easily be changed (e.g. by a decision to house the European Parliament solely in Brussels) – 
rather than to the political significance of the Union as an arena and means for the address of 
common problems.  They are overly specific to the present arrangement of the EU.  A second 
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reason, just as significant, is that it was rather rare for participants to express opinions of this 
decontextualised, non-policy-related kind.  While for academic scholars questions of 
institutional structures, the mechanisms of integration and the ‘finality’ of the integration 
process will inevitably and properly be of considerable salience, it seems natural that those 
without a professional interest in the subject are more inclined to work outwards from 
problems which are of a more immediate concern to them, and to invoke ‘Europe’ or the EU 
only where they are assumed to have a direct bearing on these.  The political scientist’s 
interest in the institutional regime, and the political philosopher’s interest in the legitimacy of 
the polity, should not be projected into the source material.  Insofar as comments like Andy’s 
did appear, or insofar as there were comments like that of Zdeněk in Liberec who noted that 
after forty years of rule by ‘the Russians’ he did not want to be ‘dictated to by Brussels’ (a 
challenge to the very idea of the Union), these tended to be in response to the researcher’s 
direct questioning towards the end of the interview, when a concerted effort was being made 
to move Europe-related issues to the centre of the discussion.  Responses to direct 
questioning are what survey data provide, and do not need to be documented in detail in a 
study such as this.1  Of interest here is rather the most common ways in which ‘Europe’ and 
the EU were invoked spontaneously in the course of discussion. 
 We shall therefore focus instead on a second type of reference to the European, 
whereby ‘Europe’ and the EU are woven naturally into the discussion of specific problems 
facing ‘people like us’.  This means, in addition to evaluating the implications of the 
assumptions and acts of positioning considered in the preceding chapters, looking at how 
‘Europe’ and the EU are invoked directly as reference-points with which to understand the 
problems of the political common – both their origins and their possible resolution.  In this 
approach, which follows from the problem-oriented focus of the political bond, it is the 
context of invocation which is crucial: not ‘attitudes’ to the EU in some general sense, but 
the political significance which is ascribed.  Of course, the EU and its current policies 
constitute only one possible version of a European polity, and alterations to these policies 
would probably lead ultimately to it being treated differently in lay discussion.  But studying 
how the ‘current version’ is talked about in substantive terms can tell us much about how the 
discursive patterns explored in the previous chapters come to be applied to a European polity, 
and the implications of this when it happens.  It provides further indication of how far a 
                                                
1 See e.g. OPTEM, 'The European Citizens and the Future of Europe', which contains substantial sections on 
knowledge levels about the EU institutions and how they work, as well as attitudes towards them.  Also, for an 
analysis of such material and his own highly focused group interviews, see Bruter, Citizens of Europe?. 
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political bond functions as a representational term and how far it is an ideal which would 
require changes in discursive practice to be realisd.  How the EU is introduced into 
discussion differs according to the three domains we have outlined, and so we consider these 
in turn, before returning to the fourth, less clearly delineated set of problems to do with 
Quality of Life. 
 
 It will have been anticipated from the analysis in the preceding chapters that in one 
domain of problems – Society and the Law – the significance ascribed to the EU is very 
minor.  These are problems which are given considerabl  prominence across the groups, and 
they represent some of the most important problems that ‘people like us’ are liable to face.  
There is a clear set of opponents against which the subjects are demarcated – the persistent, 
serious rule-breakers – and a clear sense of injustice and of the need for action to be taken.  
But it is the domestic arena which is the focus of attention.  Comparisons are almost never 
made with experiences in other countries, and the relevant comparisons are assumed to be 
cross-temporal (declining standards, declining discipline etc.) rather than cross-spatial.  
Problems tend to be explained in quite local terms, with little reference to outside factors, and 
although one sees relatively positive assumptions concerning the worth of organised, 
collective address, these tend to ascribe roles primarily to the national government and to 
fellow citizens.  While it is sometimes suggested that a minority of offenders may be 
unresponsive either to further education or to discipline – that they are simply ‘like that’, an 
essentialising, enemy-type positioning – there is nonetheless a widespread sense that many 
can be purposefully engaged with, suggesting positioning which is more of the adversary-
type.  For the Society and the Law domain, the concept of the political bond seems to fit 
fairly well.  Insofar as such a bond is constructed in the discussions it is not one that is 
conducive specifically to a European polity, since the transnational context is little 
mentioned, but nor would it be incompatible with such a polity, since the possibility that 
certain policy-areas be in the hands of local authority is recognised in most democratic 
polities, and is expressed by the EU’s principle of subsidiarity.  The discursive practice 
associated with this domain of problems could be accommodated in a European polity, 
though with implications for the institutional regime as will be discussed later. 
 In discussion of Economics (especially) and Relations between Peoples (to some 
degree), ‘Europe’ and the EU are invoked rather more.  That a connection is made on both is 
important: it reaffirms the danger of reducing the EU to a purely economic, cultural or 
geopolitical phenomenon, a tendency which one finds i  ome of the EU-related literature 
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(see Chapter 2).  The significance of the EU in both domains is no doubt linked to the fact 
that both are described in transnational terms.  Opponents of the political subjects are 
assumed to have a presence both inside and outside the country, comparisons are frequently 
made with experiences in other countries, and explanatory motifs include factors extending 
well beyond the local environment.  In this sense th re would seem to be some of the 
ideational ‘raw materials’ in place for a political bond consistent with a European polity.  But 
for both domains one finds assumptions and acts of positioning which counter this. 
 For Economics, the patterns of collective positioning noted in Chapter 4, including 
the evocation of counterparts in certain other European countries but restricted along an east-
west axis, and the construction of opponents as adversaries rather than enemies, are 
replicated in those passages where discussion is conne ted directly to the EU.  True to the 
idea that, in this domain, opponents are not irrationalised and calls are not made for them to 
be prevented from living side by side with the ‘peol  like us’, calls for current eastern-
European member-states to be expelled from the Union are not heard in these interviews.  
Rather one hears calls for ‘fairer treatment’ such that ‘people like us’ (the contributors, the 
taxpayers) are not called upon to subsidise ‘them’ to the degree currently expected, or such 
that when they come ‘over here’ to work they have to pay the same contributions as local 
workers would and work for similar wages.  Where opp sition to EU enlargement to the East 
is expressed, it often takes the form of a criticism of the timing rather than of the act itself.  
Peter in Kassel argues that ‘all these eastern-bloc countries haven’t developed far enough to 
fit in with us.  I think it’s all too early.  It should have been perhaps in ten years or so … and 
above all not this whole mass at once.’  Dieter confirms: ‘That’s the problem, yeah.  The way 
it’s being done, that’s the mistake.  You’re not necessarily against having the borders 
removed, letting everyone move around more, that’s certainly a good thing.  But I think there 
should have been more thought given to the mechanisms, and perhaps to the consequences 
too.’  Importantly, as should be clear, in this domain and in contrast to Relations between 
Peoples, the differences between the ‘people like us’ and the opponents are generally not 
essentialised.  Those who ‘do not contribute’ could in principle be encouraged to contribute 
more – to ‘pay their bit’ – or, if they unable to do this, to take less; the positioning is 
agonistic rather than antagonistic.   
 This may be a rather precarious condition nonethelss, and the emergence of an 
antagonistic dynamic cannot be ruled out.  While there is no essentialising of the irrationality 
of the opponents, occasionally one observes something close to the essentialising of their 
economic situation, for instance the poverty of east rn Europeans (though not to the ‘dollar-
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a-day’ extent of those in the ‘Far East’), and an essentialising of their willingness or 
unwillingness to contribute.  Were they thus positined as being irredeemably poor or 
irredeemably unwilling to contribute, their legitimacy as opponents might well be 
questioned.  This is by no means the only perspective – references are quite often made to 
countries which used to be poor but which have got richer, such as Ireland, Spain or Portugal 
– but it is one which does arise.  Noticeably, one se s little enthusiasm expressed at the 
prospect of further enlargement of the Union eastwards, where economic conditions are held 
to be quite different.  ‘The problem that I see with Turkey joining the EU,’ says Wolfgang in 
Lübeck, ‘is that we, that Germany is already the biggest net contributor, and we’ll have to 
pay even more in afterwards, and we’ll get none of that back for ourselves.  And again that’s 
something which is going to hit us as tax-payers.  It means we’ll have even less money in our 
pockets.’  Ali comments that ‘one Turkish person brings five Turkish people with him,’ and 
that ‘if more countries come into the EU then we can ll it a day here.’  As we saw in 
Chapter 4, a zero-sum relationship seems to be posited between the ‘industrialised countries’ 
of western Europe and the poorer countries of eastern Europe, and the idea of admitting more 
adversaries into the community is clearly not welcomed.   
 Amongst the Czech groups, this positioning towards countries further to the east as 
potential EU members is replicated.  Josef in Ostrava worries that ‘the biggest problem for us 
is going to be if Ukraine comes into the euro [sic], all of those countries – Belarus, Russia, 
Uzbekistan, the Tartars, whatever … we’re going to be between them and the West, they’ll 
be crossing over us, they’ll get to us first, so there’ll be problems here.’  One also finds 
awareness that those to the west are positioning the Czechs as economically unwelcome 
within the EU.  In an intervention supported by Václav and Zdeněk, Onřej responds to a 
question about the economic consequences of enlargig the EU: ‘Britain, France and 
Germany are all countries which are starting to ask themselves why they should have to fund 
the poor countries if those countries contribute hardly anything.  Suddenly the Germans are 
discovering they’ve got the same problems with work, with the labour market, they’re all 
closing in on themselves so that we don’t go and work there, even though each of us knows it 
wouldn’t be a problem if they opened up.  There’d be maybe a thousand people more there 
but it’s small numbers, those who want to work abrod went abroad a long time ago.  And 
those who can’t are not going to go even if they give us work there, because of family 
reasons and language problems, those kinds of problem.’  There is thus a certain reciprocity 
about the act of positioning.  While it would certainly be too strong to say that the opponents 
are positioned as enemies – they are not assumed to pose an existential threat, rather they are 
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a ‘drain on the resources’ – it is clear that their acceptance as members of the political 
community is contested and that the agonistic rathe than antagonistic nature of the dynamic 
can hardly be taken for granted. 
 Chapter 5 highlighted the widespread assumption that problems of Economics are 
beyond the control of political authority, and the evident scepticism therefore concerning the 
possibility of a political project in this domain.  The important point to note here is that the 
widely-made assumption that national governments have little capacity to remedy economic 
problems leads not to the conclusion that a European olity might have greater capacity, but 
to the transferral of the same assumption from the national to the European level.  The EU is 
very rarely mentioned in these interviews as a means of addressing economic problems 
which cannot be addressed by a national government.  Amongst the Czech groups, the EU is 
occasionally given some credit for having helped to improve Czech infrastructure: Román in 
Plzeň notes judiciously, to the agreement of his co-participants: ‘it can be said that in the 
time we’ve been in the EU the situation’s improved.’  Míra confirms: ‘the Union’s 
contributed to the construction of every bridge here, large and small.’  It remains doubtful 
however whether such EU action is seen as a genuine expression of agency, a meaningful 
response to a call for organised action, or some kind of deus ex machina whose mysterious 
arrival on the scene brings a welcome change in fortunes.  Generally, with most economic 
problems linked in discussion to global forces assumed to be scarcely amenable to control, 
little positive role is accorded to a European polity.   
 Indeed, across all groups, various current policies of the EU are often heavily 
entwined in discussion with some of the key problems in this domain, such that the Union is 
treated either as an expression or as an exacerbation of them.  This can be seen in many 
instances.  Discussion of the introduction of the euro, for example, often exhibits the motif of 
the little / normal people being taken advantage of by the rich or the financial corporations.  
‘The euro helps firms,’ says Zdeněk at Ostrava, since it saves them the costs of the exchange 
rate, ‘but the euro doesn’t help normal people.’  ‘For us it’ll all be one and the same,’ says 
Josef, ‘we’re the small guys, we’re really small ...  We’ll pay to swap our taxi-meters, we’ll 
have new digital ones with euros on them rather than crowns, but that’ll be it.’  At Norwich, 
one finds the possible sacrifice of the pound for the euro discussed as another example of that 
which rightfully belongs to ‘us’ being sold off by the people at the top.  British Telecom, the 
railways, the pound … ‘it belongs to the people of the country’, says Leyton to general 
agreement, and now it is being given away ‘lock, stock and barrel’.  What would the people 
who died for the country in World War Two think if they could see this happening?, ask 
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Leyton and Gavin.  Who benefits?  ‘Business people, rich people,’ says Barry, widening the 
point: ‘It doesn’t matter who’s in, Labour or Conservative, the rich have always benefited.  
You take your Labour politicians who speak socialism, they’ve all got two houses.  Us in the 
middle there, who do our best … [L:  Got a job keeping one house, haven’t you …]  We’ll 
argue about it passionately, they will as well, they’ll stand there, but basically they’ll all go 
home to big houses.’  The motif of inevitability is widespread, despite the indignation.  The 
Ostrava group talk of the euro as a ‘catastrophe’, but unavoidable nonetheless.  The Plzeň 
group agree that the euro is coming, ‘the only question is when’ says Petr – with the caveat 
that the EU may break up before then.  At Swansea, L e reports: ‘I picked a guy up at the 
station, took him to Three Crosses, big massive house at Three Crosses.  He works for the 
government and he’s working on the euro at the moment, and he has said that we will 
definitely be in the euro.  Definitely be in the euro within five years, without a shadow of a 
doubt.  He said, if it goes to a referendum, if they say no, we will  be going into the euro, 
everything will be fixed.  “We will be in the euro”, he said, “I’m working on it now.”’  Thus 
one of the ‘big people’ (with a big house) tells one of the ‘little people’ what is going to 
happen.  The anecdote is convincing to Andy, who has already expressed his concerns about 
the adoption of the euro.   
 Likewise, the EU is frequently absorbed into discussion of the problem of price and 
wage inequalities.  As was seen in Chapter 5, when Barry in Norwich refers back to the 
decline of British industry in the 1970s he cites the economics of the European Community 
as part of the problem: ‘We couldn’t compete with their coal price.  Common Market … Use 
our own coal, use our own steel, eat our own fish, our own farming produce first, then you 
export what’s left.  You might still have a bit of a coal industry … If we just supplied 
ourselves, rather than worrying about exporting first … If every country did look after 
themselves first ...’.  There is no indication that the EU might be a way of controlling wider 
economic processes.  ‘This country should go back to its old morals and produce more stuff 
for itself,’ suggests Lee in Swansea.  In a passage from the Lübeck discussion, a specific 
grievance with discrepancies created by the EU is linked together with a more general sense 
of powerlessness before economic forces assumed to be global: 
 
J:  All these Polish workers, the manual labourers – tilers, bricklayers, for example – they work here in 
such favourable conditions because they don’t have to contribute social-security taxes [W:  Right 
…] like a German labourer has to.  A German labourer is checked to make sure he makes all his 
contributions.  And a Polish worker comes over and says ‘yeah, I’ll do that,’ but no-one bothers 
about him so long as he’s not caught, so long as no-one catches him doing black labour, so he can 
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afford to offer attractive prices.  He can work as a bricklayer, a tiler, he’s flexible.  And naturally 
unemployment isn’t going to get better like that, it’s going to get worse. 
 
W:  I find it really, really bad, if that … what the EU Directive says, concerning the free movement of 
services, if that goes through, then Polish and Czech employees, or from Lithuania too … If 
they’re allowed to work with us here under their own conditions then no small entrepreneur’s 
going to be able to survive here.  The German master-bricklayer, or the bricklayer, or the tiler who 
works for himself, he has to pay his taxes, his contributions to the professional association, he has 
to contribute his share to employees’ health insurance, pension insurance etc., and none of them 
have that so they can set more attractive prices.  And so that also disturbs our economy.  
 
JW:  Is there any solution to this kind of problem … can one do anything about it?   
 
J:  Well, the world is heading ever more towards globa isation, and globalisation is … in the future an 
equalisation between poor countries and rich countries …  And this process won’t be complete 
within the next few years, it’ll be very, very slow, it’ll last a really long time, until Uzbekistan has 
the same standard of living as we do, for example, as the Federal Republic of Germany.  And then 
sometime far off in the distant future – fiction really – this problem will naturally be solved.  But 
that’ll definitely take generations. 
 
N:  The standards are closing towards each other … Not everyone is going to get such a high standard 
as here ... 
 
W:  It’ll go down here and go up for the others, that’s clear. 
 
J:  You can see that already in the EU.  That some countries profit from it and other countries … [W: 
… suffer from it …] suffer from it. 
 
JW:  Which ones profit, for example? 
 
J:  The ones who profit are the poorer countries with the low GNP.  And the industrial countries, they 
basically have to step down from their level, surrender their achievements.  To put it simply. 
           
JW:  What do you expect of the government in this context?  [J:  Difficult …]  What can it do? 
 
W:  Very, very difficult … [N: … to find solutions …] 
 
J:  Many say we should go back, we should have the Deutschmark instead of the euro, the borders 
must be … the walls must be erected again, then everything will be better again.  But whether 
that’s the solution, I’d strongly doubt it.  [N:  I don’t think so either.] 
 
W:  This process is no longer reversible. 
 
Globalisation, understood as the levelling out of gl bal wealth inequalities, is presented as 
something inevitable or ‘too late to stop’.  Attempts to put barriers in its way are likely to be 
in vain, for it is an irreversible process that must be played out over generations.  The 
implicit metaphor seems to be that of the flood, which ends only when the waters find their 
level and the unevenness dissipates.  Changes associated with the EU, such as the opening of 
borders and the introduction of the euro, are spoken of merely as symptoms of this broader 
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economic globalisation which produces problems for ‘people like us’.2  Note ‘you can see 
that already in the EU’ – implying that the EU is the first or the most immediate expression 
of globalisation.  The euro comes across as neither positive nor negative, neither a remedy 
nor a mistake; it is the extension of a pattern.  I this and other groups, participants do raise 
complaints about the manner in which the euro was introduced – ‘no-one asked us, there 
should have been a referendum,’ says Ali from the Lübeck group; ‘it was simply fixed by 
politicians’ says Andreas in Erfurt – but this is not matched by a sense that the outcome 
might have been different.  
 One extended passage from the Würzburg discussion is useful for illustrating many 
of these themes coming together.  It begins with Oliver lamenting the movement of 
companies from Germany to eastern Europe: 
 
O:  The population is a little sour, to pick up the example of Siemens-VDO3 again. Germany pays a 
great deal into the EU pot, a contributing country for new accession candidates like the Czech 
Republic.  The Czech Republic says to Siemens, ‘if you set up a company here, then for the first 
year we’ll pay the people ourselves.  They’ll work for you for free.’  Siemens says ‘oh, lovely, we 
can do that.’  But in principle it’s also a boomerang effect for Germany.  We pay for the 
construction of the East and in return they entice the companies away.  And here, the people who 
actually pay for that … [R: Exactly], they’re punished even higher then. 
 
R: ... Cutting off the branch you’re sitting on ... [ ]  Key word is larger internal market, that’s why 
these countries – it wasn’t so long ago – were brought into the EU.  The door was opened by us, to 
encourage development, and now there’s this boomerang effect.  The idea was to build up the 
markets there – that was the point of the thing I think, the enlargement of the EU – Poland, Czech 
Republic, Slovenia etc., to build up new markets there, so that the people there can also, how 
should I say, boost the economy here, so they can buy the products which are produced here.  It 
was already noted even then – I can remember – in the political discussion that things would turn 
out as they have now, with this migration to the East.  It was known even then, when all this was 
opened up.  It was done anyway, and now … you asked earlier what can be done about it, it 
sounds very hard and sad when I say it, but actually nothing.  … It has its own dynamic, the door 
has been opened and now it’s open!  You can’t close it any more.  So I … the proposals that we 
could possibly make, they’re of a theoretical nature, probably nothing will happen.  Because the 
EU will carry on existing in its current form, the contributions and the subsidies will also be paid 
to the eastern countries just as up till now … I don’t believe that anything will somehow be 
dismantled there … and the borders are open … 
 
O:  We hope of course, in the German case, if we’ve be n paying in for years … have been net 
contributors for Spain for example, which meanwhile has growth figures much bigger than 
Germany, we’re the tail-light when it comes to growth … We hope naturally that at some point 
there’ll be a ‘return on investment’ so that it goes the other way too a bit, so that the Spanish also 
give up a bit of the cake.  That’s the hope.  And everyone hopes of course that that works out, and 
that when they lose the Spanish … and the smaller states, that when they lose they don’t just say 
‘goodbye, we’re leaving the EU’. 
 
                                                
2 During the recruitment process in Lübeck, a driver who was unable to participate in the discussion spent a 
couple of minutes outlining certain economic problems to me: amongst these, he too was quick to emphasise the 
detrimental effect of the EU’s policy of open borders to Poland on local levels of employment in the city. 
3 A supplier of electronics for the car industry.  Its plant in Würzburg was due to be closed at the end of 2007 
and relocated to Ostrava (Czech Republic), causing significant job losses. 
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R:  But that’s … if I think back to the past, whenever it was a question of the payment of contributions, 
there was always a great deal of argy-bargy.  They always dug in hard.  That’s also a very difficult 
development, that one forces other countries to pay more …  Lots of protest and outcry, and 
opposition … Great Britain is a good example there isn’t it.  It’s famously notorious for that. 
 
O:  Great Britain has kept itself out, out of the EU … The Germans and French at the moment are 
paying not just for unification – the Germans for unification – but also for abroad, for 
neighbouring EU countries.  And that puts a brake on growth of course.  … The British have 
simply decided against that and have said ‘we’re not going to be a part of this crap, we see only 
negative growth there, we’re keeping out.’  Same with Switzerland. 
 
R:  Yeah but Britain … Britain is a member of the EU.  [O:  They’re in politically but …]  Britain isn’t 
part of the currency union … [O:  They have their pound …]  But they’re a member nonetheless, 
of the economic union?  [O:  Yeah, they’re cunning …] The Irish have the euro, don’t they?  And 
they’ve had a strong economic boom as a result, from what I can gather.  [O:  They’re takers too 
…]  Yeah, sure, they’ve profited a lot from it, from these subsidies you mean …?  [O:  Exactly]  
The Irish have … that was structurally a pretty weak country.  [O:  A small country too … so the 
growth is naturally greater.]  Anyway from what I’ve heard, the prices have really gone up too.  I 
recently drove a businessman who spends most of his time in Ireland and he said that the prices 
are now almost higher than in Germany.  In Dublin, the hotels etc, the gastronomy, it’s all to do 
with the EU … 
 
O:  Likewise in Greece the prices have gone up … massively … [R: … Mmmm, mmmm …]  Another 
disadvantage for … 
 
R:  Also in the south-European countries …  Italy’s become downright expensive, Spain has gone up a 
lot … It’s all a consequence of the EU.  But I mean …  [O:  There are winners and losers …]  
Yeah, that’s it … 
 
JW:  Who are the losers?  Who suffers the most fromit, would you say? 
 
O:  The population, they’re losers.  The people who have to pay more for something.  For example for 
a car.  A Greek person must now pay more for something like a car.  A Greek person, because of 
the euro, now has to put down more money than before.  A winner would perhaps be a guest-
worker – someone who can easily go to another EU country, can move there, can start work there 
immediately, he’s a winner.  Losers are perhaps the people in the countryside who aren’t mobile 
… 
 
R:  Yeah, and when it comes to countries, I’d say at the moment that we are the losers. 
 
U:  Well we always were in the EU.  It was always Germany … [O: … yeah …]  I mean, the Spanish 
were the great winners … [R:  Sure, but …], they’re th  ones who’ve been subsidised the most … 
 
R:  But at least earlier we had lower unemployment, we had a good standard of living … And the 
social-security system functioned properly, it was ll the best, so one happily paid higher 
contributions and put up with being the largest contributor, but now, as far as the substance goes, 
nothing functions like that any more, it’s all different … 
 
O:  Losers, for example, are people like us.  States lik  Bavaria start to cut their budget.  The loca 
authorities receive less, like Würzburg for example.  What do the local authorities do?  They raise 
the costs, the fees in other words.  Each one of us, in the last ten years, has 50% higher additional 
expenses, like rent and rubbish collection for example, right?  Everything goes up, and the local 
authorities want to draw in the money again.  Each one of us in the last ten years has considerably 
less money in our pockets.  We earn six or seven euros or whatever like before, on average, but the 
consumption … the household has really suffered in Germany [R:  Mmmm, I’d definitely call us 
losers …]  Yes, we’re losers.  The entrepreneurs who are flexible and who go abroad, they’re 
winners; the little man in Germany at least is a loser, because he has considerably less money.  
We’re not able to go out to the pub each week and have a beer and eat good food, that’s simply no 
longer an option.  We have considerably less money i  our pockets. 
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Note the rather pessimistic assumptions here concerning the possibilities for dealing with 
economic problems in an organised fashion.  Rainer’s lengthy intervention towards the 
beginning of the extract, concerning the creation of the single market, displays many of the 
motifs that were identified in Chapter 5 being applied to the EU specifically.  A sense of 
inevitability comes though clearly.  The critical decisions surrounding the single market were 
taken in the past, and the move to extend EU membership to countries such as Poland, the 
Czech Republic and Slovenia was made despite informed political discussion of the fact that 
it would lead to the movement of companies and jobs ea twards.  ‘It was already known 
about, but it was done anyway.’  Now that the process is in motion it has its own dynamic, 
the borders have been opened and they can no longer be closed.  Concrete proposals about 
how to tackle such problems could only be ‘of a theoretical nature,’ since it is unlikely that 
anything will change.   
 One sees also the motif of the political subjects as contributors being applied in the 
EU context, with discussion of the EU’s finances prompting the ‘we’ to be constructed in 
national terms (‘the population’, ‘Germany’ as a ‘contributing country’) and regional terms 
(Bavaria).  The number of different ways found to convey the idea that ‘we’ are the ones on 
whom the burden to contribute falls is indicative of a strong sense of injustice here: not only 
do ‘we’ pay, but ‘we’ lose our jobs too.4  The adversaries – the ‘takers’ – are also constructed 
along national lines as ‘the smaller states’, ‘eastrn countries’ or (like the Czech Republic) 
‘the new accession countries’.  These are all described as unitary actors rather than as 
environments.  That they are assumed to be in competition with one another is clear – there is 
the sense that Germany is losing out to its rivals, s indicated by the notion that she is the 
‘tail-light’ amongst the European economies (the same term is also used in the Kassel 
discussion).  Though there is no call for such countries to be expelled from the Union, there 
is clearly – from Oliver’s side at least – little trust towards them, since it is supposed that 
should these countries cease to profit from the Union they might simply decide to leave it.   
 Mixed in amongst this however is a discursive pattern more conducive to a political 
bond.  As was noted in Chapter 4, when the subjects are formulated not as those who 
contribute but as the ‘little people’ opposed by the economically powerful, a tendency to 
draw comparisons and to evoke ‘people like us’ elsewhere is considerably more evident.  
One sees here the discussion taking a turn of this kind as it moves away from the problem of 
                                                
4 One can also speculate, from a more psychological perspective, that a certain satisfaction is found in 
emphasising how narrow is the circle of ‘we contributors’ who bear the burden and who can thereby claim the 
moral high ground. 
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EU finances, with comparisons then drawn with certain other European countries regarding 
economic conditions – prices in particular, due to the introduction of the euro.  When this 
happens, other Europeans are portrayed not so much as competitors but as counterparts 
facing the same challenges.  This sense of shared predicament seems evident in the reference 
to the Greek person who now has to pay more in order to own a car.  This fits well with the 
positioning of the political subjects in this section as ‘the little man’, who is being squeezed 
by rising costs and who ends up with less money in his pocket as a result.  Here, the idea of a 
political bond is considerably more plausible than when the positioning is such that the 
adversaries are national competitors. 
 When discussion turns to problems to do with Relations between Peoples, one finds 
further reference to ‘Europe’ and the EU, though with less frequency than in the domain of 
Economics.  As we have seen, questions of conflict and the thr at of conflict are generally 
not conceived as domestic to the majority-peoples of ‘the West’, as these are constructed in 
discussion.  Relations between western peoples are gen rally assumed to be peaceful: 
whatever their differences in ‘national character’, war between them is unlikely.  As we 
heard Rainer in Würzburg put it, ‘the only conflicts which are left are far away from us, and 
here in Central Europe, in Europe, in the EU area w have a very peaceful shared existence.  
I think that’s very important, that’s a historical step forward.  Germany-Britain, the 
bombardment in the Second World War, this hard enmity is gone, gone once and for all.’  
Differences between European nationalities are miniised, and the idea that they might 
dangerously threaten each other is not raised.  Perhaps because this assumption is made so 
readily, any role for the EU in coordinating harmonious relations between them – one of its 
classic justifications, after all – is hardly mentio ed at all.  The organised maintenance of 
peace is unnecessary, it seems, for the very reason that peacefulness is taken to be 
characteristic.  Rainer does credit the EU with having consolidated peace on the continent, 
but Uwe from the same group expresses his doubts: ‘I don’t think the EU helps Europeans 
live together – economic interests, yeah, but not the ability to live together.  I mean, I don’t 
find a foreigner nicer or less nice just because he’s in the EU, that doesn’t matter.  It’s got 
nothing to do with it, I’d say.’  Hardly anywhere in the discussions is a positive role as peace-
maker foreseen for the EU.  The most prevalent form f collective positioning in this domain, 
whereby other peoples of ‘the West’ are treated as ‘people like us’, seems to render such a 
role of little consequence. 
 Nor does a positive role tend to be accorded to the EU as regards those inter-people 
relations which are quite clearly problematised.  Building up ‘Europe’ as a global power in 
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military and defence terms so as to manage threats merging from outside ‘the West’ – 
another possible form of collective action, whether normatively desirable or not – is a 
proposal heard rarely in these discussions.  The fact that ‘the West’ evokes something 
broader than the specifically European probably weakens the extent to which addressing 
these problems with collective action at a European l vel is given credence.  Also, the appeal 
of a collective western or European foreign policy is perhaps diminished by the assumption 
that the opponents are held to be living within the home and comparable environments, not 
just beyond them.  While an association is undoubtedly made between Arabs / Muslims and a 
certain part of the world (broadly, the Middle East), at the same time they are assumed to be 
close at hand – perhaps sitting at the next table in the pub, or walking the city streets.  When 
the problem is constructed in this way as one of daily exposure, the relevance of foreign and 
defence policy is much diminished.  Furthermore, within ‘the West’, the power of ‘the 
Americans’ tends to be emphasised.  When Jürgen in Lübeck suggests that ‘the bigger 
Europe becomes, the more weight it has in global politics,’ the reaction from the other 
participants is rather muted.  ‘Does Europe really have any power though?’ asks Ali.  Jürgen 
maintains his point, though rather cautiously: ‘No, p wer probably not, but its weight will 
increase.  So you can’t … from the American perspectiv  it gets more difficult just to ride 
roughshod and say “what Europe says is totally unimportant to us.”  [N: Definitely.]  Not 
totally unimportant, I said.  As opposed to if Germany alone said “I don’t like that”.’  
Amongst the Czech groups, the possibility of projecting global power is not even discussed. 
 The main approach advocated for tackling problems to do with Relations between 
Peoples is, as we saw, the minimisation of mutual exposure.  This is something which the 
national government rather than the EU is assumed to have control over (though as we have 
seen, the effectiveness of the former is somewhat doubted on the grounds that politicians 
may be too soft to take action and that the will of the opponents is stronger).  A European 
approach, either based on supranational regulation or cooperation with the ‘comparable’ 
countries, is generally not advocated: again, perhaps because the problems are already seen 
to be in the local environment, one sees little of a ‘fortress Europe’ motif.  Andy in Swansea 
at one point asks: ‘If Brussels is supposed to be the centre of Europe and all the politicians 
are there, why can’t they turn round to Germany andsay “well look, you have got to take 
some [immigrants].  France, you have got to take some …?”  You know what I mean, instead 
of putting them on the back of lorries and shipping them over here.  Surely Brussels, if 
they’ve got all the power, should be saying “well you got to have some, you got to have 
some”, and spread it out, instead of them all coming over here.’  The sense that fairness 
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demands that comparable countries be treated equally m y suggest that there is the basis for a 
European approach, but his point is not picked up by the rest of the group, and indeed Andy 
himself says he ‘doesn’t have much faith’ in the ida.  For problems to do with Relations 
between Peoples, the plausibility of any kind of political project centred on a European polity 
seems weak, even setting aside the issue of normative desirability. 
 In fact, rather than being treated as a possible means by which to address perceived 
problems, the EU is again occasionally treated as a contributing factor, its policies increasing 
the degree to which ‘people like us’ are exposed to those positioned as opponents.  The 
prospect of Turkish membership of the EU, when treated s a problem of Relations between 
Peoples just as when treated as an economic problem, is a not ble instance of this.  In 
Lübeck, Jürgen comments with collective approval that ‘these differences in mentality, 
they’re particularly serious with regard to Turkey’s entry [into the EU] … It’ll get even more 
extreme.  Because that’s where the Orient meets the Occident, isn’t it.  Practically two 
different cultures.  I think that’s really, really difficult.’  Ali agrees: ‘That’s going to be a 
really difficult topic when Turkey comes in.’  Mention is not made of Bosnia and Albania, 
two further countries which might one day join the EU and which in principle might be 
associated with war on the one hand and the presenc of Muslims on the other; one suspects 
though that here too the EU might easily be treated s the source of the perceived problem.  
Existing patterns of discursive practice do little o make sense of the EU in this domain. 
   
 In Chapter 3 it was noted that there is another body f problems which appear 
occasionally in these discussions, related to topics such as the environment, hygiene and the 
quality of services, which can be loosely summarised under the heading Quality of Life.  
These problems, it was argued, once articulated teno be put to one side, with their 
importance questioned or with attention diverted towards other problématiques.  However, in 
those instances where one does find problematisation of this kind – with discussion of 
pollution or food-and-safety standards, for example – ‘Europe’ and the EU are invoked with 
some frequency, and in ways consistent with the idea of a European political bond.5  For such 
problems, the ‘people like us’ would be a fairly inclusive category: after all, potentially 
everyone is affected by environmental pollution, by the purity of the water supply or the meat 
which goes into sausages.  Unlike in the other domains, here one finds the positioning of 
‘Europe’ in adversarial opposition both to ‘the East’ and ‘America’.  Briefly – and rather 
                                                
5 The number of such instances is admittedly small (around ten or so, across all the interviews), and so 
generalisations are suggested with caution. 
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casually – discussing environmental pollution, Murda in Reading accuses Americans of using 
too many aeroplanes (‘that’s why America never wants to sign any of those [environmental] 
treaties’) and proposes that ‘the little buggers can go from one state to another on a bicycle.’  
At Norwich, Mickey says that ‘the Americans … cause more pollution than any other nation 
put together,’ Leyton confirms that, according to something he has read, ‘the Americans’ 
contribute a third of the world’s pollution output, and Barry adds that in a few years India 
and China will be ‘up there too’.  Where EU regulations are mentioned, they are presented as 
well-intentioned and probably appropriate: at Kassel, all participants speak approvingly of 
the EU legislation which they say is designed to deal with fine-particulate pollution, the 
environmental problem of the day.  Perhaps such regulations can also deal with the old and 
dirty second-hand cars which Dieter reports are still driven in ‘the eastern bloc’ (i.e. eastern 
Europe), ‘the really old vehicles, the things that ere would’ve failed their M.O.T. long ago.’6  
In the Plzeň discussion, all participants note that the environme t in the Czech Republic has 
improved considerably in recent years (reference is made to reductions in factory emissions, 
improvement in the quality of buses and their exhaust f mes, and the disappearance of dirty 
old cars like the Trabant and the Tatra), and there is general consensus that the adoption of 
the EU’s standards account for this.  Román, with Petr’s agreement, makes an explicit link to 
EU accession: ‘if we hadn’t been obliged to change, who’d have bothered?’   
 These problems to do with Quality of Life tend to be marginalised however, and with 
them the potentially positive role of a European polity in dealing with them.  This is true 
even amongst the Czech groups, where discussion of such problems – probably for the very 
reason of recent adaptation to EU legislation – is the most common.  One sees something of 
this in a passage from Plzeň, which begins with Petr responding to the question whether he 
was in favour of the Czech Republic joining the EU: 
 
P:  … Now I’m no longer as sure as I was before, but back then when it was happening I was in 
favour. 
 
M:  I think in the future it’s going to be a good thing but for now there’s nothing in it … [R:  What do 
you mean, nothing?]  For us right now there’s nothing good in it. 
 
R:  What do you mean? … We’ve just been talking about the transport improvements and stuff … 
 
                                                
6 For problems to do with Quality of Life, the Kassel group puts forward plenty of possibilities for action: 
people should be further encouraged to recycle by extending the deposit (Pfand) system to more goods, by the 
use of insurance schemes, pools systems and ‘solidarity funds’, and there is general consensus on Hans’ point 
that ‘the polluter-pays principle I find particularly good.  In other words that firms which produce a thing [D: 
yeah, yeah] are then taken up on their responsibility.’   
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M:  Yeah that’s one thing but a second thing is all the new stuff which they’re implementing: the 
registration office … pubs need to have toilets, kitchens, everything.  You’ve got to buy a 
10,000CK walkie-talkie for the car … 
 
P:  Exactly, yeah, this is why I don’t see it like I used to any more … [M:  Right …] 
 
R:  Fine but how can you say you don’t see anything in it when the quality of services is going up?  
The quality of everything is going up. 
 
P:  Because I have to buy a different walkie-talkie … Ok, that’s one thing, another thing …
 
R:  In any case I’ve heard they’re dividing the radio band into quarters so a lot more people can use it.  
It’s all about improvements.  The others don’t have the right frequencies …  [P:  I know, but …] 
 
M:  It’s an improvement but you don’t notice the improvement.  Where do you notice it? 
 
R:  Where? … Well, right now the band is so mashed up that … it’s not separated out … [P:  That’s 
true, sure, but …] 
 
M:  OK so let’s talk about the toilets here in the pub.  What I notice is that it smells lovely and 
everything’s pretty, but the snag is the landlord has to install some photocell on each urinal and for 
each one he has to pay 70,000CK.  The quality improves, but at the expense of the one who has to 
pay for it. 
 
P:  Our walkie-talkies are a trivial thing, it’s true.  But another thing for example are the butchers.  
Today you’re not allowed to have the producer and the slaughterer together in one place like in a 
classical abattoir, so the classical butcher has to cease business.  Schneider, he’s ok, he’s got a 
slaughterer there and a producer there …  [M:  Is he ok?]  Isn’t he?  Relatively, compared to the 
average butcher …  [R:  Which was the one that closed?  The slaughterhouse …] [One of them 
closed …]  But Schneider … 
 
R:  You’re both talking about whether it’s better fo you yourselves … 
 
P:  Yeah well how is it better for me if I liked that particular sausage, if all the hygiene norms come in 
and …  It’s been eaten for decades and it’s never hurt anyone … 
 
R:  Of course but you notice it in the quality.  Inthe toilets for example, if you go to a pub and you’ve 
got one tiny piece of soap … 
 
P:  Fine but that’s just a detail I think, the old toilets would’ve been fine if someone looked after them.  
[M:  Right …] 
 
R:  No … now you’ve got liquid soap … the regulations … [P:  Fine but that’s …]  Those are norms 
… 
 
P:  Those are things which cost hundreds of crowns … 
 
R:  Those are things you encounter every day … 
 
M:  The services improve but at someone’s expense – someone somewhere has to pay for that 
improvement. 
 
R:  Yeah of course.  It’s a demanding investment. 
 
One must be careful with such a passage not to overstat  the link which is being made 
specifically with the EU and its policies: for the Czech groups, it is quite probable that EU 
accession carries a symbolic significance as one part of  wider process of ‘democratisation’ 
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and ‘liberalisation’, that it functions as much as a ignifier for a whole range of developments 
as it is their assumed cause.  Nonetheless, there is a linkage being made here between EU 
accession and various aspects of daily life, and one way to read the exchange of views is as a 
contest over the ‘meaning’ of EU accession.  On the on  hand it is presented, mainly by 
Román, as improving the quality of various ‘services’, from radio signals to toilets to 
sausages (i.e. addressing problems to do with Quality of Life), whereas on the other hand it is 
presented, mainly by Petr and Míra, as engendering new costs for the little people (i.e. 
creating further problems in Economics).  In the one view, the benefits are general, and o e 
should not ask simply ‘whether it’s better for you yourselves’; in the other ‘the quality 
improves at the expense of those who have to pay for it.’  While the debate is not resolved 
conclusively here, Román has to argue strongly to prevent the collective benefits being 
crowded out of the discussion.  Both Míra and Petr suggest these improvements are either 
scarcely appreciable or represent no more than ‘details’, that they improve something which 
did not need to be improved whilst creating new difficulties.  A few minutes later, Míra is 
back to the same kind of argument, asking the others whether they have a fire extinguisher in 
their taxis.  ‘It’s the same thing: it’s a good thing, but you have to pay for it.’  Insofar then as 
it is problématiques such as these which tend most often to prompt a favourable reference to 
the EU and its policies – and, to repeat, this happens most amongst the Czech groups, and to 
some extent the German ones – this positive basis for a political bond coextensive with the 
EU is undermined by the doubt which is cast on the seriousness of the problems at stake.  
The kind of positioning and the relatively strong sen e of agency are appropriate to such a 
bond, but the problems involved amount at most to a quite minor part of the political 
common. 
 
The observations of this section allow us to reaffirm the thrust of our analysis.  The bond that 
was sketched in Chapter 1 as a normative ideal for a European polity appears only quite 
sporadically in the empirical material.  This is not because speakers fail in the articulation of 
matters of common concern: they do this with considerable fluidity, and there is little 
evidence of disengagement from the substance of politics.  Where a political bond supportive 
of a European polity fails to take shape, or does so only weakly, is in matters of collective 
positioning and the expectation of organised collectiv  action.  For the problems which are 
discussed in depth, acts of positioning characterised by the transnationalisation of ‘us’ and a 
basic tolerance of ‘them’ are contradicted by converse practices more parochial in their 
inclusion or more hostile in their exclusion.  For these same problems, the EU tends not to be 
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invoked as a possible means for their remedy, since the expression of transnational shared 
predicament tends not to follow the contours of the EU polity, and since there is widespread 
scepticism concerning the very possibility of remedy.  More often the EU is treated as yet 
another manifestation of these problems.  Only to a quite limited extent, and mainly for 
problems of secondary importance, is the EU ‘made sense of’ by existing discursive patterns.   
 
 
Towards a Political Bond 
 
If the concept of the political bond is only weakly representational, this might be read as 
grounds to abandon it.  Why persist with a perspectiv  which cannot easily be associated 
with the status quo?  Why not pick an alternative id al, one that is a bit more ‘realistic’?  
While this might seem an attractive option, it would be to neglect what was suggested in 
Chapter 1, that there is no conceptualisation of the common capable of performing a perfect 
descriptive role.  All visions of the collective bond require an idealisation of sorts, and since 
alternative visions are normatively unappealing there are good reasons to seek a political 
conceptualisation of the common.  Moreover, unless one is of a conservative disposition, the 
challenge presented by divergences from an ideal need ot be seen as discouraging.  They 
indicate that the ideal is sufficiently demanding that it can perform a critical-diagnostic 
function and suggest new lines of possible development.   
 Exploring the concept empirically has highlighted the need to foster alternative 
discursive practices if a political bond supportive of a European polity is to emerge.  Given 
that discussion of the EU tends to absorb motifs which are present in the discussion of 
matters of political relevance more widely, any attempt to alter the political significance 
which is ascribed to the EU will have to proceed by addressing at the same time these 
broader discursive patterns.  Making sense of a European polity as a political phenomenon 
connected to substantive problems of shared concern requires addressing the larger context.  
This question of change is what we shall consider here, exploring some of the alterations 
which would be necessary in order for a political bond to become a more representational as 
well as normative concept.   
 When thinking about how discursive practice might be refashioned, the challenge 
clearly is not that of imagining an entirely new set of practices to be projected onto a tabula 
rasa.  One does not have this kind of freedom.  It can be taken as a guiding principle that 
successful innovation depends not so much upon a simple genius for invention, but upon the 
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pragmatic ability to make adjustments to existing repertoires of practice, to retrieve older 
repertoires which have become subordinated, to foster changes of emphasis, and to introduce 
new discursive resources in ways such that they respond to the patterns which pre-exist them.  
Herein lies the task for the ‘discursive architects’ who would seek to effect a Europe-wide 
political bond.  Existing patterns of discursive practice constitute both the target to be taken 
aim at, since certain commonly-made assumptions there is the necessity to challenge, but 
also a pool of resources to be utilised, since there is the possibility of altering the speech act 
potential of existing formulations, whether by dislodging existing associations and ascribing 
new ones, or by extending patterns of usage such that the weight of old formulations may be 
put to new purpose.  Rather like the ‘innovating ideologists’ of the seventeenth century, 
whose strategies for legitimising the new socio-economic practices of capitalist society 
Quentin Skinner has discussed, those who would seek to realise a political bond supportive 
of a European polity are in this sense ‘obliged to march backwards into battle’, to keep their 
eye on the discursive landscape which is behind them.7  For the same reason, in the section 
that follows, a certain accent is placed upon linking possible alterations in discursive practice 
to the patterns we have uncovered in the research, nd attention is drawn to the ways in 
which potential new trends are prefigured in existing tendencies. 
 The possible identity of these ‘discursive architects’ who would take it upon 
themselves to develop alternative repertoires is something that will be discussed in the 
section after this one.  There is of course no guarantee that such actors would be successful in 
carrying these innovations through.  Like architects, they would design and promote 
blueprints that can be acted upon, but they do not by hemselves ensure these come to 
fruition in the form of everyday practice.  Such innovation would be a matter for ongoing 
political effort.  Our points in what follows can be related to each of the three conceptual 
dimensions of a political bond: the make-up of the political common, prevalent acts of 
collective positioning, and assumptions about the worth of a political project.  Since the first 




                                                
7 Quentin Skinner, 'Moral Principles and Social Change', in Quentin Skinner (ed.), Visions of Politics, Vol. 1: 
Regarding Method (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p.150.  Skinner suggests that the task of 
innovating ideologists is ‘that of legitimising some form of social behaviour generally agreed to be 
questionable.’ (p.148)  The scenario is analogous t that of establishing the legitimacy of an emerging polity: 
there is the need to render acceptable and commonsensical that which is new, and which for the very reason that 
it is new seems questionable.   
 259 
1.  Positioning (I): The Opponents as Adversaries, not Enemies 
 
That opponents of the ‘people like us’ be accepted as legitimate adversaries to be engaged 
with (if only to be consistently opposed) is a basic condition of any political bond, whether 
associated with a European polity or with some other political configuration.  It has been 
seen that, by and large, this criterion is generally met in the discourse across the sample 
groups for problems to do with Society and the Law.  However, for problems to do with 
Relations between Peoples, it is generally not met.  Instead, one finds an antagonistic 
relationship being posited between the political subjects and their counterparts on the one 
hand (principally expressed with categories such as ‘the West’, with certain racial 
connotations) and their enemies (with particular reference to Arabs / Muslims) on the other.  
What kind of discursive change does this call for? 
 One approach to ‘taming’ the relationship such that it is agonistic rather than 
antagonistic would be to dislodge some of the characte istics which are ascribed to the 
opponents.  Instead of them being positioned undifferentiatedly as irrational, aggressive and 
intransigent, one would want to see them portrayed as actors rationally advancing their own 
agenda.  To emphasise the irrationality, aggression and intransigence of the other is largely to 
give up on the possibility of a political bond, since these take on the quality of essential 
attributes which are not susceptible to change and which do not permit the possibility of 
compromise.  The assumption needs to be entrenched that it is ‘conflict’ itself which is the 
problem, not the opponents as such, and that the opponents too may be seeking a way to 
resolve such conflict.8  Note that this does not imply the necessity of counter-arguments 
which negate the idea of fundamental difference to the point of affirming that all people(s) 
are essentially the same.  Opponents do not need to be seen as ‘people like us’, and assertions 
along the lines that ‘everyone fundamentally shares th  same values’ or that ‘to be offended 
by foreign-looking cultural symbols in your neighbourhood is morally wrong’ may be both 
unproductive and unwise.  However well-intentioned and however appealing at first glance, 
they are likely to fall foul of the common criticism that politicians and political parties are 
too soft in dealing with these problems of conflict, that they wish to paper over them.  The 
challenge is not so much to construct discourses of friendship as to construct discourses of 
agonism rather than antagonism.  Some reification of the categories of ‘them’ and ‘us’ is 
                                                
8 This perspective is usefully described by Bellamy when laying out the republican ideal of compromise through 
negotiation: ‘Instead of viewing a conflict as a battle to be won or lost, the parties see it as a colle tive problem 
to be solved.’ Richard Bellamy, Liberalism and Pluralism: Towards a Politics of Compromise (London: 
Routledge, 1999), p.101. 
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acceptable therefore, provided that the dynamic betwe n these two is articulated in a certain 
way.9  It will be recalled that at least two major explanatory motifs for inter-people conflict 
were observed in our research discussions: one concerned the supposedly hostile essential 
characteristics of the opponents, while the other concerned the contest for collective power.  
The first emphasises irrationality, the second rationality.  Insofar as the latter offers the 
possibility of reasoned compromise whereas the former does not, it may be that one already 
has a motif available with which to conjure a more agonistic relationship.  Of course, 
conflicts for power can certainly ‘turn nasty’ too, but it might be that the promulgation of this 
motif provides a better basis for their resolution. 
 A second approach to taming the hostile dynamic posited on problems to do with 
Relations between Peoples would involve focusing rather on the formulations ued to 
demarcate the ‘people like us’.  In particular, this might include seeking to undermine the 
frequency with which the category of ‘the West’ is adopted, since this generally seems to be 
used with either racial implications or implications of good sense and peacefulness.  While in 
principle the term could simply be a remnant of the Cold War period, without an association 
with any such markers, its deployment in the context of discussion of current conflicts tends 
to be rather more laden.  The difficulty, it need scarcely be added, is not that race is an 
inherently negative category, but that it is an exclusive and essentialising one which gives 
any conflict delineated in its terms a sense of permanence and naturalness.  Likewise, it is not 
that ‘good sense and peacefulness’ should be thought of as negative characteristics: the 
difficulty is rather that if they are claimed as intr sic to the ‘people like us’ then this will, 
almost inevitably, result in those treated as opponents being positioned as deficient in these 
qualities.  Eradicating the concept of ‘the West’ altogether is of course an implausible and 
dubious objective, but it may be that one would want to promote alternative formulations 
which can make no claim to embody white-majority countries as a whole.  Of the possible 
new subject-positions to make more readily available, ‘Europe’ is advantageous in this sense, 
and perhaps also serves to increase the extent to which collective action at a European level 
is held to ‘make sense’.  An argument of this kind is often made to support the prospect of 
Turkish membership of the EU: it weakens the plausibility of the EU as a ‘Christian club’.  
There is indeed something attractive about this proposition – but it concerns the kind of 
membership question which is beyond the scope of this work. 
                                                
9 Though it will not be possible to explore the point further here, this implies an alignment with multiculturalist 
rather than assimilationist conceptions of citizenship – cf. e.g. Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: 
Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000). 
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 This brings us to the question of positioning in the Economics domain.  The 
conclusion above was that the opponents here (which includes ‘the rich’, large companies, 
financial institutions, in some cases those dependent on state welfare, and those ‘eastern 
Europeans’ who both compete for jobs and benefit from wealth redistribution) are generally 
positioned as adversaries rather than enemies, but that his remains a precarious condition in 
need of consolidation.  Likewise, particularly when discussion is focused on the question of 
who contributes to and who takes from the EU’s finances, the adversaries tend to be 
demarcated along country lines, a pattern which is generally not conducive to a political 
bond, and which again can result in the expression of resentment towards eastern Europeans.  
The persistent danger is that the poverty or ‘cheapn ss’ which is ascribed to ‘them’, and 
which stands as the reason why they are seen to be threatening the jobs, wages, earnings and 
benefits of ‘people like us’, comes to be regarded as an essential attribute rather than a 
contingent circumstance.  The essentialisation of attributes, as we have noted, tends to herald 
an antagonistic rather than an agonistic positioning of the opponents.  The question is 
therefore how to undermine any tendency towards essentialisation. 
 Two possible argumentative strategies stand out.  In one of them, the contingency of 
these attributes is affirmed by suggesting that inequalities in wealth between western and 
eastern Europe will level themselves out naturally over time.  The argument would be that 
companies will continue to invest and create jobs in eastern Europe in the short term while 
wages there are more attractive than in the west, but that this in turn will boost average 
earnings there to the point at which the very economic disparities which make eastern Europe 
favourable to such companies will no longer exist, prompting those companies to move on, 
leaving eastern Europe in a similar predicament to ‘ours’ today.  Such an argument serves 
well to highlight the contingency of wealth inequalities, and implies that the opponents are 
not fundamentally different from the ‘people like us’.  However, while it is supportive of a 
political bond in this respect, at the same time it works to undermine the plausibility of a 
political project to tackle problems to do with Economics, since it makes the resolution of 
such problems dependent upon the inclinations of private companies and the market signals 
to which they respond.  It follows the very logic of inevitability and of uncontrollable cycles 
of good fortune and bad which, as was seen in Chapter 5, is precisely the source of a sense of 
powerlessness towards problems in this domain.  It does not respond to the sense that 
something should be done about these problems; it merely suggests that they will go away at 
some point.  A second argumentative strategy, on the o er hand, would involve highlighting 
the contingency of wealth inequalities and the problems caused by them by suggesting that 
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there are things which can be done about them.  Wage competition would be presented not as 
an eternal and unavoidable fact but as the consequence of, for instance, the absence of a 
minimum wage and harmonised levels of taxation, or the absence of wealth redistribution 
from ‘the rich’ and ‘shareholders’ (i.e. other adversaries) in western Europe.  That a gap 
exists also in eastern Europe between ‘the rich’ and ‘the little people’ might be emphasised, 
and likewise that there too there are ‘contributors’ as well as ‘non-contributors’, inviting 
some sense of shared predicament.  The clear advantge of this approach is that it tempers 
the idea that eastern Europeans might be permanent adversaries without undermining the 
sense of agency which is also necessary for a political bond. 
 As with Relations between Peoples, a repositioning of the opponents may require 
undermining or refashioning certain common formulations for the ‘people like us’.  The 
frequency with which participants in discussion positi n only themselves as being ‘the ones 
who contribute’ is problematic, since it can be mobilised to discredit any kind of political 
project involving state interference.  The burden – e.g. of taxation or regulation – can be 
presented as always falling upon ‘us’, and the benefits ‘draining away’ elsewhere, provoking 
the misleading conclusion that it is the attempt at democratic control itself which represents 
the problem.  Any alternative formulation would do well to preserve the active voice (as one 
finds with ‘the contributors’) while avoiding the potential for anti-political manipulation.  
One strategy that presents itself is to seek to refashion the subject position of ‘the working 
man / people’ so as to loosen its association with contribution and to play up its association 
with other economic problems currently linked more strongly to terms such as ‘the little 
people’.  Unlike the latter, ‘working people’ seems to carry overtones of activeness and links 
better to a sense of the possibilities for action.  Such a shift in the term’s usage is a 
considerable task of course, but arguably it has performed this role in the past, in the 
vocabulary both of trade unions and the revolutionary Left, and so there is an older pattern of 
usage to be rediscovered.   
 Alternatively, as a second strategy, one might accept the emphasis placed on ‘us’ 
being contributors, but seek to prevent this leading to the construction of opponents whose 
legitimate presence in the political community may be doubted.  For ‘eastern Europeans’ one 
would want to substitute a category which is not demarcated in national terms, and which is 
therefore less liable to invite the move to exclude.  A deflection of this kind could perhaps be 
achieved with the category of ‘the rich’.  As suggested in Chapter 4, when matters of 
contribution are at stake, ‘the rich’ tend to be invoked less frequently, and contribution to the 
tax system tends to be discussed more in simple do-or- n’t terms (which draws attention 
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towards the non-contributors ‘below’ and invites them to be positioned as opponents) rather 
than in more-or-less terms (which might draw attention rather towards those at ‘the top’ who 
do contribute, but less than they might).  However, the possibility that the contribution motif 
can be combined with a gaze ‘upwards’ rather than ‘l terally’ or ‘downwards’ is confirmed 
by this passage from the Kassel discussion: 
 
H:  … The state has always taxed the most those people who have relatively little. 
 
P:  Why?  Because the people who have the least have always been the biggest in number.  [S:  Exactly 
…]  It’s quite simple.  Why are the little people – let’s say everyone who’s sitting here now – why 
are they paying taxes and why are the big guys not paying taxes like that?  The big guys are such a 
small proportion … even if they did pay it’d be a drop in the ocean.  But us below, because there’s 
a mass of us, there the taxes can really be raked in.  But not with those few people at the top. 
 
H:  No, no.  That’s … when you think that, what is it, 85% of the population has very little money and 
only 15% of the capital … how is it, 80% of the capit l is managed or held by 15% of the people.  
And I think, if taxation was done properly … [D: done properly …] then that would be quite a 
considerable amount … [D:  Yeah, absolutely …] 
 
 
More of this kind of talk would, one may imagine, enable less of the talk which positions 
other EU citizens as opponents by virtue of their nationality. 
 
 
2.  Positioning (II): Other European Countries as Comparable Environments, Not 
Competitive Actors 
 
The demarcation of opponents using the category of nationality is avoided, we have argued, 
when the member-states that make up the EU are regarded not as unitary actors but as 
environments in which problems are encountered.  It is then that the recognition becomes 
possible of ‘counterparts’ who face predicaments similar to those faced by ‘people like us’, 
and hence the possibility of new kinds of collective action in opposition to shared 
adversaries.  From a political-bond perspective, what is important is not so much that citizens 
readily profess enthusiasm for the current configuration of the EU and its institutions.  
Rather, what is important is that problems in each of t e domains of the political common are 
seen to be arising more widely than just in the home environment. 
 In terms of discursive practices, this means in particular the readiness to make 
transnational comparisons.  As we have seen, there is already a notable tendency to make 
these with regard to problems of Economics and Relations between Peoples: the decline of 
industry, wage and price levels, and (the challenges which have been noted notwithstanding) 
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the conflicts arising from the encounter of different ‘peoples’ are all problems on which 
comparisons are spontaneously made in discussion.  Indeed, such problems are rather more 
common than those which prompt nation-based formulations for the political subjects (of 
these, EU financing was the major one).  However, more comparisons would undoubtedly be 
beneficial, and could extend also to problems in Society and the Law: frequently-cited 
problems such as a supposed decline in public-spiritedness, the ineffectiveness of 
mechanisms of criminal punishment, and the quality of school discipline and education 
would be plausible candidates in this regard.  There is one precedent for this in the 
interviews: the Erfurt group makes spontaneous reference to the findings of the EU’s PISA 
Study on the relative achievements of different education systems in Europe.  Finland’s 
positive evaluation is the source of considerable int rest on the grounds that it adopted the 
school-system of the GDR.  Andreas expresses scepticism towards the methods of the study 
– ‘for me the PISA Study is a purely statistical thing …  Why do I have to make a European 
contest out of the knowledge of little children?’ – but he, like all the other participants, is 
supportive of the principle that Germany can usefully compare its education system with 
those of other European countries, and perhaps learn from them.  This reference, admittedly 
found only in the one interview, indicates the potential for transnational comparisons in this 
domain of problems also.  More such comparisons would perhaps bring this advantage: 
awareness that the same problems are replicated elswhere might serve to undermine the 
tendency which is found with regard to some of them – crime and antisocial behaviour 
especially – to demonise particular individuals in the home environment as being responsible 
for them.  It is conceivable that comparisons encourage a more structural rather than actor-
based perspective to be taken, something which would diminish the tendency to position 
certain opponents as enemies rather than adversaries. 
 A promising feature of the discursive patterns observed is the tendency not only to 
make comparisons but, for economic problems at least, to express surprise at the extent to 
which conditions in neighbouring, ‘comparable’ countries might actually be rather different.  
Price differences, for example, regularly provoked expressions of bemusement and the sense 
that things should be more similar than they were.  David provides an example of this at 
Reading, to the agreement of Murda: ‘Now, we’re into Europe, but we don’t all have the 
same rules.  You can go to France, it’s exactly what you’re saying, you buy stuff in France – 
wine, do the beer trips and the fag trips …  We’re into Europe, and you can get on a boat for 
a pound or whatever it is and come back with a sackload of fags if you want to, you only got 
to go twenty miles across the Channel …  We’re in Europe, but we all got different prices.’  
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Price and wage differences on a global scale are not described in these tones – they tend to be 
treated much more as predictable facts of life.  True, this ‘surprise’ only extends towards 
conditions in those EU countries treated as broadly comparable: price differences between 
western and eastern Europe tend to be normalised amongst all the groups.  Nonetheless, there 
is at least some basis here on which to promote the sense of shared predicament. 
 Not all kinds of comparison are constructive of a political bond.  Comparisons 
between countries which are based on a competitive pr nciple may instead be corrosive, since 
they encourage the demarcation of opponents according to nationality, and where this is the 
defining feature of the parties to agonistic struggle the effect is likely to be to undermine the 
plausibility of joint political action.  For example, the notion put forward by several of the 
German participants of Germany as the ‘tail-light’ in economic growth evokes a competition 
along national lines in which some countries must be winners and others losers.  It positions 
those who are the winners as the opponents, something which is likely to cast doubt on the 
acceptability of being bound together in the same political community.  One sees this in some 
comments from Peter at Kassel, though the point is contested by Dieter: 
 
P:  And another thing I can’t understand, in Germany we’re the tail-light in terms of economic 
development in Europe. 
 
S:  We still have very high standards though.  [D: Just what I wanted to say …] 
 
P:  Yeah but on the one hand we’re the tail-light and on the other hand we’re the main contributor to 
the EU.  That somehow … that can’t all fit together any more.  [D: Yes but …]   And we don’t 
have a single politician who goes to town and says ‘That’s enough, we need to re-regulate the 
whole thing.’  Just not there. 
 
D:  We’re talking about two different things.  We’r the tail-light when it comes to growth.  That 
means for a very long time we were probably out in fro t …  [P:  Gone to sleep, we’ve gone to 
sleep …]  No, we’ve been out in front for a very long time and we were the leaders in 
development.  Now what’s happened meanwhile is that, because of EU enlargement, the other 
states have caught up and naturally their level of development is … That’s the problem.  [H:  
That’s the problem …]  That’s the problem.  It’s not that we’re worse than the others, it’s simply 
that their development potential … it’s being raised. 
 
P:  On the contrary, it’s said that we’re getting worse.  [D:  That’s rubbish.] 
 
On balance, the idea that other parts of Europe, including the new EU members of eastern 
Europe, represent environments rather than rivals is probably maintained in this passage – 
Dieter, Sebastian and Hans are all adopting this position – but the motif of the ‘tail-light’ 
which Peter refers to points rather in the contrary di ection.  
 It was noted in the previous section that accounts of he economic problems faced by 
the political subjects quite often make reference to the EU and its policies, either as 
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expressions or as causes of such problems.  The EU’s legislation on the free movement of 
workers and the introduction of the euro are two salient examples of this.  Interestingly, 
problems of this kind for which a close linkage to the EU is made often attract transnational 
comparisons with other European countries, as thoug it is precisely the EU connection 
which fosters some basic sense of shared predicament.  The group in Plzeň for example, 
while generally like the other Czech groups indisposed to make comparisons with western 
Europe on economic issues, shows a fair degree of interest in the experiences of these 
countries with the euro.  Petr refers to how prices have risen in Germany due to the euro, and 
to the reluctance of Britain to give up the pound sterling; Míra draws attention to those in 
Italy who want the country to withdraw from the euro system (Petr and Román have heard 
the same, though Román dismisses them as ‘just voices’), and all are willing to draw 
conclusions from these experiences for those that might be felt in the Czech Republic were it 
too to join.  One observes something similar in the Norwich discussion: 
 
B:  If we’ve all got the euro, all of Europe including us, then everything’s got to be the same prices, 
like your petrol abroad, your petrol here, your fags, blah blah.  And I’m pretty sure, whatever 
government is in in this country would never give up the revenue off cigarettes, beer and fags.  So 
we’d be getting the same wages as our European counterparts but we’d be paying more, so our 
standard of living would go down yet again. […] 
 
L:  They’ve all got mugged on the bloody euro, don’t you worry yourself about that.  Because you go 
out to Spain and see how much it bloody costs you.   
 
B:  The Dutch don’t like it, the Germans are struggling with it. 
 
M:  I tell you who didn’t struggle with the euro – financial institutions.  They made a packet on it. 
 
The recognition of ‘European counterparts’ which this specifically European ‘problem’ 
invites can be read in at least two ways.  In one perspective, it is ‘the EU’ which is the 
problem, and any sense of shared predicament it may generate is unconducive to a political 
bond since a sense of ‘the people’ comes at the expnse of a sense of the worth of the polity.  
In a second perspective, it is the specific policy (the euro) which is the problem, since it has a 
particular harmful effect on the ‘people like us’ and their counterparts (rising prices) while 
benefiting their adversaries (the ‘financial institutions’).  In this perspective, a Europe-wide 
sense of shared predicament could emerge on the back of dissatisfaction with certain kinds of 
economic policy, and could then contribute to the colle tive bond required for a quite 
different kind of polity pursuing different policies.  Fostering a political bond would seem to 
require resisting the first perspective while promoting something akin to the second.  That 
this is possible in principle seems to be evident from a passage from the Erfurt discussion.  
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Here one sees how dissatisfaction with a particular problem – in this case, the arrival of 
workers from abroad working to different conditions – coupled with the idea that ‘things 
should be the same’ in economic terms across Europe can result in rejection of the policy 
combined with affirmation of the idea of a European polity: 
 
H-J:  … If Europe is going to function as a single whole then there can’t be one law for Poland, one 
law for Portugal and whatever, there needs to be one single European law … [U: yeah].  And that 
applies to all the questions of employment law, questions of tax law … If it’s not done like that 
then there’ll always be this roaming around in Europe and nothing fair will come of it because the 
cherries will always be picked out for a few indiviuals who are able to take advantage of it and 
the bulk of people will be left behind.  And it can’t function like that.  I’m not going to say that I 
find it all crap, but I do find it crap how it’s being executed.  It doesn’t work.  [A:  I agree]  I think 
if it was done in an orderly way then it’d be a simplification.  You can set free so much potential. 
 
A:  Ok, and then the EU itself would have proper authority … [H-J: Yeah, naturally …]  And not like 
it is at the moment …  [H-J: Like it is at the moment it doesn’t work.] 
 
 
3.  A Political Project: New Discourses on the Possibilities for Action 
 
A theme of our empirical findings has been that positive assumptions about the possibilities 
for organised, collective address of the problems of the political common are unevenly 
distributed across the problem domains, and in some areas rather thin.  They are most 
strongly present as regards Society and the Law, but less so as regards Relations between 
Peoples and Economics, even though the capacities of ‘politicians’ and ‘the government’ 
remain a topic of considerable salience.  A political bond supportive of a European polity 
would require two important changes in discursive practice: a multiplication of the frequency 
with which it is assumed that political problems in these second two domains can be 
addressed; and a multiplication of the frequency with hich ‘Europe’ and the EU are invoked 
as credible means by which to tackle such problems.  Both of these are likely to necessitate 
new discursive repertoires which spell out some of the available possibilities for action.  It is 
important however not to merge these two points: while a political bond does require that 
problems facing the ‘people like us’ be treated as amenable to address (since otherwise the 
perspective is an anti-political one), it does not require that all such problems be treated as in 
need of address by European-level institutions.  To say this would be to foreclose in favour 
of a unitary state what should be a matter for ongoing debate: the distribution of 
‘competences’ amongst different political actors.  (The next section will return to this 
question.)  Rather, it requires only that a plural – though unspecifiable – number of salient 
problems be treated as plausible candidates for address at the European level. 
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 There is, from this perspective, no strong reason why problems to do with Society 
and the Law should call for a political project specifically European in focus.  A broader 
sense of space based on a greater number of transnatio al comparisons would arguably be 
welcome, since it may have a positive effect on the kinds of positioning performed, but this 
does not imply the necessity of an active European polity in this domain.  Nor therefore is 
there necessarily a need for new explanatory discour es which challenge the tendency to 
assume that these problems arise primarily from local causes.  Were one to look for these, 
several options would be available: one would be to conceive new explanatory motifs 
specific to the domain (such as technological change, as suggested in Chapter 5); another 
would be to play further on the link which is sometimes drawn already in these discussions to 
the Economics domain – the Würzburg group in particular explores some of the possible 
connections between criminal behaviour and economic disadvantage (e.g. unemployment and 
wealth inequality).  But such changes in discursive pattern are not essential to the emergence 
of a political bond supportive of a European polity, since Society and the Law represents just 
one of the domains of the common, and since the assumption of agency is already quite 
discernible in this domain. 
 For problems to do with Relations between Peoples, on the other hand, the sense that 
the specifically European context is of no particular relevance is generally coupled with a 
tendency to doubt whether such problems are amenabl to address.  Clearly such an 
assumption would need to be challenged, and the possibilities for doing so follow on from 
our observations concerning positioning.  New discourses of agency are required: not ones 
which simply raise the expectation that the opponents can be defeated, e.g. by emphasising 
‘our’ resolve, since this would be likely only to increase the extent to which the opponents 
are positioned as enemies.  Rather, as we have said, the focus would need to be on ‘conflict’ 
as the problem.  Attempts to ‘deproblematise’ it – for instance, by suggesting that relations 
between peoples are already fully harmonious, or by attempting to deconstruct the very idea 
of ‘peoples’ – would arguably be utopian and potentially counter-productive, their instinctive 
appeal notwithstanding.  More effective may be to accept such conflict as a problem, and to 
challenge the assumption that it is inevitable by disputing assumptions to do with the 
irrationality of opponents and by undermining formulations for the subjects which carry 
racial nuances, as – we have argued – that of ‘the West’ does.  Local instances of conflict in 
the neighbourhood might then have a more realistic chance of being debated and 
compromised on in local discussion forums. 
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 The need for new discourses of agency in the Economics domain is quite clear, and 
given the transnational context so readily evoked it would be natural to place emphasis here 
on the potential for tackling such problems at a European level.  Such a move most likely 
requires both diffusing the sense of mystery that surrounds many economic problems and 
disputing the tendency to explain large numbers of them with reference to distant places of 
relevant contrast.  Narrowing the sense of politica space is itself probably conducive to 
heightening the plausibility of a political project.  More specifically, there is probably a need 
to dispute the tendency to attribute causality to the dictates of the global market.  For 
example, it was seen in the analysis of the empirical material that the problem of job losses 
and the resultant unemployment is frequently attribu ed to the simple fact of cheaper labour 
costs in places such as eastern Europe and Asia, and thereby given a sense of unavoidability.  
Possible counter-narratives are easily conceived, an  need by no means be of a higher level 
of complexity.  For instance, in many cases, both in manufacturing and the service industry, 
redundancies can be plausibly attributed to acts of down-sizing which follow takeover deals 
designed to boost share price.  (That ‘shareholders’ are already positioned as economic 
opponents in several of the group discussions suggests that such an argument might be met 
receptively.)  When the cause is presented in these t rms, a number of clear, agential 
responses become available: strong regulations and trong trade unions are obvious ones, and 
basically consistent with liberal-economic orthodoxy; wider state ownership of industries, to 
insulate decision-making from short-term considerations of share price, represent another, 
more radical possibility.10  Likewise, the commonly cited problem of rising house prices is 
presented in many of the discussions as – like all instances of rising prices – a mystery.  
‘Owning a house is just a dream for the ordinary person,’ says Jürgen in Lübeck.  There is a 
clear sense of injustice – it hits ‘people like us’particularly hard – and yet also a clear lack of 
discursive resources with which to explain it.  A stronger sense of agency might emerge were 
a link more readily drawn to wealth inequality: rising house prices could plausibly be 
attributed to the concentration of wealth, in particular the rising earnings of the top strata of 
society, which increases the purchasing power of a few buyers and allows sellers to raise 
their prices.  From such an explanation there follow clear possibilities for action, including 
policies of wealth redistribution.  That such policies are best pursued at a European rather 
than a national level is of course a contention which some would challenge, and the purpose 
here is not to attempt to formulate a conclusive case that this is so but rather to suggest that 
                                                
10 Some of these arguments are explored in Will Hutton, The Writing on the Wall: China and the West in the 
21st Century (London: Little, Brown, 2007). 
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such is the kind of argument which would need to be made in order to foster a political bond 
for a European polity.  Such an argument serves at once to weaken the sense of 
powerlessness before economic problems and to weaken the association which is made 
between the EU and the source or the expression of these problems, refashioning it instead as 
a means of collective agency. 
   
 In thus outlining some of the possibilities for new kinds of discursive practice 
regarding the problems of Society and the Law, Economics and Relations between Peoples, 
we have treated them as largely independent of one another.  There has been no implication 
that by fostering a stronger sense of agency in one domain, or encouraging different acts of 
positioning therein, this may have some automatic (positive) effects on the same in the other 
domains, nor has any hierarchy of importance been implied such that one domain is in some 
way more fundamental than the others.  A Marxist pers ctive, while less concerned with 
ideational issues, and using entirely different terminology, would probably argue just this of 
course: that the Economics domain is more basic than the other two, and that 
problematisation in the domains of Society and the Law and Relations between Peoples 
occurs largely as a consequence of the false appraisal of the economic.   
 This is a perspective one may reject partly on the grounds that it derives from a 
materialist ontology in which economic interests are taken to be pre-ideational facts largely 
determinative of historical (including discursive) action.  By reducing the political to the 
economic in this way – rather like those conceptualising a commercial bond, and analogously 
to those who conceptualise a cultural bond – this perspective also overlooks that political 
goals are various and potentially incommensurable.  To seek to reduce them to one set of 
underlying goals is to pursue a coherence which is probably illusory.11  Furthermore, it 
overlooks the normative appeal of a plurality of domains of equal status.  As we have seen, 
the different discursive patterns associated with the domains give rise to different acts of 
positioning: this implies not only multiple forms of exclusion (i.e. ways of positioning as 
adversaries) but also multiple possibilities of inclusion (i.e. ways of positioning as 
counterparts).  Those citizens to whom the motifs of one domain are applied so as to position 
them as opponents may, according to the logic of anther domain, be positioned rather as 
something much closer to the ‘people like us’.  It is exactly this absence of one single axis of 
inclusion and exclusion which works to prevent the establishment of hard and impermeable 
                                                
11 On incommensurable goods and values, see e.g. Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot, On Justification: 
Economies of Worth (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Bellamy, Liberalism and Pluralism.   
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boundaries towards opponents of the kind which might prove destructive of a collective 
bond.   
 As was seen in Chapter 4, criteria drawn from the Economics domain can be used to 
position those who are outsiders in some way as being nevertheless ‘people like us’: it was 
noted how participants from the Norwich group deploy the argument that ‘anybody can come 
here providing they do their bit,’ and Hans-Jürgen in Erfurt expresses his admiration for the 
immigrant who ‘wants to work, he wants to learn.  He’s not costing anyone else any money.’  
Andreas from the same group points out that ‘it’ll always be the case that there are foreigners 
who want to move to another country because the economy there’s better.  Everyone’s done 
that – the Germans have done that too.  [H-J:  And it’s understandable …]  Because there’s a 
better future to be had there … [U:  It’s understandable, it’s completely normal.]’  Motifs 
from the Relations between Peoples domain can also be used for inclusive purposes.  Barry at 
Norwich, for instance, knows of a girl in his area, ‘blimey, can’t think of the name of the 
country now, where the Tutsis slaughtered the … the Tutsis slaughtered … Rwanda.  I mean, 
she was a genuine … her family died, they were slaughtered, so I’ve got no problem … 
genuine refugee.  Kosovans … Genuine people like that who were in fear of their lives for 
political beliefs and like that …’.  ‘I’ve got no problem with that either,’ says Mickey, and a 
little later continues: ‘people should be able to have free speech.  If people can’t have that 
free speech and they want to have that free speech, and they’ve got the bottle to try and do 
something about it, and in the end if they’re going to be killed for it, then come and stay at 
my house, mate.  Eat me food, I don’t mind.’  Thus the political subjects express the good 
sense and fair-mindedness that is characteristic of them and extend a kind of honorary status 
of subject to those non-Westerners who have been victims of conflict themselves and seek 
peace in the West. 
 Now, what clearly cannot be established on the basis of examples such as these is 
which motifs are preferred in concrete cases when participants might have to choose whether 
to extend the status of ‘costing no-one else money’ (or not) or ‘being genuine’ (or not) to 
particular individuals and groups.  One cannot infer directly from the discursive practice the 
other kinds of behavioural practice which might accompany it.  One can say, however, that a 
collective bond which incorporates this plurality of domains as a feature of its ideal, rather 
than emphasising one domain at the expense of the others, offers a greater range of resources 
for softening the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion.  Indeed, it may be that the proper 
goal is to increase the number of domains rather than reduce them or rank them, i.e. expand 
the political common. 
 272 
 
4.  Expanding the Political Common 
 
It follows from the definition in Chapter 1 that to ‘expand’ the political common would be to 
increase the number of important common problems which are assumed to exist and be in 
need of address.  From a political-bond perspective, his would be advantageous because it 
offers further opportunities for collective position ng and the construction of ‘people like us’ 
which, if understood at least in some cases in transn tional, potentially European-wide terms, 
and if accompanied by the appropriate sense of the plausibility of a political project, could 
advance the degree to which a European polity ‘makes sense’ to its citizens.  While it is 
usually unwise to speculate on the future course of political contestation, since arguably 
human freedom is dependent on the substance of politics being resistant to this kind of 
theorising, nonetheless a few short considerations may be given. 
 Such expansion of the common could take the form of new problems being 
articulated in close alignment with the logics of the three domains we have focused on so far, 
Economics, Society and the Law and Relations between Peoples.  One could imagine further 
problematisation of economic inequality for example, or of social atomisation, or of various 
features of international relations (e.g. justifications for the possession of nuclear weapons).  
This would not in itself advance a political bond supportive of a European polity, but would 
widen the terrain on which the arguments for such a polity could be made.  Expansion of the 
common could also involve the development of further linkages between these problem 
domains, such that there is greater facility for the reproblematisation of the problems of one 
domain according to the logic of another.  By promoting the sense that all political problems 
are linked together, that problems to do with Relations between Peoples can be treated as 
problems of Economics, that problems of Economics can be treated as problems to do with 
social relations, the significance of multiple resources for inclusion and exclusion could be 
underscored.  At the same time, of course, the danger of one domain achieving a dominant 
status could thereby increase: one can imagine the negative possibility, for instance, that 
large number of problématiques come to be problematised as matters of collective security.  
There is much to be said for valorising the independence of each domain. 
 Expansion of the common could also take the form of the development of new 
problem domains, i.e. new problematisations which bring with them distinctive acts of 
positioning and sets of assumption.  The body of articulated but marginalised problems 
which we have referred to under the loose heading of Quality of Life would be an appropriate 
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starting-point, particularly given that the EU is alre dy a frequently cited and generally 
positive point of reference for problems of this kind, and since changes in policy seem to 
require transnational cooperation to be effective.  Pollution and rapid changes to the regional 
and global environment would have to be treated as more salient problems than they were at 
the time of interview.  The kinds of positioning associated with a domain such as this might 
tend to be globalist, since it can plausibly be argued that the consequences of such problems 
are evenly spread across all humans, ultimately if not in the short term.  A globalist, 
universalist perspective would be quite contrary to a political bond if replicated across all 
domains, since it would undermine the agonistic dynamic and point towards depoliticised 
administration.  Even if just found in one domain, it might tempt a retreat from those matters 
of common concern where an adversarial dimension is more to the fore.  The protection of 
flora and fauna, for example, represents a cause which most will agree is worthy and on 
which adversaries tend to be few in number.  One can imagine that the reassuring moral 
certitude which this invites – the confidence of being ‘on the right side’ – might prove all too 
alluring and might divert political engagement away from other, more contentious, domains.  
Nonetheless as one strand amongst a plurality of domains, a more universalist positioning of 
this kind could provide a valuable counterpoint to some of the acts of positioning we have 
encountered. 
 Something which is not problematised in any depth in our empirical material, and yet 
which is clearly a matter of some political significance, is the reliability of the news media.  
Participants were certainly readers of newspapers and listeners to the radio (see the 
Methodological Appendix), and displayed levels of knowledge and sophistication in their 
discussions which indicate an active encounter with such news sources (note for instance 
detailed references to the Middle-East conflict, or to specific cases of corruption in public 
life).  But the reliability of these sources is barely problematised, other than a few very 
general remarks about how ‘you can’t trust anything i  the newspapers’, how editors just 
want to sell more copies, or how the ‘only things you can be sure about are the girls and the 
sport’.  The reliability of the media is a problématique which does not reduce easily to any of 
the domains that have been discussed so far, and which might in principle form the basis for 
a distinctive discursive repertoire.  One can imagine formulations for the political subjects as 
those who ‘want to get to the truth of matters’, demarcated against those who are thoughtless 
or who are actively seeking to dupe or mislead the ‘people like us’.  Román in Plzeň is not 
the only participant to note that different TV progammes and different newspapers ‘narrate 
things differently’, and that one needs to keep an eye on several.  Of course, problematisation 
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of this kind would by no means point necessarily towards the worth of a political project 
centred on a European polity to tackle such problems, but one can suppose that transnational 
comparisons might come quite naturally in this domain: interest in what the media in other 
European member-states are saying, and the extent to which they are telling a different story, 
plus the possibilities available for becoming less reliant on just one set of news sources, 
would seem fully conceivable.  However – and this is a point rarely made in discussions of 
the possibility of a European public sphere – this widening of the sense of space would only 
be likely as an outcome of problematisation, and not simply as a consequence of some 
general broadening of horizons and widening of the sphere of curiosity. 
 
 
Some Conditions for the Achievement of a Political Bond 
 
Our ideal of a political bond has highlighted some of the ways in which current patterns of 
discursive practice serve to undermine the extent to which a European polity ‘makes sense’ 
to those who are ruled through its institutions.  The general approach throughout this work 
has been to focus not so much on questions to do with the EU’s formal democratic 
accountability or the quality of representation buton the importance of ‘ways of talking’ in 
opening out certain expectations and possibilities while closing down others.  In the field of 
EU studies there is an enthusiasm for conceptualising the weaknesses of the contemporary 
EU in terms of ‘deficits’: notice has been given of the existence of a ‘democratic deficit’, a 
‘federal deficit’, a ‘constitutional deficit’ and, more generally, a ‘legitimacy deficit’.12  
Although these are contested terms, they generally point consistently towards institutional 
factors:13 to the weak ability of citizens to exert influence on decision-making at the 
European level, the untransparency of certain EU institutions, or to the ambiguous and 
unsettled distribution of powers between them.  Our analysis, though not generally 
incompatible with these, notes that formal opportunities and structures require social 
practices that consolidate them, and points therefore t  what one might call a ‘deficit of 
discursive resources’, to the lack of suitable ways of eeing the political world such as to 
foster the kind of collective bond appropriate to a European polity.  From this has been 
deduced the importance of making available new types of discursive resource more 
                                                
12 For some discussion see e.g. Bellamy and Castiglione, 'Democracy, Sovereignty and the Constitution of the 
European Union'. 
13 The main exception would be one usage of the term ‘de ocratic deficit’, where this refers to the absenc  of a 
‘European demos’, i.e. to the debate discussed in Chapter 1. 
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conducive to such a bond.  If change in discursive practice is necessary then one may 
properly wonder what might lead to it.  Who, one may ask, are to be the discursive 
architects?  Who is equipped to fashion new formulations for political subjects and 
opponents, to foster transnational comparisons, to conceive plausible means (some centred 
on the EU) to address collective problems, and to explore new kinds of problematisation? 
 Successful discursive architects would need to be visible, well-financed, credible and 
non-transient.  They would need to be in a position o set their own agenda, undominated by 
the very political forces which they might wish to oppose.  They would not necessarily need 
to have direct access to formal political power, but political institutions would need to be 
sufficiently receptive to respond to the demands for which they were successful in 
mobilising.  There are obvious candidates for this architectural role, but several have 
significant drawbacks.  Certainly a top-down approach does not seem plausible: the 
European Commission has neither the economic nor the reputational resources to act as a 
discursive architect.  The traditional media may have the requisite credibility and visibility, 
but their capacity to lead innovation in the ways suggested is questionable.  Media outlets, as 
several scholars have noted, are concentrated in ever f wer hands and run increasingly as 
commodities which must be managed to maximise sharehold r value.  In the ever greater 
competition for advertising revenue, clear parameters are set to their editorial line, and it is 
by no means clear that the innovations in content which would be necessary represent a 
reliable source of readership-based profits: there is likely to be more money in appealing to 
existing discursive practices, in ‘telling people what they want to hear.’  The public-sector 
media likewise follow increasingly a commercial model, seeking to maximise their market 
share so as to stave off the threat of cut-backs.  While discursive innovation of some kind 
will always emerge in such settings – as a theoretical necessity, given the fluidity of 
language, and as the amplification of changes that originate elsewhere – and while the market 
will continue to reward on a smaller scale those media outfits that resist such trends, the 
pattern on the mass scale in the immediate future is more likely to be towards the 
depoliticisation of content, towards simplification, sensationalism and the theatricalising of 
news and public affairs.14  The new digital-based media ostensibly offer a more promising 
venue for change, though whether discursive architets will be found here is a matter of some 
doubt too.  While the broader influence of internet bloggers is increasing, there remains a 
                                                
14 On these and other points to do with the media in contemporary democracy see: Thomas Meyer and Lew 
Hinchman, Media Democracy: How the Media Colonise Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002); Colin Crouch, Post-Democracy (Cambridge: Polity, 2004).  
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significant ‘digital divide’ in the wider society as regards computer literacy and access to 
equipment.  Moreover, the selectivity with which information can be accessed encourages 
internet users to immerse themselves in the familiar, reducing their exposure to sources of 
potential innovation.15 
 The most convincing source of such discursive change would seem to be the same as 
it has been since the arrival of mass sufferage: the political movement or party, headed by 
one or several ‘charismatic individuals’, and responding to the pressures of smaller organised 
groups.  It is actors of this kind which are best placed to provide alternative ways of 
conceptualising not just individual issues but whole domains of problems, and to do so 
consistently over periods of time.  Social movements, i  which much hope has been invested 
by those critical of the status quo, have an important auxiliary role to play.  As independent 
actors, their impact tends to be hampered by the specificity of their focus and by various 
organisational impediments, but as influences on political parties they may be effective in 
disseminating the discursive resources which can form the basis of a political programme, 
and in pressuring the party to pursue that programme.16  Small-distribution publications can 
have the same function, as may think-tanks – depending of course on their access to sources 
of income that allow them sufficient freedom to innovate.  It is not necessary, in order to be 
supportive of a European polity, that the political p rties at the centre of this network be 
organised on a European scale; parties organised at a n tional or sub-national level could be 
equally or more effective, provided they directed at least some of their claims to the 
European level.17   
 Mass political parties have traditionally – until the 1980s at least – been crucial 
innovators of the kind required.  They have served both to coin ideas and to project the will 
to realise them, thereby endowing them with a dynamism which few other actors can 
match.18  Now, of course, it is widely observed that such parties are in a state of crisis and 
perhaps long-term decline, as membership rates fall, p rtisan support ebbs away and funding 
                                                
15 On the dangers of ‘cascade’ effects, see Cass Sunstein, Republic.com (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2001). 
16 Cf. Crouch, Post-Democracy, final chapter, and Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond.  On the 
challenges that face social movements, see Claus Offe, 'Reflections on the Institutional Self-Transformation of 
Movement Politics: A Tentative Stage Model', in Russell J. Dalton and Manfred Kuechler (eds.), Challenging 
the Political Order: New Social and Political Movemnts in Western Democracies (Cambridge: Polity, 1990). 
17 One should look in other words for the ‘Europeanistion’ of domestic political actors as much as the 
emergence of new transnational ones, a point which has been well made by those studying contentious politics: 
see Imig and Tarrow, 'Political Contention in a Europeanising Polity'. 
18 In the suggestive words of Gramsci, the role of the party is ‘at one and the same time the organiser and the 
active, operative expression’ of a collective will.  ‘Brief Notes on Machiavelli’s Politics’, in ‘The Modern 
Prince’, Antonio Gramsci (ed.), Selections from the Prison Notebooks, eds. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey 
Nowell-Smith (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971). 
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sources become increasingly unpredictable.19  In the EU-zone and elsewhere, politics at the 
elite level it seems has become professionalised, with loyalty to party leaders increasing at 
the expense of the representative function, and a dislocation emerging between the party 
leadership and its circle of advisors and favoured lobbies on the one hand and the traditional 
base on the other.  As the leadership seeks to adapt to the media environment and tries to 
anticipate its cues, political messages are reduced to the banal, and the ‘body politics’ of 
actor-politicians comes to replace the ideas-led ‘briefcase politics’ of the traditional party.20  
Furthermore, ordinary citizens are deemed to be increasingly sceptical or apathetic towards 
these traditional channels of political activity, and more inclined to act individually or 
through charity organisations than to seek collectiv  political voice.21  While there is truth in 
such claims, much does seem to depend upon some questionable assumptions – both in the 
scholarship on this subject and amongst party actors hemselves – about the political 
(dis)inclinations of ordinary citizens.  Given that relatively few mass parties in contemporary 
Europe address in a distinctive fashion the full range of political problems discussed in our 
empirical material, it seems premature to dismiss their potential appeal, and therefore 
unwarranted to treat as inevitable these moves towards  more elite-style politics.  Our 
material provides numerous expressions of political engagement, and it may be that the 
widespread assumption of the apathy of citizens is just one more discursive motif to be 
challenged.  To the extent that disengagement is a serious phenomenon, the convergence in 
many western democracies of the major parties at the middle of the political spectrum has 
most likely been an important contributory factor, and parties which diverge from this 
political consensus may achieve a greater level of m bilisation.22  To seek a structural 
explanation for this ideological convergence is to rule out the possibility of actor-led political 
change, and is thus an anti-democratic move which one may choose to resist. 
                                                
19 Peter Mair, Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997); Mair, 
'Ruling the Void?'. 
20 As Crouch puts it, ‘the headline was the father of the sound bite.’  (Crouch, Post-Democracy, p.47.)  Meyer 
speaks of ‘presentism’ and ‘the tyranny of media time over political time,’ and emphasises the pre-emptive 
tendency in policy-making, concluding that ‘even if a more critical political consciousness should emerge in a 
citizen body, its members’ opportunities for influencing politics would already have been limited in adv nce.’  
Meyer and Hinchman, Media Democracy, p.104, p.108. 
21 See Mair, 'Ruling the Void? '; Eliasoph, Avoiding Politics; also the literature on political cynicism and 
distrust, e.g. Russell J. Dalton, Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: the Erosion of Political Support in 
Advanced Industrial Democracies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
22 Of course, these are not all parties that one would want to endorse – the success of certain ‘right-wing 
populist’ parties in recent years can be treated as an expression of the same.  Cf. Mouffe, On the Political.  Also 
on populism, see Laclau, On Populist Reason; Cas Mudde, 'The Populist Zeitgeist', Government and 
Opposition, 39/4 (2004); Francisco Panizza (ed.), Populism and the Mirror of Democracy (London: Verso, 
2005). 
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 By conceptualising a political bond in terms of discursive practice, one invites the 
charge of having underplayed the importance of the material world, of the things that one can 
stub one’s toe on.  Highlighting the role of political parties as ‘discursive architects’ is one 
way to introduce a more tangible, organisational comp nent.  Another is to consider the kind 
of institutional forms which might be required for a political bond to be maintained.  
Although institutions cannot themselves establish the sense of the common which may be the 
condition of their viability, arguably they are in a position to promote it. Without institutions 
receptive to political claims a political bond would probably melt away: an agonist model of 
democracy requires that the outcome of the agonistic contest have genuine consequences for 
decision-making.23  While formal institutions and democratic opportuni ies are meaningless 
without the discursive practices which animate them, so such practices need means by which 
they are to be amplified, subjected to debate and converted into policies that regulate the 
common.  One may turn briefly therefore to the question of what kind of ‘governance 
regime’ would be suitable for sustaining a European polity underpinned by a political bond.24  
 The literature on EU regimes, i.e. on the current sta us and projected destination of 
European political integration, can be divided into tw  broad families: those visions that look 
to a polycentric or ‘compound’ Europe, and those that look to a centred or ‘simple’ (though 
usually federal) Europe.25  In a compound or polycentric regime, no single branch of 
government, either at the national or the European l vel, has supreme authority over the 
others.  Supranational, national and regional actors c exist with one another in a condition of 
mutual checking and balancing, sometimes described as a ‘multi-level governance system’.  
As Sergio Fabbrini puts it, ‘one might say that the imperative of a compound democracy is to 
promote an anti-hegemonic political order.’26  The distribution of powers may be fairly 
                                                
23 See e.g. James Tully, 'A New Kind of Europe?  Democratic Integration in the European Union', Queen's 
University Belfast Constitutionalism Web-Papers (4, 2006), p.6: ‘What holds the diverse members together and 
generates bonds of belonging to the community as a whole across ongoing differences and disagreements is that 
the prevailing institutions, procedures and norms of integration are always open to free and democratic 
negotiation and experimentation with alternatives by those subject to them.’   
24 On the distinction between ‘regime’ and ‘polity’, see Richard Bellamy and Dario Castiglione, 'The Uses of 
Democracy: Reflections on the European Democratic Deficit', in Erik O. Eriksen and John E. Fossum (eds.), 
Democracy in the European Union: Integration through Deliberation? (London: Routledge, 2000), and 
Bellamy and Castiglione, 'The Normative Challenge of a European Polity'. 
25 There are many ways to express the same and related distinctions.  Sergio Fabbrini contrasts ‘compound 
democracies’ with ‘fusion-of-power models’ and associates both the US and the EU with the former (Sergio 
Fabbrini, 'Madison in Brussels: The EU and the US as Compound Democracies', European Political Science, 4 
(2005)), while Glyn Morgan speaks of ‘post-sovereign’ versus ‘sovereign’ models and associates both the US 
and the ideal EU with the latter (Morgan, The Idea of a European Superstate, p.111).  Leaving aside the 
categorisation question, Morgan’s distinction is mileading in that it may be read as implying a clash of views 
on the principle of popular sovereignty – the ‘democratic principle’ as it was referred to in the Introduction – 
when in fact neither side need abandon this principle, and neither side generally does. 
26 Fabbrini, 'Madison in Brussels', p.190. 
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stable and coherent, with a constitutional settlement that preserves much of the existing 
member-state governmental apparatus, as in the legalist visions of Weiler and Neil 
MacCormick.27  Alternatively it may be characterised by considerable flux and asymmetry, 
with competences allocated and reallocated as part of an ongoing process, perhaps on an 
issue-by-issue basis, as in Philippe Schmitter’s condominio model or the republican model of 
‘mixed government’ endorsed by authors such as Tully, Bellamy and Castiglione.28  In such a 
vision, it is precisely the inability of any single actor to achieve dominance over the others 
which is celebrated: such a regime may be said to secure ‘freedom as non-domination’ for its 
citizens.29  Whether fixed or in flux, the distribution of competences in these perspectives 
does not amount to a hierarchy.  A centred vision, by contrast, involves replicating on a 
larger scale the model of government broadly associated with the nation-state.  While certain 
powers would probably be delegated to national and regional levels, following the federal 
model, ultimate decision-making authority would be located at the European level.  This 
vision has recently been described favourably by Gln Morgan, in his endorsement of a 
European ‘superstate’.30 
 With what kind of regime is the ideal of a political bond compatible?  One’s instinct 
is to say that a useful conceptualisation of ‘the people’ who are to share in a common polity 
should be compatible with any of the possible institutional configurations that citizens might 
wish to establish for that polity.  The question of ‘peoplehood’, one wants to say, must be 
kept separate from the question of institutional regime, for one is a question of boundaries 
and the other is a question of the internal distribu ion of power, and to mix the two is 
muddled thinking.  However, we have argued that the qu stion of ‘peoplehood’ is properly 
understood not as a membership question (where to st boundaries) but as a question of the 
collective bond (how to make sense of the life in common), and thata sense of shared 
predicament deriving from the appraisal of common substantive problems, together with the 
expectation that something collectively may be done about those problems, may plausibly be 
made the basis of such a bond.  Once one imagines the bond in this political way, the 
                                                
27 J.H.H. Weiler, 'Federalism without Constitutionalism: Europe's Sonderweg', in Kalypso Nicolaidis and Robert 
Howse (eds.), The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the European 
Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Neil MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State, and 
Nation in the European Commonwealth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
28 Philippe C. Schmitter, 'Examining the Present Euro-Polity with the Help of Past Theories', in Gary Marks et 
al. (eds.), Governance in the European Union (London: Sage, 1996). Bellamy and Castiglione, 'Democracy, 
Sovereignty and the Constitution of the European Union', Tully, 'A New Kind of Europe?'. 
29 Bellamy, Liberalism and Pluralism; Pettit, Republicanism.  
30 Morgan, The Idea of a European Superstate. 
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questions of polity and regime become difficult to separate, and one needs to examine more 
closely the extent to which different types of regime are appropriate.   
 The political model advanced by Weiler, and the conceptualisation of the collective 
bond on which it is premised, was discussed in Chapter 1.  His polycentric vision (shared in 
large part by MacCormick) is intended to balance the preservation of cultural traditions at the 
national level (‘Eros’) with the veneration of humanist-rationalist values at the European 
level (‘Civilisation’), and this balance is to be achieved by ensuring that political dominance 
is exercised neither by the nation-state nor by the institutions of the EU.  Aside from the 
doubts raised earlier concerning the appropriateness of such goals, Weiler’s vision seems 
only weakly compatible with the idea of a political bond, since it is broadly accepting of 
things as they stand.  For him, Europe’s ‘unique brand of constitutional federalism – the 
status quo – represents not only its most original political asset but also its deepest set of 
values,’ and that which ‘works’ need not be ‘fixed’.31  It may be that some fixing is necessary 
however.  Realising the possibility of a political project designed to tackle problems to do 
with Economics, for example, may require alterations to the existing institutional regime, in 
which both the European Court of Justice and the Commission have been strongly able and 
willing to pursue policies which weaken the responsiveness of the economy to democratic 
control.32  Many of the problems which, in our empirical material, were constructed as facing 
‘people like us’ may perhaps find little relief under the current institutional order, in which 
the ‘four freedoms’ of the market are enshrined in Community law and interpreted often 
(though not always) rather expansively by the ECJ.  The assumption, found frequently in 
these interviews, that the current EU is little more than the cause and/or expression of a range 
of economic problems is unlikely to be shifted without some departure at least from existing 
arrangements: material changes, as well as changes i  di cursive practice, are likely to be 
required.33  Thus a polycentric perspective which simply celebrates the product of integration 
as it stands seems inadequate even to the most minimal version of a political bond.  
                                                
31 Weiler, 'Federalism without Constitutionalism', p.61, p.70.  Weiler is not the only major scholar to suggest 
that the EU needs no more than minor institutional adjustments at most: cf. Moravcsik, 'In Defence of the 
'Democratic Deficit''.  Or, outside academia, Commission of European Communities, 'Communication from the 
Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions: The Commission’s Contribuion to the Period of Reflection and Beyond: Plan-D for 
Democracy, Dialogue and Debate ', (2005). 
32 On this familiar topic, see e.g. Magnette, What Is the European Union?. 
33 Material changes may also advance some of the changes i  discursive practice discussed in the previous 
section.  It can be imagined for example that a European-level system of taxation, with contributions levied 
according to individual wealth rather than national quota, would help to substitute class-based for natio l 
positioning, and would encourage other European coutries to be treated not as competing actors (as was the 
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 The centred vision proposed by Morgan, involving the creation of a European 
‘superstate’ in which ultimate authority is at the European level, albeit specific powers are 
dispersed in federal form, clearly offers the potential for a more responsive and politicised 
regime.  In principle it implies the combination offurther supranational control of those 
policy-areas (or problem domains) in which a transntio al perspective makes sense to 
citizens with the retention of more local decision-making in other areas.  Thus problems to do 
with Society and the Law, for which a European-level approach is not obviously necessary, 
and indeed for which the invocation of wider explanatory factors so as to justify policy-
making at a higher level might undermine what sense of agency exists, could be left to 
national or subnational institutions while problems to do with Economics and Relations 
between Peoples could be tackled at a transnational level.  The fairly fixed, coherent division 
of competences which a federal system demands, perha s laid out in a constitution, is less in 
tune with the political-bond perspective, since it has been stressed that the problems which 
form the substance of politics are always a ‘moving target’.  The political common is 
composed of problematisations, constructed phenomena which evolve across time, some 
emerging and others receding, and which for normative reasons it may be desirable to seek to 
multiply.  Such a difficulty could nonetheless perhaps be circumvented with a process of 
periodic constitutional reappraisal and amendment. 
 Specifically the kind of superstate which Morgan proposes is not the most apt from 
our perspective though.  In seeking justifications for a European state, he puts overwhelming 
emphasis on one particular problem in one particular domain: the ability to mobilise 
substantial military force in order to respond to external threats in the international system.  
Only this justification, he argues, meets the three Rawlsian criteria of publicity, accessibility 
and sufficiency.  Reliance on the capabilities of the US is too compromising a position, 
suggests Morgan, and only by collectively building up European resources can the EU’s 
member-states acquire the necessary means of self-def nce.  Yet advocating a process of 
military build-up may well have quite negative consequences.  If our analysis has been 
correct, what should be a source of concern is the ease with which ‘enemy-peoples’ are 
constructed in discussion of such problems: the thrats, it tends to be assumed, are posed not 
to individuals like ‘me’ by other individuals, but to ‘us’ by ‘them’, where ‘they’ are assumed 
to have aggressive and irrational intentions and to be living not just far away but also ‘here’ 
in the home environment.  Quite aside from the question of whether a European-level 
                                                                                                                                            
case in these discussions whenever the finances of the EU were raised) but as environments in which similar 
economic problems and struggles unfold. 
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approach would be welcomed, and how it would overcome the supposed existence of 
enemies within the home environment, a policy which nvolved strengthening military 
capacity might well have the consequence of increasing the popular appeal of preventive 
wars designed to crush ‘them’ before ‘they’ strike ‘us’.  As noted in Chapter 5, such a view is 
already found occasionally in the British discussion , i.e. in that country whose military 
capabilities are, of the three, already most advanced and exercised.  As well as potentially 
negative consequences in international terms, the capacity to maintain an uncompromising 
stance towards opponents outside the community would, one can imagine, encourage the 
adoption of a similar stance towards those within the community with whom these external 
opponents are readily associated, entrenching a fearful perspective which posits enemies 
within and without.  From a political-bond perspective, what one wants rather to do is 
undermine the positioning of opponents as enemies and increase the plausibility of 
compromise.  While an increase in military capacity might undoubtedly have certain benefits 
for the EU in terms of freedom from US influence, and perhaps more widely in terms of the 
advantages of a multipolar world order, it seems highly risky to propose it as the sole 
justification for a European polity.  Nor, it should be added, is it clear that the gains justify 
such risks.  Morgan is right to identify terrorism as one of the key security threats of the 21st
century, and to this one might add two more: dependence on foreign powers for energy 
sources, and the possibility of destabilising climate change.34  It is by no means obvious that 
any of these threats is best met by the development of conventional military capabilities.  
Perhaps a better objective – to speculate further – is a European-level approach not to 
defence but to non-military foreign policy, the achievement of which might usefully serve to 
undermine the subject-position of ‘the West’, and to sever its racial undertones.   
 By basing the argument for a European superstate on security alone, Morgan also 
abandons too easily the difficult question of how a European polity should relate to the 
economic sphere.  As suggested by our empirical material, economic problems form a large 
proportion of those which are constructed in discusion and seem to have an immediate 
salience to participants; any attempt to found a European polity on a political rationale, rather 
than some cultural or values-based one, cannot afford to sidestep this crucial set of problems.  
A European polity based on a political bond would need to offer some possibilities for the 
redress of problems such as these, which are so widely assumed to be of a transnational kind.  
Morgan attempts to discount their significance for European integration by distinguishing 
                                                
34 Morgan, The Idea of a European Superstate, Conclusion. 
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between ‘principled’ and ‘unprincipled’ arguments for a European polity.  His suggestion is 
that all concerned parties are likely to agree on the goal of ‘welfare’, but to disagree (because 
of ‘partisan policy preferences’) on the means by which they believe it can be best 
achieved.35  Since disagreement is restricted to the means rather than the ends, any argument 
for a European polity which made reference to its value in promoting a market-oriented or 
state-oriented economy would be an unprincipled one, would fall foul of the Rawlsian 
principle of publicity, and would therefore need to be discounted.36  However, from a 
political-bond perspective, the issue of ‘freedom from non-domination’ which Morgan 
rightly raises with regard to security issues, though from which he draws questionable 
conclusions, is just as relevant to the Economics domain, since here too – if one is to take the 
principle of popular sovereignty seriously – what is at stake is the extent to which citizens 
can exert democratic control over the decisions which directly affect them.  Means and ends 
are indivisible, here as in matters of security. 
 While a federal regime of some kind would not be incompatible with a political bond, 
it is probably the second of the two polycentric or c mpound models which is the most 
appropriate.  Bellamy and Castiglione summarise it as ‘democratic liberalism’.  In this 
perspective, powers are dispersed across a range of institutional actors, creating a regime 
which is multifocal.  All actors must be sufficiently empowered as to be able to pursue their 
political goals in agonistic confrontation – no doubt an appropriate principle with which to 
address the weak sense of agency expressed in our empi ical material, particularly with 
regard to the Economics domain, and to make the institutional changes needed to support a 
counter-view.  The agonistic struggle is restrained by the principle of audi alteram partem, 
‘always listen to the other side’,37 a principle which neatly captures the distinction between 
‘enemy’ and ‘adversary’.  In tune with a problem-oriented approach, and a concern with the 
frequent irrationalising of the opponents in matters to do with Relations between Peoples, 
democratic liberalism envisages negotiation based on compromise so as to achieve mutually 
acceptable solutions to shared problems.  Such compromise is to be reached by parties 
justifying their position in terms that the others can recognise (the ‘politics of reciprocity’); it 
requires a spirit of reasonableness by all parties, but need not aim at the fulfilment of a 
                                                
35 Ibid. Chapter 3.  See also pp.155ff. 
36 ‘The aim of the publicity requirement is to filter out conceptions of the good that not all Europeans have a 
good reason to share.  The precise role of the statin the provision of life’s ‘necessaries and conveniences’ is an 
issue best left up to democratic majorities.  It cannot form the grounds for the very existence of a European 
polity.’  Ibid. p.160. 
37 Tully, 'The Unfreedom of the Moderns', p.218. 
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rational consensus.38  ‘Liberty’, as Bellamy and Castiglione suggest, ‘is seen as a civic 
achievement rather than a natural attribute,’39 and because no institutional actor is able to 
enjoy an enduring position of hegemony over the others, the ideal of freedom as non-
domination can be realistically pursued.  This persctive also rejects the desire for a ‘grand 
settlement’ of constitutional questions, preferring to see these as part of an ongoing and 
evolving process of political practice.40  This chimes with our theoretical emphasis on the 
point that discursive practices can, do and should be encouraged to evolve, and our empirical 
observation that the different ways of talking associated with different sets of problems are 
varied enough to make difficult a final delineation f boundaries.41  It corresponds to the 
rejection of an over-arching identity which all citizens are to adopt, and helps avoid the 
tendency to think in terms of ‘Europeans’ or ‘nationals’ and to make decision-making 
authority correspond to these categories without sensitivity to the issue-area in question.   
 One of the most developed visions of a multifocal regime for the EU is to be found 
in the work of Charles Sabel and his co-authors.42  In their reading, the EU is characterised as 
an emerging ‘directly-deliberative polyarchy’, a form of government in which power is 
decentralised to sub-units of the polity so as to give reater voice and freedom to local actors, 
while at the same time enlarging their frame of refe nce and the knowledge resources of the 
wider polity by means of information pooling and peer review.  Particular prominence is 
given to new decision-making methods such as the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), in 
which the ongoing assessment, comparison and political reappraisal of policies, rather than 
the use of centralised directives and ECJ overview, guides the policy process.  As is evident 
in the moniker they choose, Sabel et al. generally ground their perspective in deliberative 
democratic theory: theirs is not however a strongly consensus-oriented model,43 and from the 
                                                
38 Bellamy and Castiglione, 'Democracy, Sovereignty ad the Constitution of the European Union'; Bellamy, 
Liberalism and Pluralism. 
39 Bellamy and Castiglione, 'Democracy, Sovereignty ad the Constitution of the European Union', p.181. 
40 See e.g. Tully, 'The Unfreedom of the Moderns', p.218  
41 For a historical perspective on the question of coherence and the boundaries of polities, see Wagner, 'Crises 
of Modernity'. 
42 See in particular Charles F. Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, 'Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of 
Experimentalist Governance in the European Union', European Governance Papers, C-07-02 (2007); Joshua 
Cohen and Charles F. Sabel, 'Sovereignty and Solidarity: EU and US', in David Trubek and Jonathan Zeitlin 
(eds.), Governing Work and Welfare in a New Economy: European and American Experiments (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003); Oliver Gerstenberg and Charles F. Sabel, 'Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy: An
Institutional Ideal for Europe?' in Renaud Dehousse and Christian Joerges (eds.), Good Governance in Europe's 
Integrated Market (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).  These accounts draw on ideas articulated for the 
US context in Joshua Cohen and Charles F. Sabel, 'Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy', European Law Journal, 
3/4 (1997); Michael C. Dorf and Charles F. Sabel, 'A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism', Columbia 
Law Review, 98/2 (1998). 
43 As Sabel and Dorf make explicit, the guiding objective is not to replace conflict with consensus but to enrich 
the adversarial debate.  Dorf and Sabel, 'A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism', p.288. 
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perspective of a political bond it has a number of features which are attractive.  Firstly it is 
firmly rooted in the American pragmatist tradition, and is therefore problem-oriented in its 
focus.  The perspective assumes that citizens are link d to one another by a certain level of 
basic agreement regarding the existence of common pr blems in need of address, even if 
there exists diversity of opinion regarding what can and should be done.44  It rests, one might 
say, on the premise that there is a political common, and that regularity of cultural attributes, 
values or clearly defined interests need not be supposed – indeed, that it would be 
undesirable.  Secondly, the perspective combines this focus on everyday problems and local 
experimentalism with an emphasis on the importance of comparisons as a means by which to 
generalise to a wider context.  It is precisely theid a that others living outside the home 
environment should be recognised as facing similar problems, and that a common framework 
for the development of remedies may needed, which in t is perspective provides the point of 
mediation between the world of daily experience andthe broader life of the polity.45  One can 
imagine then that an institutional regime constructed on these principles would be conducive 
to a political bond, since it would foster the systematic collection and publicising of 
transnational comparative data.  This is, to a degre , what the OMC already encourages.  To 
be sure, such a regime is insufficient on its own to guarantee the emergence of a political 
bond.  As suggested above, comparisons which set sub-units of the polity in competition with 
one another may be subversive of a sense of the coll ctive, and may be tenable only by the 
evocation of an alternative bond in substitute.  Furthermore, when the notion of ‘best 
practice’ is taken to imply that policies may be right or wrong, regardless of the context of 
their application (as certain applications of the OMC sometimes suggest), or when the criteria 
by which ‘performance’ is measured are unproblematised such that they weigh consistently 
in favour of a narrow range of practices, then such a regime acquires a depoliticising 
tendency which is unfaithful to the pragmatist tradition.  It remains the role of discursive 
architects to contest exactly these points, and to ensure that the possibility of far-reaching 
change does not get lost in local experimentalism.  They would do so, however, in conditions 
which are favourable to them, given the regime’s responsiveness to political pressure, the 
absence of an overweening concentration of power, and the prevalence of comparative data. 
                                                
44 A clear statement can be found in Cohen and Sabel, 'Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy', p.323. 
45 Cohen and Sabel, 'Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy', p.314. 
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 Compound-republican visions of how the EU’s institutional regime might look have 
been elaborated by various authors in some depth and need not be further reproduced here.46  
While our argument does not stand or fall by them, it is nonetheless worth addressing some 
of the criticisms which are frequently levelled.  One of the principal objections is that a 
polycentric state is an externally weak state: its multiple centres of power disrupt the ability 
to develop and organise a coherent military force with which to defend its borders and 
project its interests overseas.  It is for precisely this reason, so the argument runs, that 
republican states such as were to be found in earlyRenaissance Italy, or during the American 
Confederacy, died out in the early modern period, t be replaced by liberal sovereign states.  
Agonism, as it is now called, is but a short step (if it is anything) from crippling factionalism, 
while ‘directly-deliberative polyarchy’ is no basis on which to secure a polity.  As Morgan 
puts the point, ‘it is difficult to understand how Europe could even begin to match the power 
of the United States without becoming a unitary federal polity,’ and ‘those who refuse to 
accept this conclusion are either deluding themselve  or they are prepared to see Europe 
remain a weak and dependent power.’47  Yet rather a lot turns here on the meaning of power, 
and if the US is to be put forward as the model then one may fairly wonder whether US 
foreign policy has really been characterised (even in the post-Cold War period) by the 
exercise of power rather than simple military force.  The 2003 invasion of Iraq undoubtedly 
bore the hallmarks of foreign policy conducted by a sovereign power – it enjoyed strong 
consensus at home facilitated by the silencing of dissi ent voices in the administration; it was 
unconstrained by the search for multilateral approval abroad; and it was launched using a 
well-organised and technologically advanced military machine under the direct control of the 
Commander in Chief.  But, insofar as one gauges power by the ability to realise one’s 
objectives, historians may judge it as a grand expression of weakness.  Indeed, it may be that 
this is attributable precisely to some of these trappings of strong state sovereignty: a 
government forced to work within the constraints of a polycentric regime might have found it 
less easy to push through such a policy.  Nor is the comparison with pre-modern 
republicanism necessarily fruitful: international lw has developed some way since then, and 
the kind of threats against which international lawprovides no protection (such as terrorism) 
are the same threats against which conventional military power is of little use. 
                                                
46 See the works of Bellamy, Bellamy and Castiliglione, and Tully, all cited above.  Likewise, proposing that 
the EU should be seen as a compound republic in the Madisonian tradition, see Fabbrini, 'Madison in Brussels'. 
47 Morgan, The Idea of a European Superstate, p.149, p.161.  The broader argument is inspired by Hendrik 
Spruyt, The Sovereign State and Its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change (Princeton N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1994). 
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 Internally, a compound-republican regime raises other questions.  There is a danger 
that it attaches insufficient emphasis to the virtue of simplicity, that a bewildering 
arrangement of balances, checks, partnerships and lines of contestation emerges under the 
fuzzy heading of ‘network governance’.  In such a system, perhaps even more so than in the 
system of hierarchical bureaucracy that emerged with the Westphalian state, the opportunity 
to influence decision-making may go unnoticed.  Significantly, the democratic 
experimentalism favoured by Sabel and his collaborators, while it is intended to facilitate 
greater participation, is not presented as intrinsically democratic, since deliberative polyarchy 
may exist even in an institutional setting quite unmoved by the broader currents of society.48  
The EU’s system of ‘comitology’ for example can coneivably be read as deliberative, but 
few would want to claim that it expresses the full range of adversarial encounters played out 
in contemporary populations.  A multifocal regime may increase the responsiveness of 
institutions, but arguably this alone does not democratise them.  This point links to the 
difficult question of participation.  Republican approaches are generally considered, by 
advocates and critics alike, to require a greater degree of popular participation in political 
activity than is commonly the case in liberal states, whether justified on the grounds of 
individual development or the protection of individual and collective freedom.49  The 
objection to this may come in two forms.  In one version, it is questioned (as a critique to 
desirability) whether there is the widespread will for greater participation, whether the 
coercion that might be required to ensure it would be acceptable, and whether wider 
participation would have favourable effects on the kinds of policy enacted.  In a second 
version (as a critique to practicality), it is suggested that, whether or not such will exists, it is 
unclear how, in large modern states as opposed to medieval city-states, further participation 
could be meaningfully accommodated.50   
 These objections it should be possible for us to sidestep, since the argument for a 
political bond hinges less on the practice of participation itself than on equipping people with 
the expectations that could point towards participation.  This is, one might say, a more basic 
condition for the eventual renewal of democracy, and for which institutional structures can 
only provide the enabling environment.  We have suggested that certain kinds of discursive 
practice are more compatible with a European polity than others, and have stressed the 
importance of strengthening those that are favourable; we have not, however, made 
                                                
48 Cf. Cohen and Sabel, 'Sovereignty and Solidarity: EU and US', pp.730ff., and Sabel and Zeitlin, 'Learning 
from Difference', p.46. 
49 For one overview of these two strands of republican thought, see Held, Models of Democracy. 
50 In the EU context, such arguments can be found in Moravcsik, 'In Defence of the 'Democratic Deficit''.  
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participation of an intense, day-to-day kind a central feature of our perspective, still less 
suggested that lay discussions be monitored as the laboratories of rational consensi.  Forms 
of political discussion seem – amongst taxi-drivers at least – not to be unnatural occurrences, 
given the cross-references made in the interviews to earlier discussions amongst participants, 
and this practice one would want to see maintained and indeed extended.  But the extent to 
which it is followed up by participation in policy-making itself is a separate issue, and one 
which goes beyond this work.51  What is necessary from our perspective is that, at the 
appropriate opportunities, the solid assumption be expressed that ‘people like us’ can have an 
effect on policy-making if ‘we’ want to, combined with a basic level of tolerant restraint 
concerning the kind of action that ‘we’ might want to pursue, and combined furthermore with 
the existence of an institutional regime which is sufficiently responsive to the efforts of those 
who do wish to get involved.  To the extent that the discursive practices examined here 
diverge from the ideal in certain crucial respects, the solution is likely to lie not so much in 
experiments in further popular participation – intriguing as these may be – but in the arrival 
of political movements which set out to challenge popular assumptions and to remake them 
in positive ways.  New discursive resources with which to further the horizon of expectation, 
rather than new initiatives to get people ‘involved’, are the advance that is needed the most.   
 
 
                                                
51 Clearly though, to the extent that a political bond can be associated with participation itself, the logic would 
be largely instrumental rather than developmental.  Such a bond would ‘make sense’ of a European polity no  
on the (Arendtian) grounds that it provides the aren  for the kind of political activity necessary to human 
flourishing, but on the grounds that it might provide some of the means to address the problems of thepolitical 






‘To constitute and give life to a body politic is to put some things in common,’ writes Pierre 
Manent.  ‘Men are political animals because they “put things in common”.  […]  The 
problem of the Europeans is that they do not know what they want to put in common.’1  The 
European demos debate with which we began in Chapter 1 owes much to this uncertainty 
about the ‘things in common’ appropriate to a European polity.  Many authors writing on this 
question have treated it as a matter of what Europeans have in common, or of what they 
crucially do not; such writers have examined the history of the nation-state and the 
theoretical accounts of its conditions of emergence, leading to a familiar set of 
conceptualisations of the collective bond necessary for a viable democratic polity.  Bonds of 
commercial interest, shared culture, or trust and solidarity have been proposed as plausible 
foundations for a European polity or, alternatively, as theoretical arguments by which to 
dismiss the possibility of such a polity in the foreseeable future.  Other writers have accepted 
that the question is rather what it is that can be put in common, of political justification for 
the life in common rather than of the pre-political regularity of a certain collectivity.  These 
writers have concluded either that there are insufficient resources for an enterprise such as 
this on a European scale, or alternatively that there are common values which Europeans 
share and of which they can be made more aware, or that will emerge in public debate.   
 Our point of departure was that none of these approaches was satisfactory.  To 
reduce the question to what Europeans have in common was to place a strong curtailment on 
the possibilities for human action and creativity, and to do so unjustifiably.  Conversely, to 
speak of the values which citizens might share and be encouraged to share was to place 
undue emphasis on consensus and harmony, and in so doing to conceive a collective bond 
which was either too anodyne or alternatively too limiting.  A different conceptualisation of 
the collective bond was necessary, it was argued: one which paid sufficient attention to 
affective engagement while allowing that such engagement must sometimes lead to 
reasonable disagreement.  It was on this basis that we foregrounded the importance of 
political problems, the lines of opposition they inspire, and the possibilities recognised for 
                                                
1 Manent, A World Beyond Politics?, p.67.  
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their settlement.  A ‘political bond’ based on some of the ideas of agonistic democracy was 
put forward, thereby linking the question of the demos with other debates in the study of 
European politics to do with the principle of democratic control and its health in 
contemporary democracy.  The question of community i  today’s Europe, now that the 
certainties of organised modernity in the nation-state era are gone, was, it was suggested, 
indivisible from the question of democratic voice and political ends.  The demos debate had 
to be thought about as at the same time a debate about models of democracy.  To think about 
the question of community necessarily involved thinking about the vitality of democratic 
control over the problems which ordinary people see th mselves as facing. 
 This led us into the area of discursive practice, and for two reasons.  Firstly, the 
nature of political problems and who it is that they affect are not simply matters of objective 
description: problems can be constructed in different ways, not out of thin air, but from basic 
material situations which are ambiguous and in need of interpretation.  Taking seriously the 
popular dimension of democracy means taking seriously (though not uncritically) the ways 
people problematise the world around them, what it is that causes grievance and that they 
would like to see changed.  Secondly, the extent to which democratic control can be 
exercised on these problems is not just a matter of institutional mechanisms and organisation, 
important and complex enough though these factors are. Democratic practice is a matter of 
expectations also, and it is here that language and tacit assumptions can be seen as crucial.  In 
the absence of the resources for formulating problems in ways which permit the possibility of 
meaningful collective action to address them, a politica  project such as the European polity 
is hardly likely to make sense to its intended audience, hardly likely to be received as an 
augmentation of popular sovereignty.  Likewise, the same will be true when certain 
assumptions encourage that which is problematised to be normalised and accepted.  Writers 
in the republican tradition, adopting a perspective of freedom as non-domination rather than 
as non-interference, have noted this with particular cl rity.2  To explore the possibility of a 
political bond, and to use this concept in a diagnostic function, is therefore to study the 
patterns that people draw on when problematising their common experiences. 
 Talking in groups with taxi-drivers in Britain, Germany and the Czech Republic gave 
us the opportunity to explore these ideas in a specific temporal and spatial context.  Group 
discussions were conceived as a site where one could st dy discursive practices in some 
depth; the talk of taxi-drivers, it was assumed, would act as a particularly rich site for looking 
                                                
2 See e.g. Pettit, Republicanism, pp.131ff. 
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at practices that could be found more widely.  By setting the concept of a ‘political bond’ in a 
reciprocal relationship with this empirical material, t was possible to pursue both description 
and normative evaluation.  We were able to develop the analytical ideas of the political 
common, of collective positioning and of the plausibility of a political project, in a way such 
as to make them empirically grounded; at the same ti , for the very reason that these 
analytical tools had been constructed with a theoretical ideal in mind, it was possible to 
assess our empirical findings with a critical eye.  As was seen in Chapter 3, a wide range of 
common problems was articulated in these discussion, a d in quite similar ways across the 
interview groups.  A political common seemed to be readily discernible, albeit the attemp to 
summarise it would inevitably be partial.  The importance of accommodating the adversarial 
dimension in any conceptualisation of the collective bond seemed to be borne out in Chapter 
4, where we saw the marked tendency for all formulations of the ‘people like us’ to be 
defined in contra-distinction to a set of opponents.  We saw some tendency for ‘counterparts’ 
in other countries to be evoked by means of transnational comparisons regarding substantive 
problems, but noted that such practices were domain-specific, and that they rarely 
corresponded to the contours of any recognisable European polity.  In Chapter 5 a connection 
was drawn between the motifs used to explain problems and the extent to which these 
problems were assumed susceptible to organised address.  It was suggested that the 
prevalence of localist and globalist motifs, combined with the rarity of more distinctively 
‘European’ ones, served to weaken the plausibility of a political project focused on the EU.  
Indeed, as was then seen in Chapter 6, when the EU was invoked in discussion it was the role 
of certain policies in the generation and expression of problems which tended to be 
foregrounded.  Our conclusions for a European polity, as these were finalised using our 
concepts for more critical purpose, highlighted theneed for certain changes in discursive 
practice if such a polity is to be supported by a desirable collective bond. 
 There is no doubt a sense in which it is counter-intuitive to put forward a political 
bond in an age which many see as characterised by increasing political scepticism and the 
hollowing of democracy.  A whole range of trends negative to lively and purposeful politics 
has been noted by scholars of national democracy, including the decline of ideological 
cleavages, the weakening of political parties, the supposed disengagement of non-elites, the 
trivialisation of the news media, and the withering of practices of collective solidarity and 
organised bargaining.3  From this perspective, meaningful politics at the national level seems 
                                                
3 Mair, 'Ruling the Void? ', p.33. 
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to be under assault from all sides, leaving the thoug t that to propose a politics-based bond 
for a newly emerging polity is to be severely out of une with the times.  Indeed, some might 
go further and question whether there was ever a ‘golden age’ of politics when these notions 
of popular sovereignty were realised in practice for the good of the polity.  To an elitist such 
as Schumpeter, a ‘political bond’ would no doubt have seemed quaint indeed: to imagine ‘the 
people’ as anything more than an audience would be misguided and probably dangerous.  If 
popular voice was always no more than an illusion or a pleasant ideal, it must be time to ‘get 
real’.  Moravcsik is no doubt just one of a large number of political scientists for whom it is 
important to separate the ideal from the real.4  Of course, such authors can easily be accused 
of falling into a version of the naturalist fallacy, of deciding that the real is the ideal, or of 
choosing their ideals such that they believe the statu  quo will confirm them.  But ultimately, 
one must wonder, are they not right that one must begin with ‘the way things are’, and 
proceed with one’s theorising from there? 
 On this they are indeed correct, and it was precisely this concern for ‘the real’ which 
inspired an empirical mode of enquiry.  The concepts which one brings to the political world 
are usefully subjected to empirical scrutiny.  In sub tantial part our disagreement with elitists 
would be based not on their supposed realism in contrast to our idealism, but on a divergent 
understanding of what constitutes ‘the real.’  A brute fact which emerges strongly in this 
research, and which cannot be overlooked, is the extent to which ordinary people are willing 
to voice a wide range of common problems about which it is felt that something should be 
done.  In no sense have grievances given way to apathy: grievances remain strongly present.  
This, combined with the fact that with regard to some problems there is a considerable degree 
of scepticism concerning what can be achieved through traditional political channels, is what 
makes the situation urgent, both for nation-state democracy and for the European Union.  The 
kind of assumptions we have traced, whereby a large number of problems are articulated and 
yet a substantial proportion of them give rise to asense of impotence, provide ample grounds 
for illiberal movements to gain support: the so-called ‘right-wing populist’ movements which 
have come to prominence in many European countries in recent years may be read as 
testament to this.  Nor can social scientists engaged in the study of European integration 
afford to dismiss the significance of mass politics so as to focus on elite bargaining: the 
impact of the results of the 2005 referenda in France and the Netherlands on the 
                                                
4 Moravcsik, 'In Defence of the 'Democratic Deficit'', p.605: ‘While perhaps useful for philosophical pur oses, 
the use of idealistic standards no modern government can meet obscures the social context of contemporary 
European policy-making – the real-world practices of existing governments and the multi-level political system 
in which they act.’ 
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Constitutional Treaty demonstrate the extent to which the integration process is dependent 
upon the kinds of discursive practice prevalent amongst the voting public.  As many analysts 
have suggested, these voters were animated not just by the abstract idea of a constitution, but 
by various associations made between the EU and its policies on the one hand and a whole 
range of problematised developments on the other, most notably the effects of neoliberal 
economic policies, of increased rates of immigration into the EU and migration between its 
member-states, and the prospect of Turkish membership of the Union.  It is the very 
significance of recent and contemporary events connected to popular politics, and of the 
widespread inclination to articulate common problems, which arguably makes the ‘political 
bond’ a concept of some relevance.  To ignore these issues of popular involvement and to 
focus purely on the constitutional aspect of democracy would be idealism of the most 
unjustifiable kind. 
 Furthermore, as these interviews have indicated, the competence of non-elites – to 
use the ugly term – to discuss substantive political issues with a high degree of sophistication 
should not be underestimated.  We have seen problems elaborated in complex ways, a rich 
set of links between them drawn, and an ability to combine media-inspired messages and 
information with personal experiences and inherited knowledge.  One sees here far more than 
the politics of personality and party-branding.  Nor is there unredeemed cynicism about 
public life: while there is useful work to be done by political psychologists on the responses 
triggered by certain key words, cynicism (as opposed to pessimism) is not the dominant tone 
of these discussions.  One does not find the major concerns of public life reduced to a small 
set of problems to do with corruption and ‘governmet waste’, as newspaper commentaries 
may sometimes suggest.  Interest in political issue, and the competence to talk about them, 
is much in evidence, even if accompanied by doubt about the ability to effect change.  
Importantly, from a more objective perspective, there is no reason to consider the problems 
raised in these discussions as fabricated from nothing, and the people who articulate them as 
whingers.  These are not problems which must be dismissed as facts of life about which one 
‘mustn’t grumble.’  It may be that one wishes to reject the terms in which some are 
discussed, and it may be that one feels certain issues are neglected in discussion, but there is 
no reason to attribute failings of this kind to incapacity on the part of the speakers.  Rather, 
one should see these as reasons to question, contest a d expand the set of discursive 
resources on which speakers are able to draw.   
 The emergence of a European polity should in principle provide a useful opportunity 
to do this, for not only does it signal the possibility of tackling common problems at a 
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transnational level, it is also a polity unable to invoke the collective bonds that underpinned 
the emergence of the nation-state, and for that reason is dependent on justifications of a 
mainly political kind.  A new polity provides the opportunity to reconsider the question of 
democratic control and political ends – a point notlos  on those elitists who would happily 
see the principle of popular sovereignty marginalised further in favour of a technocratic, 
regulatory politics.5  In this new context, both moves towards further politicisation and 
further depoliticisation are possible.  Advance of the former is likely to be dependent upon 
political parties of mass appeal being willing to promote ideas that make political sense of 
the EU and thereby build a case for its development    
 The need to revitalise more active conceptions of citizenship and reaffirm the 
plausibility of dealing collectively with common problems is not a sufficient argument for a 
European polity.  There can be no sufficient argument for a European polity, since this would 
be to suppose that the proper boundaries of political membership can be settled by appeal to a 
theoretical idea.  As we have argued, ‘the people’ can never be captured in a single thought, 
for it/they represent(s) a floating category which can be defined in a multitude of ways.  A 
political bond is a perspective from which to conceptualise the collective bond, to justify the 
life in common.  It does not indicate where one would draw boundaries on a pristine map.  It 
demands some acceptance of the idea of a European polity, whatever the particular 
institutional structures one may associate this with and whatever the external boundaries one 
may wish to see for such a polity.   
 Of course, some reject such a vision and call for a return to the nation-state.  There 
are reasons to be sceptical of this position.  A very large number of socio-economic practices 
in contemporary Europe transcend the boundaries of states, and could be re-confined to them 
only with considerable loss.  Moreover, as our empirical material suggests, collective 
positioning today is considerably more complex than c  be accommodated by the old 
categories such as ‘national identity’: there is a notable tendency, with regard to certain 
problems in particular, to evoke a political context which is considerably broader than just 
the nation-state, and to the extent that there exist doubts about the possibility of political 
action at a European level, these are matched to a considerable degree by doubts about the 
political agency of national governments.  Neither a eturn to the nation-state, nor to a 
confederal European system in which the European dimension is a function solely of nation-
state bargaining, seem plausible alternatives under these conditions.  
                                                
5 See the discussion e.g. of Majone in Chapter 1. 
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 If one takes seriously the idea of a European polity, the question of the collective 
bond is difficult to avoid.  It seems inadequate to suppose, as some advocates of further 
European integration may, that a viable democratic polity can be secured simply with better 
publicising of the alleged achievements of the EU and some adjustments to the Union’s 
institutional architecture.  Institutional issues, particularly those in ‘distant Brussels’, do not 
tend to be a subject of fevered discussion amongst European citizens, nor does it seem likely 
that, just by offering further opportunities for casting a vote, interest and enthusiasm will 
emerge spontaneously concerning the possibilities which these venues offer.  Instead, one 
would need to ‘prepare the ground’ with clear ideas about what those institutions may be 
engaged to achieve and why it makes sense to share in th m with others.  Emphasising the 
address of common problems presents itself as the most appropriate basis on which to 
animate a European polity.  But this perspective on the common will be without resonance 
unless one addresses at the same time the typical ways in which the political world is 
interpreted: those routine acts of positioning and u questioned assumptions that structure 


















Taxi-driving is a job which mixes bursts of activity with a fair bit of killing of time.  Some 
hours are busier than others, varying according to the city, locations within the city, and the 
type of customers catered to.  For those who tend to work a railway-station rank, the busy 
times coincide with the arrival of long-distance and peak-time commuter trains: early 
mornings especially can be heavy.  For those who tend to work a rank in the town-centre, the 
busy times tend to follow shopping hours: early mornings can be quiet, but work picks up 
towards the lunchtime rush.  Those who work nights will probably mix lonely hours in the 
middle of the week with considerable activity at week nds.  A Munich taxi-driver – in a 
conversation separate from the body of this research – told me that, with people increasingly 
saving on luxuries such as taxi journeys (the euro had made everyone poorer), the only times 
when custom was reliable were Friday and Saturday nights between 1am and 6am.457  
Whatever the variations in individual routine, most drivers can expect quite considerable 
periods of hanging around, especially when a job has been recently completed and the driver 
returns to the back of the rank, turns off the engine and waits for those in front to take 
customers. 
 Such time is spent in a range of ways.  A few drivers install portable televisions in 
their vehicles, but for the majority listening to the radio or reading the newspaper is the most 
likely activity.  ‘I think a lot of the guys read the paper,’ Murda in Reading told me.  ‘Half 
the time they don’t move up in their queue because they’re reading the bloody paper, or 
nattering away to somebody …’.  Local and tabloid-style newspapers are much in evidence 
on the rank, and were the most commonly cited when participants were asked at the end of 
the interviews how they passed their spare time.  Barry in Norwich reads ‘any sort of 
newspaper, always got an interest in the newspapers.  I li ten to the radio all day so I’ve got 
the news on, and I do watch Sky News at night, flip it on, keep an eye on what’s going on in 
the world.’  In some cities, Swansea for instance, reading the local newspaper meant 
exposure to very local, city-based stories; in other cities the coverage could be much wider: 
the Main Post, cited by Uwe in Würzburg, carried international as well as local and national 
news.  That significant time is spent reading the newspaper and listening to the radio is 
                                                
457 Private conversation, Munich (Schwabing), Sunday 17th April 2005, 5am. 
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evident from the frequency with which these news sources were cited in the discussions.  
Headlines, or something which was ‘just heard on the radio’, crop up with some frequency, 
though sometimes in unexpected ways: when Barry in Norwich refers to a photograph in 
yesterday’s Evening News featuring a group of mothers and children, he focuses not on the 
paedophile they were protesting against but the fact th t they all seemed to be single mothers, 
and hence probably unemployed.  One also finds in the interviews pieces of information, for 
instance to do with the conflict in Rwanda or the sale of weapons to China, which would be 
difficult to account for other than as a result of exposure to media sources (on or off the job).  
At the same time, many drivers were keen to trivialise the time they spent with newspapers: 
Murda in Reading was emphatic that he is ‘never that much up to date’ with the news, ‘about 
ten years behind’, and direct questioning about newspapers (as opposed to when they were 
spontaneously invoked in the discussions) would reliably lead to jokes about topless women.   
For Zdeněk at Ostrava, the only really credible thing in thenewspapers is ‘the sex’: ‘no-one’s 
going to deceive me on that.  They can write what tey want but that’s something I know 
about, I know how that functions.’  No doubt the sport sections of newspapers would be read 
by many in a similar spirit. 
 These daily pastimes have to be easily interruptible.  Not only is there the need to 
move up on the rank but for many drivers there is the prospect of being greeted by other 
drivers and engaged in conversation.  Jürgen in Lübeck explains: ‘you can’t really read the 
Frankfurter Allgemeine [i.e. a serious newspaper] here on the rank … there’s always 
someone coming past your door, “come on, let’s go for coffee,” you can hardly read even 
one article in peace.  I really don’t understand how s me of our colleagues can read a book in 
the car – really big books sometimes … [N & W: yeah, yeah …].’  Except for when it is 
raining or particularly cold, quite a few drivers near the back of the rank are likely to get out 
of their vehicles and stand around talking in small groups.  On larger ranks, like the one at 
Würzburg station, they may also have a hut to go to.  Apart from at peak times, when there is 
the continual need to move cars forward and pick up passengers, one rarely sees a whole rank 
of drivers sitting alone in their vehicles: conversations are a common way of whiling away 
the quieter moments.  Where the drivers are employed by a firm and more than one firm 
works the same rank, these social relations seem to take place mainly amongst drivers 
working for the same firm.  The more lonely periods are likely to be the night shifts, not least 
because fewer drivers do these.  In the daytime thoug , most ranks are fairly social places 
and the job generates plenty of group contexts, aside from the interaction involved in 
transporting customers. 
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 My arrival at the taxi-rank was intended to coincide with those times when a large 
number of drivers would be working but when customer d mand would be relatively low.  
Sometime after 9am or sometime after 2pm were generally the times I chose.  The interviews 
were not arranged in advance: I simply selected the largest of the ranks in the city and 
attempted to recruit directly.  I styled myself as what I was: a student doing research.  
Wearing jeans and a jacket and carrying a folder of papers under my arm, I tried to appear 
both young and serious.  Just as I did not want to look too casual, I wanted to avoid giving 
any impression of formality or officialdom: the fraud inspector represents an ominous figure 
for many taxi-drivers, and anyone asking questions at the rank does well to ensure they are 
not mistaken.  Also, the image of the student, with what I assumed to be connotations of 
someone reliant on a favour, perhaps a little naïve in the ways of the world and in need of 
having things carefully explained, was one which I t ought might benefit my research both 
during recruitment and during the discussions themselve . 
 Several theoretical considerations need to be borne in mind when adopting group 
discussions as a research method.  Important decisions need to be made about the size of the 
groups to be formed, the degree to which these groups are to be ‘natural’ (in part a matter of 
whether participants will be familiar to one another or strangers), and the degree to which 
they are to be ‘homogeneous’ (as evaluated by any number of criteria, including ethnic and 
socio-economic make-up).  Much of the earlier writing on this research method (c. the 1980s) 
was connected to commercial market research, where ‘focus groups’ were intended to 
provide insights into the reception of advertising campaigns and the associations made with 
brand images.  For this purpose, the recommendations were generally that the group should 
be fairly large (six to eight people), that participants should be strangers to one another, and 
often that they should be drawn from diverse backgrounds.  Such groups would allow the 
researcher in a quite short period of time to gather a range of spontaneous, instinctive 
responses from a broad section of society to whatever stimuli the client was keen to have 
tested.  My purposes were different however, and like much of the later, academic 
applications of this method I felt able to reject some of these stipulations.458  With taxi-
                                                
458 For academic work on the focus-group method, see Bloor et al., Focus Groups in Social Research; Morgan, 
Focus Groups as Qualitative Research; Matthew B. Miles and A. Michael Huberman, Qualitative Data 
Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1994); Lynne J. Millward, 'Focus Groups', in 
Glynis M. Breakwell, Sean Hammond, and Chris Fife-Shaw (eds.), Research Methods in Psychology (London: 
Sage, 2000); Claudia Puchta and Jonathan Potter, Focus Group Practice (London: Sage, 2004); Jane Ritchie 
and Jane Lewis, Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers (London: 
Sage, 2004). Kitzinger and Barbour, 'The Challenge and Promise of Focus Groups'.  The terms ‘group 
discussion’ or ‘group interview’ have been preferred in this work to ‘focus group’, so as to avoid some of the 
scientistic connotations of the latter; but cf. Morgan, Focus Groups as Qualitative Research, pp.5ff. 
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drivers often already engaged in conversations withone another when I approached them on 
the rank, and often familiar even with those with wom they did not happen to be talking at 
that moment, any attempt to recruit groups of strangers would have been highly impractical, 
and also rather perverse.  I was interested not in the short, impulsive responses of individuals 
(like marketing research) but in how discussions were built up collectively and pursued in 
depth, a pursuit which is ‘normally’ likely to take place amongst acquaintances rather than 
strangers.  Also, I had chosen taxi-drivers as people f r whom a group discussion of the kind 
I wanted would not represent a major upheaval in their schedule, and this would be truer 
where the participants were already in discussion.  Furthermore, individuals are more likely 
to participate if their acquaintances are keen also, and so the success of the recruitment 
process can generally be improved by taking advantage of existing social relations. 
 The groups which I assembled were to some degree ‘natural’ in the sense that the 
core of the group was often drawn from a pre-existing conversation on the rank between two 
or three of the participants.  Not all participants knew each other in advance, but there were 
always at least a couple who were familiar with everyone, and perhaps a general expectation 
that drivers on the rank had some degree of acquaintanceship with one another.  ‘It’s like a 
little institute,’ was the description Leyton in Norwich gave of the drivers at the rank.  When, 
during recruitment in Würzburg, Oliver suggested to Rainer enlisting the participation of 
Uwe, Rainer seemed not to know him, but Oliver still felt it realistic to try to jog his memory: 
‘you know, the guy who plays the piano.’  Rainer himself was identifiable to several of the 
other drivers on the rank by way of his hobby – running marathons.  Many of the discussions 
also featured cross-references to conversations which participants had had with one another 
on prior occasions.  Admittedly, this degree of mutual familiarity did carry certain dangers: 
where drivers were helping me with the recruitment of further participants, they might be 
inclined to ‘invite up’, as Gamson has put it459 – i.e. encourage those whom they considered 
better-educated or more thoughtful to take part while dismissing the candidacy of others – or 
they might lose enthusiasm for participating if some ne they disliked looked ready to get 
involved.  At Kassel, Dieter asked me whether he should single out some ‘sensible’ drivers to 
take part (I said it was not important), while in Swansea one driver confidentially made their 
participation conditional on another particular indivi ual not participating, a condition which 
was made irrelevant when the latter was forced to depart with a customer.  Even once the 
discussions were underway, what was said or not said might perhaps be influenced by past 
                                                
459 Gamson, Talking Politics, p.190. 
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conversations in ways which I would be unable to appreciate.460  These dangers, however, 
seemed to be outweighed by the likelihood that ‘political talk’ occurs more naturally amongst 
acquaintances than strangers.461 
 With a concern for depth of discussion, I wanted groups smaller than six to eight 
people: most of my interviews were composed of four participants, though in three of them 
there were just three participants.  Groups of this relatively small size facilitate contributions 
from all participants rather than just a dominant few, and they reduce the likelihood of 
fragmentation into multiple, simultaneous side-discussions which are both smaller than one 
wishes and exceptionally difficult to transcribe from a single-source microphone.  A group of 
three to four participants can be moderated with a light touch, whereas larger groups may 
require stronger control, either to coax participants to speak or to ensure some focus of 
discursive attention.462  More practically, assembling more than four participants would have 
been a considerable challenge.  At ranks where turnover was fast, one was always liable to 
lose those who had pledged participation by lingering for more: the arrival of one or two 
customers could force withdrawals, which in turn could generate scepticism amongst those 
remaining about the likelihood of the exercise goin ahead, and soon one would need to start 
the recruitment process again.  Also, while most cities had a dominant taxi-rank – usually 
either by the train station or in the town centre – some would have a series of smaller ranks 
equal in size, perhaps with a typical presence of ar und five vehicles.  In these cases, a few 
rejections on a small rank could result in a kind of ‘negative inertia’ whereby other drivers 
would quickly reject participation too, either deciding I was clearly up to no good or, if they 
did listen to the proposal, perhaps judging the chan es of it going ahead rather slim.  This 
happened to me in Plzeň, and after many hours of attempting to recruit I deci ed to settle for 
just three drivers; many more (e.g. six to eight) would have been entirely unrealistic.  In 
Ostrava meanwhile, the problem was not just that the taxis were divided between different 
ranks: it was simply that there was a quite limited number of taxis anywhere, and no large or 
medium-sized rank available at the time of interview.  Although it was the biggest city I 
interviewed in, Ostrava was also the poorest, something which probably contributed to the 
absence.  A couple of vehicles waited at the railway st tion, but too few to make an approach 
worthwhile.  In the city centre, the square where a f w taxis would normally park was being 
dug up, and only a few isolated taxis could be seen on the roads nearby.  I was lucky to 
                                                
460 For the same thought, see Perrin, Citizen Speak, p.59.   
461 Cf. Conover, Searing, and Crewe, 'The Deliberative Potential of Discussion'. 
462 Cf. Morgan, Focus Groups as Qualitative Research, pp.42-3 for sensible remarks on this. 
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discover a taxi-hut still manned on the square, and when the three drivers inside all expressed 
enthusiasm for taking part, and it became clear that t ey would all most likely be vocal 
contributors in discussion, I decided to proceed with the interview.  To search for a fourth 
participant might well have meant losing one of them if a job arose; to attempt an interview 
with double or more this number would have been, for these practical reasons alone, quite 
impossible. 
 The question of homogeneity is always a rather elusive one, given the range of 
criteria by which it can be assessed and the uncertainty surrounding which criteria are 
relevant.  One never knows how far the standard criteria – e.g. class, gender, ethnic 
background – are likely to have a bearing on the kind of discourse produced, and there is a 
danger that once one starts making assumptions about their relevance one slips back into a 
determinist perspective whereby what people say is ccounted for by ‘who they are’.  Such a 
perspective, while perhaps appealing to the traditional sociologist, is objectionable from a 
political-theory perspective, and the resultant dilemma is typical of those faced when one 
works at the interface of two disciplines, each with its own body of interests and concerns.  
The difficulty cannot be avoided simply by attempting to include in the sample variation on 
all possible criteria, such that no prior assumptions are made, since there will always be more 
criteria than one can hope to address.  Attempting o control methodically for the 
heterogeneity or homogeneity of the groups would clearly have disrupted any naturalness 
achieved in the selection of participants on the rank, since it would have involved introducing 
‘artificial’ variation into the sample.  Moreover, how one isolates variables in this case is by 
no means obvious.  For example, one might wish to intr duce variation according to income 
levels, an objective which – given the reticence of drivers about their earnings – one would 
probably operationalise indirectly by interviewing night-drivers (whose earnings are 
generally higher) as well as day-drivers.  Night-drivers, however, are also far more likely to 
be single, since their hours are difficult to combine with a family.  One would therefore be 
introducing variation according to marital status too, something (potentially) just as 
significant.  And the variables proliferate.  Night-drivers are likely to spend less time in each 
other’s company than day-drivers; night-drivers will spend less time reading newspapers 
(because they are more busy, and because it is dark) but will spend more time listening to the 
radio; the content of night-time radio tends to differ from that of day-time radio, and so on.   
 For these reasons, recruitment for these interviews was guided by quite simple 
criteria.  I was not interested in questions of stati tical significance, and therefore the 
representativity of my sample in this sense was not a great concern to me.  A balance of ages 
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was sought for each interview, with the youngest driver being in his 20s or 30s and the oldest 
in his 50s or 60s.  Where ethnic minorities were stongly represented on the taxi-rank (this 
was the case at Reading), it was made certain that the sample reflected this (three of the four 
participants in Reading were of first- or second-generation Asian background, though all had 
been living in the city for at least a decade).463  Female drivers were very rare in the ten cities 
studied, and while no specific attempt was made to exclude them from the sample, in practice 
they did not feature.   
 The very nature of the group-interview method makes issues of homogeneity and 
heterogeneity, and in particular of statistical representativity, difficult to control in practice, 
even should one wish to do so.  Unlike, for example, taking part in a short survey 
questionnaire, a two-hour interview represents a major commitment of time and energy even 
for those in the most flexible of professions, and well-intentioned sampling procedures can 
easily be undone by low response rates and last-minute withdrawals.  Gamson reports that his 
attempts to follow a statistics-based procedure had to be abandoned due to the fact that 
typically only ten percent of those he selected for pa ticipation would eventually follow 
through on the exercise.464  Self-selection is virtually impossible to eliminate, indeed it is 
usually the dominant fact, and so there are no sturdy g ounds for the application of statistical 
probability.  Even once the interview is underway, there are plenty of opportunities for the 
unexpected.  At Erfurt, I had decided to conduct the interview with three drivers due to the 
low numbers available on the rank that morning.  We settled down as a group in a Kneipe 
opposite the station, alongside tables of elderly men having their first beer of the morning, 
and went through the card exercise with which each discussion began.  Just as we had 
finished and were poised to open out the discussion, Ha s-Jürgen’s mobile telephone rang: it 
was the boss calling, asking them to move their taxis because they were blocking the rank.  
The interview had to be interrupted while Hans-Jürgen, Uwe and Mike went off to resolve 
this, leaving me playing with my place-mat and wondering whether I needed to be assertive 
in some way.  A few minutes later, they returned with the good news that new parking spots 
have been found and accompanied, by the way, by a fourth driver interested to join the 
discussion, Andreas.  After making a quick assessment of Andreas’s level of good will, and 
after explaining to him what had been decided in the card exercise, I restarted the discussion 
and we continued for a further two, highly productive hours.  In the face of this kind of 
                                                
463 There was only one other non-white participant in the study: Ali, a first-generation Iranian immigrant, who 
took part in the discussion in Lübeck. 
464 Gamson, Talking Politics, p.190. 
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unpredictability, an inflexible, positivistic stance would not have served me well.  
Disallowing the participation of Andreas because I had not selected him myself, or declaring 
the interview void due to the few minutes of interruption, would not only have cost me a very 
rich amount of data but would probably have so alien t d the three participants with whom I 
had begun the interview that the chances of recruiting a new set of drivers later in the day 
would have been slim. 
 While my sample was not drawn on a statistical basis, and makes no claim to 
statistical representativeness, it is nonetheless important to ask what kinds of factor might 
have informed the self-selection process such that some drivers agreed to take part and others 
declined.  In almost all cities (Ostrava was the exception) I encountered at least some drivers 
who were unwilling to take part, and in the cases of Swansea, Würzburg and Plzeň it was 
several hours before I was finally able to assemble a willing team.  Significant remuneration 
was on offer, set at a rate above waiting-time and intended to represent a sound return on two 
hours’ work for most drivers (though it was never so high that a driver might not – in 
principle at least – have made the same amount in the same time from fare-paying 
customers).465  The money was clearly by no means the sole factor however in determining 
the success or failure of recruitment, and my impression is that the decision to accept or 
reject was rarely based principally on an assessment of the interview’s financial worth.  
Certainly it was made universally clear to me that no-one was going to give up their time for 
free, and a few drivers needed reassuring that I was not attempting to cheat them and that I 
really did possess the money I was claiming to offer.466  But the majority of both participants 
and non-participants who were approached expressed the opinion that the sum on offer was 
favourable.  Some drivers who declined participation did state inadequate remuneration as 
their reason, but there were some doubts as to whether this was their ‘real reason’ – other 
drivers would often intervene along the lines of ‘well you’ll be lucky if you make that much 
in the next two hours.’  Also, drivers who had rejected the offer could often be seen inert on 
the rank for long periods thereafter, earning no money at all.  If one can fairly say that the 
level of remuneration was more often an excuse than a reason for non-participation, then it is 
                                                
465 In Britain and Germany the rates were €60-70 per head; in the Czech Republic c. €40.  These rates would 
have been more or less appealing of course according to the time of day: at peak times (which I tried to avoid) 
they might have represented a loss on expected earnings, and therefore would have been insufficient to at ract 
any but the most curious.  Likewise, for drivers at the front of the rank, for whom a new fare was likely to be 
imminent, these figures would have been less attractive than for those at the back, on whom I concentrated my 
energies. 
466 I kept an envelope in my jacket pocket with the money counted out per head for the purpose of convincing 
the sceptical that I was serious about what I was doing.  Only in one instance – in Plzeň – did the participants 
nonetheless insist on being paid before the interview began. 
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worth considering what other motivations there may h ve been for rejection.  Moments 
where the research seemed to be ‘failing’, with an absence of volunteers and a number of 
refusals, provided a good opportunity to explore thlikely nature of my sample, and by 
asking those who declined for their reasons I made sur that they too were a part of my study. 
 Some reasons for non-participation were quite straightforward.  Drivers might have 
regular bookings that needed to be honoured, requiring them to decline because the timing 
clashed.  In Swansea, large numbers were unavailable mid-afternoon because they were 
committed to taking children home from school; clearly, it would not make sense to sacrifice 
a regular customer, however interested the driver might be in participating (and some did 
express regret).  The weather was another practical onstraint on the recruitment process: not 
only might an outbreak of rain significantly increas  the supply of customers, thereby 
thinning the rank and reducing the appeal of my offer, but it would also keep the drivers who 
remained on the rank inside their taxis.  This would remove the possibility of approaching 
pre-existing groups, meaning that I would have to convince drivers one by one.  This was 
always a more difficult approach – groups tended to be more willing to ‘hear me out’, 
perhaps because the individuals involved would feel l ss trapped than when cornered alone.  
I was lucky with the weather and did not have to face this problem, though it could well have 
impeded the recruitment. 
 A third practical obstacle to participation derived from the fact that on most ranks 
there was a mixture of employed and self-employed drivers.  The latter had considerably 
more flexibility than the former, who might be required to produce records to their boss to 
account for their day’s earnings.  Several drivers expressed the concern that their boss would 
raise awkward questions if they agreed to take part, even if (or indeed especially if) they 
were to set their meter to run on waiting-time for two hours.  This was a reason for reluctance 
frequently cited in Würzburg, and was considered fully credible by Rainer, an eventual 
participant.  In Plzeň, another city in which recruitment was difficult, some of the taxi firms 
appeared to be quite small, and by engaging four drivers from the same firm I could well 
have taken that firm off the road for two hours, again something to displease the boss.  
Generally, in order to participate it seemed that drivers would have either to be self-
employed or, if they were not, to enjoy decent relations with their boss (as Rainer said he 
did) or to be indifferent to potential complications of that sort, and perhaps to be attached to a 
firm large enough to accommodate their absence without great disruption.  Whilst these were 
not especially demanding hurdles – even a sceptical boss could probably later be convinced 
that worthwhile money had been gained – they were nonetheless enough to rule out some. 
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 However, rejections also came from those for whom these practical issues would not 
have been a major difficulty.  General scepticism towards unusual propositions, especially 
when voiced by outsiders, might have accounted for a number of the refusals to participate.  
This was a reason frequently cited by drivers who were sympathetic to my project, or who 
had committed to participate themselves, to explain the reluctance of some of their 
colleagues.  In Swansea I was told by one such driver that ‘people are very suspicious around 
here’, and a driver in Plzeň implied something similar when he said ‘that’s Plzeň for you.’  In 
Würzburg, I was told the problem was that this was ‘a mall, pretty little town’ and that 
people were generally wary of outsiders.  ‘They just want to go to and fro from the station, 
no distractions,’ said one driver.  Rainer drew a comparison with another occasion when a 
stranger had approached the rank offering fifty euros to whichever driver would lend him a 
hand in putting up a sign: ‘no-one was willing to d it but me, I thought I couldn’t be hearing 
right, what was wrong with them?’  Aversion to commercial polling and advertising also 
seemed to be evident – a non-participant in Swansea told me he was ‘sick of people ringing 
up to ask questions’, and my insistence that I was from a university rather than a private 
company was of no relevance to him.  This diffuse sc pticism towards the unknown, what 
one might call an hostility towards intrusion, was no doubt compounded when drivers saw 
other drivers declining my offer: negative inertia could build quickly in these circumstances, 
and there was a danger that I could develop the reputation of a pest.  (This was starting to 
happen in Plzeň, before Petr took up my case and lent some legitimacy to my requests.)  In 
Britain, mixed in with these concerns was probably the more specific one that I might be an 
inspector from the fraud office wanting to take a look at the accounts.  For drivers with 
something to hide, this might have been another reason for wanting to be left alone. 
 My status as a foreigner could also have played a role.  As someone who grew up in 
London, I could have passed for a local in the two cities in southern England where I 
interviewed, Norwich and Reading.  Indeed, in Reading the participants readily assumed I 
was from Reading University.  But at Swansea, despit  my knowledge of the city due to 
family connections, I would have been clearly classifiable as English rather than Welsh, and 
in the cities in Germany and the Czech Republic I would have been fairly easy to place as 
British, even had I not introduced myself as such.  Generally I had no reason to believe that 
this was adversely affecting the recruitment process (for consideration of how it might have 
affected the interviews themselves, see below).  However, in Würzburg it may well have 
been significant.  This is a city which was heavily bombed by the British RAF at the end of 
the Second World War, and where an association might readily be made between a historical 
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event, a broader set of national antagonisms, and a modern-day visitor who seemed to be 
looking for favours.  I asked Rainer during the interview why he thought I had had such 
difficulty in recruiting participants that morning: ‘well I spoke to one of them, Franz … [now 
to Uwe and Oliver:] Franz Biedermann, the one who drives 16.1.  I’ve always assumed he 
was a very reasonable person so I was a bit surprised when he reacted like that.  But it was 
something to do with the British … your country, the World War 2 context.  I don’t know … 
whether … he didn’t say anything more concrete, but perhaps it was to do with the bombing 
here in Würzburg.’  All participants (predictably!) suggested that this was inappropriate of 
Franz, but they seemed to take Rainer’s explanation as credible.  Hostility of this kind was 
not something which I was aware of during the several hours I spent recruiting: indeed, 
several non-participants tried to help me find willing participants, and one driver gave me the 
phone-number of a taxi-company to call.  In particular, Franz himself had given me the 
slightly different – but equally plausible – explanation that he felt it was not possible for him 
to express the kind of opinions he wanted to in public.  ‘If I say what I want to say they’d put 
me in prison,’ was his remark.  Another driver claimed that his own views were ‘not allowed’ 
in today’s Germany.  A counter-reading to Rainer’s account would therefore be that Franz 
(and others like him) declined to participate not principally because of hostility to the British 
but because of an awareness that certain opinions culd not be expressed – perhaps in 
particular in the presence of an outsider.  This is a reason for non-participation which one 
could summarise as the feeling of ‘unsayability’. 
 Unsayability might have been of special significane in the Würzburg case.  The day 
before that particular interview, then-Chancellor Schröder had given a speech to 
commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of the liberation of the concentration camp 
Buchenwald, and had spoken of the special responsibility of Germans to ensure that anti-
Semitism and racism did not re-emerge.  This speech was reported and headlined in the 
newspapers that the taxi-drivers were reading the following morning as I was recruiting, and 
it is quite possible that certain drivers were hostile to this speech, with its emphasis on 
German war-guilt, but were unwilling to discuss their hostility in a public place, perhaps all 
the more so in my presence as a British person.  One no -participant, who spoke to me on 
political issues for about five minutes from behind his driving-wheel, was certainly very 
quick to raise this subject, and spoke indignantly of how ‘you can’t say what you want to in 
Germany.  You’re not allowed to be proud to be German, if you ever criticise the Jews they 
say “he’s anti-Semitic!” and they immediately bring up the Holocaust.’  Assuming that this 
problem of ‘unsayability’ did affect his decision to decline participation – and on these 
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essentially cognitive questions there can be little certainty – this suggests that my research 
method is likely to generate a sample which excludes those inclined to speak in a certain 
way: that it might, loosely speaking, contain a ‘liberal bias’.  There are, however, reasons to 
think that this was not a major problem, not least the fact that the German discussions 
(Würzburg included) covered in considerable detail precisely the issues which it was being 
suggested here were unsayable.  While some non-partici ting drivers might take pleasure in 
positioning themselves as no-nonsense types whose common-sense wisdom was too painful 
and too truthful to be aired, other participating drivers were quite able to bring these 
inhibitions with them and handle and reflect upon them in the course of the group discussion.  
In other words, while some drivers might use these di cursive motifs as reasons to exclude 
themselves from the discussion, this did not mean th t the motifs themselves were excluded; 
they were simply brought along by others. 
 A largely similar argument can be made with regard to a final reason for non-
participation which was cited by some drivers: that ‘politics’ did not interest them and that 
they had nothing really to say on the subject.  This was a reaction I had anticipated, and when 
recruiting on the rank I generally tried to avoid using the word ‘politics’ on the assumption 
that it might carry associations rather narrower than I intended.  Given the current everyday 
usage of the term, ‘politics’ might be taken to mean no more than a certain set of individuals 
and institutions, without regard for the substantive ssues which these might address, and 
maybe with connotations of self-indulgent, empty talk.  Cramer Walsh describes how, for the 
‘Old Timers’ whose coffeeshop conversations she would listen to, ‘politics is about impasse 
and petty griping,’ ‘controversy and the stuff of peo le who lack common sense …’.467  I 
wanted to be able to recruit those who might ‘talk politics’ even without knowing or 
intending it.  I wanted to avoid reactions like that of one non-participant in Würzburg, who – 
having given me five minutes of opinions about the euro, the state of German society and the 
problem of imported goods – rejected participation in the discussion simply on the grounds 
that ‘politicians are liars, the politicians shit on me and I shit on them.’  Moreover, I wanted 
to avoid presenting the proposed discussion as something akin to a knowledge test: to declare 
that I was looking for ‘opinions on politics’ would maximise the risk that drivers felt 
unqualified to take part.   
 Instead, I tended to use rather vague phrases such as ‘your thoughts on problems in 
public life’, ‘the kind of problems people encounter in daily life’, and ‘positive and negative 
                                                
467 Cramer Walsh, Talking About Politics, p.39, p.38. 
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developments in society’, hoping to allow potential p rticipants to fill this ambiguity with 
their own expectations.  To some extent this worked, as could be observed when enthusiastic 
drivers were trying to convince colleagues to take part: a wide range of descriptions was 
produced, including ‘he’s interested in our views about everyday problems … the way 
society’s going … political views … opinions about the times we live in,’ or as Rainer in 
Würzburg put it, ‘Weltanschauungen’.  For many drivers, this was quite enough information 
to be getting on with: ‘yeah, I’ll give him a few views’, or ‘God, yeah, where do I start’ were 
typical responses, with each of us acting as though we fully knew what the other was 
referring to.  However, there were a significant number of instances when I was pressed for 
further details – ‘what is it you’re looking for exactly?’ – and on these occasions I would 
make some kind of reference to ‘politics’ since with further vagueness I would probably lose 
the listener’s attention.  There is therefore undoubtedly the possibility that some drivers 
refused participation because they heard a word they did not like.  What are the implications 
of this?  Does the sample contain a ‘politico bias’?  This would only be the case if those who 
participated could be classed as being unusually enthusiastic about politics, marked out from 
their colleagues in this regard.  There does not seem to be much grounds for believing this: 
indeed, participants to the discussions could express considerable disillusionment with 
political institutions, individuals and processes, a  we have seen in the analysis.  Perhaps 
particularly striking is a comment which Oliver made at the end of the Würzburg interview 
when asked about where he got his news from: he did not read much in the newspapers, he 
said, because he was generally ‘cynical about politics’!  Thus Oliver, who had contributed 
fully and with considerable sophistication throughout the course of the two-hour discussion, 
was moved to say something little different in tone from the non-participant on the rank who, 
as well as ‘talking politics’ for a while, had denounced all politicians as liars.  Clearly, a self-
declared aversion to ‘politics’ understood narrowly did not indicate a lack of competence to 
speak about substantive common problems, and while this aversion may have induced some 
drivers not to participate, other drivers who also voiced it were nonetheless willing to do so. 
  
Once three or four drivers had been secured for participation, we proceeded directly to the 
pub, bar or café in which the discussion would take place.  Although sometimes the drivers 
themselves would have a place in mind, generally I chose the location myself in advance.  
For obvious reasons to do with the recording, a fairly quiet location was required.  Upstairs 
cafés, away from the noise of the street and swinging doors, tended to be ideal where 
available; pubs (and their German and Czech equivalents) could be suitable in the hours 
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before lunchtime, when generally there were few customers and no music playing; hotel bars 
were also a reliable option.  A location which was deathly quiet on the other hand would be 
one to avoid, since I did not want participants to feel that they might be overheard, either by 
neighbouring tables or by staff.  Operating without an assistant and in ten different cities, it 
would have been difficult to secure in each case the kind of setting which tends to be 
described in certain focus-group manuals: a private room laid out with jugs of orange-juice, 
pots of coffee and a selection of biscuits, maybe oservable through a one-way mirror.  Such 
an approach requires considerable preparation and expense for dubious advantage.  I wanted, 
in particular, a location which the participants might plausibly have chosen to spend time in 
themselves, one in which they would feel, as one puts it, ‘at home’.  Particularly favourable 
was if the proposed location was visible from the taxi-rank itself, since this could be used 
during the recruitment process to heighten the immediacy of the exercise and to diminish any 
sense of mystery (‘we’ll just be going to that place over there, you can see it from here’), plus 
to convince drivers that they would not be abandoning their taxis and that after the discussion 
they would be able to return quickly to work.  The small risk associated with such locations 
was that some drivers might be reluctant to associate themselves with a place serving 
alcohol, either on professional or religious/cultural grounds.  This was not a protest I 
encountered on the rank however, and participants themselves seemed content simply not to 
order alcohol, or to order a small amount. 
 For the German and Czech interviews I considered employing a local assistant to 
help me recruit participants and moderate the discussions.  This would have facilitated 
communication, although this was not a sufficient justification since my command of the 
relevant languages was acceptable and since, in a group interview especially, the role of the 
moderator can be fairly limited once the discussion ‘takes off’.  A better reason would have 
been that a local assistant would ostensibly have neutralised any influence my nationality 
might have had on what was said in discussion.  I did not want, for instance, participants in 
Germany and the Czech Republic to introduce large numbers of transnational elements into 
the discussion which they would not have done in the presence of a local moderator, or to 
assume that – as a foreign national – it must necessarily be their country I was interested in 
rather than the more local environment of their city.  Ultimately I rejected the option of 
assistance however.  While a local moderator or assist nt might have created functional 
equivalence on the nationality question, it would have disrupted continuity as regards the 
numbers involved.  The diminutive presence which I was able to achieve as an individual 
researcher, which I sensed served me well in allowing the drivers to deal confidently with me 
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and to be undaunted by concerns about the audience, would have been lost had I expanded to 
a team in this way.  Also, one would have encountered all the problems of inter-moderator 
variation in style and substance which can plague large-scale qualitative studies.  Different, 
or more frequent, interventions can change the tone a d direction of the discussion: I 
preferred to have continuity on this.  In the end, the impact of my nationality did not seem 
strong, though this is an impressionistic judgement.  A transnational context was evoked in 
the British discussions in very similar ways to that in the German and Czech discussions, and 
amongst the latter there was just as much attention to the local as amongst the former.  At 
Ostrava, for instance, participants made explicit their assumption that I would be interested in 
developments in their region as well as the Czech Republic as a whole. 
 Once the participants and I were seated around a table, we made some brief 
introductions and I laid out some of the usual rules associated with group interviews (e.g. that 
participants should avoid speaking at the same time, and that they should not treat me as 
someone directing the discussion).  I requested permission to make an audio recording, a 
request which never met objection and which had no appreciable impact on the participants’ 
style of interaction.468  I then reiterated my interest in ‘problems in public life’ before feeding 
directly into the card exercise.  There was no pre-int rview questionnaire.  While this might 
have produced some interesting biographical data, it would have atomised the group – 
extended silence is a bad way to begin a discussion – and would have taken up valuable time 
which, due to the nature of my research, would be better devoted to collective rather than 
individual activities.  Also, questionnaires can be tedious and are liable to create an exam-
hall atmosphere.  Lee in Swansea was one driver to make his participation conditional on 
there not being ‘any forms to fill out’.  I sought to avoid all kinds of fussiness where possible. 
 In contrast, the card exercise provided an engagin, argument-generating, collective 
way to initiate the session.  Aside from the theoretical rationale for it outlined in Chapter 3, it 
was intended in practical terms to ‘warm up’ the participants so that the transition to a free 
discussion would be smooth.  In this respect it wassuccessful, and there were generally no 
indications that it was received either as patronising or dull; overall, there was confirmation 
of the positive experiences which other researchers ave reported when using this research 
                                                
468 The use of a video camera, on the other hand, might well have generated a fair degree of self-consciousness, 
and would have diminished the anonymity that a couple of the drivers had requested.  Furthermore, the early 
phase of a group interview requires establishing a certain rapport with participants and conveying a sense of 
purpose.  In the absence of an assistant, it would have been most unwise for me to spend those early moments 
absorbed in the adjustment of a complex piece of equipment.  Cf. Gamson, Talking Politics, p.194 and Morgan, 
Focus Groups as Qualitative Research, p.56. 
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method.469  Two participants from the group in Kassel displayed some degree of frustration 
about the difficulty of sorting the cards into piles, arguing that it was possible to link all of 
the themes displayed to one another, but momentum was maintained by the other two 
participants.  The images and English-language captions chosen for display on the cards can 
be seen at the end of this Appendix.  The intention was to assemble a series of thematically-
related visual prompts which could be read in multiple ways.  All translations were discussed 
in depth with native-speakers of German and Czech (who also happened to be political 
scientists) with the aim of achieving equivalence for the English-language versions.  
Originally the plan had been to conduct two exerciss with these cards, one at the beginning 
of the discussion – as outlined in Chapter 3 – and o e in the later stages, in which 
participants would be invited to arrange them according to what kind of political institution 
(if any) should be in charge of developing policies for the redress of the problems which had 
been articulated.  The aim here would have been to explore how readily institutions other 
than the national government were invoked, in particular how frequently the EU was referred 
to.  Having attempted this second exercise during the Reading discussion, I decided to 
abandon it.  It was clear that it would involve unnecessary repetition of the material which 
had already arisen spontaneously in discussion, plus the question seemed hard to convey to 
the participants – perhaps precisely because a problem-oriented rather than an institution-
oriented approach was one that made more sense to th m.  Also, at a practical level, a second 
exercise at this point in the interview, when the discussion was mature, would have been 
disruptive of the flow, and might have led to digressions. 
 The discussions lasted between ninety minutes and two hours.  In some cases (e.g. in 
Erfurt and Würzburg) the discussion could usefully have continued longer, and participants 
continued to say interesting things after the capacity of my recorder had been exhausted (at 
which point I switched to a few hand-written notes, though none of these have been cited as 
quotations).  In Swansea and Plzeň, it would have been difficult to extend the discussion 
much beyond ninety minutes, since repetition was strting to occur. 
 Relations between myself and the group were generally, from my perspective, rather 
positive.  Eliasoph describes how the people she talked to for her ethnographic research 
tended to find her project rather ‘quaint’;470 while I did encounter a slightly avuncular 
manner from a few drivers, the most common reaction was a fair degree of seriousness about 
                                                
469 Cf. Coxon, Sorting Data; Meinhof, 'Europe Viewed from Below'.  For the use instead of vignettes and 
imagined scenarios as means to prompt group discusson, see Gamson, Talking Politics; Perrin, Citizen Speak. 
470 Eliasoph, Avoiding Politics, p.273. 
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my project, expressed in the sentiment that it was about time that people took the views of 
‘people like us’ seriously and that it was perfectly appropriate for a student to be expressing 
his interest.  In the Czech Republic, particularly at Ostrava, there was a sense that it was 
rather remarkable and commendable that someone had come all the way from London to talk 
to them.  Several of the participants asked why I chose to speak to taxi-drivers; such 
questions I postponed until the end of the interview (arguing that I did not want to run out of 
recording time), and then made general remarks about their depth of experience and good 
connections, remarks which always drew approval.  Only from one participant, in Plzeň, did I 
sense animosity towards me: this driver, who was younger than me, seemed keen to test my 
credentials for interviewing him, and went to some lengths to work out which university I 
was from, whether such a university existed, and what my informed opinion was on the 
problems under discussion.  Fortunately the other two members of the group were supportive 
of my desire to keep questions about myself to the end of the interview.  This experience was 
quite exceptional however: almost all drivers seemed to be little interested in me and my 
personal biography, and much more interested in making sure that their fellow participants 
and I were listening to what they had to say about the topics under discussion.   
 In much ethnographic work there is the need to avoid, or at least to reflect upon, the 
possibility of ‘going native’ in the course of one’s field-work.  Although this is a somewhat 
ambiguous idea, one takes it to mean the danger of developing emotional attachments to 
one’s subject-matter, in particular to individual persons, which then alter the conclusions that 
are drawn.  In the context of two-hour interviews, prefaced by a generally short period of 
recruitment, such a consideration is quite minor.  Naturally I warmed to those drivers who 
helped me to recruit on the rank, and to all those who spoke thoughtfully in discussion, but 
there was little opportunity for such evaluations to feed back into the data-collection.  
Likewise, when participants expressed views which in other contexts I might have objected 
to – for example, that excessive reproduction in the T ird World might be tackled by a policy 
of castration – I was quite able in the brief context of these interviews to react with 
indifference, using the same news receipts (‘right …’, ‘hmmm …’ or a repetition of words) 
that I used throughout.  While the danger remains that judgements of this kind might affect 
my choice of passages for analysis and quotation, it should be clear from the analytical 
chapters that no attempt has been made to launder the material in this way. 
 When it came to transcribing the interviews, some of the names were changed, partly 
to preserve anonymity (though very few drivers insisted on this) and partly to avoid 
confusion, since a few names recurred.  Following Gamson, the transcript notation-style was 
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kept simple, without recourse to the subtleties employed in linguistic conversation-analysis, 
which are both time-consuming to honour and difficult for the uninitiated reader to follow.471  
Preliminary coding analysis of the transcripts was c rried out using WinMax computer 
software.  As will have been evident in the analytical chapters, the discursive patterns 
observed and analysed have not been presented with percentages attached following their 
frequency of occurrence.  This decision is directly related to the observations made above 
concerning the statistical ambiguity of the universe from which the sample was taken, due to 
the element of self-selection in the recruitment process.  Only if the interviewees were taken 
to be statistically representative of a well-defined broader population would it make sense to 
take a statistical approach to the motifs evident in their conversation.  Such a claim, always a 
bold one, is one that has been avoided here, and therefore statistics have not been applied.    
 
 
                                                
471 Gamson, Talking Politics, p.194. 
 315 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Summary of Card Arrangements 
Words indicate the headings given to card piles.  ‘(Sep.)’ refers to cards which were not placed in piles but kept separate.  For each row, colours generally correspond to card piles, but override these in cases where 

































A Note on Transcription and Translation 
 
 
Extracts from the interview transcripts have been presented using a simple notation style, the 
key features of which are as follows.  ‘…’ indicates a break in the speaker’s delivery, or the 
transition from one speaker to the next where there is no pause between the two.  Where 
there is just a short pause, and the first speaker’s intervention was grammatically complete, 
this is marked by a full stop.  Where there is a longer pause, and again the first speaker’s 
intervention was grammatically complete, this is marked by a full stop followed by ‘[pause]’.  
Where there is a longer pause, and the first speaker’s intervention seemed to tail off, this is 
marked by ‘… [pause]’.  Short interventions that affirm what a speaker is saying without 
significantly adding to it are included in the body of that speaker’s text and marked by square 
brackets.  Abridgements of the text are marked by ‘[…]’.   
All translations from German and Czech are the work f the author.  For the 
occasional word or phrase for which a translation is difficult, or which has an idiomatic sense 
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